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A NOTE ON SOURCES AND TRANSLITERATION 
 
 
Sources 
 
The most important sources of public domain intelligence and commentary on China 
have until recently originated outside China.  The Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
(FBIS) stopped supplying university libraries with translated material in 1997 and a 
primary source of material from China was lost to researchers.  Defence and defence-
related material is readily available from China but there is a lack of qualified translators 
in this field.  I have been fortunate in acquiring a source of Chinese defence magazines 
and have been translating these regularly since October 2003, presenting the results in GI 
Zhou Newsletter which I publish.  This is the only source of English-language 
information on many Chinese weapons systems and articles on the PLA available to 
researchers in the field.  The Russian translations have been almost all done by Stephen 
L. Sewell, to whom I am indebted. 
 
 
Transliteration 
 
 
Chinese names and terminology are rendered in China’s official pinyin transliteration 
system.  The exceptions are: 
 
(i) Source citations where names appear in the older Wade-Giles or 
other systems; 
 
(ii) The use of the name ‘Canton’ instead of ‘Guangzhou’ in the 
‘Canton Commune’, a nomenclature which is also consistent the 
familiar name of Manchuria for dongbei, and Tibet instead of 
Xizang; and  
 
(iii) The names of historical persons, such as Sun Tzu and Sun Yat-sen.  
 
 vii
SUMMARY  
 
Tuo Mao translates literally as ‘shedding feathers’ but in the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) it is the euphemism for removing the last vestiges of Mao Zedong’s vision for 
China’s armed forces.  Mao envisaged letting an enemy strike deep into China and then 
be destroyed by a vast militia force using ‘People’s War’.  His vision, to which the PLA 
only paid lip service, has been replaced by one employing modern combined arms forces, 
operating modular independent battle groups able to fight on and outside China’s land 
borders, hence the term ‘Shedding Mao’. It is the central argument of this thesis that by 
studying the operational history of the People’s Liberation Army, it can be proven that its 
operational art was forged in the period 1928-1937 and based on the Soviet Union’s 
doctrine of operational theory, continuing to this day.  The significance of the thesis is 
that it revises and updates conventional thinking among external analysts about China’s 
guiding defence philosophy. 
 
This thesis shows that the doctrine of Active Defence has been the overriding concern of 
the PLA since 1950 and not any form of People’s War.  Active Defence is based on three 
basic principles: no provocation of other nations; no bases anywhere on foreign soil; and 
no seizure of territory.   The PLA’s articulated doctrine in the 1950s was to ‘Protect the 
North and Defend the South’.  In the 1960s this changed to ‘Lure the Enemy Deep into 
the Country’ in order to crush him with ‘People’s War’.  In the 1970s, this became 
‘Prepare to Fight Early and Fight Big’.  By using examples of the PLA in battle this 
thesis shows how the doctrine changed in light of failures in battle.  The post-Mao 
reorganisation of the PLA to rectify these faults turned it into a modern military force, 
building on this legacy by transforming itself into a hardened and networked military.  
The PLA has now reached a stage of its history where it can fully implement its 
operational art that took root in the theories espoused in the 1920s and 1930s through the 
Soviet model, and tried to be implemented in the 1950s and 1960s only to be thwarted by 
the Cultural Revolution.  The People’s Liberation Army’s operational art, this thesis 
demonstrates, has now come of age. 
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Introduction  
 
Without a militia, our regular army would be like a river without a source, a 
tree without roots, or a general with only one arm, and thus could never 
fight a genuine people’s war . . . With the help of the regional forces and the 
broad masses of militiamen in battles, the main forces can spare a free hand 
to form a powerful ‘fist’, seeking and creating advantageous opportunities to 
fight concentrated battles of annihilation.1 
 
People’s war is used to cover the concept of a just war - one fought by the 
entire nation with honour - versus an unjust war - a war which runs contrary 
to the principles of China’s defence posture and national interests.2  
 
An operational history is defined here as the history of how an organisation was 
structured, how it conducted its day-to-day activities, and how it acted upon policy 
decisions.   It is the contention and central argument of this thesis that by studying the 
operational history of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), it may be argued that the 
operational art of the PLA was forged in the period 1928-1937, was based on the Soviet 
Union’s doctrine of operational theory, and that this continues unto the present.  
 
                                                 
1 . Mao Zedong quoted in Jencks, H.   From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the  
Chinese Army, 1945 -1981, Westview Press, Boulder, 1982, p. 174. 
 
2 . Senior Colonel Hua Liuhu, PLA specialist on strategy and security, speaking to the United States 
Command and General Staff College, 8 January 2000, in Sewell, S.L.   Chinese Military Strategy, 
p. 3. 
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David Shambaugh, amongst others, criticised studies of the Chinese military as lacking 
sufficient theoretic frameworks and comparative perspectives.3   He also noted that PLA 
studies came mainly from experts in war colleges or think tanks with military 
connections only.4  The theoretical framework of most scholars may well have been 
flawed unintentionally by being filtered through the perspective of a large high resource 
military like the United States, which has overplayed the power of the PLA in the region. 
I take the work (cited below) of William Whitson, Harlan Jencks and Dennis Blasko as 
exceptions to the rule.  Harlan Jencks came from a Special Forces background where 
company and platoon sized units were the norm and William Whitson looked at the 
history of the PLA from its beginnings, so charting the growth from company-sized units 
to Army Corps.  Dennis Blasko was a US Army intelligence and foreign area officer 
specialising on the PLA.   
 
There are two questions that need to be asked.  Where did Mao obtain his ideas for his 
theory on People’s War, and where did the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (the 
predecessor to the PLA) learn to wage war?   
 
Whitson’s view, argued in his work, The Chinese High Command 1927-1971, was that 
People’s War never existed but was a means of controlling and marshalling the 
population.  Military commanders expected the Party to mobilise the masses, this was not 
a role of the PLA.5   Whitson (like Jencks) believed that Liu Bocheng - the senior Red 
Army and later PLA marshal - was influenced by his training in Moscow.  Specifically, 
this training was in the ‘integral strategy’ model that was in vogue in Moscow in the late 
                                                 
3  Shambaugh, D.   ‘PLA Strategy and Doctrine: Recommendations for a Future Research Agenda’, 
Discussion Paper prepared for Chinese Military Studies: A Conference on the State of the Field, 
U.S. National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, Center for the Study of 
Chinese Military Affairs, Fort McNair, October 26-27, 2000. 
 
4 . Ibid. 
 
5 . Whitson, W. & Chen-Hsia Huang. The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military  
Politics 1927-71, Macmillan, London, 1973, pp. 468-469. 
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1920s.  This emphasised a professional military free of commissars’ influence in 
technical plans and operations.  Whitson believed, and this thesis concurs with him, that 
Mao maintained a lifelong commitment to a Chinese version of Frunze’s ‘unified military 
strategy’6 and did not countenance a purely professional ‘integral strategy’.    
 
The aim of this thesis is to develop Whitson’s work with the advantage of documents 
unavailable to him in the late 1960s and early 1970s.   The research brought to bear in 
this shows that the doctrine of Active Defence was the overriding concern of the PLA 
since 1930 and not People’s War.  Active Defence is circumscribed by three principles: 
no provocation of other nations; no bases anywhere on foreign soil; and no seizure of 
territory.7   The last principle must be tempered with the fact that the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) lays claim to the entire South China Sea and controls Tibet by force.   
The Chinese intervention against United Nations Forces in the Korean War, and the Sino-
Vietnamese conflict, are justified using this strategy.  Whitson was aware of this when he 
argued that the 1962 Sino-Indian War showed the continuity in the Chinese professional 
preference for the offensive defensive, the Chinese government’s way of justifying pre-
emptive strikes, in which the initial spoiling attack is staged against the weaker adversary 
(India) on the eve of an assumed coordinated attack against China (in this case the 
USSR).8  This was also one of the rationales behind the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict.   
Offensive defence represents the lynchpin of Active Defence. Although the PLA has long 
described its doctrine as Active Defence, it has only recently been equipped properly to 
enable it to enact this doctrine.9   The PLA can now deploy an all arms force beyond its 
borders as required.       
                                                 
6 . Ibid., p. 473.  Frunze was an outstanding senior general with the Soviet Red Army from 1917 until his death 
in 1925.  He created the RKKA Academy in 1924 to professionalise the Red Army officer corps and was a 
leading theorist and influence on the operational level of warfare.  The academy was renamed the Frunze 
Military Acadermy after his death in 1925.  See Gareev, M.A.  M.V.Frunze, Military Theorist, Pergamon-
Brassey's, Washington D.C., 1988, pp. 1 - 42, 57 – 60 & 180 - 195. 
 
7 . Sewell, op.cit, p. 2. 
 
8 . Whitson, op. cit., p. 489. 
 
9 . Taken from observations by Senior Colonel Hua Liuhu.  Sewell, op.cit., p. 3. 
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Most commentators, including David Shambaugh, identify an evolution in PLA doctrine 
across four phases: People’s War’ (1935-79); ‘People’s War Under Modern Conditions’ 
(1979-1985), ‘Limited War’ (1985-91); and ‘Limited War Under High Technology 
Conditions’ (1991 – present).10  This is at odds with the People’s Liberation Army which 
views the phases differently.   In the 1950s the doctrine of the PLA was to ‘Protect the 
North (from the Soviet Union) and Defend the South (Against the United 
States/Taiwan)’.  In the 1960s this changed to ‘Lure the Enemy Deep into the Country’ in 
order to crush him with ‘People’s War’.   By the 1970s, the PLA was to ‘Prepare to Fight 
Early and Fight Big’, by using nuclear weapons, and this evolved from the late 1980s into 
‘informationized’ (xinxihua) warfare.11  These all, however, are regarded by the People’s 
Liberation Army itself as phases in the way they fight (and have fought) and have been 
subordinate to Active Defence. 
  
That the Chinese defence establishment prior to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
(GPCR) disregarded People’s War as well will be shown.  So too, it should be said, the 
PLA under Deng Xiaoping’s reforms was simply reverting to its way of operating prior to 
the Cultural Revolution.   Harlan Jencks noted in an email to the author of this thesis that: 
 
I must point out that almost everything Deng Xiaoping and the newly 
‘rehabilitated’ old cadres implemented in the late 1970s & early 1980s was 
picked up from where they left off in the early 1960s.  The same men were 
in charge of the same measures after the GPCR interruption. This has been 
widely noted with respect to lots of economic, industrial, and military 
measures.12  
                                                 
10 . Shambaugh, op.cit. 
 
11 . Sewell, op.cit. p. 3; See also Joffe, E.,  “‘People’s War under Modern Conditions”: A Doctrine 
for Modern War’, China Quarterly, No. 112, October-December 1987, pp.  551 – 571 passim. 
 
12 . Harlan Jencks, private correspondence to the author, 6 June 2004, and quoted verbatim with his  
permission. In the email ‘with respect to’ was written as ‘w.r.t.’. 
 
 5
 
This means that Mao Zedong’s strategy of People’s War was never accepted nor adopted 
by the PLA and was, at best, paid lip service.  Even though ‘the gun must be subordinate 
to the party’, it is more conceivable that the PLA’s position was closer to Sun Tzu’s (Sun 
Tzu’s) dictum ‘All Warfare is Based on Deception’13 against the Party itself.   This 
obviously throws into question most works written on the People’s Liberation Army 
since the mid-1960s, and is based on source documentation written by the People’s 
Liberation Army itself.   
 
Whitson argued that out of the five encirclement campaigns only the second could be 
viewed as the Red Army employing People’s War to win the campaign.  Mao saw the 
First Encirclement Campaign as correct yet it started with a pre-emptive thrust (spoiling 
attack) against the expected path of attack.  Although this was in vain, it enabled the Red 
Army to hit the Guomindang (GMD) forces from the west.   The Second was similar to 
the First and by the Third Encirclement Campaign Mao employed his theories of 
extensive manoeuvre and deception by guerrillas to confuse the invading GMD forces.  
The Fourth Encirclement Campaign saw the Red Army caught off guard and having to 
trade land for time until it could rest and regain the initiative.  The use of attacks outside 
the Jiangxi Soviet, to relieve the pressure on the Soviet, reflected the increase in power of 
the 28 Bolsheviks14 and Otto Braun as Mao’s ability to influence events was on the 
wane.15   The Fifth Encirclement campaign violated all of Mao’s principles of war but the 
Red Army had no choice.  Further, the Long March was planned by professionals and 
People’s War was used in name only in 1937-1942, notably after the ill-fated One 
Hundred Regiments campaign. This was when the combat power of the Red Army was at 
                                                 
13 . Giles, L.   Sun Tzu on the Art of War, Reprint of the 1910 edition, Graham Brash, Singapore,  
 1988, p. 6.  
 
14 .  The 28 Bolsheviks, also known as the Returned Students faction, had studied in the Soviet Union 
and were influenced by Moscow’s views on warfare and politics.  The group was nominally lead 
by Bo Gu and Zhang Wentian and they fell from power when Mao took control after the Zunyi 
Conference in January 1935. 
 
15 . Whitson, op.cit., p. 486.   
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low ebb, as it was a defensive strategy and an example of the operational art as described 
by Frunze.16     
 
People’s War, as envisaged by Mao, was essentially guerrilla warfare conducted 
generally at platoon strength, occasionally at company and rarely at battalion strength.  
He saw People’s War as a way of utilising the entire population in some way to defeat the 
enemy, and its genesis was during the period of the Jiangxi Soviet (1930 – 1934).  During 
this period there was a series of locally based armed units called ‘local armed units’.   
These were the Red Guards and Young Pioneers and they were tasked to carry out 
guerrilla operations and to assist the Red Army main forces in battle.   They originally 
had a similar structure to the Red Army but this was found too cumbersome and the 
organization was changed to reflect the small unit tactics of the Red Guard and Young 
Pioneer units.17     
 
Guerrilla detachments adopted a structure of five squads, three with firearms and two 
with spears; there were three platoons and the detachment was directly responsible to a 
three-man detachment headquarters.18  There were eight to fifteen men in a squad, three 
to five squads to a platoon and three platoons to a company.  They were all male and they 
ranged in age from 23 to 50.  Mao described how an entire district had mobilised the 
masses by militarising the villages in his investigation of the Xingguo tenth district 
known as the Yongfeng district in late October 1930.19   The Children’s and Youth Corps 
normally did the day sentry with two girls and two boys from the Children’s Corps led by 
a member of the Youth Corps. Their job was to check internal travel passes. They 
                                                 
16 . Ibid., pp. 486 & 486. 
  
17 . ‘A Secret Order on the Problem of Organising Local Armed Forces’, in Schram, S.R. Mao’s Road 
 to Power Revolutionary Writings 1912.1949 Volume IV  The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Soviet 
Republic 1930-1934, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1997, p. 340. 
    
18 . Ibid. 
 
19 . ‘Xingguo Investigation (October 1930)’, in Schram, S.R.   Mao’s Road to Power Revolutionary  
Writings 1912.1949 Volume III From the Jinggangshan to the Establishment of the Jiangxi Soviets 
July1927-December 1930, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1995, pp. 651 - 655.   
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reported directly to a detachment commander who was aided by two vice detachment 
commanders.20  
 
Herein lays the difference to other studies of the Red Army and the People’s Liberation 
Army.  This thesis will proceed from the bottom up, using a building block approach to 
lock in all the pieces of the PLA’s triangular organisational structure.   Previously the 
capability and organisational structure of the PLA was derived by counting the number of 
pieces of equipment and then working from the top down.21  The disadvantage of this is 
that the figures never go below battalion strength, and it is in this level that the fighting 
strength of an army is located.   Indeed, the organisational charts for the PLA infantry 
regiment and below have been distorted in previous works due to the mistranslation of a 
major source document.22    
 
The author of this thesis was the first since 1984 to publish open source documents on the 
structure of the lower formations of the PLA,23 identifying errors in the translation of the 
source document on the structure of the fighting arms of the PLA, which had been the 
basis of all work on PLA studies since 1965.24   That the structure was not translated into 
NATO terminology caused the problem: confusion occurred when comparing it with 
                                                 
20 . Schram, 1997, op.cit., p. 340. 
 
21 . Blasko, D. J.   PLA Ground Forces: Topics for Additional Study, Discussion Paper, 
 “Chinese Military Studies: A Conference on the State of the Field,” U.S. National 
Defense University, Washington, DC, October 2000. 
 
22 . Cheng Mien-chih.   ‘The Organzation and Equipment of the Chinese Communist Infantry’, Issues 
and Studies, Vol. 2, No. 10, July 1967, pp. 18-25.    This article was based on documents on 
organization and equipment brought by defectors to Taiwan in 1965.   Nelson, H.W.   The Chinese 
Military System: An Organizational Study of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Brassey’s 
Publishers, London, 1977, p. 242.  
 
23 . Andrew, M.   GI Zhou Newsletter, Number 2, published by the author, Darwin, 2001.  Harlan 
Jencks quoted from an early draft before I had added corrections.  This is in Jencks, H.  Thoughts 
and Questions about PLA Ground Forces, Conference Paper, “Chinese Military Studies: A 
Conference on the State of the Field”, US National Defense University, Washington, DC, October 
2000, pp. 2, 10, & 18 -22. 
 
24 . The United States Defense Intelligence Agency used the article by Cheng Mien-chih as its 
departure point  in its unclassified work, Handbook of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 
DIA, DDB-2680-32-84, November 1984.  Harlan Jencks explained this to the author in an email. 
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similar structures from other forces.   The Chinese military has historically overstated the 
named size of its units, at least since the late Qing dynasty.  For example, a platoon-sized 
unit is often called a company.   
 
Recent material from Russia and China has changed the generally accepted view of 
Soviet influence on the PLA.  Work by the author of this thesis will be included, as well 
as this author’s translations of Chinese weapon capabilities and their use in combat.  
These translations will elaborate on how the PLA’s force structure and capability, 
behaviour and strategy, have been intertwined from 1949.  The opening up of discussions 
and articles about the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution have revealed it to be a time 
of experimentation by the arms factories that led to the rapid increase of PLA capability 
in the 1980s.  The United States military had noticed that despite the People’s War 
rhetoric of the 1960s, there was large-scale development and production of improved 
types and large quantities of military equipment.25  Lo Jui-cheng, the secretary-general of 
the Military Affairs Commission, complained at the time that research moved from 
‘design to design without completing anything’.26  The capability of the PLA and its 
equipment has been both under and overrated, as the capabilities of its equipment have 
not been evaluated adequately in any recent work, or how they related to the force 
structures of the PLA and Red Army before it.    
 
 
Literature Review 
 
Studies of the People’s Liberation Army prior to 1990 suffered from a shortage of 
resources, relying mainly on the Central Intelligence Agency’s Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service (FBIS) translations; original source material on the PLA in the 1950s 
and 1960s was almost impossible to come by.   China was essentially a closed society 
and other than the People’s Liberation Daily, and the odd visitor, information was not 
                                                 
25 . Jencks, 1982.  op.cit., p. 190. 
 
26 . Quoted in ibid., p. 61. 
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readily available to a researcher outside the intelligence communities.  Material from the 
United States was tainted with anti-communist rhetoric. For example, Robert Rigg’s Red 
China’s Fighting Hordes was based on open source intelligence reports from the Korean 
War; while any Chinese documents that were available were, at best, propaganda.27    
 
Edgar O’Ballance in his 1962 work, The Red Army of China, for the first time in English 
wrote a history of the People’s Liberation Army from its beginnings as part of the 
Guomindang to after the Korean War.28  In the preface he acknowledged the lack of 
accurate material and the inherent problems of the rewriting of history by the Chinese 
Communist Party.   The problem of a lack of accurate material changed in October 1961. 
This was when Tibetan resistance fighters ambushed a People’s Liberation Army convoy 
and captured 1,600 documents including 29 issues of the Bulletin of Activities, a 
classified series of reports meant for political cadres at the regimental level and above.29   
This provided a wealth of information on the People’s Liberation Army, and the Hoover 
Institute published an English translation in 1965, as The Politics of the Chinese Army.   
The Bulletin of Activities and documents brought by Chinese defectors from the PLA to 
Taiwan in 1965 became the major sources on material on the People’s Liberation Army.   
Both works were quoted by Samuel Griffith II in The Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
and the former, by Alexander George, in his book The Chinese Communist Army in 
Action: The Korean War and its Aftermath.     
 
These two works, quoted extensively by subsequent authors on the People’s Liberation 
Army, contributed to the literature on the formulation of People’s War doctrine during 
                                                 
27 . Rigg, R.B.   Red China’s Fighting Hordes, Military Service Publishing Company, Harrisburg, 
1951; Stories of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, Foreign Language Press, 1960; A Volunteer 
soldier’s  day: recollections by men of the Chinese people’s volunteers in the war to resist U.S. 
aggression and aid Korea, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1961.  
 
28 . O’Ballance, E.   The Red Army of China, Faber and Faber, London, 1962. 
 
29 . Knaus, K.J.   Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival, Public  
Affairs, New York, p. 249. 
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the period 1927 – 1937, and its effect on the capability of the PLA in 1967.30   This is not 
to detract from Edgar O’Ballance’s work.  William W. Whitson contributed a major work 
on the higher workings of the PLA from its roots in 1927 and Edward Dreyer wrote a 
small piece in the early 1970s.31 These were added to by Harlan Jencks, Ellis Joffe and 
Thomas C. Roberts in the 1980s,32 but since that time no individual author has been 
published mentioning the effect of People’s War on the contemporary People’s 
Liberation Army.  The more recent works have been RAND or United States 
Government reports that have tended to concentrate on the People’s Liberation Army’s 
ideas of Information Operations and the Revolution in Military Affairs, without the 
background knowledge of how these changed the previous doctrine which had been 
formulated during the period 1927-1937.33   
 
A Chinese language work that looks at how People’s War generated from the experiences 
of the Worker’s and Peasant’s Red Army in the period 1928-1937 was touched on by Cai 
Xiaoqian in his 1971 work, The Study of Mao Zedong’s Military Thought and the 
People’s Warfare, Shanghai Press, Taipei.  This was also mentioned in Chen-Ya Tien’s 
1992 work, Chinese Military Theory: Ancient and Modern, which quoted Cai’s work.  
Chen also looks at Chiang Kai-Shek’s military thought amongst others.  The work suffers 
from the author attempting to cover a broad range of topics from grand strategy to small 
unit tactics in the absence of an understanding of the military, and neglects the problem 
with infrastructure in China during and before the Republican period.    
 
                                                 
30 . George, A.   The Chinese Communist Army in Action, Coumbia University Press, New York, 
1967; Griffith, S.B.   The Chinese People’s Liberation Army, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967.  
 
31 . Whitson, loc. cit.; Whitson W.W. (ed.).   The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s, 
Praeger, New York, 1972. 
  
32 . Jencks,  loc. cit.; Roberts, T.C.   The Chinese People’s Militia and the Doctrine of People’s War, 
National Defense University, Washington DC, 1983; Joffe, E.   The Chinese Army After Mao, 
Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1987. 
  
33 . The United States Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office and the RAND Corporation are  
particularly strong in publishing works on the Chinese Military.   To be fair to some of the 
authors, they have no background on China but are excellent in their own fields of speciality.   
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Edgar O’Ballance’s aforementioned work, The Red Army of China, was free of anti-
communist rhetoric and looked at the political and military ramifications of Mao’s rise to 
power.  Alexander George published The Chinese Communist Army in Action in 1967, 
centred upon a series of interviews of approximately 300 Chinese prisoners of war 
conducted from March to May in 1951.34  There were two aims for the interviews.  The 
first was to find how the methodology of the Maoist guerrilla warfare model had 
converted an essentially guerrilla force in 1945 to a larger and more modern army by 
1950.   The second was to determine ‘the extent to which PLA authorities had managed 
to develop their army along the requirements of their military model.’35    
 
The interviews reflected the soldiers’ sentiments and revealed the structure of the PLA at 
the battalion level and below, especially at the company and platoon level.   This book is 
unique in this respect.  The areas of morale, Party control and small unit organization 
were emphasised and George ended his book with a chapter on the developments of the 
PLA after the Korean War.   He used the Bulletin of Activities to compare the results of 
the changes the PLA undertook post Korean War.36   This book stands as a landmark in 
the study of the People’s Liberation Army at the lower levels.  The ‘three by three’ 
structure of the infantry squad is examined and its origins to the Eighth Route Army 
given great credit, yet a similar arrangement had been in use by the United States Marine 
Corps since 1942.   The ‘three by three’ structure refers to a section of ten soldiers broken 
up into three equal teams under a section commander.  This is the book’s only mistake, as 
the US Marine Corps in Shanghai and the Eight Route Army had examined the origins of 
the ‘three by three’ independently in 1937 and 1938.37    
                                                 
34 . George, op. cit., p. 14. 
 
35 . Ibid., p. 16. 
 
36 . Cheng, Chester J. (ed).   The Politics of The Chinese Red Army: a Translation of the Bulletin of 
 Activities of the People’s Liberation Army, Hoover Institution Publications, Stanford, 1966. 
 
37 . The Eighth Route Army’s use of fire teams was not the only instance of fire teams being used in 
China at the time.    In 1937 and 1938, General W.M. Greene when a captain with the 4th Marine 
Regiment in the International Settlement in Shanghai, developed and organised his Marine rifle 
company for riot control.   Based around ‘four man fighting teams’, with each team imbued with 
the ‘Follow Me’ spirit, this was similar in concept to what the Chinese Communists were doing in 
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The next year (1967) saw the first major work on the People’s Liberation Army that 
traced its history from its beginnings to 1966.  Written by a China specialist, who also 
had the advantage of being a retired United States Marine Corps brigadier general, 
Samuel Griffith Jr’s The Chinese People’s Liberation Army was the definitive work to 
date.38  Griffiths was also the first Westerner to start translating Mao’s military works 
into English.  Comprehensively researched, it gave an excellent account of the rise of the 
People’s Liberation Army from its origins to the start of the Cultural Revolution with the 
benefit of the Bulletin of Activities and the Taiwanese translations of PLA manuals.   It 
was not an anti-communist piece and gave a balanced view of the capabilities of China’s 
army, navy and air force.   It looked at People’s War doctrine as it related to guerrilla 
warfare and the militia, and Griffiths was scathing of the United States military when 
necessary.  This work overshadowed O’Ballance’s due to the availability of new and 
accurate material.  The only fault with Griifith’s book is that it could have included a 
regimental organization chart.      
    
The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s is regarded as a landmark piece 
due to the large number of intelligence analysts who wrote chapters in it.39   A series of 
essays edited by William Whitson, a respected scholar on the Chinese military, it was 
notable straddling the period from the ending of the Cultural Revolution in 1969 and just 
prior to Nixon’s visit to China in 1972.   Edward Dreyer’s chapter, ‘Military Continuities: 
The PLA and Imperial China’, unfortunately focussed mainly on the Tang (618-917 AD), 
Sung (960-1279 AD), and Ming (1368- 1644) dynasties with only one mention of the 
Qing dynasty (1644-1911), and this concerned the crushing of the Taiping Rebellion.   
Part III was dedicated to the organisation of the PLA yet the seven chapters that 
                                                                                                                                                 
their own army.   Greene, W.M.   ‘The Employment of the Marine Rifle Company in Street Riot 
Operations’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 24, No, 1, March 1940, pp. 50 & 62.  
 
38 . Griffith, S.B.   The Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,  
 London, 1968.  
 
39 . Whitson, W.W. (ed) The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s, Praeger Press, New 
York, 1972. 
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comprised it used mainly the same sources.  This was occasioned by the scarcity of open 
source material coming out of China during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, 
aggravated by the Chinese Communist Government’s penchant for secrecy and suspicion 
of Chinese contacts with external researchers.   Part IV titled ‘Military Style: Strategy 
and Tactics’, was deficient in both tactics and capability.  The work provided very little 
new material but gave the China studies community of the time an insight into official 
US government thinking on the People’s Liberation Army.   
 
From the early 1980s more open source material slowly became available but was often 
overlooked.  Works like Bingqi Zhishi (Ordnance Knowledge) have been available since 
1982 and the National Library of Australia, for example, has a full set.   More recent 
works like Tanke zhuangjia cheliang (Tank and Armoured Vehicle) and Qing Binqi 
(Light Weapons) have added to the understanding of the PLA, but there has been a dearth 
of translators translating them.   Bingqi Zhishi, when examined from its inception, has 
matured from being essentially a training manual, to one that examines foreign concepts 
and equipment, as well as introducing new concepts and ideas to the Chinese military.  
More recently, historical articles have started to appear in these journals, shedding new 
light on the way the PLA and its various organs have operated and the resulting changes 
in force structure from the Korean War onwards, as well as their equipment.   For 
example, one article discusses the disposition and structure of army corps inside China 
from 1954 to 1986, showing how at different times in recent Chinese history forces have 
been moved around China in response to perceived threats.40      
 
Jonathan R. Adelman, a Russian specialist, wrote his work, The Revolutionary Armies: 
The Historical Development of the Soviet and Chinese People’s Liberation Armies, in 
1980, examining the formative periods of the two armies and twenty years after their 
winning of the civil war.41   In the PLA’s case this was the period 1927 to 1949, with 
                                                 
40 . ‘Jiefungjun zhongda yanxi huigu’, Bingqi Zhishi, 2004 Niandi, 9 Qi, Zhongdi 203, pp. 38 - 40. 
 
41 . Adelman, J.A.   The Revolutionary Armies: The Historical Development of the Soviet and 
 Chinese People’s Liberation Armies, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1980. 
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Adelman concentrating on the period 1927 to 1937 after the Long March.   Twenty years 
later was the height of the Cultural Revolution, and Lin Biao’s failed bid for power 
followed by his disappearance.   The contemporary period for the Soviet Army in the 
book was Stalin’s purges in the late 1930s.   Worthy for its time, it examined how the 
world’s largest communist armies came into being, and what happened to them 
afterwards.  The book, like all books on the period, suffered from the lack of primary 
source material from Chinese and Soviet archives, which have only recently become 
available to researchers.  It offered no insights that had not been examined earlier in 
various articles in the journal China Quarterly. 
 
In 1982 Harlan Jencks had is famous work on the People’s Liberation Army, From 
Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-1981, 
published.  This was the definitive study of the People’s Liberation Army and is the work 
with which to start when examining the PLA in the last two decades of the Twentieth 
Century.  The work looked at the commitment and professionalism of the PLA’s officer 
corps in the context of the period.  Jencks was the first person to examine the influence of 
the old ex-Long March oligarchy on the modernisation and their effect on the  
professionalism of the PLA officer corps.   He did this by showing how Stalin’s purges in 
1937 and 1938 meant that the Soviet Army entered the Second World War under the 
leadership of men with little or no ‘revolutionary experience’.42  He then contrasted this 
with the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war in which there were still divisional commanders who 
were veterans of the Long March.43   The ossified officer corps affected doctrine, force 
structure, military technology, Party ideology and cultural changes – all of which are 
examined in relation to their effect on the capability of the PLA.  The author retired from 
the United States Army as a Colonel who served in Europe and in Vietnam; the 
knowledge and experience of his background is evident throughout the book.  This is an 
excellent work that has stood the test of time.   The organisational charts of the PLA at 
the end are still valuable today and reflect the author’s intimate knowledge of the subject.  
                                                 
42 . Jencks, op. cit., p. 18. 
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In the mid-1980s, two works stood out as they were not written by American authors.   
These were Gerald Segal’s Defending China and Ellis Joffe’s The Chinese Army after 
Mao.44   Both these works suffered from not using enough Chinese language sources, and 
were mostly based on the United States Government’s Foreign Broadcasting Information 
Service.  This was despite Chinese journals, like Bingqi Zhishi (Ordnance Knowledge), 
being readily available in the West and access to better reporting on Chinese military 
affairs.45    Segal’s work was an overview of the PLA’s ability to defend China proper.   
It was another work that concerned itself with higher-level organisation while neglecting 
capability, except when quantifying equipment.  No effort was made to address the 
serviceability of the equipment and its ability to survive modern warfare, especially in 
naval and air combat.  This was a major failing of the book.   Lastly, it made no 
discernible contribution to the literature.     
 
Ellis Joffe’s The Chinese Army After Mao also suffers from a lack of original source 
documentation.   Joffe is regarded by his peers as the pioneer of PLA studies, and has 
been studying the People’s Liberation Army for decades.  The book looks at how the 
PLA was changing from a guerrilla force adhering to People’s War doctrine to a 
professional military force equipped and trained to fight on the country’s borders.  The 
first four chapters cover this transition from Mao’s ‘man over machine’ philosophy to 
one based on modern combined arms operations.  The fifth chapter is devoted to weapons 
and equipment, the sixth on professionalising the military and the seventh on Deng 
Xiaoping’s influence on the military.  The fifth and sixth chapters would have benefited 
from a reading of Bingqi Zhishi (Ordnance Knowledge).  As noted above, Bingqi Zhishi 
underwent its own transformation in that period from a training manual to a more 
sophisticated periodical discussing modern weapons technology, doctrine and topics such 
                                                 
44 . Joffe, E.   The Chinese Army After Mao, Wedenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1987; Segal, G.    
Defending China, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984.  
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as  information warfare.  What otherwise would have been an excellent work was 
diminished by not consulting Chinese language sources.     
 
From 1990 onwards the amount of literature available to scholars on the PLA has 
increased markedly but the amount translated into English has conversely shrunk.  In the 
United States intelligence community, the FBIS is the primary source of translations and 
only translates books on special request; it translates approximately one percent of the 
open source Chinese military newspapers and very few magazines.46   The FBIS reports 
were widely available to universities, but from 1997 they became unavailable to 
universities and other scholars of the PLA.  This has meant translations of work on the 
PLA into English that are available to universities and other scholars have had to come 
from private translation services (often with little understanding of the material being 
translated) or by individuals themselves.  An example of the latter is the author’s GI Zhou 
Newsletter.  
 
There was a 16-year gap between the publishing of a serious work on the PLA by a single 
author between Ellis Joffe’s, The Chinese Army After Mao and David Shambaugh’s 
Modernizing China’s Military.47   David Shambaugh is one of the most respected PLA 
specialists yet the work exhibits some major flaws and errors.   Shambaugh writes about 
Chinese concerns regarding lessons learnt on Information Warfare and airpower from the 
1991 Gulf War, the Air campaign over Kosovo and the Revolution in Military Affairs.   
There is an article in the September 1987 issue of Bingqi Zhishi (Ordnance Knowledge) 
titled Xinxi zhan, which translates as ‘Battle on Information’.  The article, written by a 
Yuan Wenlin, discusses command and control warfare, pre-emptive strikes, stealth, and 
hiding and camouflaging assets from the air.  Here was an article written about all the 
concepts of air campaigns, command and control and information warfare in 1987 yet 
                                                 
46 . ‘Michael Pilsbury in reply to a question’, Security Issues: Strategic Perceptions August 3,  
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this was not included.48   The section on the PLA’s modernisation of its land force 
equipment contains sufficient errors to detract from the work as a whole.  The ‘Doctrine 
and Training’ chapter similarly discusses China’s new airmobile infantry and its 
supposedly obsolescent helicopter force, yet fails to mention the Z-9 series of helicopters, 
licence built copies of the Eurocopter Panther 2, which are modern multi-role helicopters.  
Like Ellis Joffe’s book, Shambaugh’s Modernizing China’s Military suffers from not 
consulting modern Chinese language military journals, such as Tanke zhuangjia 
cheliang (Tank and Armoured Vehicle), Qing Binqi (Light Weapons), and Bingqi Zhishi. 
 
Shambaugh’s work was followed by Andrew Scobell’s China’s Use of Military Force: 
Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March.49  This book is flawed most from the 
author’s belief in the concept of People’s War.  His writing about People’s War 
concentrates on the use of reserve, militia and civilian assets.  It is no more than Australia 
would use in conflict on its own territory, and does practise on exercises; it did during 
operations in East Timor in 1999 and 2000.  As a concept it is no different to other 
nations’ use of these forces, examples being Switzerland, Sweden, Norway 
and Singapore.  Indeed, Singapore uses the 'Total Defence' doctrine as does Israel - the 
Singapore Defence Forces’ original instructors.   The first use of a People's War doctrine 
in action in modern military history was Britain during the Second World War.   The 
doctrine of holding the aggressor at the border, now under the aegis of 'active defence' 
appears to be a justification for an aggressive doctrine of pre-emptive strikes, and is the 
opposite of People's War.    A positive aspect of Scobell’s book is the chapter on the PLA 
during the Cultural Revolution, which is beyond anything published before, as is the 
chapter on the PLA during the Tiananmen Square protests.  Particularly laudatory was 
identification of the weapons involved in the incident as a means of identifying the units 
involved, a method that should be employed more often.  The Tiananmen chapter 
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corroborates recent research that most of the killings occurred after the Square was 
emptied.   
  
As a concept, People's War never related to PLA operations at the tactical level and was 
never used by the PLA.  Reserve forces are to augment the main force units with logistics 
and the PLA has tried to improve on this area but it has to have its own integrated 
logistics, especially in mechanized units.  The reserves and militia are only suitable for 
rear area security and the militia are counter-productive in operations outside their 
territorial areas.    
 
Written works on the PLA between Joffe and Shambaugh have been edited works with 
each chapter written by a different PLA specialist.   Mostly compilations of conference 
papers, they have suffered from the bias of the author or the organisation that sponsored 
the conference.   For example, the Taiwanese, through the Council of Advanced Policy 
Studies, share the funding for the RAND PLA Conferences and thus it is not surprising 
that the PLA is perceived as a threat in some of the papers.50    The biggest drawback 
with these writers is that many appear to have a limited knowledge of the early history of 
the PLA, and many have no military experience, thus lacking an understanding of the 
problems of the PLA from a military viewpoint.     
 
A typical book of this type is China’s Military Faces the Future, by James R. Lilley and 
David Shambaugh, working as joint editors.51  It suffers from being sponsored by a 
United States right-wing think tank, the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, with most of the authors assuming China to be a threat.   Chapter Five of the 
work, ‘Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA Modernization’, and its Appendix, ‘Gallery of 
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Known and Possible Future Foreign Acquisitions to China’, creates the impression that 
the PLA is the new threat to US national interests.   On the other hand, the chapter written 
by Michael Pilsbury, a China specialist with the United States Government, is more 
balanced in its approach.  It attends to all sides of the debate on the PLA’s future 
capability regarding the Revolution in Military Affairs and Information Warfare.  The 
book suffers from being disjointed and provides no more than The People’s Liberation 
Army in the Information Age offers.52  The latter is arguably the best book to be written 
about the People’s Liberation Army until Dennis Balsko’s work (see below), covering the 
whole gambit of the PLA including naval and air forces, dispassionately.  It identifies 
what is not known, and has the advantage of having five chapters written by ex-United 
States military China specialists, including three who served in China.  In 1997, the 
United States National Defense University produced a book containing a series of small 
articles by senior PLA officers translated into English.  Titled Chinese Views of Future 
Warfare, and edited by Michael Pilsbury, it is divided into four parts: the ‘Strategic 
Thought of Deng Xiaoping’, ‘Future Security Trends’, ‘Modernizing for Local War’, and 
‘The Revolution in Military Affairs’.53  The articles do not add new information or 
insights to the literature.     
 
There were two significant Australian works that examined the doctrine of the PLA in 
this period.   The first, by Rosita Dellios, was based on her doctoral thesis, and published 
as Modern Chinese Defence Strategy: Present Developments, Future Directions,54 and 
the second was Ka Po Ng’s doctoral thesis, The Evolution of Chinese Local War Doctrine 
and China’s Military Readiness in Asia.55  Dellios looked at both the influence of the 
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western and classical Chinese (Sun Tzu) principles of war on PLA strategy and its 
conceptualisation of military affairs.56  Unlike many other authors on the PLA, she 
included the capability of the weapons systems and their influence on strategy, and 
showed an understanding of the operational level of warfare as well as how history 
shaped the strategic view of the PLA, and not just Mao.  She correctly identified that 
although the Soviet Union was viewed as China’s prime threat it was the lack of 
development in China’s western regions that was going to be the future threat to China.57  
Although Xinjiang’s terrain allowed for mass armoured warfare, Dellios noted that its 
distance from China’s major industrial and population centres meant that the Soviets 
were unlikely to use it to attack China.58  Dellios also examined the possible use of 
‘nuclear guerrilla warfare’59 by the PLA, which no other author has broached. The 
extensive use of Chinese source material throughout her work, and her idea of ‘nuclear 
guerrilla warfare’, means that this often overlooked work should be compulsory reading 
for students of the PLA when examining Chinese strategy during that period. 
  
Ng looked at the influence of the Second Agrarian Revolutionary Period but misread 
some of the ideas that came from it, arguing that ‘guerrillaism’ (youji zhuyi) never left 
Chinese military doctrine.   People’s War entails mobilising the entire nation’s resources 
for total war – typified by the British with its Home Guard, Royal Observer Corps, Air 
Raid Precaution and fire brigade volunteers.  Ng’s thesis argues that the personnel who 
had studied at Russian military academies, the Russian returned students (who beame 
known as the ‘Returned Student Faction’) – with the exception of Liu Bocheng who ran 
the Red Army’s central Military Academy - were marginalised after the failure to halt the 
Guomindang’s Fifth Extermination campaign; yet the philosophy of the operational level 
of war was part of the PLA’s doctrine since the early days of the Peasants’ and Workers’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
56 . Dellios, loc. cit., pp. 4, 11, 13 & 20. 
 
57 . Ibid., pp.115 & 116. 
 
58 . Ibid., p. 116. 
 
59 . See ibid., ch. 3, ‘The Nuclear Guerilla’. 
 
 21
Red Army.   Ng also wrote that training was neglected in People’s War yet the available 
documents, especially the ‘Bulletin of Activities’ showed that training was paramount for 
company level and below.60  He also neglected the fact, available in the late 1980s and 
later, that during the Cultural Revolution the power of the land force components of the 
PLA increased, due to the standardisation of armaments, which were relatively modern.  
The command, control and communications systems were not updated and the closing 
down of the military academies meant that combined operations were impossible.   Local 
war, as a concept, is not described fully enough to add to the literature in the field.  The 
over-reliance on Jonathan Pollack’s 1980 work on People’s War and Ellis Joffe’s 1987 
work on the PLA are two other major shortcomings.61 
 
A 2003 work on the operational art of the PLA is Chinese Warfighting, edited by Mark 
Ryan, David Finkelstein and Michael McDevitt.62  Written mostly by staff at the Center 
for Naval Analysis and published by the Center it is a disappointing work.  This is despite 
the authors being ex-soldiers.  They display an absence of basic tactical knowledge or an 
understanding of the difficulties of high-altitude warfare when writing about Tibet.  Even 
worse, drawing from a small sample of actual operational data they draw numerous 
conclusions, most of which amount to proper soldiering and expected of any professional 
force and staff officers.    
  
In the Tibet chapter, Cheng Feng and Larry M. Wortzel fail to appreciate that the Chinese 
attacked at a company level.  They achieved surprise at that level due to their sound 
infantry skills and the fact that the PLA high numbers of personnel and equipment in 
Tibet due to the Tibetan Insurgency.   The chapter on the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN), by looking at a small number of naval clashes, is over-stated.   The naval battles 
around Hainan in 1950 and a series of minor naval clashes around Quemoy and Matsu, 
where the PLAN held the advantage of deploying in its own area of operations and 
                                                 
60 . Cheng, op. cit. p.  
 
61 . Pollack, J.   ‘China as a Military Power’, in Marwah, H. & Pollack, J. (eds.)   Military Power  
and Policy in Asian States: China, India and Japan, Westview Press, Boulder, 1980.   
 
62 . Ryan, M., Finkelstein, D. & McDevitt, M.  Chinese Warfighting : The PLA Experience Since  
1949,  M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 2003. 
 22
superior numbers, is not a true reflection of its power.   Similarly, sinking a Vietnamese 
transport ship and landing craft, and damaging another in 1988 by three frigates does not 
reflect whether the PLAN could have fought a more sophisticated navy.   A single First 
World War destroyer or modern offshore patrol vessel could have caused the same 
degree of damage.  The chapter on the People’s Liberation Army Air Force gives a 
Chinese account of the PLAAF in combat and admits that air-to-surface capability was 
always neglected.   It fails to look at the almost total lack of support to the PLA in the 
1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and its loss of capability due to obsolescence of the total 
force. 
  
As for the PLA’s 1969 border clashes with the Soviet Union, no Russian sources are 
cited, and the syntax of Thomas Robinson's work suggests a literal translation of Chinese 
sources - too much use of the word 'determined' to describe the actions of the PLA.   The 
work would have been better if it had not attempted to depict Chinese strategy and tactics 
as specifically Chinese, and focused more on how effective the Chinese were.  Too much 
has been identified as People's War when it was more clearly a reflection of the standard 
of operational planning and staff work.  
 
Dennis Blaskos’s The Chinese Army Today, published in 2006,63 is the heir to Harlan 
Jencks’ From Muskets to Missiles and the definitive work on the PLA up to 2006.  Like 
Jencks’ work, it was written on the cusp of a transformation in the PLA:  Jencks in the 
case of the restructuring following the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War; and Blasko with the 
informatisation and transformation of the PLA to fight for extended periods beyond its 
borders.  Blasko was a United States army intelligence officer for 23 years, and was a 
defence attaché in both Beijing and Hong Kong.  His book encompasses the whole 
gambit of the PLA from the lower to higher level organisations. The chapters are a series 
of questions – Chapter Two being ‘What is the PLA?’ and Chapter Five asking ‘How will 
the PLA fight?’.  Chapter Six looks at their equipment; training is covered in Chapter 
Seven.  Other chapters examine the PLA’s role in society, its demographic profile and the 
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geographic locations of its forces.  Blasko has access to FBIS translations and uses these 
freely in his work, enabling him to give the best open source references since Jencks.  If 
there is a fault in the book is that more could have been written about the envisaged 
changes in force structure and how they relate to Xinjiang and energy security.  
 
Two primary conclusions may be drawn from the above survey. First, nearly all the 
literature neglects the operational level and how the capability of the weapons systems 
themselves have influenced the way the PLA fights.  Second, and in accordance with the 
premise of this thesis, as Peoples’ War was merely an idea - expressed as Maoist doctrine 
- but without a demonstrated basis in operational reality, the scholarship that examines 
the PLA from a People’s War perspective is fundamentally flawed.   
 
 
Attitudinal and Historical Background 
 
Haotie bu dading, haozhen bu dangbing64 translated as ‘Good iron is not used to make 
nails, good sons should not become soldiers’, expresses the disesteem by which 
soldiering was held in China generally up to the middle of the Twentieth Century.  The 
army was regarded as an ‘iron rice bowl’ by petty criminals, opium smokers, bandits, 
vagabonds and the dregs of society who filled its lower ranks.65   People joined up as 
soldiers to have their stomachs filled and the hope of a little money.  Their loyalty was to 
their paymaster and this was especially so in the warlord armies of the early 1920s.66   
Prior to a conflict, warlords would publish a scale of rewards to opposing soldiers who 
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deserted to them.   The sliding scale would go from a private with his rifle all the way to 
a colonel with his battalion.67 
 
Confucian scholars looked down upon soldiers as the scholar was seen as superior, and 
the true gentlemen, in Chinese society.68   Chinese armies rarely paid for anything they 
took from the peasants, and the soldiers were often no better than the bandits they were 
supposed to be thwarting.69   Bandits held an unusual position in China. They were often 
mercenaries, for hire like many of the armies in the Hundred Years War in Europe.   
They worked for Chinese and foreigner alike, and many were involved in both criminal 
and political activities, notably anti-Manchu.70   The government in power used the term 
‘bandit’ to describe anti-government forces that were regarded by the ruling power as 
criminals.   The Japanese used bandits in the Russo-Japanese War as partisan bands 
against the Russians,71 and the Guomindang referred to the Red Army and Communist 
forces as gong fei (communist bandits) even after they had retreated to Taiwan, well into 
the 1970s.     
 
This public view of soldiers of lower rank is not exclusive to the Chinese.  Kipling’s 
poem, ‘Tommy’, about British soldiers showed the prevailing attitude of British society 
to the regular army’s lower ranks in the Victorian and Edwardian period.72   The officers 
in the British Army of the time, with notable exceptions, came from the middle and upper 
classes and the other ranks from the lower classes.  
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The encroachment of foreign powers on China’s sovereignty was the unifying event in 
terms of upsetting all classes of China.   What became known as the ‘unequal treaties’ 
saw the loss of parts of China; foreign residents in the ceded territories enjoyed 
extraterritoriality (they were not subject to the Chinese judicial system).   Mostly on the 
Chinese coast, these areas included what became known as the treaty ports of Tientsin, 
the International and French Settlements in Shanghai and Hong Kong and its attendant 
New Territories.   The foreign powers also demanded, and many times received, rights to 
build railways and mines in China’s hinterland.73  The rights of Christian missionaries in 
China and their converts also were seen as an affront.  Roman Catholic priests were given 
the same rank as local magistrates and their converts were often given their protection.74   
Often these converts bullied and harassed the non-Christians with the protection afforded 
them by the local priests.   The rise of Christianity and the abuses of power by some of 
the converts was one of the causes of the Boxer Rebellion (discussed below).    
 
The origins of the organisation of the present infantry battalion can be traced back to the 
late Qing Dynasty.   The Chinese Army in 1890 was in dire need of updating but its 
biggest problem, and one that continued up until the end of the Guomindang government 
in China, was provincialism.  During the Qing, provincial governments had separate 
budgets to raise their own forces and were loathe letting the central government use them, 
lest they lose their power base.  After the easy Japanese victories over Chinese forces in 
the 1894 Sino-Japanese War the Chinese government made its first serious effort to 
create a modern army.   
 
                                                 
73 . Norie, E.W.M.   History of the War in China 1900-1901, Author’s Proof, April 1902,  
pp. 2 - 4.    
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In 1895 the Newly Created Army75 (Xinjian Lujun), started to be formed under Yuan 
Shikai, and after four years of training it was sent to Shandong Province with the dual 
mission of putting down the Boxer Rebellion and thus curbing German expansion (in 
which the Boxers would be a pretext).  Yuan Shikai had ensured that his army was not a 
threat to the peasants wherever they were and fostered a professional and disciplined 
military force.  Their discipline and bearing were commented upon favourably, even with 
amazement by both Chinese and foreign observers.76 After suppressing the Boxers in 
Shandong the Newly Created Army was deployed against German units in the outskirts 
of Tianjin, to stop them from advancing. This mission the Chinese deemed a success.77   
This ‘success’ against the Germans gained the respect of many Chinese towards the New 
Army.    
 
The Newly Created Army was based around eight infantry battalions, supported by two 
artillery, two cavalry and one engineer battalion. Shortages in manpower, equipment and 
funds saw it organised around five infantry battalions, one artillery, one cavalry and one 
half-strength engineer battalion.   What it lacked in numbers it made up in training and 
the quality of its men.78   
 
The infantry battalion contained four companies, each with three platoons, each with a 
headquarters and six squads of 17 men.   Each squad had a squad leader, assistant squad 
leader, twelve fighting men, a cook and two coolies.  Every officer had a sidearm, a 
revolver left turn and six bullets, and all the enlisted men except the coolies had a rifle.   
Each soldier carried 50 rounds for his rifle and both the revolver and rifle were of 
                                                 
75 . Taiwanese official documents refer to this as the ‘Newly Established Army’.    Collier, 
H.R. & Chin-Chih Lai, P.   Organizational Changes in the Chinese Army 1895-1950, Office of the 
Military Historian, Taipei, 1969, p. 1. 
 
76 . Fung, loc. cit. 
 
77 . Ibid., p. 23.   This is not mentioned in Norie’s history, which one would have expected, unless  
his forces were involved in turning back the First Relief Column.     
 
78 . Collier and Chin-Chih, op. cit., pp. 1 & 2. 
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Austrian manufacture.79  The platoon headquarters had three officers, five enlisted men 
and four coolies.   A platoon at full strength had three officers, 95 of other ranks and 16 
coolies; it was the size of an infantry company in most other armies.80   The battalion at 
full strength had 60 men and 1,212 of other ranks.81 
 
After the Wu-Xu coup d’etat in 1898 the Qing government decided to again reorganize 
the Army into the Wuwei yujun (Fearless Defence Army).  They still suffered from the 
same lack of training, pay, and personnel problems as their predecessors.  The Wuwei 
yujun was split into four armies: the Front Defence Army which defended Ludai and 
Taku; the Hunan Army which became the Left Defence Army; the Kansu Army which 
was organized into the Rear Defence Army; and the Newly Created Army which became 
the Right Defence Army, responsible for defending Tianjin.  A new Army was formed – 
the Central Defence Army which was responsible for defending Beijing.82  It had a 
unique organization that saw the Division split into the left and right two wings 
(brigades) with four battalions named the right, left, front and rear battalions, each with 
four large platoons again named the right, left, front and rear, each of nine squads that 
had a squad leader, 12 fighting men and one cook.83    
 
The Boxer Rebellion and the Creation of a Modern Chinese Army 
 
The Boxer Rebellion was an uprising against foreigners and Christians in China in 1900 
and 1901.  The Foreign Legation in Beijing, which was the walled area where the foreign 
diplomats and their families lived, was besieged by the Boxer rebels with the tacit 
support of the Chinese Dowager Empress.  If the Chinese military forces in the provinces 
                                                 
79 . Ibid., p. 2. 
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had come to the aid of the Beijing in 1900 with their modern artillery and Maxim 
machine guns, the forces of the Dowager Empress that were protecting the Imperial Court 
in Beijing and besieging the Foreign Legation could have easily defeated the forces in the 
Legation and the Second Relief Column.  The first one relief column had already been 
turned back but the second one was far more powerful and organised.    
 
The Second Relief Column only had one major battle with Imperial troops during its 
march to Beijing: at the town of Beicang on 5 August 1900.   The Chinese were 
outflanked and after the bridge was captured in the town, turning their right flank, the 
Chinese forces retreated under artillery fire towards Yangcun.84  Thoroughly 
demoralised, many deserted during the night.  An assault the next day, by British and 
United States forces, captured the city of Yangcun.85  The Chinese retreated from their 
defences with all their artillery.   The Chinese defences were well constructed and could 
have held up the relief force if the defenders had stood firm and fought.   The Imperial 
Chinese troops rarely stood and fought, and many military commentators noted that the 
Chinese would often retreat rather than fight, being masters of the strategic withdrawal.  
One reason was that they were often provincial troops, paid by the governor of their 
province, who did not want to lose his power base.  The way to Beijing was now open 
and the relief force marched to the walls of Beijing, unmolested except for one or two 
minor skirmishes.86  The defeat of the Chinese Army sent to stop the Second Relief 
Column to relieve the siege of the Legations in Beijing had far reaching effects.   
 
                                                 
84 . Norie, op. cit., pp. 69 & 70.   The history when it came out in 1903 had deleted many of Norie’s 
comments about the causes of the war, comments about the Imperial Court’s intrigues, command 
and control problems between the forces involved in the relief, and the looting and massacres that 
occurred after the relief of the Legation.  See  Andrew, M.K.  Official but not history – Official 
rewriting of British military operations in the Boxer Rebellion, presented at the Seventh Biennial 
Conference of the China Studies Association of Australia, Australian National University, 5 - 8 
July 2001.   
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Lack of firepower was not an obstacle either to the Chinese side. There were sufficient 
Maxim machine guns available to the Chinese government had they been released.   In 
1892, 18 Maxim machine guns were sent to commercial firms in Hong Kong, 15 in 1893, 
34 in 1894 and 17 in 1895.   These were for the provincial governors who had their own 
budgets.   More importantly, a further 75 were sent to the Chinese government in 1895.   
All the Maxims sent to China from 1892 to 1895 were in .303-inch calibre except for 10 
in 1895 that were in .45 inch Martini-Henry.87  These would have more than sufficient to 
counter the Legation and the relief force. 
 
In the Foreign Legation in Beijing  there were only three machine guns, a hand operated 
Nordenfelt, a Model 1895 air-cooled ‘gas hammer’ machine gun and an Austrian 8mm 
Maxim that had been brought to the legation by the guard detachment of the Austrian 
cruiser Zenta.88   The Second Relief Force was not as well armed when compared to the 
arms the Chinese Army could theoretically muster.  There were 21 .303inch Maxim 
machine guns available with the British China Expeditionary Force, one for every 
infantry battalion and one privately purchased one in the 3rd Bombay Cavalry 
regiment.89   
e headquarters at every level and cutting the size of the 
latoon to half in peacetime.         
                                                
 
The Wuwei yujun Front and Central Armies suffered heavily when they clashed with the 
Second Relief Force.  After the sacking of Beijing and the loss of more land to the 
foreigners, the Qing government finally realised a modern national army was required 
throughout China.  Yuan Shikai was sent from Shandong to Hubei with the mission to 
create what was known as the Beiyang New Army.   He restructured the infantry 
battalion by reducing the size of th
p
 
87 . Goldsmith, D.F. & Stevens, B.R.   The Devil’s Paintbrush: Sir Hiram Maxim’s Gun, 
Collector Grade Publications, Toronto, 1989, p. 323. 
 
88 . Ibid., p. 324. 
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 On 12 September 1904, the Beiyang New Army was officially sanctioned.  It was 
composed of two different units, the Land (general for empire) Forces and the Reserve 
Forces (or Provincial Troops).90   The provincial troops were former members of the New 
Army; they were expected to return to their province on completion of their service in the 
army.  The division had two brigades, each having two regiments of three battalions each.   
An infantry battalion contained four infantry companies and in peacetime had paper 
strength of 659 men and in wartime 1, 240 men.    Many of the units were under strength.  
Each company contained three platoons that in peacetime had three squads each of 14 
soldiers and in wartime six squads.
 
 most likely spread out 
etween the platoons.92  The rifles and artillery were Japanese.93    
                                                
91   The squad consisted of a squad leader, assistant 
squad leader, four private first class and eight privates.  The platoon headquarters had one 
officer and two other ranks and the company headquarters had one officer, one warrant 
officer and two Sergeants First Class.  There were also eight cooks
b
 
In 1906 the Department of the Army was created and in August 1907 the Qing 
government ordered that the entire army was to be reorganised into 36 divisions using the 
Beiyang New Army division as the model.94  The major changes at the lower level were 
as an increase in the company of ten other ranks and the incorporation of a machine gun 
company at the regimental level.  To complicate the logistics even more, the Department 
of the Army, which controlled all of China’s arsenals, ordered that the units be equipped 
with weapons from these arsenals.95  Self-sufficiency was an excellent idea but the 
 
90 . Brunnert, H.S. & Hagelstrom, V.V.   Present Day Political Organization of China, Foochow, 
1911, p. 285 
 
91 . Ibid., 288. 
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weapons produced by the arsenals were rarely standardised and often the weapons could 
not share their parts.  Moreover, the arsenals could not produce enough weapons for the 
forces in its province let alone produce sufficient for sale.   In the first two decades of the 
wentieth Century, the only arsenal that could do this reliably was the Hanyang arsenal 
in Hubei Province.96   
throughout the army by 
913, but at the time of the 1911 Revolution only 23 divisions had been reorganised as 
ide into what became known as the Second Revolution.  Sun 
at-sen fled to Japan and started to create a new political organization and force - the 
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This lack of standardisation became the major problem of the all Chinese Armies 
henceforth and was only fixed in the late 1960s.  This structure up to the Regimental 
level was what the warlords, Guomindang and Red Army nominally used in the 1920s 
and into the 1930s.   It was aimed to have this new structure 
1
some provinces had not done as directed.97    
 
The Revolution of the 1911, which led ultimately to the end of the Qing Dynasty, saw the 
army break up into different factions.  In time, these factions became part of the 
Revolutionary Army under Sun Yat-sen, and although Yuan Shikai initially stayed loyal 
to the Qing Government, he eventually sided with the Guomindang.  Yuan Shikai became 
the provisional president and after the Guomindang in the new parliament was writing a 
new constitution, purged the Guomindang while establishing himself as the paramount 
leader power.  He even entertained thoughts of becoming the new emperor in the 
Japanese style.  By taking loans from the Japanese in exchange for trading and 
investment rights in China and Manchuria (known as the Twenty-One Demands), Yuan 
Shikai saw the country sl
Y
‘Revolutionary Army’.    
 
Yuan Shikai died in 1916 and China descended came under the control of various 
warlords who were nominally part of the government, but were a law unto themselves.  
 
96 . Curtis, L.  The Hanyang Arsenal, GIG Concepts, San Antonio, 2000, p. 2. 
 
97 . Collier and Chin-Chih, op. cit., p. 32; Brunnert  & Hagelstrom, loc.cit.    
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Zhang Xun, now that Yuan was dead, used his army to try and re-establish the Qing by 
leading a counter-revolution in 1917 with his small army of Qing loyalists.  They 
installed Pu Yi as emperor on 1 July 1917, and China was theoretically ruled by the 
Manchus for 11 days until the other local warlords attacked and re-established a republic 
 Beijing.   Pu Yi still remained in the imperial palace at government expense, as being 
 Fourth Movement spread throughout China and even to 
ingapore.98  Some of the leaders of the May Fourth Movement were to become involved 
Congchang.  Many warlords were eventually killed: Zhang Congchang was shot by the 
                                                
in
eleven years of age, was not part of the coup.  
 
Duan Qirui, who had been Yuan Shikai’s deputy, gained control of Beijing and declared 
war on Germany.  He took secret loans from Japan, for even more concessions than Yaun 
Shikai, including the rights to Germany’s ex-possessions in China.  These also included 
letting Japan station troops in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.   When these agreements 
were found out in 1919, during the Versailles Treaty negotiations, the Chinese people 
were enraged and on 4 May 1919, after riots over these concessions broke out in Beijing, 
what became known as the May
S
in China’s politics in the 1920s. 
 
China descended into a convoluted series of battles in which the warlords contended for 
power, with Duan Qurui and Zhang Zhuolin holding power jointly in Beijing and 
nominally for all of China.  The period of the warlords had started in China.  Some of 
these warlords commanded armies of over 100,000 men, well equipped and trained 
whereas others were little more than bandit gangs.  During the period 1917 to 1926, many 
large conflicts occurred among these warlords.  Notable wars in southern China were the 
Guangdong-Guangxi and Hunan-Hubei Campaigns and the battles between the Szechuan 
warlords.99  Eventually there emerged in Northern China five prominent groups who 
fought two major battles in April-May 1922 and October 1926 for the control of Beijing. 
The groups were led by Zhang Zuolin, Wu Peifu, Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang and Zhang 
 
98 . Straits Settlements Annual Report 1919, Government Printer, Singapore, 1921, p. 210. 
 
99 . Collier and Chin-Chih, op. cit., p. 62. 
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adopted son of a man he murdered. or in Zhang Zuolin’s case blown up in his train by the 
Japanese.100  Others became nominally part of the regular Guomindang Army as in the 
e of Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan.101    
rs and created the Revolutionary Army.  A new 
hapter in China’s history had begun.      
                                                
cas
    
Sun Yat-sen had slipped back into China in 1916 and in 1917 had formed a parliament 
meant as a rival to Beijing, but even though he declared himself Generalissimo, he was 
still only there with the blessing of the local warlords.102  In 1918 his forces and he 
moved to Shanghai in 1918 as warlord forces had started attacking his men.103   Never 
beaten, in May 1922 he led forces composed of the Guangdong, Jiangxi and Yunnan 
armies against the warlords in Jiangxi, which became known as the First Northern 
Expedition.104  However in June he had to return to Guangdong as the local warlords led 
by Chen Jiongming launched a counterattack.105  Sun Yat-sen’s home was surrounded on 
17 June by soldiers of the warlord Yeh Chu, and he escaped by gunboat with his wife and 
bodyguards.106   He rebuilt his forces in Guangdong.  Discovering that his forces lacked 
organisation and training, he established the Whampoa Academy with Comintern 
assistance, which provided military adviso
c
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The Soviet Union wielded enormous influence on the nascent Chinese Communist Party 
and the early years of the Whampoa Academy and National Revolutionary Army.  The 
Soviets ordered the Chinese Communist Party to join as a group inside the Guomindang, 
creating the first United Front. The need for a Communist army was recognised after 
eviously sympathetic warlords killed Communist leaders organising railway labour 
e was often the main operational 
anoeuvre.  It was not until the Guomindang’s Great Northern Expedition that any 
 
sometimes paid and known as kulis (coolies in Cantonese), were used for the shipping of 
           
pr
unions. 
  
Was There a Possibility of an Operational Art at the Time? 
 
Although Sun Tzu’s The Art of War was written in 500 BCE, and presumably well read 
in China, warlord armies had shown themselves incapable of bold manoeuvres – due as 
much to poor staff work as their almost complete lack of any means of logistics.  Most 
warlords were content to work on a balance-of-power concept and would withdraw from 
an area after only one large battle.  Allegiances could never be guaranteed either.  Thus 
although there were large numbers in many forces, most ended up using frontal assaults 
or trying to entice another warlord into battle.  Intrigu
m
Chinese military force had an integral logistic force.     
 
The major transportation systems in China up until the mid-1950s were water and rail.  
Major roads hardly existed outside the Treaty Ports and the major cities of Beijing and 
Nanjing.   These rarely extended more than a few kilometres outside their walls.107  In the 
Yangtze and Yellow River deltas the land was cut up due to levies, irrigation ditches and 
transport waterways.  The major roads were nothing more than tracks that could only use 
pack animals and movement was in single file.108  Peasants, mostly coerced but 
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supplies for the armies.109  Railroads were the primary means of moving personnel 
rapidly, and their control militarily significant.    Many of the railway lines were foreign 
owned and the staff of the warlord armies unable to grasp the complexities of railway 
movement.  After defeats, the railways could be blocked due to inept handling of the 
lling stock and locomotives.110      
 
 doctrine of 
perational theory, that the modern Chinese military’s operational art began. 
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Whitson noted that railway lines were of strategic importance especially the railways 
from Shenyang to Beijing and Tianjin; the Beijing-Hankou line, the Tianjin-P’uk’ou line; 
the Lung-hai line from the east coast to Xian and the line northward from Guangzhou.  
He dismissed the railways for battle as most of the battles were away from the lines and 
soldiery was expected to live off the land - that is, appropriating the resources of the 
peasantry.  One of the warlords did employ the railways as means of manoeuvre and as a 
means of combat.  Zhang Congchang at the end of 1926 had four armoured trains manned 
by ‘White’ (anti-communist) Russian mercenaries and even had a pontoon to cross rivers 
to outflank other warlord armies.111  However, Zhang Congchang’s efforts were an 
isolated case and were not representative of an operational art emerging at that time. It 
was not until soon after - the period 1928-1937 - following the Soviet Union’s
o
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Chapter One 
Creation of a Red Army: The Arming of the Chinese 
Communist Party 1919-1927 
 
 
Prior to the Nanchang Uprising on 1 August 1927 there was no independent Chinese 
Communist Army.   This is not to say that there were no armed members of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP).   There were members of the CCP inside the Guomindang and 
at the Whampoa Military Academy.  They followed the instructions from the Comintern, 
the external arm of the Soviet Communist Party.   By working within the Guomindang 
and as part of the Whampoa Academy the military organisation and training of the early 
Chinese Communist Party was nurtured.  The Whampoa Academy was set up in 
Guangzhou in 1924 by Sun Yat-sen with the aim of indoctrinating and training officers to 
take control of China. 112     
 
It was not the Chinese Communist Party that started nationalist and anti-foreigner 
organisations in China after the First World War.  Initially anarchist groups formed them, 
as part of the May Fourth Movement, a series of violent anti-government demonstrations 
that were a result of Japan taking over ex-German concessions under the Versailles 
Treaty.  The Chinese Communist Party soon supplanted them and started organising 
unions in the early 1920s, notably in Canton and Shanghai.   This included the 
International Settlement in Shanghai, which gave Chinese Communist Party cadres, 
outside of the Whampoa Academy, the experience and base to create an armed force.   
These enabled the creation of worker’s pickets enforcing the strike against the British in 
Hong Kong and Canton following the Shaji Massacre and the takeover of Shanghai by 
workers’ pickets in 1927, prior to the arrival of Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition.              
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A considerable gap presents itself in the history of Chinese communism, as there were 
Chinese who served with the ChEKA (the Extraordinary Commission for Combating 
Counter-revolution, Sabotage and Speculation) during the Russian Civil War.113  Further, 
Lenin himself maintained a 200-strong bodyguard comprised of 70 Chinese and 130 
Hungarians.114  The biggest question is why there is no record of them in CCP documents 
from the 1920s.  It is difficult to imagine the CCP not lauding these Chinese 
internationalists.  They were not intellectuals and have left very little material on what 
they did.  One is an article from 1957 by Li Xingpei.115   The article is on Li Fuqing, who 
along with two cousins was tricked into going to Russia in April 1916 to work in factory 
but who were instead used to clear forests and build a railway.   He joined the Red Army 
in 1917 and after being wounded four times he became one of Lenin’s bodyguards in 
1919.116  After the war, he studied in the Russia Cultural University and joined the 
Russian Communist Party Youth Group in 1923; in the same year he was sent to a 
military college.117   Upon completing his studies he worked as an interpreter in a 
Russian mine using Chinese workers.   When Japan invaded Manchuria in 1933 he was 
deported to south-western China near the Afghan border, where he lived in exile until 
1950.   He joined the Chinese People’s Liberation Army after returning from exile in 
1950.11
adkey in his 1976 work wrote: 
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S iet regime 
questionably derived strength from their bruised feelings.119 
el as Hungarian and Chinese ‘Internationalists’ and 
hEKA, ChON and VOkhr units.’121 
 
The notion that the Soviets used Mongol or Mongolian troops for 
repressive purposes has surfaced repeatedly.  It seems to have died a hard 
death.  The Mongols are a small people and could not have possibly 
committed all the nefarious actions attributed to them.  If the range is 
widened, however, to include Chinese, Turko-Tartars and Finno-Ugrians, 
we move from the realm of fiction into that of fact.   The ov
un
  
With access to Soviet archives since the fall of the Soviet Union and further accurate 
material, Khvostov in 1996 wrote: ‘The Chinese had special value to the Bolsheviks: 
industrious, efficient and seldom able to understand Russian, they were employed by the 
ChEKA for the arrest and execution of anti-Soviet elements.’120  In 1997 he further 
observed: ‘So great was the threat posed by Antonov’s Army that the Soviets treated it as 
a new front, and sent against it their best commanders, Tukhachevsky and Uborevich, 
with nearly 50,000 regulars as w l 
C
 
It is unlikely that many of the Chinese in the ChEKA actually came from China to 
support the Red Army.  The Whites (Russian anti-Soviet forces nominally Pro-Tsarist) 
controlled much of the Urals, Central Asia and the Far East.  Bringing Chinese 
internationalists to the area around Moscow would have been difficult and hardly worth 
the effort.  As mentioned earlier, there was Chinese conscript labour in Russia,122 and 
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there would have been ethnic Chinese from territories acquired when Imperial Russia 
took over parts of the Far East, Maritime Provinces, and Eastern Turkestan.  Some may 
have been subjects of the Tsar since the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk at the beginning of the 
reign of Peter the Great.   Some of these people moved westward as merchants, and/or tea 
growers and Chinese were brought to the Caucasus to found and manage tea plantations 
stablished there.   
 
til August 1920 that the first Communist group in China was 
rmed in Shanghai.126    
                                                                                                                                                
e
 
Turning back from developments in Eurasia to China proper, in 1919, as noted above, an 
anarchist organisation began urban action against foreign and capitalist interests in 
Shanghai.  The International Settlement authorities regarded the street unions that they 
formed as Bolshevist, yet there was only mention of anarchist literature on the October 
10 Revolution Anniversary Celebrations in 1920.123  This ties in with the Shanghai 
Municipal Police (SMP) reports of the time.   Bolshevism rated only one paragraph in its 
1919 report, mentioning the seizing of Bolshevist books in the Settlement and a small 
paragraph reporting the arrival of Russian refugees into the Settlement from Siberia.124   
The 1920 report devoted only one paragraph to Bolshevism and one to local Russian 
politics.125  It was not un
fo
 
The suppression of nationalist and communist movements in the International Settlement 
was the responsibility of the Political Section of Central Intelligence Division (CID) that 
later became the Special Branch of the Shanghai Municipal Police, under the command 
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of a Deputy Commissioner.   It was formed in October 1917 as a separate squad of the 
CID ‘to deal with a special phase of crime’.127   It was responsible for ‘watching and 
reporting on all political, quasi-political and politico-religious movements, on the 
activities of political associations and labour organisations, political and other meetings, 
and on the activities of the Press, and for conducting inquiries of a political nature’.128   It 
was Special Branch’s responsibility to provide intelligence of impending political trouble 
and in the event of it, to keep the SMP informed of developments.129   This meant that the 
Shanghai Municipal Police took an active interest in any organisation or event that could 
disturb the running of the Settlement.   This ranged from agitation to paying rent, the cost 
of rice or boycotts of foreign goods, to political parties such as the Guomindang and the 
ommunist Party.   
ere aimed primarily at workers and soldiers 
ho, for the most part, could not read.132     
C
 
It was not until the 1921 Annual Report that Communism proper became a concern.  
Nonetheless, street unions, the price of rice, house rents and Chinese representation on 
the Shanghai Municipal Council took up two-and-a-half pages as opposed to just over 
half a page devoted to ‘social extremists’, the Guomindang and Bolshevism.130  The 
report revealed that the Chinese Communist Party was growing in strength and the police 
were attempting to suppress it.  In that year four publishers of Communist material were 
successfully prosecuted and the SMP raided the May Day committee before it could stage 
a demonstration.131   The Political Section of Central Intelligence Division of the SMP 
had by the end of 1921 collected 27 different types of communist leaflets and handbills 
since 1919, but these were a failure as they w
w
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It is worth noting that although the Chinese Communist Party was perceived as a threat, 
the ‘communist literature’ was in reality anarchist.  The CCP upon its formation consisted 
of only 53 members in seven groups in China and one in Japan.133   It was not until the 
Second Congress in July 1922 that it even had a stable Party organisation.134   Its 
members had by then grown to 195 for the whole of China.135  In the period 1922 to 1924 
the Shanghai Municipal Police were active in suppressing communist groups in the 
International Settlement of Shanghai.  As it was a cell within the Guomindang it was 
difficult to isolate it from the Guomindang proper.  Indeed the Shanghai Municipal 
Police, and the European population in Shanghai, did not view them at the time as 
ifferent, both being desirous of the removal of foreign privileges in China.    
                                                                                                                                                
d
 
On 8 June 1922 the Shanghai Municipal Police raided a series of houses in Taku Road, 
on the grounds that they were being used as the headquarters of a number of societies 
including the Marx Literature Research Society.136  The rooms, later revealed to be a 
front for the Guomindang, contained a library of 388 ‘extremist’ books in Chinese, 
English, Japanese, French and German.137  The next day the Labour Secretariat in 
Chendu Road was closed down as its journal, The Labourer’s Weekly, was said to have 
printed inflammatory articles, and the Secretariat was accused of inciting postal workers 
to strike.138  Constant surveillance by the SMP saw a marked decline in communist 
propaganda and activities in the International Settlement in 1923.139   The following year, 
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1924, saw a resurgence in demonstrations and conferences, albeit peaceful, with 
communist, anti-foreign and Guomindang speeches; but no action was taken against 
them.  Obviously the Shanghai Municipal Police had them under surveillance.   This is 
not to over-estimate the size of the Chinese Communist Party during this period.   It had 
420 members in June 1923, rising to 994 in January 1925.140  The May 30 incident 
however saw membership increase rapidly to 2,223 by August 1926.141   This is still a 
small number when compared to the size of the Guomindang and China itself.  The 
increase would also have been due to the 365 Chinese students that had recently 
graduated and returned from the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in the 
oviet Union.142 
ithin the Guomindang, Soviet Assistance and the Whampoa 
cademy  
‘bloc within’, 
work with the Guomindang, and became known as the ‘United Front’.143    
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Working W
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The Comintern sent agents to China in 1919 to identify prospective leaders and labour 
activists and in 1921 these agents assisted in the setting up of the Chinese Communist 
Party.  In 1922 they identified that the best way that China would have a revolution was 
through the Guomindang.  Although the Guomindang was not necessarily communist in 
ideology, they were an indigenous anti-imperialist and anti-feudal group, which fitted in 
with the Comintern’s aims. To ensure that they followed the correct Party line the 
Comintern instructed the nascent Chinese Communist Party to become a 
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The Chinese Communist Party had identified the need for armed action to aid the 
revolution after the 7 February 1923 incident where three warlords, who were previously 
sympathetic to workers, attacked railway workers who were forming a General Union of 
the Beijing-Hankou Railway.144  This resulted in the deaths of between 30 and 35 
workers and many more wounded.  The Comintern had been pressuring the Chinese 
Communist Party to work with the Guomindang since April 1922.  Although the CCP at 
its Second Congress had agreed to work with them, it baulked at joining the 
Guomindang.   The February 7 Massacre, as it is called in CCP documents, revealed how 
weak the Chinese labour movement was by itself, and the need of Sun Yat-sen’s support.   
On 25 June 1923, after the Third Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao 
Zedong, Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Cai Hesen and Tan Pingshan signed a communication 
to Sun Yat-sen that ‘to oppose and overcome “feudal warlords”, the Guomindang must 
establish a new-style “centralised national-revolutionary” army to fight them.’145  
 
From there the CCP worked with the Guomindang for an armed revolution in China.   
The Whampoa Academy was established to train and create an army to unite China.  The 
Guomindang’s Special Party Organisation was formed to instil Party ideology and teach 
the army what it was fighting for.  The head of the Academy was Chiang Kai-shek, and 
Zhou Enlai headed the Special Party Organisation for political training.  Military and 
political advisors from the Soviet Union aided them.146   This came as a result of a series 
of letters and discussions between Adolf Joffe and Sun Yat-sen (through members of the 
Chinese Communist Party as part of the United Front), whereby Sun Yat-sen signed an 
agreement with Joffe on 26 January 1923.  Known as the Sun Yat-sen–Joffe Declaration, 
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it promised Soviet support for Sun’s struggle for national unification and full 
independence.147  This came in the form of advisors, funds, and munitions under the 
ontrol of General Vasily Blyukher. 
n had either a Japanese rifle in 6.5 mm or a locally made 
.92 mm bolt action rifle.148  
 
                                                
c
 
In October 1924, the Training (Indoctrinated) Regiment of the Whampoa Academy was 
created.  Its organisation was three rifle battalions of three rifle companies of three 
platoons of three squads.  The squads comprised one squad leader, an assistant and ten 
enlisted men.   There were a total of two officers and 36 enlisted men and the company 
headquarters had four officers and 24 enlisted men.  In the battalion there were a total of 
24 officers and 401 enlisted men.  At the regimental level there was a machine gun 
company with six French air-cooled machine guns that became over-heated and jammed 
after 300 rounds.   There were also transportation, reconnaissance, communication, and 
medical detachments and a special service company.  The officers had ‘broomhandle 
Mausers’ and the enlisted me
7
 
In December 1924 the Second Indoctrinated (Training) Regiment was formed and the 
Party Army became a brigade in size.  Based on interviews there were only 1,200 
combatants in the first regiment in December 1924 with the establishment being 179 
officers and 1,835 enlisted men.  Further, they were all armed with 7.92 mm rifles made 
at the Canton Arsenal.149    In July 1925 the Canton Government was superseded by the 
forming of the National Government.  At the same time the Party Army and certain local 
units were combined to form the National Revolutionary Army.   On 20 August 1925 the 
brigade was enlarged to two divisions.  The brigade had three regiments, as did the 
division.  The First Infantry Division had three regiments, an artillery battalion, a military 
police battalion and an engineer battalion.  There was a shortage of men and materiel.  
The Second Infantry Division had only two regiments whilst the Third Infantry Division, 
 
147 . Pantsov, op. cit., pp. 57 & 58. 
 
148. Ibid., p. 72.  
 
149 . Ibid., note 2, p. 78. 
 
 45
made up of units from the Guangdong Army, comprised three regiments and a 
replacement regiment.  The biggest change was the addition of a machine gun company 
 each rifle battalion containing six machine guns. 
-
orkers) in single file; pack artillery was the only artillery that could be moved.      
ubordinate to the Party, the Export of Ideology and the May 
0 Incident 
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The Guomindang started to receive increased aid from the Soviet Union and in 1926 it 
received seven 76.2 mm mountain guns, 103 machine guns, nine 37 mm Model 15 
‘Rosenburg’ infantry guns, 40 bomb throwers, seven million German and 1.3 million 
Japanese cartridges amongst other materiel.150   They were supplied after a Soviet advisor 
reported in June 1925 that the rifles and machine guns in the Party Army ranged from 
‘obsolete to modern, with very few of the latter’.151    Outside of the cites there were only 
narrow footpaths which meant that all supplies had to be moved by kulis (manual
w
 
The Gun is S
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Beginning in September 1924, the Guomindang forces had, in addition to the Party 
organisation, a Party representative assigned to all headquarters from company level up.   
The orders issued by any commander were valid only if the Party representative had 
countersigned them.152  This kept control of the army in the event of a commander 
deciding to rebel against the Party or wanting to make the army the preserve of himself, 
that is, ‘warlordism’.  In times of need the Party representative could assume control of 
the unit he was assigned, thus the commander of the unit was only responsible for the 
training.  This was how the army in the Soviet Union was controlled by the Communist 
Party and reflected the views of the Russian advisors to the Guomindang.  Loyalty to the 
Party was synonymous with loyalty to the nation and thus loyalty to the National 
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Revolutionary Army, as it was called, in July 1925.  This was when the Canton 
Government was superseded by the National Government, and the Party Army as well as 
ertain local Guangdong units, were formed into the National Revolutionary Army. 
 had reached the Yangtze River it had 
bsorbed 34 warlord armies and expeditions.154  
Soviet Union and the expelling and killing of Communists during the White Terror.156   
                              
c
 
The Military Council was set up at the same time with the role to be in charge of all 
Army units.  At the time of the First Eastern Expedition, January 1925, the Political 
Department of the Whampoa Academy was divided into forward and rear area sections 
with Zhou Enlai in charge of the former.  After the expedition it became the Political 
Department of the Army and thus organic to it.  In July 1926 it was reorganised as the 
General Political Department becoming the General Political Department subordinate to 
the General Headquarters of the National Revolutionary Army.  It was organised into the 
Propaganda, General Affairs and Party Affairs (organisation) sections.153  The 
propaganda units preceded the Second Northern Expedition and were an unqualified 
success.  By the time the Northern Expedition
a
 
To increase the martial spirit and political ideology in the Party Army, teams or ‘cells’ 
were made in every squad, and at the staff section level.   In the eyes of the Party, all 
were equal, and members were able to make suggestions and express their opinions 
without restriction.  Its members elected the leader of the cell.155  The use of ‘cells’ was 
the cornerstone of political training in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army and 
continued in use when it became the People’s Liberation Army at the beginning of the 
Civil War in 1946.  The Political Department, having been under Zhou Enlai from its 
beginnings at the Whampoa Academy, was the means whereby the Communists 
influenced the Guomindang.   It was deactivated in March 1927 due to the split with the 
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From then on, the influence of the German advisors to the Guomindang came to the 
fore.157 
 
Another factor in the international dimension of the Chinese communist movement is the 
export of its ideology south to Singapore and Malaya, and not only the importation of 
ideas from the the north. The link between the Guomindang, and the anarchist and 
communist movements in Shanghai and Singapore, was reported in February 1923 when 
it was discovered that all these groups used American Post Office Box Number 913 in 
Shanghai to send material to Malaya.158   The Shanghai Municipal and Straits Settlement 
Police Force’s Detective Branches were in contact with each other on this matter, and 
there were no major acts of violence or overt disobedience aimed at the police or other 
government organs in both settlements by communist or anarchist groups until 1925.     
 
The first act of violence was the bombing of the Chinese Protectorate by a Chinese 
anarchist on 23 January 1925 which galvanised the Straits Settlement’s government into 
overt action.159   The local branch of the Anarchist Society was not involved, but the 
mass arrests and banishment of known anarchists as a result of the bombing effectively 
destroyed it.160  The bombing coincided with a considerable increase in Chinese 
communist literature arriving in Singapore, and Malaya, for Hailams (the name used at 
the time for people from Hainan) living there.161    Raids on Hailam night schools during 
this time were fruitful.  One raid found letters from Hailams who had left Singapore in 
February for the Whampoa Military Academy. All these connections with political 
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groups were compounded by the May 30 Incident in the International Settlement in 
Shanghai.  
 
The May 30 Incident became central to the growth of the Chinese Communist Party and 
anti-foreign sentiment in China, and was initiated by a series of strikes and 
demonstrations in early February 1925 against Japanese-owned mills, after the dismissal 
of 40 employees and the subsequent imprisoning of six of them.  The strikes peaked with 
mass arrests by the Shanghai Municipal Police, and the shooting of strikers by Japanese 
employees when they broke into the factory, leading to a procession by students on 30 
May 1925 in honour of the dead worker.  This procession in the International Settlement 
that ended with the rushing of the Louza Police Station in Nanking Road by some of the 
students in the procession.  They were shot down by SMP Sikh and Chinese constables, 
which resulted in 12 students being killed and 17 wounded.162      
 
Both the Guomindang and the Communists used this lack of action by the Shanghai 
Municipal Council to whip up anti-foreign sentiment in China.163   A general strike was 
called in the International Settlement where there were numerous attacks against the 
police and foreigners in June and July.164   The strike eventually petered out by the end of 
September.165   The situation was different in Canton and Hong Kong. 
 
By 1925, military and political organisation and training in the Guomindang was well 
advanced.  On 23 June 1925 more than 50 Chinese were killed and over a hundred 
wounded in what became known as the ‘Shaji Massacre’ where a demonstration was 
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fired upon by British personnel troops guarding the Sha Mian Concession.   Cantonese 
soldiers using a political demonstration commemorating the killing of five Frenchmen by 
a bomb thrown by an Annamite (a person from the northern Vietnam province of Annam) 
for cover, fired upon French, British and Portuguese troops guarding the Sha Mian 
Concession.  One French civilian was killed with one British Marine, the Commissioner 
of Customs, and two civilians wounded.  The French forces fired back first from machine 
guns mounted on the French gunboat, Altair, followed by British and Portuguese 
personnel.166   
 
This led to a 16-month boycott of trade with Hong Kong and a general strike in Hong 
Kong. When the striking workers from Hong Kong returned to Guangzhou, the 
Guomindang, including members of the Chinese Communist Party, used the experience 
they had gained in training the army to quickly organise and train the strikers as workers’ 
pickets to enforce the boycott.  A committee was formed to organise them into workers’ 
picket ‘brigades’, with each nominally the size of an infantry battalion.  Initially each 
brigade had a headquarters with a commander, a supervisor and a training officer.  The 
supervisor was later replaced with a seven-man committee in light of the experience 
gained with the workers’ pickets.167    Each brigade had five ‘big teams’ (dalu), each with 
three detachments (zhidui), each of which had three groups of 12 men.  Thus each 
brigade was structured as an infantry battalion of five companies each with three platoons 
of three squads for a nominal total of 540 men.168   Each ‘brigade’ was armed with 400 
rifles, with less than half being usable.169  This organisation and training enabled the 
Communists in Zhabei to defeat the forces of the local warlord, Sun Chuanfang, in early 
1927. 
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In a report to the Foreign Office, dated 17 July 1925, the Governor of Hong Kong 
reported that large quantities of Russian arms were being imported into Canton and that 
‘Hong Kong strikers are being armed and drilled by Russians’.170  The latter was 
incorrect as although there were Russian advisors, there was no evidence that they were 
training the strikers and, moreover, the Chinese were quite able to train them. The 
Governor of Hong Kong was most concerned about the strikers being armed and trained 
by the Guomindang as he reported to the Colonial Office that: ‘It is not possible to ignore 
the possibility of Hong Kong being attacked.’171   Although Hong Kong proper was never 
attacked, incidents arose as a result of the trade blockade of Hong Kong.  On 16 July 
1925, a picket fired upon a boat on the Shamshun River within British territorial waters.   
Two women were killed and two others drowned as a result of this shooting and on 30 
July 1925 a picket shot at a British Police patrol on the border with no casualties.  There 
were also incursions into the New Territories.172  On 14 and 31 July 1925, ‘small parties 
of armed Chinese Soldiers made raids across the frontier for the purpose of stealing pigs 
and cattle’.173  
 
The End of the United Front 
 
The Guomindang took action in March 1926 to reduce the influence of the Communists 
in the Guomindang.   Chiang Kai-shek, who had taken control of the Guomindang after 
the death of Sun Yat-sen, declared that leftist elements in the Guomindang where 
planning an armed overthrow.  Troops loyal to Chiang arrested the leading Communists 
and their Comintern advisors in Guangdong.  They were released after agreeing to 
register all Communists in the Guomindang, remove themselves from many of the 
                                                 
170 . Foreign Office FO 371/10935 F35275/1925 dated 6 August 1925, ‘Suppression of the 
Malayan Branches of the Kuo Min Tang’. 
 
171 . Ibid. 
 
172 . Foreign Office FO 371/10935,  ‘Telegram from the Governor of Hong Kong to the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies’ dated 1 August 1925. 
 
 173 . Ibid. 
 
 51
committee positions in the Guomindang and curb the power of its Comintern advisors.174  
These were the same advisors that Chiang had used to build his army.   When the Soviet 
Embassy in Beijing was raided on 6 April 1927, documents revealing the extent of 
Communist subversion in the Guomindang and the Soviet Union’s influence of the 
Chinese Communist Party were discovered and published.175 
 
The authorities in the International Settlement, through the Shanghai Municipal Police, 
were having successes as well.   The Annual Departmental Report for 1926 noted that the 
Chinese Communist Party in the International Settlement was subdued in comparison to 
other provinces.   The SMP banned all political demonstrations, handbill distribution and 
street lectures in 1926, and under these orders 125 people were prosecuted and six 
headquarters of ‘agitators’ closed down.176  Over 400 different types of handbills were 
distributed,177 but these figures really do not show the full extent of communism in 
Shanghai.  The headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party was still in Shanghai and 
its strength grew rapidly in the first three months of 1927.         
 
The height of the workers’ pickets, which also sowed the seeds of its own downfall, was 
in the early months of 1927.  The reaction to the workers’ pickets, by the Guomindang 
and the treaty powers, showed the impossibility of the Marxist strategy of using urban 
insurrection to change the government in China.  With the advance of the Northern 
Expedition towards Shanghai in early 1927 the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai 
started to mobilise its workers’ pickets to take over Zhabei, the Chinese area of Shanghai.   
Chiang Kai-shek’s advance also worried the authorities of the French and International 
Settlements who called for military assistance from the countries represented in the 
International Settlement.   The British, Japanese and the Americans, amongst others, sent 
                                                 
174 . Spence & Chin, op. cit. p. 78. 
 
175 . Wilbur, & How, op. cit., pp. 606 & 607.  
 
176 . Annual Report of the Shanghai Municipal Council, 1926, Shanghai Municipal Council, 
1927, p. 51. 
 
177 . Ibid. 
 
 52
forces as none wanted to lose any of their concessions along the Chinese coast.   This had 
already occurred in early January when Guomindang forces took over the inland British 
concessions of Hankou and Jiujiang.178    
  
There were clashes between the Guomindang’s Northern Expedition and the forces of 
Sun Chuanfang, the local warlord, around Shanghai in February and March 1927 as they 
battled for control of the city.   Taking advantage of this, the Chinese Communist Party, 
using its workers’ pickets, sponsored a general strike from 20 - 24 February and an 
aborted uprising on 24 February in Zhabei.179   Another Communist uprising on 21 
March 1927 was more successful and 2,700 workers’ pickets took control of Zhabei and 
obtained 1,700 rifles and a sizeable amount of machine guns.180    With Zhabei under the 
control of the workers’ pickets, the Northern Expedition attacked and took over the city 
of Shanghai in the afternoon of 22 March 1927.181  There were clashes between the 
forces protecting the International Settlement and units either of the Northern Expedition 
or the Communists.  Two British armoured cars were attacked by two machine guns on 
the night of 21 March, firing from Zhabei.182   Six bodies, clothed in black, were found 
the next morning and in the unit diary they were believed to be part of the ‘Cantonese 
Army’ (Guomindang).183  Later in the year, an article in the Royal Tank Corps Journal 
identified them as communists.  The Guomindang was now seen as friendly towards the 
British; the communists became their shared foe.  
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There were two problems with the communists in nominal control of Shanghai.  The 
municipal authorities in the French and International Settlements did not want the 
communists so close and Chiang Kai-shek did not want to share power with them.  To 
destroy their power, and purge Shanghai of ‘undesirable elements’, the Guomindang with 
the assistance of the Green Gang secret society, and the tacit support of the French and 
International Concessions attacked the communists in the morning of 12 April 1927.184   
The Shanghai Municipal Police were not involved in this action except in allowing armed 
Green Gang members to pass through the Settlement quietly and unhindered.185  The 
Communists lost 20 machine guns, 3,000 rifles, 200 Mauser pistols, one million rounds 
of ammunition, seven handcart loads of axes and 2,000 long handled pikes.186 
 
In the course of the year the ‘White Terror’ spread across the cities of China and 
destroyed the Communists’ city power bases forcing them to go underground, with city 
operations disrupted for the rest of the year and into much of the next.  The Shanghai 
Municipal Police played its part in suppressing communism in the International 
Settlement, prosecuting 185 people for offences related to communism including rioting 
and the dissemination of literature, and having 14 headquarters of ‘the agitators’ closed 
down.187    The ‘White Terror’ destroyed any chance there was of an urban-based Marxist 
revolution, but what it did do was create the spark of revolution, and instil the 
determination to overthrow the Guomindang. This occurred when some army units in 
Nanchang mutinied leading to what was to become the People’s Liberation Army.  
 
This chapter has examined the arming of the Chinese Communist Party in its formative 
period of 1919-1927. It has been shown that the CCP, though small and nominally part of 
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the Guomindang, possessed an ‘armed wing’ that was able to take over a city.  This 
action also proved to be its downfall, but it gave the leaders invaluable experience for the 
future.  The next chapter examines the how the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army from 
the Nanchang Uprising, through a series of failed rural and urban uprisings, went onto 
form the Jiangxi Soviet.  It was at this time that the PLA’s operational art took form. 
 55
CHAPTER TWO 
ANNEI RANGWAI 188  
 
The defining period of the operational art of the PLA was 1927 - 1934.  There are two 
major schools of thought on the operational art of the PLA.  One regards Mao’s vision of 
People’s War as the PLA’s operational art and is seen to have influenced the doctrine of 
the PLA until the disaster of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War.  The other, primarily 
championed by Whitson and Jencks, and argued and expanded upon in this thesis, is that 
the Red Army officers who studied at the Whampoa Academy and officers who studied 
at the Frunze Academy, derived the PLA’s operational art from Soviet models.189 
 
The Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army and Soviet Operational Art    
 
The first half of the 1920s was a fervent and vibrant period in Soviet military academies 
where new ideas on military operations and strategy were developed.  Members of the 
Chinese Communist Party, and initially members of the Guomindang, were undergoing 
training at these academies.   At the Whampoa Academy, the Soviet advisory team under 
Blyukher taught Frunze’s ‘unitary military doctrine’, but this was now out of date with 
what was being taught about operational art to students in the Soviet Union.  Jencks 
rightly pointed out this dichotomy, with the Whampoa cadets being taught what he called 
the ‘unified strategy’ while those in Moscow were taught ‘integral strategy’.   Jencks and 
Whitson confused ‘unified strategy’ with Frunze’s ‘unitary military doctrine’, while 
‘integral strategy’ was Soviet Operational Art. 
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Frunze’s ‘unified military strategy’ decentralised control, intermixed Party, army and 
government, and so synthesised a unity of offensive action, ideological training and the 
‘promotion of world revolution’. This fitted in with the Lenin’s views of communism, 
and the experiences of the various Bolshevik armies in the Russian Civil War, which had 
just concluded.190  Frunze’s unified military strategy resembles Mao’s operational art as 
Active Defence in reinforcing spoiling and pre-emptive strikes, along with Mao’s 
emphasis of ‘man over machine’ philosophy and the ‘world revolution’ which he 
espoused in the 1960s, at the height of People’s War doctrine and the Cultural 
Revolution.     
 
The unified military strategy had four general statements,191 all of which tie in with 
Mao’s vision of People’s War: 
 
a. there is a proletarian method of war – Mao’s People’s War; 
b. the method of war must reflect the society and means of production – the 
use of a peasant based revolution and the militarising of the villages as a means of 
both support of the Red Army and political control; 
c. manoeuvre, offensive and aktivnost (dynamism or activity) are essential in 
military operations; Mao’s use of offensive flank attacks and the use of ‘drawing 
an enemy in deep’ to isolate and the destroy them piecemeal; and 
d. the Soviet military is a vehicle for spreading the revolution in the interests of the 
world proletariat – for Maoist China this is reflected in the takeover of Tibet, the 
Chinese support for the Viet Minh and then North Vietnam, and China’s 
involvement with insurgency groups in the 1950s and 1960s.   
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The later Soviet Operational Art emphasised central control, but more autonomy in 
political, military and government chains of command.192   Frunze’s unified military 
strategy was used twice by the Chinese Communists: in the aftermaths of the Long 
March; and the Japanese response to the One Hundred Regiments Campaign.  Both times 
the Red Army was at a distinct disadvantage in regards to the Guomindang and needed to 
build support and win over the local peasants. 
 
Besides being heavily influenced (Whitson describes it as obsessed193) by Frunze’s 
unified military strategy, Mao also drew inspiration from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. 
Chinese military historians have shown that the theories and principles contained in this 
work greatly influenced Mao, who played a significant role in planning and executing the 
Huai Hai Campaign, and also his generals in the field.194
   
Tan Yiqing, a researcher in 
China’s Academy of Military Science’s Department of Strategic Studies, has written the 
following about the way in which Sun Tzu’s ideas helped shape Mao’s military thinking:  
 
The primary source of Mao Zedong’s military thought was the practical 
experience of the Chinese revolutionary war . . . [but he] also drew upon 
China’s splendid ancient military heritage, most notably the essence of 
Sunzi’s [Sun Tzu’s] The Art of War. If one does not understand what Mao 
Zedong’s military thought inherited from The Art of War, it will be 
impossible to understand its deep grounding in history, and it will also be 
very hard to explain the unique Chinese characteristics inherent in Mao’s 
strategy and tactics.195
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Further:  
 
Mao Zedong not only put Sunzi’s theories about war into practice, he used 
the fine quintessence of Sunzi’s thought to create strategic theories that fit 
the specific conditions of China’s revolutionary war, pushing Sunzi into a 
new age.196
  
 
  
While the operational art is simply expressed as the art of winning wars, it is the 
application of analysis and insight, not only force.  Simpkin wrote that operational art is 
manoeuvre warfare inside a theatre, as opposed to attrition warfare.197  Soviet staff 
officers, utilising their experiences during the 1919-1920 Civil War, first espoused the 
operational level of war in the early 920s.  The nascent Red Army198 was involved in 
fighting on many fronts, and both strategy and tactics did not cover this type of conflict.   
The concept of the operational art was advanced by Alecsandr A. Svechin, who in 1926 
was a member of the Frunze Academy and the Red Army Staff Academy.  The concept 
was developed further by a number of theorists in the 1930s and received its full 
definition in the Red Army’s Polvei Ustav (Field Regulations) of 1936.199  Using the idea 
of successive operations, Svechin explained operational art thus: 
 
. . . tactical creativity is governed by operational art.  Combat operations are not 
self contained, they are only the basic material from which an operation is formed.  
Only in very infrequent cases can one rely on achieving the ultimate goal of 
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combat operations in a single battle.   Normally this path is broken into a series of 
operations separated by more or less lengthy pauses, which take place in different 
areas in a theatre and differ significantly from one another due to the differences 
between the immediate goals one’s forces strive for.200    
 
He further wrote: 
 
An operation is a conglomerate of quite different actions: namely, drawing up the 
plan of the operation; logistical preparations; concentrating one’s forces at the 
starting position; building defensive fortifications; marching; fighting battles 
which lead to the encirclement or destruction of a portion of the hostile forces and 
the forced withdrawal of other hostile forces, either as a result of a direct 
envelopment or as a result of a preliminary breakthrough, and to the capture or 
holding of a certain line or geographical area.  Tactics and administration are the 
material and the success of the development of an operation depends on both the 
successful solution of individual tactical problems by the forces and the provision 
of all the material they need to conduct an operation without interruption until the 
ultimate goal is achieved.   On the basis of the goal of an operation, operational art 
sets forth a whole series of tactical missions and a number of logistical 
requirements.  Operational art also dictates the basic line of conduct of an 
operation, depending on the material available, the time which may be deployed 
for battle on a certain front, and finally on the nature of the operation itself.   We 
cannot acknowledge the full superiority of objective battlefield conditions over 
our will.  Combat operations are only one aspect of the greater whole represented 
by an operation, and the nature of the planned operation.201 
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In the immediate post-civil war period, Soviet Russian military academicians, staff and 
commanders set up associations to study military science, under the guidance of the 
Communist Party.  One area that was of particular concern to the Military Studies Society 
of the Red Army was how to articulate as doctrine forms of combat action as well as the 
restructuring of the armed forces to match these changes in military thought.  Two 
leaders of this school of thought were S.S. Kamanev, the commander of the Red Army 
from 1919-1924 and M.N. Tukhachevsky.202   Kamanev wrote: 
 
In spite of all victorious fights before the battle, the fate of the campaign will be 
decided in the very last battle – Interim defeats in a campaign, however serious 
they may be, subsequently will be viewed as ‘individual episodes’ – In the 
warfare of modern large armies, defeat of the enemy results from the sum of 
continuous and planned victories on all fronts, . . . the uninterrupted conduct of 
operations is the main condition of victory.203 
 
In 1926 Tukhachevsky added: 
 
Modern tactics are characterised primarily by organisation of battle, presuming 
coordination of various branches of troops.  Modern strategy embraces its former 
meaning: that is the ‘tactics of a theatre of military operations.’  However this 
definition is complicated by the fact that strategy prepares for battle, but it also 
participates in and influences the course of battle.  Modern operations involve the 
concentration of forces necessary to strike a blow, and the infliction of continual 
and uninterrupted blows of these forces against the enemy throughout an 
extremely deep area.  The nature of modern weapons and the modern battle is 
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such that it is impossible to destroy the enemy’s manpower by one blow in a one 
day battle.  Battle in a modern operation stretches out into a series of battles not 
only along the front but also in depth until that time when the enemy has been 
struck by a final annihilating blow or when the offensive forces are exhausted.  In 
that regard, modern tactics of a theatre of military operations are tremendously 
more complex by the inescapable condition mentioned above that the strategic 
commander cannot personally organise combat.204    
 
Students were taught this refinement of operational art in the Soviet Union’s military 
academies, as were the Chinese students studying in them.  The education of Chinese 
students at these academies was aimed at training officers capable of commanding ‘large-
scale military units in China’, that is, at the operational level of war.205   
 
The Communist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV) was founded in 1921 with 
the aim of training cadres to make them ‘real revolutionaries armed with the theory of 
Leninism, equipped with practical experience of Leninism, and capable of carrying out 
the immediate tasks of the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries 
with all their heart and soul’.206   From September 1927 to June 1928, the KUTV also ran 
special military-political courses.207  These courses were run at an elementary level and 
the content was deemed as trivial, largely because many of the Chinese students were 
combat experienced, and the head of the military school was seen as arrogant and 
ignorant of China.208  
                                                 
204 . Tukhachevsky, M.N.   ‘Voina’ (War,), 1926, in Voprosystrategii I operativnogo iskusstva v 
 sovietskikh voennykh trudakh (1917-1940), Voenizdat, Moskva, 1965, pp. 104-105, cited in 
Glantz, op. cit., p. 22.          
   
205 . Pantsov,  op. cit., p. 166. 
 
206 . Stalin, J.V.   ‘The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East’, in Works,  
Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, p. 153. 
 
207 . Pantsov, loc. cit. 
 
208 . Wang Fan-hsi.   Chinese Revolutionary, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1980, p. 62. 
 62
 
At the KUTV, Chinese students from 1921 until the late 1930s worked alongside other 
nationalities in advancing Communism except for the period 1925 – 1930.  In this period 
they were taught at an institution in the Soviet Union initially known as the Sun Yat-sen 
University of the Toilers of China (UTK), but on 17 September 1928 it was renamed as 
the Communist University of the Toilers of China (KUTK) after Stalin finally realised 
the United Front had failed.209  Special Chinese student departments were set up in the 
Frunze Military Academy, the Tolmachev Military Political Academy, the Aeronautical 
Military-theoretical School, the Artillery School, the Moscow Infantry School and in 
military schools in Kiev and other provincial centres.   Military training was also given to 
Chinese Communists when they visited Moscow.   In early 1928 some of the veterans of 
the Nanchang and Autumn Harvest Uprisings arrived at the Sun Yat-sen University, 
which included a large number of workers, trade unionists, and youth and women’s 
activists.210   Alexander Panstov, using the archives of the KUTV and the UTK/KUTK 
identified 500 Chinese students as attending the KUTV and 1,600 attending the 
UTK/KUTV.  From various sources he discovered that of the 118 top leaders of the 
Chinese Communist Party who studied abroad, 80 (70 percent) studied in the Soviet 
Union.  Forty-seven of these became members of the Central Committee and 15 became 
Politburo members.211 
 
Two Chinese Communist Party military commanders that were trained in Soviet higher 
military academies were Liu Bocheng and Nie Rongzhen.  Both were awarded the rank 
of Marshal of the PLA in September 1955.  Upon their return from the Soviet Union, they 
were able to teach and influence the operational level of warfare first in the Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Red Army and then the People’s Liberation Army. 
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Liu Bocheng went to the Soviet Union in 1928 and studied at the Frunze Academy. Upon 
his return in 1930, he commenced to work in the Central Military Commission (CMC).   
At the end of 1931 he took charge of the Red Army Academy and in October 1932 
became chief of staff of the CMC.  After a distinguished combat career where he was 
noted for his use of manoeuvre warfare during the Civil War, he served as the president 
of the PLA Military Academy in the period 1951 to 1957.  In November 1954 he 
concurrently became the director of the PLA General Training Department until 1957, 
but remained as a member of the Standing Committee of the Military Affairs 
Commission.212   
 
Nie Rongzhen became a student activist in Paris in 1919 and joined the CCP in 1922.   In 
1924 and 1925 he went to the Soviet Union and attended the KUTV and the Soviet 
Military Academy to study military affairs and the defence industry.  Upon his return he 
became the secretary and instructor at the Huangpo (Whampoa) Military Academy’s 
Political Department under Zhou Enlai.  At the Nanchang Rebellion he was the CCP 
representative to the Eleventh Army.   His organisation skills saw him become a deputy 
director of the Political Department of the Chinese Red Army Command in the late 1920s 
and deputy chief of staff of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army in 1931-1935.  In 
combination with Lin Biao’s forces during the Civil War, he oversaw the surrender of 
Beijing and Tianjin after Guomindang forces were caught in a pincer movement.  From 
1945 Nie was a Central Committee member and a Politburo member from 1956–69 and 
1977–1987, after his fall from grace during the Cultural Revolution. 213 
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Annei Rangwei was the term for Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of destroying the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) before attacking and defeating the Japanese in China.   It was an 
amalgam of the term Annei (subjugate the internal enemy, the Communists) before 
Rangwei (expelling the external enemy, the Japanese).214  In 1927 the White Terror had 
destroyed Communist Party’s influence in the Guomindang and disrupted its organisation 
in the cities of China, forcing it to go underground.  Further attacks, aimed at the 
destruction of the CCP and its various organs, became the state policy.   This came at the 
expense of defeating the Japanese military forces in China, and removing the 
extraterritoriality rights enjoyed by foreign powers in the treaty ports.  The CCP’s 
realisation that a workers’ led revolution was not possible without a military force, saw 
Guomindang troops under Zhu De mutiny at Nanchang on 1 August 1927.   This act was 
the beginning of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army that eventually became the 
People’s Liberation Army which saw the Communists take power in 1949.      
 
At the 7 August emergency meeting of the CCP, the then Party secretary Chen Duxiu was 
denounced as a ‘rightist opportunist’, and a policy of revolution against the Guomindang 
‘White Terror’ was adopted.  This meant plans to occupy major industrial cities where 
the workers would rise up and then turn them into ‘soviet’ cities.215  Unfortunately for the 
Communists, the uprising of the workers and peasants did not occur and led to the 
situation in late February and early March 1928 at Haifeng and Lufeng where ‘many of 
the best revolutionary cadres were sacrificed’.216  All the various forces eventually 
retreated to the Jinggangshan (Jinggang Mountains) by April 1928 where Mao Zedong 
had formed the first soviet base area. 
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From Defeat to Defeat: Chinese Communist Armed Forces from August 
1927 to March 1928  
 
The Nanchang uprising was formulated by Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Ye Ting and He Long.   
Some of the other officers involved were Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, Chen Yi, and Liu 
Bocheng.  This group were the fathers of the People’s Liberation Army and all but Zhou 
Enlai and Ye Ting were awarded the title of Marshal of the People’s Republic of China in 
September 1955.217  Zhou Enlai was a civilian so was not eligible and Ye Ting was killed 
in an aircraft accident in 1946.218    It was not an auspicious beginning. 
 
The Communist forces were driven from Nanchang on 4-5 August 1927 with few 
casualties.  Around 20,000 strong, it was split into He Long’s 20th Army which had three 
divisions; Ye Ting’s 11th Army which had three regiments, and Zhu De’s Ninth Army 
which was only one regiment.  Almost immediately one of Ye Ting’s divisions, the 10th, 
defected back to the Guomindang.   During the next three weeks, the forces moved south 
through Jiangxi and Fujian provinces before capturing Shantou on 23 September 1927.219    
 
In the initial forced three-day march from Nanchang to Linchuan, military discipline 
broke down.  The 20th Army was notorious for its ill-discipline.  Soldiers shot peasants 
and pressed them as porters under the barrel of a gun; and their staff officers, along with 
those from the 11th Division, deserted during their break in Linchuan.   He Long’s 20th 
Army had five regiments of experienced soldiers and a sixth regiment of raw recruits.  
The four battalion-strong training regiment was also of raw recruits and two battalions 
were recruited from reserves.  After three days the losses were severe with the Sixth 
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Regiment down to half its original strength.220  The force carried all its equipment as it 
had no porters.  The peasants refused to help, having been told that the force was going to 
introduce communal wives and farms.  There was no food or water and they took to 
drinking from ditches, contracting water borne diseases and dying on the march.  After 
three days, losses approached 4,000 - mostly from desertion or having died from illness, 
and all the mortars and half the ammunition had been abandoned.221  
   
After stopping the troops at Linchuan for three days the force rested and was given 
propaganda by cadres and a Party organisation established within the force.  The force 
then continued towards Ruijin in cooler weather, but the peasants were even more hostile, 
soldiers who dropped out of the march frequently being killed by them.   Their fighting 
spirit had been restored, however, as they took the city of Ruijin by defeating two 
Guomindang armies but suffered over 1,400 casualties.222   
 
Having rested for a week, they headed towards Swatow and Chaozhou unmolested and 
took Swatow and Chaozhou with the force numbering around 5,000 on 24 September.   
Five GMD divisions numbering 15,000 well-rested soldiers attacked the force and after 
three days of heavy fighting Chaozhou fell and Swatow was then abandoned.223  After 
this defeat the force numbered around 2,000 due to desertions and battle deaths.  Ye 
Ting’s army, now down to 700 men, escaped to the countryside and his forces merged 
with He Long’s and withdrew to the area around Haifeng and Lufeng where Peng Pai had 
organised a small Communist soviet.224  Zhou Shidi’s 25th Division fought a rear guard 
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action north of Swatow and then joined up with Zhu De’s soldiers who were also fighting 
as a rear guard force; they retreated together to Fujian Province.225     
 
With the forces and He Long and Ye Ting out of contact with the Central Committee 
plans for an autumn harvest uprising were updated and put into action.  The original 
concept was for an insurrection in the four provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi and 
Guangdong, but after the forces of He Long and Ye Ting became unavailable the plan 
now centred on capturing the major cities in the central Yangtze valley in Hunan and 
Hubei provinces.   The plan essentially relied on the peasant masses to rise up, supporting 
any armed military units, and not the other way around.  The Communist forces were 
based on peasant associations, peasant self-defence forces and Communist Party cells in 
the cities.  These were to be supplemented by ‘Red Spear’ (secret society) and bandit 
groups if these could be brought over to help.  This was not always possible as, for 
example, the Hubei Provincial Committee which had no concept of the military situation 
in the field, refused the local Communist cadres from seeking assistance outside the 
peasant associations, including Communist military advisors, branding the Communist 
actions as ‘opportunistic’ or ‘military adventurism’.226  The insurrection was doomed 
from the start.   
 
Guomindang suppression of the peasant associations in East Hubei after the Day of the 
Horse Incident made any uprising there impossible.  In South Hubei the Special 
Committee there realised that an attack on a major city could only lead to disaster.   
Leaders of the Communist peasant movement restricted the armed activities to self-
defence only and had sought to prevent them from being armed.  In the whole of South 
Hubei there were less than 300 firearms scattered unevenly throughout the counties. 
There was no ‘Red Spear’ organisation, so effectively there was no firm base, nor local 
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armed unit, to assist the peasants.  After a robbery on the Changsha train on 8 September 
1927, alerting the Guomindang of the insurrection a day before it was supposed to 
happen, this small group based around the Special Committee then decided to attack 
Hsienning with the assistance of 800 local peasant troops under its commander Liu Pui.   
They abandoned their attack on 9 September and then moved to the hills to establish the 
Xigeng Revolutionary Government on 12 September, predating Mao’s move to the 
Jinggangshan by a week.  In any event they tried to organise one more attack on Xintien 
and asked for assistance a local commander with Communist sympathies, Liu Pui, who 
but ambushed them as he was slighted by not having enough share of the loot from the 
train robbery.   The members of the Special Committee filtered back to Hankou where 
they were ordered back to South Hubei by the Hubei Provincial Committee to ‘carry on 
the insurrection’.227  The Special Committee broke up and was eventually captured by the 
Guomindang and executed or disappeared from view.  This effectively finished the 
Autumn Harvest Uprising, although there were uprisings until early November as the 
Provincial Committee kept calling for more insurrections despite their failures, each time 
blaming the local cadres.    
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Mention needs to be made of Peng Pai who had created a peasant revolutionary army in 
the area around Haifeng and Lufeng.  He organised an uprising on 1 May 1927 that was 
defeated eight days later but his forces established themselves in the countryside.228  
Following the Central Committee’s direction to stage the Autumn Harvest Uprising, Peng 
Pai’s forces retook Haifeng but were again forced to retreat to the countryside in late 
August in the face of Guomindang attacks.  Peng Pai sent out patrols to make contact and 
gather what was left of He Long’s and Ye Ting’s forces which eventually numbered 
around 800.  These combined forces were now designated the Second Division of the 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army.229     
 
On 1 November 1927, due to a Guomindang power struggle between generals Li Jishen 
and Chang Kui in Guangzhou, all of the Guomindang forces were withdrawn from the 
Haifeng area and the Second Division quickly moved in and established control in 
Haifeng and several other towns, including Lufeng.  On 21 November, a public 
conference of workers, peasants and soldiers establish a soviet government, China’s first 
soviet political power.230    
 
The CCP had set up a committee to organise an uprising in Guangzhou that became 
known in the West as the Canton Commune, which was the watershed for the Agrarian 
revolution.   Canton, now called Guangzhou, was where the workers on strike from Hong 
Kong had created the first workers’ army in China and was the one city where the 
workers would have been expected to rise up in support of the Chinese Communist Party.    
This was an abject failure.  Due to an internal Guomindang struggle for power the 
Guangdong CCP Provincial Committee resolved on 26 November to ferment an uprising.  
A revolutionary committee under Zhang Tailei was set up, with assistance from the 
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Soviet consulate, and decided upon 13 December for the uprising, but it was brought 
forward to 11 December 1927 due to the date being leaked.231  Zhang Tailei, in 
conjunction with Ye Ting and Xu Xiangqian with other senior Chinese Communist Party 
members, led the armed uprising and set up a soviet government.232   Unfortunately for 
the Communists, the ‘masses’ did not join them, as Ye Ting wrote ‘help us by destroying 
the (rail) tracks’.  Zhang Tailei was killed in fighting on 12 December 1927, and the 
commune was destroyed the following day by Guomindang forces under Zhang Fukui; 
several thousand workers and peasants were killed.233  The Soviet consulate was closed 
down with the Guomindang breaking off diplomatic relations with the USSR and 
ordering all Soviet diplomats and citizens in China to leave.   Of the survivors, 1,200 
made their way to the Haifeng Soviet and became the Fourth Division; Ye Ting went to 
study overseas.234     
The Second and Fourth Divisions comprised the core of the military units defending the 
Haifeng Soviet and numbered 2,800 by late February 1928.235  There were also Red 
Guards in the villages for self-defence and the Revolutionary Corps of Workers and 
Peasants – an armed peasant organisation numbering 1,000.236   Despite winning a battle 
in January the Soviet could not hold out. This was also despite the mobilisation of the 
Red Guards in the attack on 28 February when a Guomindang force under General Yu 
Han-mou destroyed both divisions in a classic pincer movement.  The remnants slipped 
into the countryside, later to become guerrillas.  There was a fruitless counterattack 
against the Guomindang forces in Haifeng on 6 March and then again on 3 May which 
decimated any remaining Communist forces.   The Second Division was reduced to 240 
men.  Xingqian later wrote there were only 60 survivors from his Fourth Division and 
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that ‘our best revolutionary cadres were sacrificed’.237   This was not entirely correct as 
in early 1928 some of the veterans of the Nanchang and Autumn Harvest Uprisings had 
gone to the Soviet Union to study.238  The CCP was not equipped organisationally or 
militarily to enable a rural insurrection.   The peasants – ‘the masses’ - in a base area 
needed to become ‘aroused’ politically which meant that they needed to be given political 
and some military training to enable the revolution to succeed.  But what of Mao’s 
forces? 
 
The Red Army under Mao took Liuyang in Hunan on 15 September 1927 but on 19 
September was seriously defeated on the Jiangxi-Hunan Border.239  Mao then moved his 
ill equipped and depleted force to the Jinggangshan on the border area of Hunan and 
Jiangxi to build a revolutionary base area from where they could recover, rebuild and 
create a revolutionary army.  Here they joined forces with two bandit leaders, Wang Zuo 
and Yuan Wencai, on 24 October 1927.240       
 
By the beginning of October 1927 the Communist forces had been split into three main 
groups, the remnants of He’s and Ye’s forces with Pai Peng’s in Haifeng area, Zhu De’s 
force in the Fujian area and Mao’s in the Jinggangshan.  Mao and Zhu De were in regular 
contact from December 1927.241  In a bold move Mao moved his forces out of the 
Jinggangshan and on 18 November 1927 his troops seized Chaling in Hunan and held it 
for over 40 days before returning to the Jinggangshan.242    The importance of Mao’s base 
area cannot be over emphasised when in late April 1928 Zhu De’s forces arrived there.     
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As Zhu De’s and Zhou Shidi’s force retreated to Fujian in October 1927, and then 
through Jiangxi, they were wracked with a power struggle between the two leaders, 
which resulted in them splitting.  Further desertions saw the force down to 600 - 700 
poorly armed men but Zhu De, using the pretext it was still a Guomindang unit, managed 
to get supplies from the Guomindang general of the 19th Army, Fan Shisheng.243  
Following a directive from the CCP Central Committee forbidding CCP units forming 
temporary alliances with GMD units, Zhu’s force split with Fan’s and headed towards 
Yizhang, aided by two outstanding junior officers that were to make their mark on the 
PLA, Chen Yi and Peng Dehuai.   Around 20 April 1928 after being involved in another 
failed uprising in South Hunan, Zhu De met up with Mao in Lingxian, and decided to join 
him in the Jinggangshan where his forces could rest and rebuild.244 
 
The Jinggangshan could not support that many troops so in mid-July 1927, on the orders 
of the Central Committee the bulk of Mao’s and Zhu De’s forces sent an expedition to 
South Hunan to attack Chenzhou.   Many of Zhu De’s forces, notably the 29th regiment, 
were from Hunan Province, and forced the expedition against Mao’s and Zhu’s 
wishes.245  There was no clear operational plan and the Red Army lurched from one 
assault against cities to another in Southern Hunan and repeated counterattacks by 
Guomindang forces.  The Hunan Provincial and Central Committees’ hopes that the 
masses would be aroused failed to occur.  The Jinggangshan would have fallen but for the 
battalion left to guard fighting a major battle.  Mao wrote that if the attacks in Hunan had 
not occurred the area under control of the independent regime in the Jinggangshan would 
have expanded by mobilising the masses.  The reasons that the expedition failed were 
laid solely at the Hunan Provincial Committee.   It had removed itself from its support 
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base, there was no intelligence on enemy forces, the plan lacked direction, the troops 
were tired from constant marching and morale was low.246    
                                                
 
The Guomindang forces then blockaded the Red Army in the Jinggangshan.  It was a 
military disaster with the Red Army losing half its strength and many areas under its 
control lost.247  They returned to the Jinggangshan on 26 September 1928 and started 
removing from the Party and army unreliable members who had been recruited during the 
rapid build-up of the Red Army in 1928.   
 
The Central Committee had no idea of the problems that the Fourth Army had faced.  In 
the period April to July 1928 the Fourth Army was attacked by units containing nine 
regiments, and on occasion 18 regiments, and survived despite it being only four 
regiments strong.248  The Red Guard units that had been formed at village level, the 
mountainous area the Red Army was in, and the inability of the Guomindang forces from 
Jiangxi and Hunan to coordinate their attacks, were deciding factors.  Command and 
control problems in Guomindang attacks were to continue for five more years but once 
fixed, constituted a significant problem for the Red Army.  
 
 
Rebuilding for the Struggle: From the Jinggangshan to the Li Lisan Line 
 
Peng Dehuai led his forces, who had mutinied against the Guomindang, to the 
Jinggangshan in January 1929 having joined up with the Fourth Red Army on 10 
December 1928.  Peng’s forces became the Fifth Red Army under his command.  On 4 
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January 1929 Mao and Zhu De decided to establish a new base in southwest Jiangxi, the 
Jinggangshan being under blockade and constant attack, rendering it unviable for further 
expansion of the Red Army.   Mao and Zhu De left the Jinggangshan with their forces on 
14 January 1929, leaving Peng Dehuai with his two regiments as a rear guard.  After 
repeated attacks from Guomindang forces, Peng Dehuai’s forces moved out of the 
Jinggangshan on 29 January 1929 to join the Fourth Red Army.249    
 
The Fourth Red Army initially moved to the border junction of Fujian, Guangdong and 
Jiangxi provinces, then to Jiangxi followed by Guomindang forces and decided to adopt a 
policy of flexible guerrilla warfare as opposed to creating fixed bases in the interim.  
Then they moved to southern Jiangxi and Fujian provinces and went over to winning the 
masses as they had defeated the local warlords by April 1929.250   On 1 April 1929 Peng 
Dehuai’s force had joined the Fourth Red Army which now totalled 3,600 men and 1,100 
rifles.251   Basing themselves in Ruijin they went on an expedition in five xian (counties) 
attacking Guomindang elements and landlords and arousing the masses before returning 
to Rujian in mid-April.   
 
In March and April 1929, the Fourth Red Army was reorganised for guerrilla warfare.   
The first, second and third columns had over 1,200 men and about 500 small arms.  Each 
column had two detachments, each equivalent of a small battalion, and each detachment 
had three groups (da dui) equivalent to companies.  The columns were dispersed into 
villages and formed as required.  Peng Dehuai’s Fifth Red Army of 800 men and 500 
small arms became the fifth column.  A group of 500 men and 300 small arms under Tian 
Guiqing that had defected from the Guomindang became the fourth column and a group 
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of 300 bandits with 200 small arms became an independent battalion under its leader Hu 
Zhusheng.  These were trained from mid-April.  There were also two regiments of the 
Jiangxi Red Army to assist the Fourth Red Army as required.252  Mao told the Central 
Committee that the Fourth Red Army should be independent of local and front 
committees and only answerable to the Central Committee, with which it had trouble 
communicating - so the Red Army often acted independently of the Central 
Committee.253     
 
Peng’s forces moved out west to organise base areas on 14 April and the Red Army 
moved to southern Jiangxi to work on organising the mass movement.254  The Fourth Red 
Army settled down for the rest of the year mobilising the peasants to build the structure 
required for a mass Communist movement of Red Guards and the Party organisation in 
the countryside to create secure base areas.255  It also allowed for rebuilding the 
organisation; meanwhile the Guomindang was involved in suppressing rebellious 
warlords, leaving the Fourth Red Army much of the time alone.256   By January 1930 the 
Fourth Red Army had established effective base areas in southern Jiangxi, and to a lesser 
extent in northern and western Jiangxi with a smaller force working with the masses in 
Fujian.257  The Fourth Army’s plan was to expand the base areas in Jiangxi as part of its 
operational plan but the Central Committee had other ideas.258   
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The Battles Within the Cities: The White Terror and the Export of 
Ideology into Southeast Asia   
 
After the ‘White Terror’ spread the Communists fought back when they could.  CCP 
propaganda now was against the Guomindang as well as the foreigners in their 
concessions.  The CCP also increased its attacks on ‘counter-revolutionary’ elements, 
especially in Shanghai.  The Central Committee still operated out of Shanghai where it 
was under constant attack.  Zhou Enlai created the Red Brigade to protect the Central 
Committee, to enforce Party discipline and attack the Guomindang.259  The attacks on 
counter-revolutionary elements and the purging of unwanted elements of the Party led to 
increasing attacks against the Communist Party by the Shanghai Municipal Police.  One 
group that came to the attention of the SMP, the Pootoo Road Assassination Gang, was 
responsible for 17 murders in the International Settlement from 25 August 1926 to 27 
March 1928.260   The Shanghai Municipal Police broke the gang up in March and April 
1928 making 22 arrests.261  Thirteen members of the gang were sentenced to various 
terms of imprisonment; seven were handed over to the Guomindang on charges of 
communism and two acquitted.262  A total of 76 Communists were handed over to the 
Guomindang by the SMP in 1928; many were executed.    
 
Raids by the security forces in Singapore on 30 January 1928 and on 8 March 1928 
showed that members of the Chinese Communist Party had fled to Singapore, to escape 
the White Terror.263  These CCP members, along with the remnants of the ‘Main School’ 
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that had not been caught after the Kreta Ayer Incident, formed the Nanyang (South Seas) 
Provisional Commission of the Communist Party of China in January 1928.  More 
commonly called the Nanyang Communist Party it targeted the colonies of Great Britain, 
France and Holland as well as Siam.  The Chinese Communist Party now directed 
Communist operations in Southeast Asia in lieu of the Comintern. 264   Far more radical 
than earlier Communist groups, its stated objectives included the use of assassination, the 
overthrow of the Straits Settlements government by force, and the use of Chinese labour 
as a means to create an organised labour struggle.  Comrades were advised to acquire 
bombs, revolvers and daggers to suppress and kill the anti-revolutionaries.265  This 
radical posture resulted in an assassination attempt against a visiting group of 
Guomindang politicians in Singapore, and a series of bombings during the shoemakers’ 
guild strike (discussed below) there afterwards.    
                                                
 
On 8 February 1928, after Wu Chian Choo, a Guomindang politician from China had 
held a meeting at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Singapore, Cheong Yok Kai, a 
CCP member from Guangzhou along with two helpers attempted to kill him with a 
revolver that had been stolen from a planter’s bungalow in Johore.266   He succeeded only 
in wounding Lim Boon Keng, a prominent local Straits-born Chinese.   During his trial, 
Cheong Yok Kai admitted to having been sent by the Communist Party of China to kill 
Wu and two of his companions.  To make their escape, Cheong’s two assistants who 
were never identified, threw two bombs made from thermos flasks.267  Thermos bombs 
were the weapon of choice during the shoemakers’ guild strike of 1928.    
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The shoemakers’ guild in Singapore declared a strike on 15 February 1928 with its aim 
being a 40 percent pay rise.  To enforce the strike, a bombing campaign was launched by 
the Nanyang Provisional Commission against shoemakers’ shops that operated in 
defiance of the strike.268   The bombing campaign reached its height on 28 March when 
11 bombs exploded simultaneously throughout Chinatown. The targets including a 
Hailam night school and the residence of a Hailam book seller who had recently been 
arrested for selling seditious material.269   One bomb-making factory was discovered on 6 
March in Short Road when a bomb exploded during its manufacture with the police also 
seizing seditious material.270   A second bomb-making factory was raided on 8 March at 
59B Balistier Road resulting in the arrest of several key members of the Nanyang 
Provisional Committee.271  The shoemakers’ strike lasted seven weeks, ceasing in late 
March after the Singapore police persuaded potential strike breakers to work under police 
protection.272    
 
As a result of police action over the bombings against the Nanyang Provisional 
Commission of the Communist Party of China, Communist operations in Singapore for 
the rest of 1928 and 1929 were quiet.  A raid on 23 December 1928 saw the important 
seizure of 25 pistols and 1,987 rounds of ammunition meant for the Provisional 
Committee.273  The Singapore police and Chinese Protectorate did ease their vigilance 
and in 1929 they conducted 47 raids against the Communists which resulted in 28 
persons being convicted and deported.  This included several leaders who had previously 
escaped arrest and a large quantity of literature was seized.274  The Annual Departmental 
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Report for 1929 noted nine murders ‘by political and labour agitators or their paid 
assassins’, an attempt to set fire to a newspaper office and stone throwing to smash 
windows of trams and Chinese newspaper offices.275    
 
In December 1929 captured documents revealed that the Communist Party in Singapore 
and Malaya was to become ‘devoted to local emancipation’ and not ‘for the benefit of 
revolutionary movements in China’.276  This meant that the Comintern in Moscow now 
directed Communist operations in Singapore and not the Chinese Communist Party, as 
were other organisations in Siam, Burma, Annam and the Netherlands East Indies, 
previously under the control of the Nanyang Communist Party.  
 
The End of a Worker’s Led Revolution in China: The Failure of the Li 
Lisan and the Creation of the Jiangxi Soviet  
 
Li Lisan upon becoming secretary of the Chinese Communist Party decided that the time 
for a broad-based revolution had come and if cities were captured then workers and 
peasants would rise up and city after city would fall to communism.   There were long 
delays in communications between the Comintern in Moscow and the Central Committee 
of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai; as well as the CCP Central Committee and 
the Fourth Red Army in the field.  This inevitably led to problems where the Comintern 
wanted a particular strategy followed but it did not accord with the realities in the field in 
China.  The Red Army was often aggrieved in this period by decisions made by the 
Central Committee that had no idea of its situation.277   Coupled with the problems of 
Party organisation after the White Terror and continued attacks by the Guomindang this 
could see policies adopted that were unsuitable for action.   Li Lisan and his aide, Zhou 
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Enlai, both having been schooled in Marxism in Moscow, saw the revolution in China 
being an urban one based on the workers and the proletariat.  They followed the 
directions of the Comintern and, in turn, tried to ensure that these directions were 
followed by the Fourth Red Army.278   Add to this Stalin purging the Party and the 
Comintern in Moscow of any opposition, it meant a period of confusion and lack of 
strategic direction.279   Zhu De was especially upset as he believed the Red Army’s main 
task was fighting, not propaganda, and that the Central Committee was interfering in 
military matters, which he believed were his area of expertise.280    
 
To try and make the ‘gun subordinate to the Party’, and further exacerbating the situation, 
the Central Committee in May 1929 sent to the front Liu Angong, who had just returned 
from the Soviet Union where he had been studying military affairs.  He had no 
knowledge of the situation in the Red Army and was made the chief of the Political 
Department; he tried to reduce both Mao’s and Zhu’s authority.   He was killed in action 
in October 1929 just before the Central Committee decided in December that the Red 
Army should be concentrated not dispersed, changing its previously stated strategy. 
 
The Comintern had decided that a ‘revolutionary wave’ was beginning to rise in China 
and that the Chinese Communist Party should take action.  In reality it was to keep 
pressure on the Guomindang as the Soviet Union had just taken back control of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway from the Guomindang in November 1929 after a short war.281 
The Central Committee under Li Lisan believed that China was ripe for creating ‘a direct 
revolutionary situation and to seize power’.282   The tool to do this was the Red Army and 
in June 1930 it was reorganised for the task. 
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Since leaving the Jinggangshan the Red Army had expanded but was not under a single 
commander, as the forces were in four separate areas, semi-independent of each other.  
The reorganisation saw all the elements of the Red Army under a single commander, Zhu 
De, with Mao Zedong as its political commissar.   The Fourth Army now became the 
First Army Group; the forces of He Long in Hunan became the Second Army Group; 
Peng Dehuai’s forces that were now in the Jinggangshan formed the Third Army Group 
and the guerrilla bands north of the Yangtze became the Fourth Army Group.283   
 
The major aims of the Li Lisan’s plan were the capture of the cities of Nanchang by the 
First Army Group, Wuhan by the Second Army Group and Changsha by the Third Army 
Group.  The First Army Group did not capture Nanchang as the defending forces were 
too strong and decided that an attack would be fruitless.  They took a train station over 
the river from Nanchang as a demonstration to commemorate 1 August.284    He Long’s 
forces attempted to take Wuhan but were defeated and the counterattack saw them lose a 
considerable amount of territory previously under their control.285  Peng Dehuai’s forces 
successfully took Changsha on 27 July 1930 but retreated from the city on 6 August after 
a successful counterattack by Guomindang forces.286  The First Army Group moved to 
attack Changsha after a successful attack on Wenjiashi where Mao’s forces took 1,400 
rifles, 20 water-cooled and 17 light machine guns and over 100 Mauser pistols.287   They 
attacked from 29 August 1930 and abandoned the attack on 12 September after the final 
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attack on 10 September with heavy losses.288  The Guomindang forces were in strength 
behind extensive fortifications and the Red Army lacked heavy artillery to destroy 
them.289   The refusal by Mao and Zhu De to launch another attack on Changsha spelt the 
end of the strategy of fomenting workers’ uprisings by taking over cities and Mao’s 
theory of an agrarian based revolution came to the fore.  Li Lisan became discredited, 
was removed as Party secretary and from the Politburo, and exiled to Moscow.290  
 
The First and Third Army groups then headed to the city of Jian in Central Jiangxi to 
establish the Jiangxi Soviet base area.  Much of the area was already under effective 
Communist control as Mao’s ‘Xingguo Investigation’ of October 1930 showed.291  On 4 
October 1930, the Red Army took Jian and the Jiangxi Soviet was officially established 
there on 7 October 1930.292  The city was abandoned six weeks later on 18 November; 
the Communists did not try to occupy another major 
city until 1947. 293   Mao and the Red Army were now in a position to start the peasant-
based revolution.  
 
The Identity of the Red Army and Its Maoist Teachings  
 
Mao Zedong in 1926 wrote about the potential of a class known in Marxist terminology 
of ‘vagrants’ or ‘the lumpenproletariat’.294  He identified a direct relationship between 
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revolutionary zeal and poverty.  The five separate class sub-groups he wrote about were: 
soldiers, bandits, thieves, beggars and prostitutes who, if led properly, were capable of 
fighting bravely and becoming a revolutionary force.  Mao used the experience of the 
Paris Commune in the Franco-Prussian War to demonstrate his argument, which he wrote 
about, and which was to be commemorated in the Chinese Communist Party.295  
However, initially, as the five sub-classes were not the proletariat that orthodox Marxists 
identified as revolutionaries, conflict arose within the Chinese Communist Party.  This 
was particularly evident when the nascent Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army aligned 
itself with the two bandit leaders on the Jinggangshan in 1928.296   Intra-Party disputation 
did not finish until Mao took effective control of the Party in 1935. 
 
Just as he identified class sub-groups as having revolutionary potential, so too Mao – in 
November 1928 – described the soldiers of the Red Army as coming from six distinct 
groups.  These were: troops formerly under Ye Ting and He Long in Chaozhou and 
Shantou; the Wuchang Guards Regiment; the Peasants’ Army from Liuyang and 
Pingjiang; the Peasants’ Army from southern Hunan and workers from Shuikoushan; 
captured ex-warlord and Guomindang soldiers; and workers and Peasants from various 
xian (counties) in the border area.297   The first four provided the most experienced and 
reliable soldiers; the last provided the bulk of the Red Army.   Mao noted that without the 
ex-warlord and Guomindang soldiers the Red Army would have difficulty finding 
reinforcements.298  One advantage of captured soldiers was that they had some military 
training and often brought a rifle as well.  
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The Fourth Army had its problems in organisation and operations in the Jinggangshan.   It 
was accused of not following the ‘Party’s Correct Line’, ‘adventurism’, ‘opportunism’ and 
‘cliquism’; and not understanding the army was a political tool as it  suffered from having 
a ‘purely Military Viewpoint’ that needed to be changed.299   It had to recognise it was not 
just a military force.   It was expected to promote the Party through propaganda, organising 
and arming the masses, and setting up Party organisations.  The last of these was adjudged 
its basic reason for its existence   The cliquism charge was levelled as it did not see its role 
to arm the masses.  The adventurism and opportunism charges were that many of the ex-
warlord, Guomindang and bandit troops had a non-proletarian ‘consciousness’ that 
alienated the masses and meant that they tried to conserve their strength and not become 
involved in propaganda and working with the masses.300    
 
A bigger problem was the origin of the bandits who saw themselves as roving rebels 
involved in guerrilla operations and wanted to use ex-soldiers to expand the army instead 
of being involved with Party organisation and arming the masses, thereby increasing the 
army.301  To rectify these problems, political training was increased and local parties were 
allowed to criticise the Red Army.  This set an unfortunate precedent process that reached 
its height during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.302  Under Li Lisan the ex-
bandits and ‘vagabonds’ were seen as a major obstacle to the Party and were not to be part 
of the Red Army or the Red Guards.303  The worst case of removing ex-bandits from the 
army after the denunciation of bandits in the resolution of the Sixth Congress of the CCP, 
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was the killing of Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo.304  These two ex-bandit chiefs had let the 
remnants of the Red Army into the Jinggangshan and thus ensured its survival.   
 
If the period before the Jiangxi Soviet was the formative period of the Operational Art of 
the PLA then the period when it was refined and became the cornerstone of Mao’s and 
Zhu De’s strategy may be identified as the five Bandit Extermination or Encirclement 
campaigns, aimed at destroying the Jiangxi Soviet in the period 1930 to 1933.  The Fifth 
Campaign ended with the breakout of the Red Army and its famous ‘Long March’ to 
Yan’an.  The first four were successes for the Red Army, which despite being 
outnumbered, was able to outmanoeuvre and out fight the numerically superior 
Guomindang forces.  In December 1936 the Red Army University started using a 
textbook written by Mao titled, Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War, 
which enunciated Mao’s operational art using the bandit extermination campaigns as his 
reference.305   
 
In January 1930 in a letter to Lin Biao, Mao explained the need to organise the masses in 
the countryside to create secure base areas. He also wrote about the Fourth Red Army’s 
operational tactics.  These were his main points: 
 
The tactics we have derived from the struggle of the past three years are 
indeed different from any other tactics, ancient or modern, Chinese or 
foreign.  With our tactics, the masses can be aroused for struggle on an 
ever-broadening scale, and no enemy, however powerful, can cope with 
ours.  Ours are guerrilla tactics.  They consist mainly of the following 
points: 
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‘Divide our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our forces to deal with 
the enemy.’ 
‘The enemy advances we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass: the enemy 
tires, we attack, we pursue.’ 
‘To extend stable base areas, employ the policy of advancing in waves; 
when pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policy of circling around.’ 
‘Arouse the largest number of the masses in the shortest possible time and 
by the best possible methods’.   
These tactics are just like casting a net; at any moment we should be able to 
cast it or draw it in.   We cast it wide to win over the masses and draw it in 
to deal with the enemy.  Such are the tactics we have used for the past three 
years.’306 
 
Mao was employing manoeuvre extensively due to the Red Army’s lack of firepower, an 
approach which he copied from Sun Tzu and which was employed by many guerrilla 
forces prior to Mao.   Sun Tzu emphasised flank and rear attacks by hitting the enemy by 
manoeuvre, winning over the support of the local population, and only engaging an 
enemy when it was advantageous to victory.  When the base areas were secure in Jiangxi, 
Mao further refined his operational strategy.   
 
In December 1930, Mao wrote Eight Great Conditions for Victory, which has his first 
known use of Luring the Enemy in Deep and Protracted War.307  A reading of Sun Zi 
Bing Fa shows that Mao paraphrased many of Sun Tzu’s paragraphs.308  Mao’s main 
points, which were repeated again in later documents were:  
a. Luring the Enemy Deep into the Red Areas making ‘all his ships, trains and 
fortifications useless’;   
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b. Adopting the Tactics of Protracted War whereby ‘the enemy wants to fight a short 
war, and we will just not fight a short war.   The enemy has internal conflicts’;      
c. Besieging the enemy for a long time in a tight encirclement, which he described as 
‘After the enemies arrive in the Red areas, they will have no firewood, rice, oil and 
salt’; 
d. Our Forces are Concentrated and the Enemy’s Force are Dispersed, which Mao called 
‘concentrating our forces to destroy the enemy one by one’; 
e. We have Topographic Advantages, and the Enemy Does Not, as ‘there are many 
mountains and ridges, the roads are narrow, and the terrain is dangerous.  Thus the 
enemy cannot engage in large-scale manoeuvres, and his cannons are useless’.309  
 
These were based on Mao’s and Zhu De’s experience in the Jinggangshan.  They were 
known and well used methods of warfare and were certainly not developed by Mao.  
They depended on the attacking force not being able to supply itself or provide support 
from other units.   Mao used ‘luring the enemy in deep’ to fight the enemy at the time and 
place of the Red Army’s choice.  This was clearly enunciated in Mao’s order of 1 
November 1930, ‘Order to Lure the Enemy in Deep into the Red Area, Wait Until They 
Are Exhausted, and Annihilate Them’.310    
 
The Guomindang initially had a three-month limit on operations, which was a weakness 
the Red Army exploited.   Guomindang forces would spend months searching for the Red 
Army in vain, and were then ambushed when exhausted.  Red Army units used night 
attacks and offensive hit and run operations to keep Guomindang forces off balance and 
employed a scorched earth policy.  The mountainous topography the Red Army favoured, 
a defensive position used for centuries, meant in the First Encirclement campaign the 
Guomindang regiments were scattered and unable to provide mutual support.  Mao called 
it ‘concentrating our forces to destroy the enemy one by one’.  Splitting a force with the 
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inability to provide mutual support in the event of attack will generally lead to defeat.   
The Red Army by moving fast, and knowing the terrain was able to block Guomindang 
forces in narrow passes and then send a force to gather them up from the rear.  
 
Mao wrote of protracted war: ‘We will not fight a fast war with them, but will take some 
time to kill many Chiang Kai-sheks, eliminate spies in the Red Army, and unite more 
closely.  The enemy is defeated once again, and we have already won a major victory.’311  
Protracted war was the only war the Red Army could conceivably fight.   Mao depended 
on the cooperation of ‘the masses’, which was the cornerstone of his strategy.   At best they 
were apathetic towards any form of government interference with their lives, and at worst 
openly hostile.   Without their support any thought of the Chinese Communist Party 
coming to power in China was doomed.  Hence, political propaganda and control was 
central to Mao’s thought. 
 
 
Mao’s Vision of the Operational Art - People’s War  
 
People’s War was the concept of letting an enemy be drawn deep into Chinese Territory 
and then overwhelmed by the masses, mobilised to defeat an aggressor when it was at the 
end of its logistics chain.   It traded land for time.  It also enabled the mobilising of the 
masses in peacetime for political control, which was the precursor of the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution.   It has some major flaws.  These include the loss of 
control and destruction of areas that have been taken over even after the mobilising of the 
masses; and the assumption that the enemy, which was the Soviet Union, would want to 
be drawn in deep into the Chinese countryside.  Mao based his concept on the defeat of 
Guomindang Forces in the early encirclement campaigns in the Jiangxi Soviet from 
1930-1932 but forgot, or did not care to remember, the destruction the Guomindang 
forces caused during these assaults on the Soviet.  For these reasons alone the regular 
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PLA never took People’s War near and dear to its heart and stayed with the Russian view 
of the Operational Art.    
 
The expression ‘People’s War’, Volkskreig, was taken from Moltke the Elder who 
analysed it as ‘involving the whole nation in the war effort, militarily, economically and 
emotionally.312  It came out of his experiences of the Franco-Prussian War after the 
defeat of the French Army after the Battle of Sedan.  Bismarck’s demands were so harsh 
that the French government, and the French people, would and could not accede to them.  
French nationalism would not allow it, so the Germans marched on Paris and laid siege to 
it.  It was to be a different war to what the Germans had expected as Gambetta and 
Freycinet organised the whole nation’s resistance to the Germans.  Men and materiel 
from the unoccupied areas of France were mobilised and the French Army was 
replenished with mass conscription.  These conscripts fought alongside foreign volunteer 
brigades and francs-tireurs (irregulars).313  Moltke abhorred People’s War with its 
revolutionary and irregular tendencies embodied by the arming of the French population- 
the francs-tireurs.     
 
The winter of 1870-71 saw German supply lines extended and they struggled to keep 
them open due to attacks by the francs-tireurs.314  German regular troops were forced to 
conduct combat operations after thinking the war was over.  On many fronts, guerrilla 
warfare was the only type of French resistance and atrocities occurred on both sides as 
terror begat terror.315   German losses mounted, and breaches to their extended defences 
were plugged with great difficulty, but it did not affect the eventual German victory.   
Moltke’s comment about the situation was: ‘A whole people under arms should not be 
underestimated’; his reaction was to use a policy of destruction.  People’s War had 
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Moltke’s reaction to it engendered on both sides.316   (Mao Zedong was well aware of the 
revolutionary potential of the francs-tireurs and the Paris Commune in the Franco-
Prussian War.  As noted above, he identified a direct relationship between revolutionary 
zeal and poverty which his five class sub-groups embodied.) 
 
The first example of an entire country organised in People’s War - a better expression 
being ‘Total War’ - was Great Britain in 1940, followed by the Soviet Union in 1941. 
The entire economy and population were mobilised for war.  The British system was 
initially voluntary and was based around people who had civilian occupations during the 
day and then civil defence or military duties after their day employment finished.  These 
included the Local Defence Volunteers, later renamed the Home Guard, and the civil 
defence services including the Observer Corps, the Air Raid Precaution System which 
included air raid wardens and rescue teams, the Auxiliary Fire Service, and the Women’s 
Voluntary Service.317  
 
Mao wrote in April 1929 that ‘combat was only a means’ and that ‘the Red Army cannot 
survive without a united leading organisation for the Party and the army; otherwise, it 
will fall into anarchy and will certainly fail’.318    He further wrote that for the Red Army, 
the ratio of political work when working with the masses compared to combat, was ten to 
one.319  This was when the Red Army was creating base areas and the main objective was 
to mobilise the masses, whereas the only mission of the original Red Army under Ye 
Ting and He Long, ‘was to fight’.320   This was the genesis of Mao’s vision of what a 
People’s War was, which also enabled closer political control of the masses. 
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Mao and Zhu De wrote:  
 
The purpose of the army’s work here (in Jiangxi) is to win over the masses and to 
train ourselves, it follows that all rules regarding military bearing and discipline must 
be strictly observed.   Even the slightest slackening will have adverse effects on the 
masses.   We have therefore issued repeated orders in the hope that officers and men 
alike will follow the Three Rules of Discipline and the Six Main Points for Attention 
in order to make widely known in the ordinary masses the spirit and principles of the 
Red Army.321 
 
The Three Rules were:  
a. obey orders in all your actions;  
b. don’t take anything from the workers and peasants;  
c. when attacking the local bullies, turn over (whatever you take from them).    
The Six Points for Attention were:  
a. put back the doors  (you have taken down for beds);  
b. put back the straw (you have used for bedding);  
c. speak politely;  
d. pay fairly for what you buy;  
e. return everything you borrow; and 
f. pay for anything you damage.    
 
Mao is reckoned to have written the three rules on 24 October 1927 as he was about to 
lead his forces up the Jinggangshan.  According to Chinese documents the six points of 
attention were put forward on 25 January 1928 with Mao formally promulgating the sets 
together in April 1928.  In January 1929 Mao added two extra Rules for Attention: (7) 
don’t bathe within sight of women, and (8) defecate only in latrines.322  ‘Don’t bathe 
within sight of women’ was replaced by ‘don’t search the pockets of captives’.  This was 
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translated in 1938 by Evans Carlson as: ‘Do not kill or mistreat prisoners.’323  Killing and 
mistreating prisoners was counter-productive as ex-prisoners, as noted earlier, were an 
important source of new recruits for the Red Army.  These rules for the Red Army made 
sure that the people in the liberated areas were looked after and that its soldiers did not 
abuse them in any way.     
 
Military discipline is paramount in any military force and the Red Army also suffered 
from the same problem as most armies throughout history.  On 21 March 1930, Order 
Number Three of the Fourth Red Army Headquarters was promulgated, carrying the 
signatures of Zhu De and Mao Zedong, titled ‘Rectifying Military Bearing and 
Discipline’.324  Its importance should not be underestimated with its aim to stop soldiers 
visiting prostitutes, catching venereal disease and spreading it amongst the population, 
besides its effect on their work.   
 
Turning to the protection of the Jiangxi Soviet, this was not solely in the hands of the Red 
Army and it was here that Mao’s employment of People’s War was to bear fruit.  To 
enable Mao’s vision of using the whole population in some way to defeat the enemy, the 
villages were militarised into a series of ‘local armed units’.  These were the Red Guards 
and Young Pioneers who were tasked to carry out guerrilla operations and to assist the 
Red Army main forces in battle.   They originally had a similar structure to the Red Army 
but this was found too cumbersome and the organization was changed to reflect the small 
unit tactics of the Red Guard and Young Pioneer units.325     
 
The Young Pioneers and Red Guards had two types of battalion, model and normal.   
Model teams of the Red Guards and Young Pioneers were the elite and were used to as a 
model for the normal units to aspire to.  Their structure was three platoons, of two squads 
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each of eleven fighters, with each squad split into two sections.  Three companies of 
model Red Guards and one company of model Young Pioneers made a model battalion 
with three battalions to the regiment.326   The structure for the normal Red Guard armies 
was three squads to the platoon and four platoons to the company.  Three were combat 
platoons and the fourth was a first aid platoon.  It was laid down in orders that the first 
aid platoon should consist of middle-aged women.  The orders further laid down that 
there should be four companies to the battalion, three battalions to the regiment and three 
regiments to the division.327    
 
In October 1930, in his investigation of the Xingguo tenth district known as the 
Yongfeng district, Mao described how an entire district had mobilised the masses by 
militarising the villages.328  There were eight to 15 men in a squad, three squads to a 
platoon and three platoons to a company.  They were all male and they ranged in age 
from 23 to 50.  The Children’s and Youth Corps normally did the day sentry with two 
girls and two boys from the Children’s Corps led by a member of the Youth Corps. Their 
task was to check internal travel passes. They reported directly to a detachment 
commander who was aided by two vice detachment commanders.329 
 
At night, usually two men stood first shift and then another two the second night shift.  In 
times of threat four Red Guards stood guard during the day and in the night 20 or more if 
the situation warranted it.  The Red Guard brigades had separate women’s and men’s 
units.  The women did not normally stand sentry duty except when the men were out of 
the village.  The Youth and Children’s Corps did not separate males or females with the 
Children’s units ranging in age from eight to 15.   The best of the Red Guards and Youth 
Groups became the District Special Agent battalion or in one of three Red Army 
Independent Regiments, each of over 1,000 men.  The rest became part of the Red Army 
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Reserve Corps, as required.  The best unit was the Special Agent Battalion; it was armed 
primarily with shotguns, other locally made guns and a few locally made cannon.   
 
The militarisation of the villages was used by the Viet Minh against the French, and by 
the Viet Cong against South Vietnamese, United States and Australian forces, amongst 
others during the Vietnam War.    
 
 
Soviet Operational Art: The Red Army in the Jiangxi Soviet  
 
As stated at the opening of this chapter, there were two differing versions of the Soviet 
Operational Art in the Red Army.  In Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War, 
Mao further refined his operational art.330   By using this and other material, it is possible 
to trace how the bandit extermination campaigns refined the operational art of the People’s 
Liberation Army. 
 
Mao described ‘Left Opportunism’ in the form of Li Lisan and then the Returned Student 
Faction as being responsible for the setbacks the Red Army suffered.   Li Lisan’s attack on 
Nanchang and the failure of the Red Army in the Fifth Encirclement are explained, 
although he wrote that the seeds were sown in the Fourth Encirclement Campaign.331    
 
Mao describes the strategic defensive as the operational art of the PLA at the time, as it 
was under constant attack but it was not a passive defence.  Mao always proscribed, as the 
current Chinese leadership does, that China is not an expansionist power; so strategic 
defence is the cornerstone of the operational art.  Under this, Mao wrote of the nine rules of 
strategic defence: 
 
a. active and passive defence; 
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b. preparations for countering ‘encirclement and suppression’; 
c. strategic retreat; 
d. strategic counteroffensive; 
e. the problem of starting a counteroffensive; 
f. the problem of concentrating troops; 
g. mobile warfare; 
h. wars of quick decision; and 
i. wars of annihilation. 
 
The Left factions derided this type of war as ‘guerrilla-ism’.  Mao described their 
operational art as: 
a. pit one against ten, pit ten against a hundred, fight bravely and 
daringly, exploit victories by hot pursuit; 
b. attack on all fronts; 
c. seize key cities; and 
d. strike with two fists. 
 
When the enemy attacks, the methods of dealing with him are:   
e. engage the enemy outside the gates; 
f. get control by striking first; 
g. don’t let our pots and pans be smashed; 
h. don’t give up an inch of territory (the meaning of the previous 
rule); and  
i. divide our forces into six routes.332 
  
Mao’s strategy in 1937 had changed little from 1930.  Except for splitting of the forces, the 
Left Opportunist operational art would find little in difference to the operational art of the 
modern PLA.  The modern armoured mobile forces of the PLA are capable of this strategy, 
but the Red Army and the Peoples’ Liberation Army into the 1980s were foot soldiers and 
                                                 
332 . Ibid.,  p. 501. 
 
 96
thus were forced by circumstance to use strategic defence.  Using the performance of the 
Red Army in the encirclement campaigns Mao’s evolution of his operational art is best 
described. 
 
In December 1930 the Jiangxi Soviet was a collection of semi-separate base areas in rural 
central and south western Jiangxi Province.333  The first campaign, which started in 
December 1930, saw the Guomindang force of 12 divisions and two brigades totalling 
100,000 men shattered with heavy losses of men and materiel.334   As Mao Zedong’s and 
Zhu De’s order of 26 December 1930 showed, the Guomindang forces were to be lured 
deep into Xiaobu and the advance forces not attacked early, letting the main force 
escape.335   The order of 29 December 1930 showed that this was the 18th Division, under 
Zhang Huizan, which was to be attacked in a classic pincer movement, and a blocking 
force manoeuvred in its rear to stop any reinforcements.  It was a complete success with 
Zhang Huizan himself captured, along with 9,000 of his soldiers.  On 28 January 1931 
after a public trial and humiliation, he was beheaded and his head floated down the 
Yangtze River towards the Guomindang’s lines atop a small clan tablet from the family 
temple.336     Mao was able to ‘lure the enemy in deep’ despite the Li Lisan line (no retreat 
but attack strategy).337  Mao was successful in having the operational art of strategic retreat 
for the first three bandit campaigns.338   The results of the three campaigns also show how 
the Red Army became more professional.  Mao was fortunate in that the two smashed 
divisions had advanced into an area where popular support for the Red Army was strong, 
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so it was able to manoeuvre and concentrate its forces without the Guomindang 
knowing.339  
 
The Red Army now had to become more professional, especially in non-combat units.   
Shortcomings noted in the First Encirclement Campaign included the lack of terrain 
intelligence, operational planning and the distribution of these plans.  Logistical planning 
and provision in the administrative, medical and catering areas required improvement.340   
Command and control in the battle was poor as was post-battle intelligence, the collection 
of enemy equipment and the handling of wounded and prisoners.  This meant the 
establishment of dedicated logistics and the training of staff officers.341  Early 
improvements were to increase the number of order groups from divisional to company 
levels, increased training for medical personnel in combat rescue, training porters to 
move in ranks and how to move aside so combat troops could pass them, air raid drills, 
weapons training and the improved training of cooks so that their meals were better and 
that cooks should be exempted from performing fatigue duties.342       
 
The second campaign from April to May 1931 saw the destruction of the Guomindang’s 
28th and 43rd divisions and the capture of Jianning in Western Fujian Province.343  The 
Guomindang forces conducted a systematic destruction of food crops in the areas they 
entered forcing the Red Army to assist the peasants to replant their fields.344  Although 
the Guomindang forces had consolidated the areas they captured, they were enveloped 
and units were attacked individually from 15 May 1931 in a series of hammer and anvil 
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manoeuvres, after the Red Army had undertaken a large enveloping movement.345   
Hammer and anvil type attacks after an enveloping manoeuvre were the type of attacks 
favoured in the Soviet Operational style.  The Red Army was able to manoeuvre 
unmolested between the larger Guomindang units, which indicated the poor flank 
security and coordination of the Guomindang forces.346  A smaller unit was first 
destroyed which opened up their right flank and saw both the 28th and 43rd divisions 
rolled up and their retreat to Futian blocked as the Red Army out-manoeuvred them a 
second time during the operation.  The Red Army quickly attacked, and moved to 
Jinniang where the Guomindang unit defending the city attacked them.  The Guomindang 
unit did not realise it was the main force of the Red Army, after diversionary attacks were 
launched against other major Guomindang forces, to hide the main assault being 
undertaken against Jinniang.   After Jinniang was taken, with large amounts of weapons 
and medical supplies, the Red Army consolidated its gains in Western Fujian.347  The 
main points in the follow-up were the need to establish movement control in recently 
captured areas and the collection of enemy equipment captured or discarded on the 
battlefield.348   
 
The third campaign launched in July 1931, just one month after the Second Campaign 
had finished, caught the Red Army off guard. Instead of ex-warlord troops, the 
Guomindang committed some of some of Chiang Kai-shek’s best officers and men.  The 
Guomindang used an attrition-based strategy, moving simultaneously along the entire 
front, meaning their flanks were secure but the pace of the offensive would be slow.349     
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The Guomindang forces did however use lightly equipped mobile forces, which caused 
the Red Army problems.  The base areas to which the Red Army went on the strategic 
defensive, were squeezed until September when there was unexpected relief; the 
Guomindang forces had to be withdrawn to put down a rebellion in Guangdong.350      
The Red Army had slipped behind the Guomindang’s forward units by splitting into 
smaller units and sought to avoid battle in force, instead using guerrilla warfare in the 
rear areas to attack the logistics areas and lines of communications, until the opportunity 
arose to counterattack in strength.351  By early August, the Guomindang forces had been 
on campaign for two months without engaging the main units of the Red Army.  On 17 
August 1931, the order went out for the Red Army to reduce the baggage chain and the 
number of horses so as to facilitate movement at night and to counteract the ‘highly 
mobile forces’ the Guomindang was using.352  Moving by night and resting by day 
became a cornerstone of the Red Army.  It enabled them to manoeuvre in the face of an 
air threat, becoming central to the operational art of the Red Army and later the People’s 
Liberation Army.353    
 
The campaign ended prematurely due to Wang Jingwei and Li Jongren creating an anti-
Chiang Kai-shek government in Gangzhou on 1 June 1931.  Mao disputes this in his 1937 
work but other archival material refutes Mao.354  The rebellion lasted until September 
1931 when Japanese aggression in Manchuria forced all the Chinese leaders to give 
priority to national unity and survival.355  This forced a general withdrawal to regroup 
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and then restore Guomindang control in Guangdong.  Taking advantage of this the Red 
Army attacked the withdrawing units in early September 1931.  On 11 and 12 September 
1931 orders were issued to the Red Army to manoeuvre behind Hen Deqin’s 52nd 
Division and cut off its withdrawal.  The Ninth Division was also severely damaged as it 
withdrew.  The Red Army had a respite from Guomindang attacks for 15 months, which 
enabled it to reorganise and retrain.  This was fortuitous given the internal political 
problems of the Chinese Communist Party that were to impinge directly on the Red 
Army.  
 
 
The Road to the Long March: From Expansion to the Fifth Encirclement 
Campaign   
 
In a political and propaganda coup the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese 
Soviet Republic declared war on Japan on 15 April 1932 and called for the Chinese 
people to rise up and overthrow the Guomindang as only a national revolutionary war 
could defeat the Japanese.356  This was only a gesture, as the document itself noted that 
there was nothing that the Red Army could do to stop the Japanese, but by declaring war 
against Japan, the Chinese Communist Party made itself the only Chinese political group 
willing to fight Japanese and other Imperialist (Western) encroachment on China.357   
 
Mao’s and Zhu’s strategy of ‘luring the enemy in deep’ into the mountains and ambush 
them piecemeal was subject to criticism after the Third Campaign.  Guomindang forces 
had entered deep into the Jiangxi Soviet and had wreaked considerable damage against its 
infrastructure, for comparatively few losses until their withdrawal, as they had forced the 
Red Army to fight on terrain unfavourable to them.  After the Third Encirclement 
Campaign the Jiangxi Soviet had a respite against Guomindang attacks.  It embarked on a 
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series of attacks to expand the territory under its control and internal policing to enforce 
control over its existing territory.   Mao of course refuted this.  He wrote that the strategic 
withdrawal had exhausted the Guomindang forces and described a Guomindang brigade 
commander as remarking of his forces that ‘the fat were worm thin and thin were worn to 
death’.358  Mao admitted that his forces were caught off guard and that they carried out an 
‘extreme type of retreat’ to the rear area of the Soviet as they were attacked by a force ten 
times its size.359  It was exhausted at the end of its withdrawal and required time to 
rest.360 
 
In August 1932 the Red Army expanded the Jiangxi Soviet around Le’an in the north to 
gain more defensive space against further attacks by the Guomindang, which attacked 
from the north.361   They were ordered to attack Nanchang, which they regfused as it 
would have caused the destruction of the Red Army.  Rather, Mao proposed that the Red 
Army attack enemy units in their staging areas instead of attacking cities, as had been 
advocated by the Returned Student Faction or ‘Internationalist’ group that had been 
trained in Russia.362   This led to the Ningdu Conference, named from where it was held, 
to sort out the military strategy of the Red Army.  The conference saw the Returned 
Student Faction strip Mao of his power but then agreed to postpone its actions if he 
agreed to work under Zhou Enlai.363  This was due to Mao’s military prowess and the 
almost complete lack of practical military knowledge of the Returned Student Faction.364 
 
In the period November 1932 to early January, the strategy of the Red Army and the 
Returned Student Faction saw the further expansion of the Jiangxi Soviet into the 
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northeast in eastern Jiangxi and northern Fujian.   The Red Army was thus in a position to 
try and disrupt the expected attack on the Jiangxi Soviet as Guomindang forces 
concentrated for the Fourth Encirclement Campaign.365   The Red Army did not attack 
them as the politburo under the Returned Student Faction forbade it and Mao was not in 
the field.  He was in hospital with a recurring attack of tuberculosis and in no position to 
challenge the faction’s orders.366   
 
When Fourth Encirclement Campaign commenced in December 1932, the Guomindang 
forces totalled 31 divisions and 400,000 troops, including blocking forces, with the main 
strike force being composed of 17 divisions of over 154,000 soldiers. The Encirclement 
Campaign attack coincided with the arrival of the last of the Central Committee, the 
Returned Students who favoured offensive operations and conventional warfare against 
the Guomindang, notably its leader in China, Bo Gu.  They ordered Mao and Zhu, who 
had returned in early January, to confront the Guomindang frontally. Mao and Zhu 
promptly ignored the order as they knew the Red Army was not capable of defeating the 
Guomindang frontally.  Instead they headed to the familiar territory of the Red Army’s 
old staging areas.367  The Guomindang assisted Mao’s strategy by splitting its force into 
three armies, which were not mutually supporting, and followed linear lines of assault 
due to the terrain.  In familiar terrain, the Red Army, using its superior mobility and 
tactics easily manoeuvred around the rear of enemy units, isolating them from support 
and destroying them piecemeal.  The Guomindang’s 52nd Division was ambushed on 27 
February 1933; it was caught in an area of defiles, the narrow walls of which degraded 
their combat effectiveness. It suffered heavy casualties losing 6,000 men in 48 hours.368  
The Guomindang’s 59th Division was also severely defeated one month later and this 
brought the fourth campaign to a finish.369     
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The Red Army had been able to win the four encirclement campaigns by using superior 
tactics and manoeuvre, enjoying better morale and, most importantly, having the trust and 
assistance of ‘the masses’ (peasants) in the countryside.  They provided rear area 
security, porters, intelligence and guided Red Army units through areas with which they 
were not familiar.  These are some of the roles that the People’s Militia after 1949 were 
designated to perform.  Unfortunately for Mao, his disobedience of the Central 
Committee saw him lose completely his military position within the Chinese Communist 
Party.  The Returned Student Faction even claimed it was their strategy that won the 
campaign.   
 
Whitson has argued that Mao’s vision of a People’s War that he promoted in the 1960s 
did not occur in the Jiangxi Soviet and instead conventional combat occurred with the 
Red Army’s main forces – except perhaps during the main forces’ retreat during the 
Third Encirclement Campaign.370  The history of the first four encirclement campaigns 
bears this out. Mao saw the first campaign as justifying his methods yet it started off with 
a spoiling pre-emptive strike, albeit on the expected path of attack.  Although the attack 
was in vain it enabled the Red Army to attack the Guomindang forces from the west.  The 
second was similar but the third attack used the strategy of ‘luring the enemy in deep’ as 
the Red Army was on the strategic defensive and trading space for time until they could 
regroup.  The destruction to the Jiangxi Soviet was extensive, known as ‘the breaking of 
pots and pans’ which is the key flaw to ‘luring the enemy in deep’.  It was called off due 
to other priorities, otherwise it could have achieved far more.  Although the Red Army 
won the Fourth Encirclement Campaign, the Guomindang’s lack of route security in all 
the campaigns was as much to blame as Red Army tactics.  The next campaign would be 
different with no ready victories for the Red Army. 
 
When the Red Army was reorganised in 1933, the army in the Jiangxi Soviet became 
known as the First Red Army under the control of Bo Gu, Otto Braun and Zhou Enlai, 
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supported by the Returned Student Faction.  There were two smaller Red Armies, the 
Second Red Army under He Long in Guizhou and the Fourth Red Army under Zhang 
Guotao in the Szechuan-Shensi border area. 371  
 
  
The Battle in the Cities against the CCP and the Battle for Shanghai 
against the Japanese in 1932 
 
The policy of Annei Rangwei brought together some strange bedfellows.  The security 
services of the International and French Settlements, and by association the imperial 
security networks of the British and French worked with the Guomindang’s Public 
Security Bureau (PSB) to defeat the Communists.  This apparent contradiction was in line 
with the policy of Annei Rangwei as the destruction of the CCP overruled the 
Guomindang’s avowed policy of removing foreign settlements from China.  This did not 
prevent the British authorities suppressing the Guomindang in Malaya and the Straits 
Settlements.372   Two incidents in the first half of 1931 were to destroy the influence of 
the Chinese Communist Party in the cities of China and drive it underground to the effect 
that it was to remain ineffectual in the cities for many years.    
 
In 1930 the Shanghai Municipal Police conducted 69 raids and arrested 540 people for 
disseminating Communist literature, participating in demonstrations and related offences, 
and collected 895 different kinds of Communist literature.373  The year 1931 was even 
busier for the SMP’s Special Branch.  Acting independently and with the assistance of 
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the Guomindang’s Public Security Bureau, the SMP arrested 276 Communists, 
discovered 95 places from where they operated and seized 963,601 copies of 815 
different types of Communist literature.374   It scored two major successes against 
Communist operations in the Settlement, the latter affecting Communist operations in 
North and Southeast Asia.    In April 1931, acting on its own intelligence, the SMP 
conducted 22 raids, arresting 54 persons and seizing approximately 500,000 leaflets.  As 
successful as this operation was, it was dwarfed in June, when the Shanghai Municipal 
Police, working with British Military Intelligence broke up the Far Eastern Bureau of the 
Comintern, almost destroying the Communist parties in China, Japan and Southeast Asia. 
It was not until the second half of the 1930s that the Soviet Union could regain its 
influence and communications.  The clandestine Communist Party in Japan, of which the 
Japanese internal security police had no knowledge, was crippled until after the Second 
World War.  The Jiangxi Soviet lost its major source of funding which had amounted to 
over three million pounds a year; this was a considerable amount of money in China at 
the time.375   
 
Documents captured during a police raid on the first Central Committee of the Malayan 
Communist Party on 29 April 1931 in Singapore established that both the Malayan and 
Chinese Communist Parties were under Comintern control via its Far Eastern Bureau.376   
In June 1931 the Special Branch in Singapore arrested a French Communist, Joseph 
Ducroux, alias Serge Le Franc, and two members of the Malayan Communist Party.377   
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Amongst Ducroux’s documents was his diary, which contained the postal address of the 
Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai and Ho Chi Minh’s address in Hong Kong.378     
 
The SMP’s Special Branch and British Army Intelligence were working together in the 
International Settlement and knew that Hillaire Noulens was involved with the 
Comintern’s operations in North and Southeast Asia and had him under surveillance for 
almost two years before his arrest.379  The SMP had copies of the messages and letters 
sent to him but, being in code, could not decipher them to gain the evidence needed to for 
an arrest.  However, one day he inadvertently left evidence which would have otherwise 
been burnt.  The SMP found that the books he used to decipher the codes were the 
German language version of Bentley’s Commercial Guide and The Lion and the Lamb by 
E. Phillips Oppehnheim.380  This knowledge enabled the decoding of intercepted 
communications.    
 
On 15 June 1931 the SMP’s Special Branch raided the office of Hillaire Noulens and to 
their surprise they discovered he was the Comintern’s man in Asia. A total of 211 
documents and 1,081 books and papers referring to Communist activities in China, Japan 
and North and Southeast Asia were seized.381  These captured documents  and  payroll 
records enabled the breaking up and capture of couriers and agents throughout China, 
Japan, Korea and in Southeast Asia and in Chinese organisations including Guomindang 
secret services and the Shanghai Municipal Police.382  Worse was to come with the arrest 
of Gu Shunzhang.   
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Arrested in April in Hankou, Gu Shunzhang was the leader and chief assassin of the 
CCP’s Special Services Unit or Hongdui (Red Brigade).  It was responsible for 
supporting underground work by providing ‘safe houses, documents, weapons and even 
food and clothing’, as well as surveying Party loyalty and disciplining those who strayed.  
This meant death for any members that defected.383  Further, Gu Shunzhang was also a 
senior member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party.  He had been sent with a team to assassinate Chiang Kai-shek and 
decided to defect to save his life.384  A Communist agent in Chiang Kai-shek’s office 
alerted the Central Committee in Shanghai, so some were able to leave before they could 
be captured, but many other Party members were not so lucky.      
 
When the CCP found out that Gu Shunzhang had defected to the Guomindang in June, in 
retaliation they kidnapped and murdered his wife and parents in-laws.  On 22 November, 
their bodies were dug up with other CCP members punished by the Red Brigade.385  
Upon learning of the death of his family Gu acted with ruthlessness.  He knew many of 
the underground cells in Chinese cities, thus the Chinese Communist Party organisations 
in Chinese cities were broken. These included agents in various Guomindang 
departments; the Red Army’s Second Army group cell in Wuhan; and Xiang Zhongfa, 
the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.386   Party members who had been 
jailed but had hidden their true identity were identified, leading to their deaths - including 
Yun Daiying, the leader of the Revolutionary Wing of the CCP and a Central Committee 
member.387  In the three-month period from June to August 1931 the French Security 
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Service estimated that the number of Communists executed due to Gu’s defection was 
estimated at ‘several thousands’.388  Many of those who survived fled to the Jiangxi 
Soviet and thus the Central Committee and the Red Army were finally together.  This 
caused the friction between them which did not end for many years.       
 
If 1931 had been an adverse year for the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai, 1932 
and 1933 were to be worse.  The Japanese attack on the Chinese areas of Shanghai from 
28 January to 2 March 1932 disrupted the CCP so much that it was unable to reorganise 
itself for contact with Communist groups in Southeast Asia.  Moreover, from May 1932 
to October 1933, there were 16 major joint operations between the police forces of the 
International Settlement, French Concession and the Guomindang.389  The Chinese 
Communist Party had to abandon Shanghai as its base from at least early July 1932, with 
the last members having left by early 1933.390     
 
The attacks in the International Settlement in 1932 alone saw the Shanghai Municipal 
Police locate 103 buildings the Communists were using, and the prosecution of 233 
persons for Communist offences.391  Included in the arrests were Chen Duxiu, the first 
Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party who now led a breakaway Trotskyite 
Communist group, and 11 of his principal assistants.  Chen Duxiu received 13 years 
imprisonment and 15 years deprivation of civil rights.392    Another major success was 
the break-up of the Central Office of the Chinese Youth League on 18 November 1932, 
which resulted in the arrest of its head and eight other officials.393  This raid also netted 
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over 1,500 documents including, importantly, ones about Communist activities in 
Shanghai, other cities and various parts of China.394  It was not until August 1933 that the 
Comintern had properly established itself in Shanghai and was able to start remitting 
funds to Communist movements in Southeast Asia.395    
 
The state of the Chinese Communist Party reflected the attacks upon it in China and by 
the International Settlement police.  In the International Settlement the successes 
continued into 1933, with 223 Communists prosecuted and 174 addresses discovered 
from which they operated.  Communist literature seized was of 338 different kinds and 
totalled 71,607 pieces.396   The breaking up of the military committee of the CCP saw the 
arrest of nine Chinese and one Annamite, and the seizure of literature in English, French, 
Annamite, Japanese, Gurmukhi and Chinese.397     
 
The Shanghai Municipal Police with the assistance of the Public Security Bureau 
continued their attacks on the Chinese Communist Party in the International Settlement 
where in 1933, 131 Communists were convicted and 91 handed over to the Guomindang, 
including five sentenced to death.398  During 1933 Communist operations in Shanghai 
centred on mainly propaganda and assassination of Guomindang security officials by the 
‘Dog Beating Corps’ – as the CCP’s Red Brigade was commonly called.  Between 
November 1932 and September 1933, members of the Chinese Communist ‘Dog Beating 
Corps’ operating from within the Settlement conducted four assassinations of 
Guomindang  officials there.  Six were arrested along with a large quantity of 
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ammunition and weapons, including 11 automatic pistols with five spare magazines and 
over 1,000 rounds of ammunition.399    
 
The killings did not stop, however, as the CCP carried out ‘purification’ of the Party in 
1934, and the killing of Guomindang agents in and around Shanghai.400   As noted, the 
Comintern had restarted its operations in Shanghai and police intelligence indicated it 
was much better organised for subversion.401  Operations in 1934 by the Shanghai 
Municipal Police to suppress Communism, in cooperation with the Public Security 
Bureau, effectively destroyed the Chinese Communist Party in the International 
Settlement.   The Shanghai Municipal Police prosecuted 149 Communists and discovered 
142 addresses from where they operated.   In conjunction with the raids, the SMP seized 
the outfits of three secret radio stations, and 27 pistols with over 1,000 rounds of 
ammunition.402    In March 1934 Guomindang security services raided the Jiangsu Party 
Headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party, completely disrupting Communist 
activities in Shanghai and the surrounding countryside.403    
 
The Guomindang had not shown any resistance to the Japanese encroachments on its 
territories.  The policy of Annei Rangwei coupled with strategic withdrawal, trading land 
for time against the Japanese, saw Manchuria fall with little resistance.  Chiang Kai-
shek’s main forces had been used in combat against the Communist base areas and 
rebellions within the Guomindang.  The policy of strategic withdrawal stood firm until 
Shanghai in early 1932.    
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The Japanese Army in China was not that much better armed than the Chinese forces it 
faced, especially in regards to infantry weapons.  The Japanese Army in 1925 had no 
machine guns at the battalion level and no light machine guns.  They still advanced in 
line as they did in the Russo-Japanese war with close quarter combat, relying on the 
bayonet as the core tactic, with these tactical principles maintained right up to the Second 
World War.404  What it did have, however, was far better training, standardised weapons 
and artillery.    
  
To make up for a lack of modern weapons the army relied on seishen.  It came to mean 
more than ultimate sacrifice under desperate circumstances - it transcended the necessity 
for modern scientific weapons capability.405  Sakairai Todayoshi wrote a book, Human 
Bullets, which glorified the Japanese Army in terms of its soldiery and their seishen 
based on the Japanese Army’s experiences in the Russo-Japanese War.406  Seishen saw 
the Army depend on ‘expendable’ men rather than expensive weapons. which was the 
direct opposite of the navy. 407 
 
The emphasis on Seishen led to the 1928 manual, Basic Principles of the Imperial Army, 
which placed particular emphasis on spirit or morale as superior to material in combat, in 
recognition of Japan’s ‘insufficient numbers of troops and scant resources’. The words 
surrender, retreat and defence were removed from the manual.  This permeated through 
the army field manuals and training material and became an integral part of the school 
and youth material; later, it was part of the Army’s general propaganda to the Japanese 
people.408   
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After the 1925 reductions, the Army was authorised to activate a small experimental tank 
unit, two regiments of anti-aircraft artillery and the Taiwan Mountain Artillery Battalion.  
Heavy machine gun and motor transport units were expanded, the development of a light 
machine gun started and wireless communications equipment was improved.  The two 
aircraft battalions were expanded into air regiments and became a separate branch of the 
army.409  Units that were destined in China were equipped with the new equipment first.  
When the Japanese forces were involved in Shanghai in 1932 they certainly employed 
armoured units and were seen with machine guns at below battalion level. 
 
In the 1932 Battle for Shanghai, Japanese forces used the Type 89 tank, the French NC 
and the Type 88 tankette.410   The latter were Carden-Loyd light machine gun carriers Mk 
IV, six being purchased by Japan in 1928, with two more Mk IVb models purchased later 
on.411  The French NC was not popular as the engine suffered from overheating, the 
power train was prone to malfunctions and the suspension easily damaged.412  The Type 
88 was popular and robust and was also used in the 1937 Battle of Shanghai.  The Type 
89 was equipped with a short 57 mm gun and two 6.5 mm machine guns.  Its armour was 
between 6 and 17 mm and weighed 9.8 tonnes.  The vehicle was 4,300mm long, 2150 
mm wide and 2,200 mm high.413  The Type 88 was 2,464 mm long, 1994 mm wide and 
1219 mm high and weighed 1.5 tonnes. It was equipped with one .303 in Vickers water 
cooled machine gun.414 
 
The 19th Route Army under Cai Tingkai was garrisoned in Shanghai as the anti-Japanese 
boycott and anti-Japanese sentiment were starting to affect Japanese businesses in 
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Shanghai.  A series of incidents in late 1931 came to a head in early January 1932 when 
five Japanese priests were beaten up by a group of Chinese, secretly organised by Major 
Tanaka Ryūkichi of the Japanese Secret Services; it was done to draw foreign attention 
away from the setting up of the puppet state of Manchuko.415  The Japanese used this to 
give the Guomindang a series of ultimatums.  Eventually these were refused and the 
Chinese city of Zhabei in Shanghai became a war zone.416  The 19th was composed of the 
60th, 61st and 78th Divisions from Guangdong and the 87th and 88th Divisions from 
Jiangsu stiffened with Guangdong cadres.417  Its title belied its strength as it had only 
33,000 soldiers, the equivalent of three divisions.418  They resisted the Japanese in 
Shanghai for 35 days and showed Chinese soldiers to be effective if well led and 
equipped.    They withdrew, as they received few reinforcements from other Guomindang 
forces to replace casualties and ammunition.419  After the armistice the 19th Route 
Army’s soldiers were regarded as national heroes but were not popular with the 
Guomindang government in Nanjing.  They were sent to Fujian as Chiang Kai-shek did 
not want them near any major cities and hoped that by being used in the anti-Communist 
role, they and the Communists would both be weakened.  The city of Zhabei was handed 
back a smoking ruin.    
 
The 19th Route Army, feeling aggrieved at their treatment and opposed to Chang Kai-
shek’s policy regarding the Japanese, rebelled in November 1933 and set up a rival 
government in Fujian.  The Army was essentially composed of soldiers from Guangdong 
Province who owed no loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek, especially in view of their treatment 
after the 1932 Battle for Shanghai.   The rebellion was quickly crushed as agents of Dai 
Li, who was the head of the Guomindang’s Secret Services, the Jutong, had undermined 
                                                 
415 . Wakeman, op. cit., p. 187. 
 
416 .  Shanghai was split into the International Settlement, French City and the Chinese City of Zhaibei, 
which in reality was the city. The correct term by non-Chinese was the Chinese city of Zhaibei. 
 
417 . ‘The Fighting at Shanghai’, Journal of the RUSI, Vol. LXXVII, No. 506, May 1932, p. 393. 
 
418 . Wakeman, op. cit., p. 189. 
  
419 . ‘The Fighting at Shanghai’, op. cit., p. 394. 
 
 114
two key commanders of the 19th Route Army through bribery.  The Guomindang was 
given the 19th Route Army’s codebooks, which meant they were able to read all of the 
19th Route Army message traffic and plans.  The bribery also enabled Guomindang forces 
to attack through Fuzhou unopposed in January 1934, which enabled the rebellion to be 
quickly crushed.420  The Chinese Communist Party and the Fujian rebels sent officers to 
the Jiangxi Soviet to see whether it was to join with the Red Army.  The CCP’s Central 
Committee decided after much debate in the negative, even though this would have 
meant relief for Communist forces in the Jiangxi-Fujian border area, who were cut off 
from the main force in the Jiangxi Soviet due to the Fifth Encirclement Campaign.421   
 
 
The Fifth Encirclement Campaign, the Loss of the Jiangxi Soviet, and the 
Road to Ya’nan 
 
The Fifth Encirclement Campaign, which led to the famous Long March and Mao 
becoming the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, saw the Guomindang finally 
succeed in destroying the Jiangxi Soviet.   Instead of a three-month campaign, the 
Guomindang’s logistics were built up to wage siege warfare and a campaign of attrition 
with the new tactics negating the Red Army’s strengths in manoeuvre.   
 
Firstly, the Guomindang had modified their divisional structure and created the Anti-
Communist Division.  It reduced the number of headquarters units to simplify command 
and control and emphasised bringing all combat units up to full strength.   Secondly, the 
advance was to be slow, deliberate and linear to avoid flank attacks, and was supported 
by blockhouses, which isolated the battlefield and secured the rear areas from attack.422  
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A soon as the advance stopped blockhouses were built to secure the areas taken.423  This 
negated Mao’s strategy of ‘luring the enemy deep’ into the Jiangxi Soviet, isolating them 
from supporting forces and then destroying them with a series of ambushes.  
 
The problem of attacking fortified villages and blockhouses had been identified in 1931 
as the Red Army sought to destroy fortified villages where the remnants of the local 
gentry lived.  Zhu De and Mao ordered that the tactics employed by various units to 
destroy the blockhouses, and in now what is known as urban warfare, were to be 
collected and documented for use throughout the Red Army.424  Attacks on blockhouses 
were generally expensive in casualties or ineffective due to the Communist’s lack of 
supporting weapons.  Tunnelling was the preferred option in the countryside.425 
 
As part of the Guomindang’s new strategy, before the battle, lectures were conducted in 
Lushan for cadres from all the Guomindang divisions involved, where Chiang Kai-shek 
stressed that a counterinsurgency campaign was 70 percent political and 30 percent 
military.   This is significant as it was seen as much more ‘a hearts and minds’ campaign. 
It was used to consolidate the areas that they had captured by winning over ‘the masses’ 
as the Red Army had done and was their primary role.426    
 
The change in Guomindang tactics was aided by a change in strategy by the Returned 
Student Faction that now controlled the strategy of the Red Army.  Instead of letting the 
enemy move deep into the Soviet and then attacking it when it was advantageous, the 
Red Army was forced to attack the Guomindang forces on its borders to take back cities 
and territories lost.  Thus when the city of Lichuan was lost early in the campaign, the 
Red Army was bled white against the blockhouses, trying to retake it.  Mao wrote that his 
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strategy of strategic defence would have entailed the Red Army give battle in a place and 
time of its choosing, as in the year-long campaign there would have been 
opportunities.427   
 
The Returned Student Faction was well aware of the problem as Otto Braun wrote: 
‘Strategically, we were on the defensive.  Still, we could not permit ourselves to sink into 
positional war, but had to solve the double task of preserving our essential strength 
through tactical manoeuvres and attacks.’428 
 
Mao further wrote that the Returned Student Faction could not identify the first battle 
from which the Red Army could launch a counterattack.  Mao’s strategy would have 
been doomed to failure as the Guomindang forces were stronger and offered no room to 
manoeuvre for flank or rear attacks. Mao failed to recognise that Guomindang’s 
blockhouse strategy and its slow methodical attack negated the ability of the Red Army to 
isolate Guomindang units. Moreover, if attacked, or they suffered a reverse, they quickly 
retreated behind the blockhouses to regroup and await the inevitable Red Army attack.   
The Guomindang simply were not going to be ‘lured deep’ into the Jiangxi Soviet 
unsupported by flanking units and blockhouses. 
 
Mao further accused the Returned Student Faction of lacking strategic leadership but it is 
difficult to see what they could do but to withdraw.429   The tactics of the Red Army in 
the Fifth Encirclement Campaign were to fight for every bit of territory and to 
counterattack on a wide front with ‘short sharp thrusts’, which was all they could do to 
obtain time, even if it meant receiving heavy casualties.  Lin Biao’s method to attack 
against these blockhouses was to launch a feint, make the Guomindang forces move out 
from them, and then have his forces launch a flank attack.  Very difficult to coordinate, 
the Guomindang forces just retreated back to the blockhouses, leaving the Red Army 
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units involved in the open.  They were then attacked by Guomindang artillery and aircraft 
which decimated them, causing a steady loss of its strength.430  The Returned Student 
Faction rightly argued that any ground lost to the Guomindang forces was lost forever as 
it was quickly fortified, and the people behind the blockhouses were then suppressed – 
the ‘smashing of pots and pans’.431      
 
A spoiling offensive against Guomindang forces north of Guangchang in late April 
failed, mainly due to the flanking force arriving late and failing to engage the 
Guomindang forces, leaving the attacking force exposed in the open which wore the 
brunt of and was savaged by Guomindang artillery and aircraft.  This failure which led to 
the loss of Guangchang convinced the central committee in the Jiangxi Soviet the Red 
Army and the central committee needed to withdraw from the Jiangxi Soviet. 432   Mao 
was vehemently opposed to any breakout and still believed that he could ‘lure the enemy 
in deep’ and stood by this belief in his writings after the Long March.433   
 
The Long March actually consisted of five separate retreats from Guomindang 
encirclements, and the mythology surrounding the performance of the Red Army, the 
actions it faced and Mao’s performance and influence on it, started almost from its 
completion.   
 
Preparations for the breakthrough started in May 1934.  The objective was to give the 
Red Army an area where it could manoeuvre, and after linking up with the Second and 
Sixth Corps, create a new base area in the Hunan-Guizhou border area.434  Unknown at 
the time was that the Second Corps was also on the move due to Guomindang offensives.  
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Operational security was paramount and initially only the central committee and army 
commanders knew of the breakout.  This was gradually relaxed with the junior troops 
being told just one week before the breakout.  Mao criticised this as it led to ‘insufficient 
political training’ but the need to keep the operation secret and to forestall desertions was 
paramount.435  The future of the Chinese Communist Party depended on it.  To conceal 
the Red Army’s massing for a withdrawal, the ‘short sharp thrusts’ were gradually taken 
over by local and guerrilla forces.   
  
Besides hiding the Red Army’s intentions it battle hardened the local units which were 
tasked to stay behind after the Red Army left.  Mao’s ideas were unsuitable.   
Preparations were essentially completed on 1 October 1934 and on 16 October the main 
force of the Red Army commenced its breakout from the Jiangxi Soviet and so began the 
Long March. 436   
  
The effect of overwhelming firepower on forces with little room to manoeuvre, as 
occurred during the Fifth Encirclement Campaign, were forgotten by the staff of the 
Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) in Korea.  Lin Biao’s ‘Iron Divisions’ attacked the 
United States Marine Corps (USMC) First Marine Division in the Chosin Reservoir 
campaign in late 1950.  The First Marine Division conducted a strategic withdrawal and 
USMC aircraft and US Navy aircraft were able to attack the CPV as they grouped to 
attack the Marines, covering the Marines’ withdrawal.  After the Korean front stabilised 
in early 1951, the United Nations forces’ overwhelming superiority in firepower caused 
the CPV to be bled white as it battered itself against the United Nations front lines.  There 
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were no flanks, again like the Fifth Encirclement Campaign, and thus there was no room 
to manoeuvre.   Almost thirty years later during the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict the 
PLA again employed the same tactics with the same predictable results.  Their forces 
involved were hammered.    
 
 
The Arming and Organisation of the Red Army: ‘The Kind of War to 
Fight Depends on What Kinds of Arms We Have’437  
 
The organisation of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army was never as structured as the 
plans laid down by Mao and Zhu.  From its earliest days the arming of the Red Army was 
problematic at best, as it equipped itself with whatever weapons it could capture.  Relying 
on captured weapons and ammunition, and given the chaotic state of the Guomindang’s 
weapons procurement, and that many of the units were ex-warlord armies, meant that 
there was no standardisation in the Red Army’s weapons and ammunition.   Warlord 
armies were supplied from an assortment of local and overseas sources and there was 
little or no standardisation with the Nationalist Army.      
 
The armies of the late Qing had settled on the 7.92 x 57 mm round for their rifles but 
there were still many different calibres in circulation.  The Nationalists were no better as 
the Northern Expedition was equipped from a variety of sources including the Soviet 
Union, and the incorporation of warlord armies only compounded the problem of non-
standard weapons and ammunition.  Further hampering logistics, the 7.92 mm round was 
available in two different versions, one being too powerful to use in rifles chambered for 
the other.  The Arsenals at Hanyang in 1928 and later Shanghai supplied new bolt-action 
rifles and the Shanghai Arsenal also supplied 82mm mortars.438  To be fair, the Chinese 
were not the only ones guilty of having many varied calibres.   For example, the British 
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Army started the Second World War with four calibres for the small arms in the battalion 
and by the end of the war this had grown to eight; the German Army in the Second World 
War was worse – it used captured weapons on an immense scale.439  Appendix One 
shows the problem of the differing weapons types and ammunition in service made by the 
Guomindang Arsenal Administration Office in December 1934.  This plethora of 
different weapon and ammunition types, which was compounded in 1945 with ex-United 
States and Japanese equipment, was to continue to plague Chinese Communist military 
forces up until the 1960s.440  
   
The Red Army’s main forces were as fully armed as possible, with the Red Guard and 
Pioneer units on a lesser scale, supplementing them with ‘naked blades’ (spears).   The 
amount of weapons available depended on their success in battle.   In 1928 the Red Army 
on paper had 75 rifles in the company.  The Red Army was so successful in battle that in 
June 1931 it was noted that ‘each company should carry at least 90 guns with it, even if it 
does not have enough people’.441   Similarly success in battle saw another problem.  The 
Red Army in 1931 and 1932 had a problem that has plagued armies before them and 
after, soldiers overloaded carrying too much ammunition.  In 1932, Zhu De and Mao 
Zedong signed an order that said, ‘It appears that the most valuable thing for an army in 
combat is swiftness’; and later on, ‘Therefore, it is hereby stipulated that the number of 
bullets each fighter carries may not exceed 150 rounds at most’.442  One bonus in the 
victories after the Fourth Encirclement Campaign was that each Red Army division was 
able to have four or five mortars.443 
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Guerrilla detachments, the Red Guards and the Young Pioneers had a lesser scale of 
rifles, supplemented by spears that were laid down to be a uniform 1,575 mm long.444   A 
guerrilla detachment was to have three squads armed with rifles and two with spears.   
For model teams of the Red Guards and Young Pioneers each squad should be allocated 
three rifles for the squad heads and two group heads each, the other eight having 
spears.445   If spare rifles were available, two to four rifles per squad could be issued to 
give 35 to 47 rifles in each company instead of the stipulated minimum of 23 rifles.446 
 
Successes in the 1933 Bandit Extermination Campaigns saw the Red Army grow to over 
40,000 and better armed, especially in machine guns.  Mortars were available but 
ammunition was not.  Rifle and machine gun ammunition was manufactured from 
reloading used cartridge cases, small arms were being repaired in their own arsenal and 
hand grenades were manufactured.  Radios and telephones were in good supply and from 
1934 mortar bombs were also manufactured.447    
 
Turning to its organisation, the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army in 1928 had 
the most modern infantry squad structure of its time, and from there, the structure had 
been adopted all over the world.  This came about because the army was new and was 
imbued with a sense of being revolutionary in thought and behaviour.  Mao had proposed 
a regimental structure that was based on the Guomindang’s, which itself was based on the 
late Qing.448  It was to be composed of a headquarters, three infantry battalions and one 
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machine gun, trench mortar and special task company each.449   He was overruled in May 
1928 by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, with its Directive 
Number 51, titled ‘the Question of Setting up the Red Army’. The directive 
recommended the use of available arms, including old-fashioned guns and swords and 
that the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army should apply the ‘Taiping Heavenly 
Kingdom’ organisation.  The Taiping ‘three-five’ system was to be used: twelve men to a 
squad, three squads to a platoon, five platoons to a company, five companies to a 
regiment and five regiments to a division, each division to have 4,500 men.450  The small 
amount of weapons meant that only two companies in each regiment could have firearms.   
The Central Committee selected the Taiping system and spirit as it was suitable for 
guerrilla operations.451  The Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army composed its infantry 
squad into three four-man groups.   
 
This was also based on the Taiping rebels’ structure but the platoon structure differed in 
that the Tapings’ had five groups of four men and five at the platoon headquarters.452   
The structure enabled the squad to be a small independent unit that could provide its own 
fire and manoeuvre.  The People’s Liberation Army following on from The Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Red Army, has utilised this type of organisation in the infantry squad since 
1928 and its use is ingrained in all its soldiers.  Thus fire and movement is simplified, as 
each sub-group in any PLA organisation understands its role if called into combat.   
 
Each infantry company was allowed to have 75 rifles (long-barrelled guns) and six 
handguns guns per company, and 40 rifles per machine gun and mortar companies.453   
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Weapons captured during the Bandit Extermination Campaigns may have allowed some 
units of the Red Army to approach the equipment levels of the organisation charts.   
 
In 1930, after Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army had organised itself in the Jiangxi 
Soviet, the tactical unit was the corps.  This would seem unusual as a corps is normally 
composed of two or three divisions and is too large as a tactical unit.  Looking at the Red 
Army’s organisation charts this appears true as a Red Army corps consisted of three 
infantry divisions with three regiments each.  However the Red Army had conformed to 
the Chinese military trait of overstating the size of their units.  A regiment was nominally 
composed of four infantry companies and a machine gun company when the availability 
of men and equipment permitted it.  A company was composed of three platoons each of 
three squads of 10 men.  Thus a regiment was actually battalion strength and a division at 
best a regiment with a corps having the strength of a division.454  Thus the Red Army was 
structured with too many headquarters units.       
 
In May 1931 the Third Army under Mao Zedong and Zhu De was estimated by the 
Guomindang to number 14,000 men with 8,800 rifles, 157 machine guns, 10 cannon and 
16 trench mortars.  By January 1932, after the end of the Third Bandit Extermination 
Campaign, it was estimated by the Guomindang that the Red Army’s First Group of 
Armies, comprising the Third, Fourth and 12th Armies, numbered 50,000 men with 
50,000 rifles.455  Thus the Communist Armies in the Jiangxi Soviet were becoming 
stronger after each successive Bandit Extermination Campaign and after the third one had 
become a very strong force.  By December 1932 a mortar company of 120 officers and 
other ranks with four to six mortars, 40 rifles and six pistols was added to the division.  
The mortars were obtained through the Guomindang’s Bandit Extermination Campaigns.   
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Also added were a special service company of 95 officers and other ranks with 88 rifles 
and a communications platoon of 60 officers and other ranks.456   
 
In 1933 the Comintern sent Otto Braun, who had just passed the Frunze Military 
Academy, to act as a military advisor.457  The Guomindang identified him as Chey and 
the Chinese Communists called him Li De (Li the German).458  He reorganised the Red 
Army in line with Soviet Union’s divisional structure of the time.  He recommended that 
the corps be abolished and that the reorganised division become the tactical unit.  There 
were two other major changes recommended.  The first was that a regiment was to 
consist of three rifle battalions and a machine gun company, and that the company 
structure, which had previously been subordinate to the regiment become subordinate to 
the battalion.  The second was the platoon was to consist of three rifle squads and a light 
machine gun squad.  Zhou Enlai, the vice-president of the Military Commission, ordered 
the changes on 1 October 1933 and at the same time each squad was ordered to select 
marksmen.  There was also added a reconnaissance team of 40 men at divisional level, 18 
to each regiment and six to each battalion.  The division was to be composed of three rifle 
regiments, a mortar detachment of between two and six mortars, a reconnaissance 
company, an intelligence company and a guard (staff) company.459   
 
The significant organisational change to the 1937 Chinese infantry division was the 
introduction into the section/squad of two groups each of four men.  One was the light 
machine gun group, the other the rifle group.460  This was done on the recommendation 
of the German military advisors.  The machine gun group was equipped with one ZB26 
light machine gun with the other members equipped with Mauser Schnellfeuer machine 
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pistols.461  The rifle group had four 7.92 mm bolt action rifles.  The Mauser C-96 
'Broomhandle' automatic pistol and its Spanish copies were generally accepted as the 
standard sidearm of the Guomindang.462  This was the same structure as the German 
assault or ‘storm’ troops in the First World War who had by 1918 evolved its section into 
a stoss grupp comprising a light machine gun squad (lechte maschinegewehrtrupp) with 
five soldiers and an assault squad (stoss trupp) of seven riflemen.463  This occurred just 
as the rest of the world’s militaries were going to three light machine guns per platoon, so 
they were still going to be behind the rest of the world, especially when compared with 
the Japanese and the Chinese Communists.  The Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, now 
designated the Eighth Route Army, was still using the Taiping squad structure. 
 
The splitting of the squad into two equal groups, or teams, was seen as a tactical 
innovation by Captain Evans Carlson who was a United States Marine Corps officer 
visiting Yan’an in 1938.464   However, the use of fire teams by the Eighth Route Army 
was not the first time fire teams had been used in modern warfare, or in China.465   In 
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1937 and 1938, General W. M. Greene when a captain with the Fourth Marine Regiment 
in the International Settlement in Shanghai, developed and organised his Marine rifle 
company for riot control.466  It was based around ‘four man fighting teams’, with each 
team imbued with the ‘Follow Me’ spirit which was similar in concept to Carlson’s Gung 
Ho philosophy.467  Carlson had discussions with Greene about his experiences with the 
Eighth Route Army, and Greene’s use of four-man teams, whilst transiting in Shanghai 
during his return to the United States.468      
 
It was a change of strategy rather than a lack of materiel that was the major reason for the 
Communist’s withdrawal from the Jiangxi Soviet.  The losses of the Red Army after the 
Long March and the One Hundred Regiments Campaign would not have allowed this 
structure to be equipped until after the end of the Second World War when ex-Japanese 
and captured Nationalist weapons were available on a large scale.    
 
The structure of the Red Army infantry battalion did not change greatly until the early 
losses in the Korean War.  The way it operated did however.  Although overwhelmingly 
an infantry force, from 1946 to 1949 guerrilla warfare tactics became less important as 
battles were fought against regular Guomindang forces.  As more weapons were captured 
from the Guomindang, sub-machine guns and light machine guns became available to the 
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platoon commander and light mortars to the company commander.469  The existing 
structure could absorb these new weapon types but at the battalion level medium mortar 
and machine gun platoons were added.    
 
 
Tactics - The Hand Grenade and the Bayonet  
 
Guerrilla warfare was the type of fighting that the Red Army practised and with which it 
was successful.   Mao wrote in April 1929 that his guerrilla tactics were derived from ‘the 
struggle of the past three years’ and claimed they were unique, the Red Army’s, and not 
copied from any previous doctrine.470  This is interesting as there was no Red Army until 
August 1927.  Mao had thus been formulating his strategy of using the masses (peasants) 
in the countryside for a rural-based revolution from at least 1926.  Given that China was 
essentially a rural based economy this made sense, but contradicted the Marxist-Leninist 
advocacy of a city-based revolution.      
 
The basic rules for combat for the Red Army that Mao developed in conjunction with 
Zhu De were: 
a. divide our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our forces to deal with 
  the enemy; 
b. the enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, 
we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue;471 
c. to extend stable base areas, employ the policy advancing in waves; when 
pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policy of circling around; and 
d. arouse the largest numbers of the masses in the shortest possible time and by 
the best possible methods.472 
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The Red Army fought in mountains from its inception and emphasised close combat from 
which evolved Mao’s ‘man over machine’ philosophy and the concept of ‘People’s War’.    
This emphasis on training and morale over materiel continued until recently.  Training of 
the Red Army in the early days of the Jiangxi Soviet was simple and emphasised three 
areas: capturing hilltops, rifle marksmanship and throwing hand grenades.  After the 
Third Extermination Campaign bayonet drill was added.473  In the war with Japan, 1937 
to 1945, and the civil war from 1946 to 1949, the four areas of training emphasised were 
shooting, bayonet drill, throwing grenades, and employing mines and booby traps.474   
Hand grenades became the primary weapon of the Red Army who used covering fire to 
get close enough to use hand grenades.   
 
China became involved in the Korean War (1950 – 1953) with the People’s Liberation 
Army being  known as the ‘Chinese People’s Volunteers’ (CPV)  who came to the aid of 
the North Korean Army against United Nations Forces as they approached the Chinese 
border.  In the early days of the Korean War, the tactics of the CPV in quietly moving up 
to and infiltrating United Nations positions, then using automatic fire from sub-machine 
guns positions to provide cover whilst throwing hand grenades, was generally successful.   
That was until they met the United States Marine Corps.475    
 
The history of the Jiangxi Soviet revealed the ultimate folly of guerrilla forces which 
decide to employ conventional, as opposed to guerrilla, tactics against larger government 
forces; they invariably lose as the government forces can bring all their firepower to bear.  
                                                                                                                                                 
472 . Ibid., pp. 155 & 156. 
 
473 . Cheng, C.J. (ed).   The Politics of the Chinese Red Army: A Translation of the Bulletin of 
Activities of the People’s Liberation Army, Hoover Institution of War, Revolution and Peace, 
Stanford, 1966, p. 265. 
 
474.  Ibid. 
 
475 . Koperts, K.   ‘The Origins of the Fire Team: Excerpts From An Interview With Homer L. 
Litzenberg, 27-30 April 1951’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 84, No. 12, p. 44; Thomas, 
R.C.W.   ‘The Chinese Communist Forces in Korea, Army Quarterly, October 1952,  
pp. 37 & 39 .  
 
 129
Mao’s operational art based on strategic defence and ‘luring the enemy in deep’ 
depended on manoeuvre and strategic depth, and the attacking forces complying by 
letting themselves be drawn into a series of ambushes in terrain favourable to Red Army.  
The policy of counterattacking by primarily guerrilla and lightly armed forces, as 
occurred in the Fifth Encirclement Campaign, resulted in the Red Army bleeding itself 
white in the face of the firepower that the Guomindang could bring to bear.  The 
Communist forces’ attacks were blunted and stopped by the blockhouses. This was the 
classic ‘hammer and anvil’ approach to defence and counterattacks.   
 
The next chapter examines how the lessons of the Jiangxi Soviet were put into practice 
after the completion at the Long March.  These lessons were seemingly ignored in the 
disastrous Hundred Regiments Campaign against the Japanese and their retaliation which 
wreaked immense damage on the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Army.  Yet they 
rebuilt themselves and when the Red Army was renamed the People’s Liberation Army 
in 1946, both it and the Party were ready to challenge the Guomindang for the control of 
China.  In just a little over three years of civil war, the Chinese Communist Party became 
the new the government of China. 
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Chapter Three  
The Operational Art Formalised and Tested, 1935 - 1949  
 
 
The success of the Fifth Encirclement Campaign and the subsequent Long March by the 
Red Army and the Central Committee of the CCP meant that the Party members in the 
cities were isolated and tried to continue the struggle, but were under constant attack.  Six 
branch headquarters were located in the International Settlement during 1935.  The raids 
yielded 91 identified Communists, of whom 69 were transferred to the Guomindang.476   
Only 18 Communists were arrested in the International Settlement in 1936, so successful 
had been the joint SMP-PSB operations in 1935.477 
 
The formation of the ‘Second United Front’ meant it was no longer a crime to be a 
communist in China, and Communist Party members in Shanghai and elsewhere surfaced 
again.  In Shanghai their freedom of action was cut short by the Japanese occupation of 
Shanghai after bitter fighting at the start of the Sino-Japanese War.  No longer regarded 
as bandits, they could now openly seek safety inside the International Settlement. 
 
On 7 July 1937 Japanese and Chinese forces clashed at the Marco Polo Bridge 
precipitating China’s War of Resistance, and on 13 August the Japanese launched their 
attack on Shanghai.478  By 11 November 1937 the Chinese had withdrawn from the 
environs of Shanghai, except for one battalion which was cut off and was interned in the 
International Settlement.479  The 1937 and 1938 Annual Police Reports of the Shanghai 
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Municipal Police mention communism only once: a raid on a bookstore.480  Given the 
three-month Japanese assault on Shanghai in 1937, and its subsequent capture, this is not 
at all surprising.     
 
The Guomindang Secret Service now took over assassination of Chinese who were aiding 
the Japanese, using the safety of the International Settlement as the base of operations.  
They were an unwelcome presence; the 1938 Annual Police Report noted that ‘14 
Chinese males were assassinated for political reasons’.  To this figure must be added 
Chief Detective Superintendent Lu Liankui who had been responsible for the running of 
the Chinese defectives in the Shanghai Municipal Police.  He was sitting in his car 
outside the Canton Hotel, when on 18 August 1938, three armed men appeared, shot him 
and made their escape.  Most likely he was killed by the Guomindang Secret Police as he 
had been secretly working as a Japanese agent, although ‘unconfirmed Chinese reports’ 
declared that experts at the SMP’s Ballistics Department identified the bullet as having 
come from ‘one of the 27 pistols sold to the Japanese Special Services Section not long 
ago’.481    
 
The Long March and the 1937 Battle of Shanghai 
 
A force under Fang Zhimin first broke through in June 1934 followed by a force under Fe 
Ke Yu in August 1934.  These were diversionary attacks to allow the Red Army and the 
leaders of the CCP to escape and on 16 October 1934 this force, led by Bo Gu and Otto 
Braun broke through near Yudu.  The end is taken as 10 0ctober 1936 when what was left 
of the Second Army arrived in Yan’an in Shaanxi Province to join the remnants of the 
First and Fourth Armies.482  
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Mao wrote that initially the Long March looked like a panic driven flight, yet it in reality 
it was a military force withdrawing from an untenable area to a more secure one.  
According to Otto Braun the entire force comprised 75,000 to 85,000 men with 57,000 to 
61,000 combat troops with 41,000 to 42,000 rifles and more than 1,000 light and heavy 
machine guns.  Each soldier carried two weeks worth of rice and salt, and had two hand 
grenades.  Each rifle had 70 to 100 cartridges, each light machine gun 300 to 400 
cartridges with 500 to 600 cartridges accompanying each heavy machine gun.483  There 
were ample radios and field telephones as well.   
 
The two assault groups designated with forcing the breakthrough initially comprised: (a)  
the First Corps made up of the First, Second, Third and 15th Divisions which comprised 
16,000 to 18,000 men of which 14,000 to 15,000 were combat troops with 9,000 to 
10,000 rifles  and 300 to 350 machine guns; and (b) the Third Corps which consisted of 
the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Divisions with 15,000 men of whom 12,000 to 13,000 were 
combat troops with 9,000 rifles and approximately 300 machine guns.  To aid in the 
breakthrough each corps was given two field guns each with several hundred rounds of 
ammunition and between them they shared 30 to 40 light mortars with around 3,000 
rounds that had been produced in the Jiangxi Soviet.484  The baggage train, which was the 
largest division at the start of the march, was immense and included all the civilian 
porters, the arsenal, leaflets and silver bullion.485  Due to its size, the baggage train was 
cumbersome and would slow down the march, regardless of any interference from the 
Guomindang.   
 
The Zunyi Conference of 15 – 17 January 1935 is generally taken to be the occasion Mao 
gained control of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, yet was one of 
many and did not figure in the move to Ya’nan in Shaanxi Province.  Zunyi, in Guizou 
Province, was to be the next base area but 200,000 Guomindang troops approached so the 
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First Army, now under Mao, headed towards Sichuan from where many of Mao’s senior 
commanders hailed and the Fourth Army had a secure base area.486  After a series of 
zigzag manoeuvres including crossing the Qi River four times, to shake Guomindang 
pursuers, he finally reached Sichuan with an emaciated and worn out force and where the 
Fourth Army had a secure base.  The First Army had escaped the pursuing Guomindang 
again but even Lin Biao attacked Mao over his time in Guizou Province.  This was Mao 
at his tactically best but strategic worst as it nearly wore out the First Army.  He kept 
looking for a place to build a base area, which was an unfeasible mission because of the 
poor economy and resource base of the provinces.487 
 
Mao’s forces were far weaker so after three months he split and moved his First Army to 
Yan’an to maintain his independence, fearing the Fourth Army would subsume his force.  
One of Mao’s myths was that Zhang Guotao was trying to take control of the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party yet Sun Shuyun showed that the alleged 
message Mao used to justify the split never existed.488  Jia Tuofu, a Shaanxi Communist 
from the area who was with Mao’s force, told Mao of Yan’an.489  Liu Zhidan was purged 
along with many of his followers in the months leading up to Mao’s arrival, and who 
Mao had come to ‘rescue’.  Mao’s force arrived on 19 October 1935 after having crossed 
the Tibetan lowlands and ‘the grasslands’ which were the hardest trek of the Long March 
by Mao’s forces.490  Six months later Liu was dead, killed by an ‘accidental’ gunshot to 
the chest.491  Whether it was a genuine accident cannot be verified but the famous song 
The East is Red was originally a Shaanxi folk song about Liu Zhidan with Mao’s name 
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being substituted after Liu’s untimely death.492  With the Red Army safely ensconced in 
Yan’an, myths about the Long March were quickly perpetuated by Mao Zedong, 
unwittingly aided by Edgar Snow, and continued by Chinese Communist Party 
propaganda ever since.493   
   
On 13 August 1937 Japanese landing forces, supported by 27 navy ships including 
aircraft carriers, attacked Chinese positions in Zhabei.  Chiang Kai-shek sent in his best 
forces to battle the Japanese and held them at bay for over two months in increasingly 
bitter urban warfare.  The Japanese were saved from destruction by naval gunfire support 
and airpower.  In November there were 250,000 Japanese and 500,000 Guomindang 
troops crowded into Zhabei and most Chinese casualties were caused by Japanese 
artillery which included 355mm siege guns.494  On 25 October, Japanese forces north of 
Shanghai at Woosung, finally broke out of their beachhead where they had been fighting 
since landing there on 22 August.495  On 7 November Japanese forces supported by 
carrier borne aircraft and a naval bombardment made an amphibious landing at Zhapu in 
Hangzhou Bay, south of Shanghai.  Coupled with the Japanese forces advancing from 
Woosung, they threatened to envelope the Guomindang forces who had been weakened 
in the fighting.  They retreated from Shanghai before the Japanese forces closed around 
them and blocked any means of escape.496    
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Japanese brutality towards people under its occupation occurred long before the Sino-
Japanese War.  Humphreys noted that the occupation of Siberia in the immediate post 
First World War period affected the morale and discipline of the Japanese Army, whose 
reputation was one of indifference in dealing with impoverished Russians and desperate 
Korean expatriates in Siberia, and the Chinese and Koreans in Manchuria.497  The 
Japanese proxies such as Semenov, Ivanov-Rinov and Kalmykov were worse in their 
callous and inhumane treatment, with Humphreys remarking that they ‘set a standard of 
terrorism and brutality which Japanese units may have tried to emulate’.498   
 
A 1940 Marine Corps Gazette article on the Sino-Japanese War showed that the Japanese 
Army’s brutality in Nanjing cost the Japanese any chance to destroy the remnants of the 
main Guomindang Army.499  The Guomindang’s best forces slipped out of Shanghai and 
although the retreat turned into a rout the Guomindang survived to fight another day.500   
Similarly, whilst the Japanese soldiers were brutalising the population of Nanjing, the 
remaining Guomindang forces slipped away to regroup, turning its rout into a semi-
organised withdrawal enabling the army to escape.501  The 88th Division stopped the 
initial attack on Nanjing, acting as a blocking force and then slipped away.  Nanjing was 
subsequently defended by only poorly armed provincial troops.  Cooper-Smith wrote 
frankly of the Japanese atrocities: 
 
The city fell on December 13 and was given over to the invading army.  
Wild scenes of panic and disorder prevailed.  Thousands of Chinese troops 
in the city were trapped and slain.  Weeks elapsed before order was restored.  
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Meanwhile there was no pretence of pursuit of the beaten and disrupted 
Chinese forces.502    
 
Further on he wrote: 
 
Brutal treatment of civilians by soldiers, widespread aerial bombing of 
cities, and the sack of Nanking served to create a deep and lasting hatred of 
the invader and stiffened the Chinese national spirit and resistance as no 
peacetime propaganda could have done.503 
 
This enmity continues to this day.  The Japanese attack on China became a grand 
strategic disaster for the Japanese as its forces were now tied up fighting the Guomindang 
forces, instead of prosecuting the initial land attacks in the Pacific campaign more widely 
and, later on, stiffening island defences against the Allied counter-offensives.  
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Tactics and Structures Formalised and Tested: Yan’an, and Operations 
against the Japanese, 1937 - 1945 
 
The Red Army arrived at Yan’an in Shaanxi Province on 19 October 1935 and was an 
organisation that through the crucible of the Long March had become a tight homogenous 
group.  Mao set about absorbing and formalising the lessons of the Jiangxi Soviet with 
the establishment of the Red Army Academy.  Here Mao was able to espouse his vision 
of fighting the war to liberate China first from the Japanese, and then from the 
Guomindang to create a communist state.    
 
Although militarily weak, the cadres that had survived the Long March were battle 
hardened and ideologically sound, and set about militarising the villages outside of 
Yan’an, as they had in the Jiangxi Soviet.  This gave the Eighth Route Army strategic 
depth for defence, ready logistic support to provide ‘eyes and ears’ and local guides to 
facilitate quick movement.  Other duties included rear area security, litter bearers for the 
wounded and personnel to collect enemy equipment after the battle; and if the battle went 
badly to harass a pursuing enemy to facilitate the Eighth Route Army’s or main force’s 
escape.    
 
After the Sino-Japanese War started, cadres espousing the call, ‘Resistance for National 
Salvation’, established contact with Chinese forces, which either had dispersed due to 
Japanese victories, or were now behind the Japanese lines.  They were so successful that 
by December 1937, there were 18 border governments behind the Japanese lines and the 
Zhinzhaqi border area was declared a new army zone which later was recognised by the 
government in Chongqing.504  The neutral zone was seen by the Communists as an area 
where the peasants had not been sufficiently educated and organised to defeat the 
Japanese.  As the Communists grew in strength and trained cadres became available, they 
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sent them to the neutral zone to sway to their aims the peasants and resistance fighters 
loyal to the Guomindang.  
 
As soon as he was able, Mao set about formalising the tactics and strategy for the Red 
Army and future communist armies to follow. The Red Army University was formed to 
teach the lessons that had been learned and to train a new generation of cadres.  Mao 
Zedong wrote a small textbook titled, Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary 
War; it was issued as a mimeograph until a printed version was produced in 1941.505  It 
was Mao’s operational art and was the basis of all his military actions.  Written prior to 
the Xi’an Incident of 12 December 1936, if referred to the Guomindang as the enemy.  
The classing of the Guomindang as the enemy was against Stalin’s wishes, as through 
Wang Ming he had been directing the Chinese Communists to join with the Guomindang 
since late July 1936 in line with the united front strategy adopted at the Seventh World 
Congress of the Comintern.506    
 
In terms of the empirical basis for Mao’s concepts of war, the Battle of Pingxingguan507 
is used by the PLA to validate theory and is regarded as a major action by the PLA in the 
Sino-Japanese War.  It would never have been a major action, nor taken place the way it 
did, but for Japanese complacency.  The ambush of the 21st Brigade of the Fifth Division 
occurred because it failed to organise a screening force when knowingly entering a large 
ravine.  The brigade was composed of over 100 trucks and 200 carts.   
 
Under the command of Lin Biao, the Eighth Route Army units involved were the 115th 
Division composed of the 343rd and 344th Brigades supplemented by cavalry and an 
independent regiment.  The 343rd Brigade was used to launch the ambush with the 344th 
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and the supplementary forces were used to attack and block reinforcements.  Lin Biao 
ensured that all possible contingencies were planned for.  After a forced march, his forces 
only had two hours to deploy and these were the best forces that the Red Army had, 
including the ‘Heroic First Red Company’ and the ‘Iron and Steel Second Red 
Company’.  
 
The Chinese forces were poorly equipped with one company in the 686th Regiment of 
the 344th Brigade only having 100 rifles with 30 rounds and two hand grenades per man.  
Some men of the regiment used home-made rifles and others were armed only with 
sabres.  Men in the 685th Regiment had extra hand grenades as they acted as the blocking 
force against Japanese reinforcements.  There were some light and heavy machine guns 
and some mortars at the divisional level but ammunition was low.  Samuel Griffith II, 
when he was a United States Marine Corps officer attached to the Japanese forces in 
China, had the chance to talk to captured Eighth Route Army soldiers.  In late 1937 he 
noted the individual soldier would carry a bolt-action rifle with 30 rounds of ammunition 
and three hand grenades.508   He also carried a tea and salt ration and a two-kilogram 
pack of millet flour, supplementing this with food from the peasants he lived amongst.509    
                                                
  
As it was an enemy held area, the intelligence available to the 343rd Brigade was poor 
and they only entrenched on one side of the road, meaning they could not trap the 
Japanese forces in a cross-fire.  This was criticised yet they only had two hours to deploy 
and if overwhelmed by other Japanese units had to be able to retreat quickly.  Primarily a 
guerrilla force, it would be overwhelmed rapidly by conventional manoeuvre forces and 
air power, so an effective escape route was required.  The attack commenced at 0700 on 
25 September 1937 with the Red Army units attacking in small groups and using hand-to-
hand combat. This was ‘hugging the enemy’ so the enemy’s heavier weapons were not 
able to be employed.  Later on, a small Japanese force went onto Laoyehmiao Hill to 
attack the Chinese forces and relieve the Japanese forces.  Lin Biao sent a unit across the 
 
508 . Griffith, op. cit., p. 374. 
 
509 . Griffith, loc. cit. 
   
 140
road to blunt this Japanese counterattack and another Chinese regiment came up the 
Japanese rear trapping the remnants of the Japanese in a cross-fire. 
 
The blocking forces routed Japanese reinforcements who lost about 400 men. This 
finished the battle, as the Japanese units in the ravine who had not fought their way out 
were dead.  From there Lin Biao’s forces went to the base of Tungpaochih to aid 
Guomindang forces who had surrounded a Japanese force.  They had to retreat the next 
day as they started to take considerable casualties from the better equipped and trained 
Japanese ground forces and air strikes.  This battle was a little one in the grand scheme of 
battles in China but it was the first time a Red Army force had taken on the Japanese on 
its own terms and won.  It inflicted a severe defeat on the Japanese unit involved and the 
Red Army captured much needed arms and equipment.   
 
In 1937 and 1938, Captain Evans Carlson of the United States Marine Corps, at the 
behest of President Roosevelt, spent six months marching over 3,200 kilometres with the 
Communist Eighth Route Army in Shaanxi.510   Carlson had previously spent two tours 
in China, first under General Smedley Butler in Shanghai in 1927-1929 and in 1933-1935 
when studying the Chinese language in Shanghai and Beijing.511  He resigned his 
commission in 1938 after being censored by the US Navy over his comments about the 
Eighth Route Army.  When he went back to the United States he tried to persuade the 
public that if the United States stopped selling war materiel to Japan, China could win its 
war against them.512  Based on his experiences in Yan’an, Carlson also espoused his 
vision of Gung Ho (work together) when making a military unit to give it morale and 
martial spirit.513  In early 1942 the United States Marine Corps raised two raider 
battalions, a special mission force based on the success of the British Commandos and 
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the Chinese guerrillas operating in Northern China.  Evans Carlson, now a Lieutenant 
Colonel, became commanding officer of the Second United States Marine Corps Raider 
battalion, basing the organisation of the battalion on the Eighth Route Army’s.514    
 
The Xi’an Incident saved the Red Army from continued attacks.  Zhang Xueliang, the 
son of the late Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin, and Yang Hucheng arrested Chiang 
Kai-shek to force him to join forces with the Chinese Communists.   After the arrest there 
was much political manoeuvring.  For example, it was Zhang’s and Yang’s own forces 
that were supposed to be attacking the Chinese Communists in Shaanxi, and Stalin telling 
Mao not to have Chiang Kai-shek killed and instead join with him.  Mao and Zhou Enlai 
most unwillingly accepted this was in the Chinese Communists’ best interests (it was 
actually in the USSR’s best interest) not to have Chiang killed and instead join him in an 
anti-Japanese pact.515  Chiang was forced to agree to stop attacking the Chinese 
Communists, and form a second ‘United Front’, this time against the Japanese on 24 
December 1936.    
 
Zhang Guotao’s force was cut off and decimated by Guomindang forces in March 1937, 
against the rules of the ‘United Front’, but as he was a major rival to Mao there was no 
complaint from either Zhou Enlai or Mao.  Even Stalin was averse to assisting them and 
suggested that although the USSR could provide instructors and support, Sheng Shicai, 
the Soviet-sponsored warlord of Xinjiang, should also offer partial support.516  They later 
moved to Yan’an with Zhang in disgrace, and he went over to the Guomindang in 1938.  
 
 
The Operational Art 1938-1945  
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Mao Zedong’s book, Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War517, comprises 
five chapters:  
 
Chapter One   How to Study War;  
Chapter Two  The Chinese Communist Party and China’s Revolutionary War;  
Chapter Three  The Characteristics of China’s Revolutionary War;  
Chapter Four ‘Encirclement and Suppression’ and Counter-Campaign against 
‘Encirclement and Suppression’ __ The Main Form of China’s 
Revolutionary War; and  
Chapter Five   The Strategic Defensive.   
 
The latter three chapters especially defined Mao’s theories of war but this thesis will 
concentrate on Chapter Five as it encapsulates his operational art.  In Chapter Five, Mao 
explained nine problems.  These were: 
 
1. active defence and passive defence; 
2. preparations for countering ‘encirclement and suppression’; 
3. strategic retreat; 
4. strategic counteroffensive; 
5.  the problem of starting a counteroffensive; 
6. the problem of concentrating troops; 
7. mobile warfare; 
8. wars of quick decision; and  
9. wars of annihilation.518 
 
Guerrilla warfare was viewed with distain by senior communist commanders.  Ho Lung, 
the officer most drawn to a peasant army, derived great pleasure from incorporating a 
guerrilla unit into the main force where he could subject it to ‘training, march discipline 
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and a reliable chain of command’.519  Whitson wrote that from Yan’an onwards there was 
a clear preference for a war of manoeuvre by Eighth Route Army senior officers, starting 
with battalion-sized operations rising to regimental size in 1938, ambushing smaller 
Japanese forces.   It must be remembered that a communist battalion was often only a 
company in size and a regiment was often only battalion sized.  
 
Guerrilla warfare was conducted by the local district battalion and village Red Guards, 
and not by the Eighth Route Army.  They were expected to perform rear area security and 
harass Japanese forces as well as provide logistic support for the Eighth Route Army.  
Fighting Guomindang guerrillas was specifically tasked to the district battalion and Red 
Guards, especially after the Guomindang blockade of Yan’an, which commenced from 
May 1939.   
 
Deng Xiaoping explicitly supported this division of labour, with the defence of the border 
areas left to the regular army who fought the battles against an enemy’s main force.  This 
characterised the Red Army’s tactics during the Fifth Encirclement Campaign, which 
Mao vehemently criticised yet was happy to use in Yan’an.  Deng further argued that the 
Eighth Route Army should use local and militia forces for combat roles only when 
necessary, as they were better suited for crop production, espionage and combat support 
services.520  The latter included rear area security, and instead of local forces, the Chinese 
Armed Police Force is now used for internal security missions including counter terrorist, 
insurgent, organised crime and riot control.   Whitson argued that in the context of both a 
war against an invader (Japan) and a civil war (against the Guomindang), the regular 
commanders fought a conventional war and the provincial forces fought a People’s War.  
Commanders could fight the style and type of war they wanted while ‘procrastinating on 
ideological purity’ which was finally sorted out in the Zheng feng rectification movement 
of 1942-43.521 
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If the Operational Art is to win wars then it has to be asked why the Eighth Route Army 
undertook the One Hundred Regiments Campaign.  Was Japanese strength and likely 
Japanese response underestimated?  Lacking men, artillery, armour and aircraft, how 
were the Communist forces expected to defeat Japanese forces in a conventional war in 
North China?    
 
The campaign itself made no operational sense as normally it would have been regarded 
by Mao as ‘adventurism’.  Mao wrote about ‘adventurism’, which he saw as a large-scale 
offensive operation where no decisive tactical or strategic outcome could occur.  Indeed, 
he wrote specifically that the root cause of the defeat of the Jiangxi Soviet was ‘the 
military adventurism of attacking key cities in 1932’.522  This is precisely what happened 
as after the Communists’ initial successes, and the Eight Route Army’s offensive was 
blunted and the Japanese First Army regrouped and went on the offensive.    
 
Mao wrote succinctly that:  
 
In preparing for a counteroffensive, we must select or create conditions 
favourable to ourselves and unfavourable to the enemy, so as to bring 
about a change in the balance of forces, before we go on to the stage of the 
counteroffensive.  
 
In light of our past experience, during the stage of retreat we should in 
general secure at least two of the following conditions before we can 
consider the situation favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy, and 
go over to the counteroffensive.  The conditions are: 
 
1. The people actively support the Red Army. 
2. The terrain is favourable for operations. 
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3. The main forces of the Red Army are completely concentrated. 
4. The enemy’s weak points have been discovered. 
5. The enemy has become exhausted and demoralised. 
6. The enemy has been forced to make mistakes.523 
 
These conditions required for a major offensive are not unique to Mao, and are what any 
competent commander would regard as necessary for a successful offensive operation. 
Thus it is necessary to ask: what overriding strategic condition required Mao to launch 
the One Hundred Regiments Campaign knowing it was bound to fail?  
 
Chalmers Johnson in 1962 advanced several theories why the Eighth Route Army went 
on the offensive.  These were either to prevent Japanese forces from crossing the Yellow 
River and taking Xi’an; as a reaction to General Tada’s building of blockhouses that were 
encroaching into the neutral zone; and by acting against the Japanese forestalling any 
peace treaty between the Guomindang and the Japanese which would have been at the 
Communists’ expense.524  The last certainly accords with the message Mao sent to the 
Comintern on 7 November 1940 writing that the Guomindang were ‘inspiring a broad 
anti-Communist campaign to clear the way to direct capitulation to Japan’.525  He added 
that the ‘Japanese are relentlessly organising punitive expeditions in northern China  
(and) our bases are diminishing and shrinking daily’.526  He neglected to mention that the 
Japanese attacks were the Japanese army’s response to the One Hundred Regiments 
Campaign.  In this respect his comments about the Guomindang capitulating to Japan 
could also be viewed as alarmist, so the Soviet Union would be more likely to supply the 
Red Army weapons.   
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Mao believed in active defence whenever possible, using mobility and rear area and flank 
attacks against an attacking force to keep them off their balance.  This alone makes the 
decision to launch the One Hundred Regiments Campaign difficult to comprehend, as the 
it went against Mao’s own principles of war.  Mao wrote that the first battle needed to be 
successful for the entire operation to be successful, and that the initial contact need not be 
the first battle.527  The destruction of the rail lines and damage to the coal mine was not 
the first battle, as there was no operational or strategic direction, something else about 
which Mao wrote scathingly. 528  
 
The Japanese North China Army was aware of the communist build-up in August 1940 
but believed they were going to attack Guomindang units.  The Eighth Route Army at 
least had the element of surprise.  On 20 August 1940 the Eighth Army went on the 
offensive in what has become known as the One Hundred Regiments Campaign which 
ended on 5 December that year.  The first phase was aimed at destroying Japanese 
infrastructure and communications and met with early success.    One hundred and fifteen 
regiments were involved in the attack.  From 20 August to 10 September Communist 
forces attacked the railway lines that separated the communist base areas and succeeded 
in blowing up bridges, tunnels and destroying track.529  The Shijiazhuang to Taiyuan 
railway line was rendered almost useless, and the Qingxing coal mine which was a major 
fuel source for the Japanese forces, was seriously damaged as well.   
 
Railway destruction missions were generally successful and the second phase, the 
attacking of Japanese blockhouses and cities ran from 20 September to early October.  
This was generally a failure as the Eighth Route Army’s lack of firepower meant large 
casualties for little reward.  The third phase was the resulting Japanese response, lasting 
from 6 October to 5 December, and was brutal.    
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A shortage of field personnel in the Japanese Army stationed in North China was the only 
reason that they did not pursue the Communists more vigorously.530  The Japanese 
control of North China was based on the concept of zones and the most important one for 
the Eighth Route Army was the neutral zone that existed between the main areas of 
control of both the Communists and the Japanese army in North China.  Li identified four 
phases in the Japanese rural pacification efforts:  
 
1. to secure control over the land alongside railways;  
2.  to expand from areas of semi-occupation into the neutral zones; 
3. to crush Chinese communist guerrilla base areas; and 
4. the contraction of areas of Japanese control as a result of Communist-controlled 
areas and Communist infiltrations into Japanese –held territories.531  
 
Li noted that phase one continued until the fall of Wuhan, whereupon the freeing up of 
Japanese troops enabled phase two to commence.  Phase three began with the One 
Hundred Regiments campaign.  The fourth phase started when the CCP started to 
infiltrate back to the now enlarged neutral zone after the ‘Three All’ campaign (see 
below).532 The Japanese retaliation for the Hundred Regiments campaign ended up being 
a punitive campaign that, although it ‘broke pots and pans’ and decimated the Chinese 
Communist Party infrastructure, turned the villagers against the Japanese due to the 
damage and killings they endured. 
 
Mao did not expect the ferocity of the Japanese response with its doctrine of sankō-
seisaku which translates as ‘Three All’ (‘Kill all, burn all, loot all’). Assisted by Japanese 
military personnel loaned by the Guandongzhou Army, it decimated the Communist 
support base in the countryside as well as causing immense casualties to the Eighth Route 
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Army, especially amongst the cadres.  From mid-1941 until late 1942 the sankō 
campaign saw the Eighth Route Army shrink in size from 400,000 to 300,000 and the 
population under Communist control from 40 million to 25 million.533  The surviving 
villagers, as a matter of continued survival and partly due to nationalism, went over to the 
Communists where many previously may have wavered.    
 
Jencks called the One Hundred Regiments Campaign a disaster for the Eighth Route 
Army but the Japanese failure to destroy the Chinese Communist base areas meant, that 
like the German victories in the Soviet Union in 1941, the campaign was a tactical 
victory but the strategic advantage was still ultimately with the Communists.534  The 
Soviet Union provided military advisors and there were some in Yan’an prior to the 
Japanese sankō campaign but their relationship with the Chinese Communists was, at 
times, strained.535 The depletion of Japanese field personnel for the war in the Pacific 
against the United States allowed the Communists to gradually regain, and then increase, 
the areas of North China under their control.   Cadres started to re-enter many areas in the 
Spring of 1943 and the areas under Communist control quickly increased beyond the 
August 1940 figures.536   
 
The lessons learnt from the One Hundred Regiments Campaign and the resultant sankō 
campaigns meant the Eighth Route Army would not launch another major operation until 
1946, after it had received heavy equipment and supplies from the Soviet Union.  The 
operational art of the Communists reverted to People’s War as the Chinese Communist 
Party was more concerned with expanding its territories and political control of these 
newly acquired areas.     
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The blockade by both Japanese and Guomindang was causing economic problems to the 
Communist base areas and the supply of war materiel, as in the Jiangxi Soviet, was from 
weapons captured from the Japanese and their puppet forces.  These effects of the 
blockade reduced Eighth Route Army military operations against the Japanese after the 
One Hundred Regiments Campaign to guerrilla warfare only.  This was secondary in any 
case compared to establishing the areas under Communist control and economic guerrilla 
warfare - denying the Japanese food crops, disrupting their lines of communication and 
stopping them from currency manipulation.537  The Eighth Route Army for example 
aided in harvesting crops before the Japanese could appropriate them, which besides 
supplying their own needs, increased their influence amongst the peasants.  The 
Communists were conserving their forces, knowing that the war was going against Japan 
and that eventually it would surrender, releasing the Guomindang forces to renew attacks 
against them.   
 
The agreement stopping Guomindang attacks against the Communists did not stop their 
actions against Zhang Guotao’s forces nor end the blockade of Yan’an. The ‘United 
Front’ effectively ended when the Guomindang attacked the New Fourth Army 
headquarters in January 1941.  Mao sent Stalin a message on 7 November 1940 that 
asked Stalin for directions on what the CCP’s response should be to Chiang Kai-shek’s 
demand for the removal of Eighth and Fourth Route Armies from Shandong, otherwise 
the 200,000 Guomindang soldiers massed for a punitive expedition would attack them.538    
Stalin’s response was to tell them to await their reply ‘due to the complexity of the 
problem’.539   
 
The core of the New Fourth Army, under Ye Ting, was the blocking force that held up 
the Guomindang after the Long March and had continued to harass Guomindang forces 
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in eastern Jiangxi and western Fujian provinces.540  Former Red Army soldiers, who had 
turned to other pursuits after the Long March, also rejoined - further adding experienced 
personnel to the force.541  
 
Vacillation proved deadly as Guomindang forces surrounded, then attacked, a column of 
10,000 members of the New Fourth Army under Ye Ting and Xiang Yin.  They were 
attacked near the market town of Maolin, about 32 kilometres southeast of their base at 
Yunling, killing between 7,000 and 9,000 and capturing some 3,000 to 4,000 of whom 
perhaps 10 percent survived the war.542  Along with Chiang Kai-shek’s 
counterrevolutionary decree on 17 January 1941 aimed specifically at the Chinese 
Communist Party, this effectively ended the facade of the ‘Second United Front’.  Mao 
informed Stalin in a message dated 13 February 1941 that unless the Guomindang 
stopped attacking them and acceded to 11 other demands, over which Zhou Enlai and the 
Guomindang were in discussion, the Chinese Communists would withdraw from working 
with the Guomindang.543   Mao was not hopeful of reconciliation, as his message of 6 
February 1941 indicated.544    
 
The Soviets had been supplying the Guomindang with weapons as they were fighting the 
Japanese who the Russians wanted kept busy in a conflict, lest they attack them again in 
Mongolia.  Stalin favoured the Guomindang as it was the larger force.  Between August 
1937 and August 1941, the Soviet Union supplied approximately 900 aircraft, 82 tanks, 
1,000 pieces of artillery with over two million rounds, almost 32,000 bombs, nearly 
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10,000 machine guns and 50,000 rifles.545  Mao argued that after the Wannan Incident 
that supplies to the Guomindang should cease but they only stopped due the Germany’s 
invasion of the Soviet Union.546  The Red Army got no supplies from the Soviet Union  
during this period, and during the entire Second World War the Red Army received only 
six anti-aircraft guns and 120 machine guns in early 1943 from the Soviets.547 
 
The Red Army had rebuilt itself from 1943 and in July 1946 was renamed the People’s 
Liberation Army to signify its mission and was ready to wrest control of China.548  The 
Soviet Union supplied weapons it had captured from the Japanese Kwantung Army, 
which included 11,000 heavy and 3,000 light machine guns, 1,800 pieces of artillery and 
2,500 mortars and grenade launchers.549   Japanese soldiers who were  still working with 
the PLA gave invaluable assistance in the training and maintenance of all this new 
equipment.550  When the People’s Liberation Army took Tianjin, most of their artillery 
gunners were ex-Japanese soldiers.551  The Soviets supplemented ex-Japanese weapons 
with ones from Czech and their own factories.  Captured Guomindang weapons were the 
moist prized of all, especially the modern United States 105mm artillery.  Part of the 
rebuilding, particularly under the pressure of the Japanese, was to ensure loyalty to the 
Party and to Mao as well.  Known as the Zheng Feng Rectification (Rectification of 
Work-Style) Movement, it saw the orthodox Marxist-Leninist line turn into what is now 
termed Maoism and ensured Mao’s grip on the Chinese Communist Party.552  Jencks 
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referred to this as Mao’s ‘mass-line’, which was to unify the Party, army, and the masses 
into one homogenous group under Mao’s leadership and direction.553      
 
The Zheng Feng Rectification Movement started with Mao’s speech of 1 February 1942 
titled, ‘Reform in Learning, the Party and Literature’.  The head of the Party’s secret 
police, Kang Sheng, used internal examinations (confessions) and ‘struggle meetings’ 
where people openly accused each other of being counter-revolutionaries.554  Some sort 
of rectification movement was needed to ensure Party discipline in the crisis which was 
occurring due to the Japanese sankō offensives that were occurring against the base areas 
and to ensure that any form of ‘warlordism’ was removed before the forthcoming battles 
against the Guomindang for the control of China. 
  
Kang was after people who were ‘half-hearted’ (lacking in genuine revolutionary 
fervour) as well as ‘spies, enemies and Trotskyites’, and embarked on a purge of the 
Party.555  A series of training classes to instil the new orthodoxy into the Party cadres was 
organised.556  Party translators only completed the full works of Marx and Lenin into 
Chinese in late 1939; some other Communist works took until 1942, and these gave Mao 
his intellectual base to stamp his authority on the Party.557   Zheng Feng was a key to the 
victories of the CCP after 1946.558    
 
 
Post Second World War 
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The Soviet Union invaded Manchuria in August 1945 and did not leave until May 1946.  
They conducted joint operations with the Red Army in August and September including 
parts of Inner Mongolia, Jehol and Shanhaiguan, which was known as ‘the gateway to 
Manchuria’.559  They became more circumspect when United States forces landed in 
North China and took control of the major ports on the coast and Shandong, Hebei, 
Tianjin, and Beijing along with Guomindang troops from 30 September 1945.560   US 
amphibious ships staged a landing at Qinghuangdao on 27 and 30 October 1945 landing 
Guomindang and US Army units who rapidly proceeded along the Tianjin-Shenyang 
(Mukden) Railway.  This was the only time that US land forces operated alongside 
Guomindang personnel in a combat operation.561    
 
Moscow subsequently had a pro-Guomindang Policy and ordered Red Army units away 
from the railway lines.  Chinese Communists were removed from power in Manchuria 
either ‘voluntarily’ or were removed openly by Soviet forces.  In this period from mid-
November 1945 to March 1946, the Guomindang took control of Manchuria.  
Guomindang forces retook Shanhaiguan and repulsed a doomed counterattack by Lin 
Biao’s forces who dispersed into the countryside.562   
 
The United States tried to mediate between the Chinese Communist Party and the 
Guomindang but their efforts were doomed from the start.  In December 1945 General 
George C. Marshall started negotiations between the Guomindang and the Chinese 
Communist Party to negotiate a ceasefire and then peacefully form an united China.  The 
US Ambassador to China, Patrick J. Hurley, had been openly supporting the 
Guomindang.   It never had a chance of achieving its aims and the talks broke down with 
the Chinese Communist Party deciding on 18 April 1946 to unify China by military 
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means.563  Military action by the Red Army against the Guomindang had already 
occurred from the beginning of April when Communist forces tried to stop Guomindang 
forces from breaking through to Changchan from Siping.  The Red Army units were 
soundly defeated.564  
 
As the Soviet forces left Manchuria they openly sided with the Chinese Communist Party 
handing over control of a large part of Northern Manchuria to them.565  The Chinese 
Communists were not universally welcomed as the Russian occupation of Manchuria had 
been brutal with murders, rape and looting commonplace, harking back to the White 
Russian Armies’ actions in the early 1920s.566  The last Soviet soldier left on 3 May 1946 
and by that time it was estimated by using the United States military figures that the 
Soviets had removed US$9 billion worth of factories and other material.567  This is a 
significant figure remembering it is in 1945 dollars. 
 
In May 1946 an offensive by the Guomindang captured Changchan and Kirin.  Following 
a mutually agreed ceasefire the Guomindang used this time to capture almost all of the 
cities in Manchuria by year’s end.  The now renamed People’s Liberation Army used this 
as a time to recruit, train and rearm its forces ready for the battles to come in 1947.568  
 
The first campaign the Communists launched was the Liaoshen Campaign to capture 
Manchuria.  The Communists had previously moved out of Yan’an and established a 
mobile headquarters in their campaign against the Guomindang.  Aided by poor morale 
and in-fighting among Guomindang generals the PLA surrounded the various cities, 
initially without attacking them, to establish their control of the countryside and the 
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infrastructure.  They ambushed Guomindang forces when they moved out of the cities 
and their first major success was taking Jinzhou on 14 October 1948, blocking the retreat 
of Guomindang forces from the North China plain.  Guomindang forces in Changchun 
surrendered on 21 October 1947 after Zeng Zesheng rebelled and turned to the 
Communists opening the way for the PLA to attack Changsan unimpeded.   
 
In pre-1949 China, defecting to the enemy was not seen as traitorous and often occurred.  
Many were poor peasants, who had been forced into the Guomindang, and many were 
generally faithful to their commander and not the Guomindang centrally, as it was the 
commander who was responsible for ensuring they were fed, paid on time and looked 
after.  As noted in Chapter Two of this thesis, the policy of taking in defecting soldiers 
was a lynchpin of the Red Army from its earliest days and was enshrined as Communist 
Operational Principle Number Nine.  This stated that ‘the main source of manpower was 
at the front and that most of the enemy personnel…could be incorporated into their 
units’.569  This was generally taken to be 80 to 90 percent of the enlisted men and a small 
number of junior officers.570  The Fourth Column of the East China Field Army (ECFA) 
had a systematic program for re-educating these soldiers and absorbing them into its 
forces, bringing 13,000 ex-Guomindang forces into its force between 6 November and 15 
December 1948.571   To this must be added the entire Guomindang XVCI Corps which 
defected intact under the command of Wu Huawen on 19 September 1948 during the 
ECFA campaign to take Jinan.572   This was renamed as the XXXV Corps and became 
part of the ECFA.573   The ranks of the PLA swelled with these new soldiers and from the 
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US-supplied equipment that the forces in Manchuria held.  Communist forces in Northern 
China were stopping Guomindang reinforcements reaching Manchuria by land.   
 
The PLA then moved in a pincer action to cut off the remaining Guomindang forces in 
Manchuria before attacking Shenyang proper.  By 28 October 1948, the Battle of Liaoxi 
had seen the PLA take another 100,000 of the Guomindang forces.  Shenyang was 
attacked on three sides on 29 October 1948 and by 1 November was taken by the PLA.  
The collapse of Guomindang morale aided the PLA to take Shenyang so quickly and 
Manchuria was lost to the Guomindang with another 134,000 soldiers.  PLA forces 
quickly absorbed these new soldiers and learned how to use the new equipment to 
prepare for the assault on the Guomindang forces north of the Yangtze.  They did this by 
creating schools to integrate the equipment and become an army capable of using artillery 
and tanks in a coordinated manner.  Ex-Guomindang officers and soldiers as well as 
Japanese prisoners of war were employed to this end. 
 
 
The Huai Hai Campaign and the Destruction of Guomindang Forces in 
North China  
 
Using a similar operational art of isolating Guomindang forces and attacking them 
individually, the PLA gathered a series of victories again compounded by Guomindang 
forces not coordinating their defence and counterattacks.  The PLA always tried to make 
the Guomindang forces react to its movements, forcing them to move their units, wearing 
them out and enabling PLA ambushes.  Forced GMD movements denuded the defences 
of positions the PLA were to attack.  Employing deception operations __ always high on 
the Chinese Communist operational art __ both forced these movements and deceived the 
Guomindang of the PLA’s true intentions.  Deception measures even extended to the 
need to preserve the secrecy of Soviet aid, which saw Lin Biao’s soldiers rearmed with 
captured American weapons instead of any Soviet ones, before they marched 
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triumphantly into Beijing.  This was also to show ‘how Chiang Kai-shek supplies the 
troops of the People’s Liberation Army with American technology’.574   
 
By quickly manoeuvring its forces and attacking from unexpected directions the PLA got 
inside the Guomindang’s decision cycle causing strategic paralysis.  Whole units 
surrendered and were quickly absorbed into the PLA so that by the end of the campaign 
the force had 40,000 more soldiers than when it started.  The loss of 500,000 soldiers led 
to the rapid collapse of the last Guomindang forces north of the Yangtze in the Ping Jin 
Campaign.   Tianjin fell to the Northeast China Field Army (NECFA) after less than two 
days fighting on 15 January 1949 with the loss of a further 130,000 soldiers and Fu Zuoyi 
surrendered the 200,000 soldiers he commanded around Beijing without a shot being 
fired on 21 January.575  The operational art of the Northeast China Field Army was high 
as it involved combined operations on urban terrain.  The NECFA employed an early 
version of the Quantou (fist) units of the 1980s and 1990s, using infantry, ex-Japanese 
tanks and mountain guns to destroy the Guomindang defences.576  No organised 
Guomindang forces now existed north of the Yangtze and the PLA underwent a period of 
rest, re-equipment and regrouping, absorbing new soldiers into the PLA.   
 
Chinese historians view this campaign in three phases but Bjorge saw it as a continual 
offensive, taking advantage of a disintegrating Guomindang which at the start of the 
battle comprised seven armies.577  The two main forces were different in style, revealing 
the two differing styles of the PLA and what went on to precipitate the ‘Red versus 
Expert’ arguments which crippled the PLA from the late 1950s until the debacle of the 
1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. 
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In the Huai Hai Campaign the PLA used the East China Field Army (EFCA) under Su Yu 
and the Central Plains Field Army (CPFA) under Liu Bocheng.  These two commanders 
were completely different as were their forces.  Su Yu was an impressive guerilla 
commander and had been part of the forces that stayed as the rearguard in the Jiangxi 
Soviet after the main forces went on the Long March.  He survived the 1941 attack on the 
New Fourth Army, and after its reconstruction became its deputy commander.  His use of 
smaller forces to destroy larger Guomindang forces in 1946 and 1947 saw him become 
the acting commander of the EFCA.578  Unlike Liu Bocheng, whose biography is in 
Chapter Two of this thesis, Su received no formal military education in the Soviet Union, 
and used Sunzi Bingfa for his operational planning whereas Liu Bocheng used his Soviet 
training on the operational art.   
 
The PLA’s offensive started when the CPFA and ECFA tried to catch Guomindang units 
attempting to cross the Yangtze River on one bridge.  Unable to stop the Guomindang 
redeployment, Su Yu revealed his trump card.  His political staff had been negotiating 
with the Third Pacification Area, a corps sized unit.  On 7 November the defections 
started and by 8 November 23,000 men had defected and a further 5,000 who had not 
were heading towards Xuzhou in haste.  This opened up a sizeable gap in the 
Guomindang’s defences and enabled the ECFA to surround the Seventh Field Army by 
10 November.  This gap was exploited by the CPFA which now controlled the central 
position, effectively splitting the Guomindang forces in the North China Plain in two, and 
headed south towards Suxian.579  Factionalism had played into the PLA’s hands with Li 
Mi’s refusal to assist Huang Baitao help on 8 November, effectively isolating his Seventh 
Field Army.580  This was after the destruction of the Guomindang’s LXIII Corps by the 
same force that was attempting to encircle his force.581 
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Lead elements of the 12th Army on 19 November tried to break through to the besieged 
Seventh Army and came close as they were stronger in firepower than the PLA columns 
screening the besieging forces.  However they could not reach it due to blocking 
attacks.582  At the same time ECFA columns had organized a night general attack on the 
Seventh Field Army; it did not meet all the objectives but seriously damaged the 
Guomindang defences.  On the night of the 21st, not allowing any time for the Seventh 
Field Army to rebuild its defences, the Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Columns launched 
another general attack. Following a heavy artillery bombardment, the Fourth Column 
moved against villages north of Dayuanshang, the Eighth Column moved against villages 
east, and the Ninth Column conducted a direct assault on Dayuanshang.  On 22 
November, Ninth Column units had penetrated and defeated the Dayuanshang defences 
with the Seventh Army reduced to a few units holding several tiny hamlets north of 
Dayuanshang.  Huang Baitao ordered his forces to disperse and try to escape through the 
PLA’s lines but Huang and his aides came under fire; Huang took his life after being 
wounded.583  Guomindang soldiers numbering 2,000 to 3,000 made their way to other 
Guomindang lines, but 25,000 of their colleagues lay dead with another 80,000 prisoners.  
The ratio of forces was tipping towards the PLA.584   
 
The defection of the 110th Division on 27 November sealed the fate of the Guomindang 
12th Army in Suxian.  The divisional commander, Liao Yunzhuo, had been a member of 
the CCP since March 1927 during the Northern Expedition and besides bringing the 
division over also forwarded the plans of the breakout.  The counterattack to breakout 
and recapture the Central Portion of the North China Plains ended in failure with the loss 
of another division and its link up with the Sixth and Eighth Armies was thwarted.585  
They were forced to withdraw to Benghou and set up a defensive position.  The 12th 
Army was isolated 60 kilometres to the northwest.  In a coordinated attack the 
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Guomindang’s 16th and 25th Armies using armour, artillery and air support attacked 
ECFA positions in an attempt to move south to Suxian, which if successful would 
threaten the CPFA’s rear and possibly break the 12th Army’s encirclement.586    
 
The ECRA Army prepared three lines of defences around Xuzhou and the Guomindang 
repeatedly smashed itself against them.  The PLA fed in reinforcements, especially 
around Yuzhou and these included many ex-Guomindang soldiers.  In the battle of 
attrition which the battles around Xuzhou had become, these soldiers helped tip the 
balance.587   If this was a miniature Kursk, then the siege of the 12th Army in Suxian had 
become a miniature Stalingrad.  Both sides were suffering casualties at an alarming rate 
and the CPFA had to change its tactics as the Guomindang defenders were not going to 
surrender easily.   
 
The CPFA decided to employ approach trenches dug at night to get closer to the positions 
where they could jump off and ‘hug the enemy’ negating the 12th Army’s strength in 
artillery.   The first were dug too far away and were now dug closer to the jump off points 
around 50 metres from the 12th Army’s defences, with every squad in the first assault 
given a light machine gun.  To deal with the flamethrowers which the PLA assault waves 
feared, two bishou (dagger) squads in each platoon received submachine guns and 
carbines tasked to kill the soldiers carrying flamethrowers.   These tactics were successful 
and gradually wore the defenders down, seeing the perimeter shrink.   A pack howitzer 
battery of four guns was also in direct support and to neutralise any Guomindang artillery 
that was located.588 
 
To aid the CPFA, the ECFA transferred three columns along with extra artillery; they 
were in place by 13 December.  The 12th Army commander decided to attempt a 
breakout with what forces he had left. This was planned for 15 December 1949 but 
unfortunately for the 12th Army the PLA conducted a general offensive on 14 December 
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with the three ECFA columns leading the assault from the 12th Army’s rear.  Their 
artillery destroyed defences and telephone cables creating gaps for the advancing infantry 
and creating confusion by destroying any semblance of command and control.  The final 
battle was over on 15 December as the Guomindang soldiers who tried to break out were 
either killed or captured by the surrounding PLA forces.  The 12th Army’s commander, 
Huang Wei, along with the X, XVIII and LXXV Corps commanders were among the 
captured.  The PLA was now free to finish off Du Yuming’s army group – the 
Guomindang’s last field force left in North China.  As the CPFA and the ECFA forces 
were transferred to the Beghou area the PLA decided to try political action instead of 
military action to reduce Du Yuming’s forces. 
 
The reasons were threefold:  to deceive the Guomindang as to the dispositions of the PLA 
and the exhaustion of the EFCA and the CPFA; to reduce Du Yuming’s forces without 
taking casualties; and to hide the fact that other PLA forces were cutting off the Beijing 
to Tianjin railway, and concentrating forces to attack them.  The PLA did not want the 
Tianjin garrison evacuated by sea, but captured and removed from the battle.589  For 16 
days no military action was taken against Du Yuming’s forces but gradually a steady 
flow of soldiers started to defect from the Guomindang and the two PLA field armies 
rested and regrouped for the final offensive of the campaign.  In this period the attack 
was planned, there were to be 10 columns each with supporting artillery for attacking 
from all directions.  Each column was to supply a battalion or regimental strength light 
assault forces, equipped with ample ammunition and two days’ rations; their mission was 
to bypass the lead defences and strike at the command and control and logistic centres, as 
well as movement choke points to disrupt the rear areas.   
 
On 7 January, after having begun the offensive on the previous day, more than 20 
villages had been taken and what remained of the 13th Army was in disarray. Heavy 
losses had also been inflicted on the Second Army’s LXXII Corps, and the remaining 
units withdrew to the west. In less than two days Su Yu’s force had achieved what he had 
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estimated would take three to seven days. On 8 January the Guomindang’s east flank was 
so compressed that the PLA’s Bohai Column was shifted from the east side of the pocket 
to the west side as there was no space for four columns.  It was placed under southern 
group command and sent into the line between the Eighth and Ninth Columns.590 
 
Despite Guomindang air strikes, by late 9 January the Third, Fourth and 10th Columns 
were all nearing the heart of the Nationalist command.  Du Yuming and Qiu Qingquan 
abandoned Chenguanzhuang and went to Chenzhuang to meet with Li Mi and V Corps 
commander Xiong Xiaosan. Du authorised a breakout towards the west but was a 
complete failure. Some soldiers including Li Mi made it to Guomindang lines but they 
were the few exceptions.  Before dawn on 10 January the 10th Column entered 
Chenguanzhuang and the Fourth Column entered Chenzhuang.  During the next several 
hours these two columns and those attacking from other directions swept across what 
remained of the pocket.  By 1600 hours the fighting was over with all Guomindang forces 
either captured or destroyed.  The Huai Hai Campaign was over. 591 
 
 Why did the Guomindang fail?  Du Yuming, the Guomindang commander captured and 
imprisoned by the PLA, blamed overly centralised command and control, as well as 
factionalism inside the Guomindang.  To this must be added the almost total lack of 
battlefield intelligence.592  The defection of entire units meant that none could really be 
trusted and factionalism meant that some units would not come to another’s aid, co-
ordinate an attack, or retreat with them.   
 
The United States was under no illusions as to the disasters that had befallen the 
Guomindang, nor the ineptness of many of their commanders.  In a report dated 
November 1948 in the Battles of Tsinan the Liaoaming Corridor, Changchun and 
Shenyang, they estimated the Guomindang to have lost over 320,000 men including eight 
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divisions that were predominantly equipped (at 85 percent) by the United States.593  In 
December 1948, the US Military Attaché in Nanjing reported that 80 percent of the 
weapons and 75 percent of the ammunition that the United States had supplied the 
Guomindang had been captured.594  This amounted to 17 United States equipped 
divisions, with virtually none destroyed prior to the Guomindang defeats, revealing a low 
state of morale, the mass defections and surrenders.595  This was before the end of the 
Huai Hai Campaign which saw the destruction of all Guomindang forces north of the 
Yangtze.  
 
The failure of the Guomindang was best summed up by the General Barr who reflected 
what the United States attaches and observers in China thought of the Guomindang.  In a 
report to the Department of the Army, dated 16 November 1948, he said: 
 
Military matériel and economic aid in my opinion is less important to the 
salvation of China than other factors.  No battle has been lost since my 
arrival due to lack of ammunition or equipment.  Their military debacles 
in my opinion can all be attributed to the world’s worst leadership and 
many other morale destroying factors that lead to a complete loss of will 
to fight.  The complete ineptness of high military leaders and the 
widespread corruption and dishonesty throughout the Armed Forces, 
could, in some measure, have been controlled and directed had the 
authority and facilities been available.  Chinese leaders completely lack 
the moral courage to issue and enforce an unpopular decision.596  
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On 21 April, the PLA crossed the Yangtze on a 500-kilometre front centred 
approximately 100 kilometres west of Nanjing.  Led by the Second Field Army (the 
renamed Central Plains Field Army) and the Third Field Army (the renamed East China 
Field Army), they entered Southern China in force and advanced rapidly.  Nanjing fell on 
23 April, Hangzhou on 3 May, and Shanghai on 27 May. In early May part of the Fourth 
Field Army (the renamed NECFA) opened a new front in the Wuhan area.597  Opposition 
collapsed and the PLA sent units throughout China to remove Guomindang resistance.  
On 1 October 1949, with most of China under control of the Chinese Communist Party 
and its organs, Mao Zedong in Shanghai  the city where the First CCP Congress was 
held  proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.  
__
__
 
 
The Operational Art and Lessons Learnt by the PLA: Red Versus Expert - 
Su Yu and Liu Bocheng 
 
Which operational art worked the best: that of the Red Army officers who studied at the 
Whampoa Academy or the operational art of the officers who studied at the Frunze 
Academy that defined the PLA’s operational art on the Soviet model?598  Sun Yu was for 
the best part of his career a guerrilla warfare fighter and organiser of base areas and 
guerrilla forces who studied Sun Tzu using a combined arms force in the Huai Hai 
Campaign.  Liu Bocheng was an officer trained in the Soviet model of the operational art 
using primarily an infantry force armed as guerrillas.  Liu Bocheng used his forces’ 
higher mobility to act as an envelopment force and to attack the rear and flanks, whereas 
Sun Yu’s force was far better equipped for assaulting fortified terrain.    
The Huai Hai Campaign demonstrated that the PLA was no ragtag organisation but a well 
trained and reasonably well equipped force.  With the capture of the equipment in North 
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China it was well equipped by regional standards but fell short of United States and 
Soviet artillery standards; but their infantry battalions were on par in firepower.       
 
The PLA did not lack from ammunition either after capturing so much materiel in 
Manchuria.  By the end of the Huai Hai Campaign there were over five million porters 
who had moved approximately 680,000 mortar and artillery rounds and over 209 million 
small arms cartridges.599  The success of the militia and the porters led to their over-
reliance in the post-Liberation PLA which was one of the reasons for the heavy casualties 
suffered by the PLA in the Sino-Japanese War.  Both ‘Red’ and ‘Expert’ performed well, 
which was to be expected.  The mass surrenders and defections aided both, and the 
reliance on mass uprising and defections was a feature particular to China and did not 
occur in the Korean War where the lack of artillery and motorised logistics were a factor 
in the PLA’s defeats after their initial gains, albeit for heavy casualties.  
 
In terms of organisation, the CPFA was a predominately infantry force whereas the 
EFCA had a combined arms focus, and reflected the fact that it had acquired United 
States equipment after its operations in Manchuria.   The EFCA was better for positional 
defence and attacking fortified towns whereas the CPFA was more mobile and could 
move rapidly to out manoeuvre Guomindang units.  The CPFA had lost its artillery 
during its operations in August 1947 march to the Dabie mountains to establish base 
areas near Wuhan and the Guomindang capital of Nanjing forcing the Guomindang to 
deploy 33 divisions, totaling around 330,000 soldiers against Liu Bocheng’s force of 
around 120,000.600  Tying up so many Guomindang divisions and denuding them from 
defending other areas of North China aided PLA operations elsewhere.   
 
The largest unit in both armies was the column, which equates to a corps of two or three 
divisions of 20,000 to 30,000 personnel but the Fourth Column with the addition of the 
Southern Shaanxi division was the largest of the campaign with 45,000 soldiers.  The 
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divisions were being organised on the triangular structure with three regiments to the 
division, three battalions per the regiment, three companies to the battalion, three 
platoons to the company and three squads to the platoon.  At each level was a fire 
support.601  The ECFA divisions were more advanced in reorganisation than the CPFA 
and their division being around 1,000 soldiers larger at 9,000 compared to the CPFA’s 
7,000 to 8,000.602 
 
There was at the time no standard table of organization and equipment (TO&E) for a 
PLA division but one was being worked on.  Even inside the same field army the 
following paper TO&E’s were unlikely to be standardized.  What is shown is the lack of 
firepower in a CPFA division compared to its ECFA counterpart. 
 
On paper an EFCA division had: 
 
4 – 8 75mm Pack Howitzers 4-8, 
20 82mm Mortars, 
36 60mm Mortars,  
36 Heavy Machine Guns,  
180 Light Machine Guns,  
250 Automatic Rifles, 
2800 Rifles,  
350 Carbines, and  
130 Pistols. 
 
A CPFA division had: 
 
2 – 4 75mm Pack Howitzers, 
9 82mm Mortars,  
12 60mm Mortars,  
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30 Heavy Machine Guns,  
150 Light Machine Guns,  
150 Automatic Rifles,  
2000 Rifles,  
300 Carbines,  
100 Pistols, and  
10 (?) Explosive Launching Tubes.603 
 
There were no 105mm howitzers in a CPFA column which was fortunate to have a full 
artillery battalion of three companies with a total of 12 guns, which might include ex-
Japanese guns and not the modern ex-US 75mm pack howitzers.  By contrast in 1948, the 
ECRA had, due to captured Guomindang weapons, full artillery battalions with 75mm 
pack howitzers. As the Third, Ninth, 10th, and 13th Columns were designated as special 
attack columns, they were given specialised training in infantry and artillery cooperation 
as well as assault tactics and extra fire support.  In the Third Column divisional artillery 
was two 75mm pack howitzer batteries instead of the usual one, and the Column received 
a battery of 105mm howitzers.  
 
The ECFA’s Special Type Column had, by the start of the Huai Hai Campaign, grown to 
be an expanded division with approximately 11,000 soldiers, containing three artillery 
regiments and contained the ECFA’s small light tank force of around 20 tanks and 
several engineer battalions.  Each of the three artillery regiments had three battalions, and 
every battalion had three companies with a battery of four guns in each company.  Two 
of the regiments had 105mm howitzers, and the third had 36 Japanese 75mm guns.604  
Compared to a British First World War corps it still lacked artillery, mortars and machine 
guns, let alone a Second World War infantry corps. 
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Guomindang forces were generally similar in structure but were more numerous, had far 
more artillery and heavy mortars and over 200 M3A Stuart light tanks, 80 fighters, 40 
bombers and 40 transports in support.  Their being ‘penny packeted’ to support infantry 
units, instead of being centralised in a division, negated the shock and firepower of the 
tanks.   
 
The lessons of 1927 – 1935 had been absorbed by the People’s Liberation Army and it 
went from a force that was just surviving after the Long March to a politically and 
militarily reliable and conventional armed force that was able to defeat the Guomindang 
in a little over two years.  The force was about to re-enter the crucible of combat battle in 
the Korean peninsula, suffering devastating losses amongst its veterans but at the same 
time modernising with the assistance of Soviet assistance.  The ‘Red versus Expert’ 
arguments, coinciding with the Chinese and Soviet schism in 1959 and the subsequent 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, saw the PLA forget these hard won lessons.  The 
performance of the PLA in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War exposed the need to relearn 
these lessons.  
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Chapter Four 
The Human Element: Operational Art and Tactics Become 
Moribund, 1953 - 1979    
 
 
This chapter will examine the human element in operational art and tactics from the end 
of the War of Liberation to the debacle of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War.  After 
liberation the PLA had to face whether it was to become a peasant or regular army.   The 
latter was necessary to stop attacks from Taiwan, to retake Tibet and to defend the 
frontiers.   The PLA benefited from Soviet assistance during and after the Korean War, 
but which ceased after the 1959 Sino-Soviet split.  Tactical and operational training in the 
PLA continued, despite the effects of the Great Famine into the 1960s, but training was 
severely constrained by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.605  The service 
academies were closed and the PLA became an internal security force, ensuring stability 
throughout the country. 
 
Immediately after winning the Chinese Civil War, however, the PLA was not a mere 
internal security force but one of conquest in its takeover of Tibet.  The Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Red Army, the forerunner to the People’s Liberation Army, was involved in 
mountain warfare from its inception, including the Jiangxi Soviet, the Long March and its 
operations around Yan’an (as discussed in the previous chapter).606  Thus when the PLA 
moved into Tibet on 6 October 1949 it had some experience in operating at high altitudes.  
After a 10-day campaign the PLA had established control over the capital, Lhasa.   They 
soon discovered that it is easier to control the cities but not the countryside.   
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The poor infrastructure in Tibet and the PLA’s rudimentary logistics capability, 
exacerbated by the Korean War and the provision of aid to the Viet Minh in their anti-
colonial war in Indo-China, saw the Chinese have major problems re-supplying their 
forces in Tibet.   Foraging from the local populace, as was the practice of the Red Army 
in the 1930s and 1940s, was not possible.   The Chinese soldiers were unable to accustom 
themselves to the Tibetan diet of yak meat, barley, tea and butter.607  Due to severe 
weather conditions, air supply was sporadic and operations by the PLA had to cease 
during the winter months.  The rugged terrain, across which artillery had to be 
manhandled, meant the Tibetan guerrillas could move out of range before they were 
subjected to fire from the artillery.   Caves, hides and valleys, where available, provided 
cover when the weather enabled the PLA to employ aircraft. 
 
While Tibet posed hardships, this was not a time for the People’s Liberation Army to feel 
forsaken.  In the period between 1950 and 1953 the Soviet Army supplied 3,642 advisors 
and specialists to help the PLA.  By 1966 this number reached 6,695 personnel 
comprising 68 general officers, 6,033 officers, 208 short-service soldiers and 386 civilian 
workers.608  During the same period the Soviet Union provided training in its military 
establishments to 1,514 Chinese service personnel.  This is broken down to 97 from the 
ground forces, 178 from the Air Defence Forces, 466 Air Force personnel, 608 Naval 
personnel, 99 from the rear services and 66 personnel from other branches of the People’s 
Liberation Army.609 
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The Korean War 
 
The initial period of Soviet military aid was also a time of another cross border 
involvement for the PLA: from looking east to the retaking of Tibet, Beijing turned its 
gaze west to events in Korea.  China became involved in the Korean War with the 
People’s Liberation Army being known as the ‘Chinese People’s Volunteers’ (CPV).  
They came to the aid of the North Korean Army against United Nations Forces as they 
approached the Chinese border.      
The People’s Liberation Army divides the Korean War into four stages.  The first stage is 
from 25 June to 14 September 1950, which is the Korean People’s Army offensive 
against South Korea.  The second stage is from 15 September to 25 November, and is the 
Korean People’s Army retreat against the United Nations forces.  The third stage, from 
26 November 1950 to 31 January 1951, is the United Nations retreat after China’s 
intervention.  The fourth stage, spanning 1 February 1951 to 27 July 1953, is referred to 
as the ‘stalemate’.     
 
In the Korean War it was quickly discovered that the Chinese soldier was fit, had 
excellent field craft skills and could withstand hardship whilst relying on minimal logistic 
support.  The 13th Army Corps commanders of the Chinese People’s Volunteers wrote in 
a report dated late September 1950 that ‘tactically [we] will employ our traditional 
methods such as concentration of [our] superior force [to attack weak enemy positions], 
penetration, circling and disintegration, close combat, night strikes and quick battles to 
force a solution’.610   Attacks at night and over broken ground were the norm.611  Chinese 
soldiers would move quietly, infiltrate enemy positions and then use automatic fire from 
sub-machine gun positions to provide cover whilst throwing grenades at the enemy’s 
flanks and rear.    
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Highly trained crews provided the base of fire with heavy machine guns.612   
Considerable numbers were pushed forward stealthily into the front line during the 
attack.613  After one unsuccessful CPV battalion assault during the Chosin Reservoir 
Campaign, US Marines collected ten heavy and seven light machine guns, 12 Thompson 
sub-machine guns and 76 rifles.614   
 
By moving silently and ‘hugging’ United Nations’ positions, Chinese infantry negated 
the UN force’s artillery and air firepower advantage, unless UN commanders were 
prepared to accept ‘friendly fire’ casualties.  CPV infantry defence against tanks initially 
consisted of satchel charges and ineffective grenade bundles,615 but a precious few 
bazookas and recoilless rifles became available towards the end of the Korean War. 
 
The United States Marine Corps were under no illusions as to CPV fighting capacity.  
Official reports after Chinese attacks on the First United States Marine Corps Division at 
Hagaru and Koto-ri noted that: 
 
The attacking troops were well armed, well trained, well-equipped, and 
ably led.  Ironically enough it was with US weapons that the Chinese were 
for the most part armed.  These included 60 and 81 mm mortars, 
Thompson sub-machine guns, and heavy and light machine guns, most of 
which had been captured from Chinese Nationalist forces. 616 
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‘Hugging the enemy’ was the primary tactic in offensive operations against an adversary 
who held an advantage in firepower.  The Chinese were disadvantaged in grenade 
throwing and the quality of their stick grenades (too light to be effective).  This reduced 
their effectiveness in close combat actions, once UN forces had evaluated CPV tactics.  
‘Hugging the enemy’ was also used by the Viet Minh against the French, the Viet Cong 
against United States forces in South Vietnam, the Mujahideen against Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan and Chechen forces fighting the Russians.617     
 
Chinese tactics were successful in the early days of their involvement in Korea until they 
met the United States Marine Corps.618   The US First Marine Division used the fire team 
as its basic building block for its infantry, which it had developed from the Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Red Army.  With elements of the US Army and British Royal Marine 
Commandos attached, the First Marine Division during its famous 11-day withdrawal 
from the Chosin Reservoir fought and decimated seven Communist Chinese divisions.619   
In the period 26 October to 15 December 1950, a total of 50 days, the division destroyed 
four Chinese armies of 13 divisions for only 718 dead, 192 missing and 3,508 wounded. 
The USMC was fighting an enemy that was using the same structure, the big difference 
being that the Marines were better armed and equipped. 
 
As the Korean War entered stalemate, both sides dug and conducted raids and limited 
actions reminiscent of the First World War.  It became a battle of attrition in a series of 
small but significant and quite bloody battles.  The People’s Liberation Army – or CPV 
as they were then - quickly became adept at organising in-depth defensive positions in 
Korea.  They were stubborn and difficult to dislodge and were always improving their 
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defences, using trench works, tunnels and bunkers along ridgelines, mountain peaks and 
with mutually supporting fire.  Bunkers were well constructed being usually made of 
double logs with one to two metre thick roofs of rock and could be three storeys deep.620  
Deception measures were utilised and dummy positions were common.621   Sniping by 
CPV forces in the Korean War started in early 1952 when the 230th Communist Youth 
League Regiment brought with them some ‘special grade shooters’.622   These were 
sharpshooters and not trained snipers but as the Chinese People’s Volunteers referred to 
them as snipers, this is the term used in this thesis.  They employed captured United 
States M-1 Garand semi-automatic rifles and Soviet Mosin-Nagant 1891-30 bolt-action 
rifles without telescopic sights.623  The maximum engagement range was between 400 
and 500 metres with the average engagement range around 100 metres.624  Spread along 
the front and operating in teams of one to two men, one acting as an observer and the 
other the shooter, they killed or wounded 14 enemy soldiers for the expenditure of 29 
rounds according to Chinese sources.  Special ranges were built for their use, utilizing 
both fixed and disappearing targets. 625 
 
 
Operational Level Planning and Command and Control 
 
The ability of the PLA to move the 13th Army Corps with its four infantry armies of 
260,000 in often poor weather, with total strategic surprise, demonstrated the high quality 
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staff planning.   The offensives, once underway, showed the two major problems the PLA 
faced in offensive operations in Korea.  These were (1) the lack of command and control 
once the attack started and (2) the ability to sustain the troops logistically.  In Korea 
runners were employed to relay orders as there was a lack of radio communication 
equipment – there were only two telephones per battalion.626        
 
Logistics, despite excellent planning staff was woefully inadequate.  Ill equipped to 
sustain operations in the harsh Korean winter, the Chinese operations ground to a halt due 
to an inability to supply enough rations and cold weather clothing.627  Ninety percent of 
the 26th Army Group became frostbite casualties, the 27th had 10,000 struck down with 
frostbite and the Ninth Army Group was rendered ineffective for three months during the 
winter of 1950.628  Similarly inadequate ammunition supply and heavy equipment like 
artillery meant the combat power of the PLA divisions was low.   Despite tactical success 
the inherent low combat power of the PLA meant it was incapable of operational success.   
United Nations forces even when trapped could often still find a way out and be supplied 
if isolated.629   
 
Poor roads, UN airpower and having fewer than 300 trucks for over 300,000 troops 
meant inadequate supplies for any CPV offensive, let alone keeping forces supplied with 
the basic requirements like cold weather clothing.  UN aircraft had destroyed much of the 
in-theatre cold weather supplies and lack of motor transport meant that a rapid 
exploitation of a breakthrough in an offensive operation was not possible, and similarly, 
if there was a need to retreat, troops could be quickly enveloped.  Chinese troops were 
accustomed to living off the land but this was not possible in Korea (like Tibet – but for 
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different reasons), as there was little spare food in the winter months, and in any case 
much of the crop had been destroyed.  In the rugged terrain of Korea when the lines 
stabilised, by dermination and organisation rations were supplied to personnel in static 
positions so that the soldiers were now getting sufficient food to enable them to withstand 
the cold.630  
 
Korea forced the PLA to learn how to sustain a force centrally and not by foraging.  The 
best example is rationing, as in conflicts there is usually more than enough ammunition, 
but often a scarcity of food.  The static conditions from mid-1951 allowed the logistics 
chain to be built up, the PLA to rebuild and replenish its units, and the soldiers to start 
receiving regular rations.  
 
The normal peacetime standard for the PLA during that period was 1.2 kg per man 
comprising 900gm of rice or millet, 300gm of vegetables and 40gm of meat.631   In Korea 
as the logistics chain improved so did the soldier’s diet.  In mid-1951 PLA soldiers in 
Korea were receiving rice, with or without millet with salt with little vegetables or meat; 
but by the Winter were receiving 1,000 gm of cereal with salt and small amounts of meat, 
vegetables and condiments.   By the end of 1952 this had grown to 900gm of cereal and 
670gm of meat, vegetables and oils and 180gm of condiments (for example, soy sauce, 
salt, spices).632  The PLA had learned to keep an army supplied in the field. 
 
By the end of the Korean War the PLA emerged as a force that had learnt how to master 
many of the technologies required in modern warfare.  Artillery and armour were 
integrated into the PLA and, above all, the logistics required to maintain them was now 
available, if limited in scope.   By the cessation of hostilities it was functioning under 
combat conditions without the benefit of air superiority, and had sufficient combat 
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stockpiles to allow a 21-day offensive if required.  The logistics lessons and operational 
planning and tactics that the People’s Liberation Army learnt in Korea were used to 
provide assistance to the Viet Minh in Indo-China, in its own operations in Tibet, and the 
1962 Sino-Indian Conflict.  
 
Turning to the generational changes in the Chinese Communist soldier, it is notable that 
in 1937 the Chinese Communist soldier was hardy, travelled light, was involved in 
guerrilla warfare against the Japanese and building a base of operations amongst the 
peasants.  He was little changed in 1950 at the squad level except in having more 
automatic weapons, and as with all armies, new weapons mean more to carry.   In late 
1937 he would carry a bolt-action rifle with 30 rounds of ammunition and three hand 
grenades.633   The average Chinese soldier who crossed the Yalu carried a rifle with 80 
rounds of ammunition, five hand grenades, one or two mortar bombs or block TNT, and a 
few extra clips for sub-machine guns or light machine guns.  For sustenance there were 
emergency rations of rice, tea and salt; and these were supposed to be supplemented from 
the Korean populace or captured rations.634  The heavy use of garlic in rations when the 
front stabilised, meant that United Nation’s soldiers could tell when Chinese soldiers 
were nearby or had been in an area as the smell could travel several hundred metres 
depending on the weather.635  A soldier in 1937 carried a tea and salt ration, a two-
kilogram pack of millet flour, and would also have supplemented this with food from the 
peasants he lived amongst.636    
 
Like his Red Army predecessors, the Chinese soldier who crossed the Yalu was superbly 
fit.  One example is the forced march the 38th Army conducted on the night of 27-28 
November 1950.  It covered 72.5 kilometres in 14 hours to try and cut off the retreating 
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United States Second Infantry Division.637   The average weight a CPV rifleman carried 
was 18.5 kg, which was half that of a US rifleman.638  The CPV infantryman’s basic field 
equipment was: a one pint canteen; a mess kit of a rice bowl, chop sticks and cup; first 
aid kit; bandoleers for ammunition; and a small pouch for carrying his kit.639 
Contrary to accepted wisdom, the Chinese soldier who crossed the Yalu was well armed 
and heavily equipped.   On a small frame he was carrying a large amount of ammunition 
and his weapons, although of varied composition, he was not as bad off as many writers 
have commented upon.640  To simplify training and logistics, entire armies were armed 
with Japanese, United States or Chinese weapons.641   The United Nations forces were no 
better.  British Commonwealth and United States forces when working together had three 
different rifle calibres for four different types of rifles and carbines and four different 
types of sub-machine guns with two different types of ammunition.   There were five 
different types of machine guns with two different calibres.  Only the two different types 
of British rifles had interchangeable magazines, as did the Australian and British sub-
machine guns.  
 
 
PLA Operational Planning in Indo-China – The Lynch Pin of the Viet 
Minh’s Success 
 
Almost as soon as the Chinese Communist Party came to power they almost immediately 
offered assistance to the Viet Minh.642   The Viet Minh was short of staff officers and the 
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PLA provided military advisors at the battalion, regiment and divisional levels under the 
auspices of the Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG). The CMAG also put the 
administration and financial systems of the Viet Minh on a sound footing.  More 
importantly from a Communist view, they helped politicise the army and mobilise the 
masses.  Finally, besides providing training they effectively took over the operational 
planning of the Viet Minh.643  From April to September 1950 China also supplied enough 
equipment to equip 16,000 soldiers and this included 14,000 rifles and pistols, 1,700 
machine guns, 150 artillery pieces including mortars, 2,800 tons of grain and large 
amounts of ammunition, medicine, uniforms and communications equipment.644  These 
enabled the Viet Minh, under General Chen Geng of the PLA, to capture Cao Bang by 
mid-October, breaking the French blockade of the Vietnamese-Chinese border and 
destroying seven French battalions.  General Chen Geng left in early November 1950 for 
the Korean War.645  
 
French resistance stiffened with new tactics and bolstered with United States equipment.  
The CMAG suggested that the Viet Minh start to conduct guerrilla warfare behind the 
French lines whilst defending their base of Hoa Binh.  This showed an appreciation of the 
operational level of planning that the French appeared to lack.  The Viet Minh ceased 
their conventional attacks against French positions, which had proved costly, and 
accepted the Chinese strategy of clearing the French from northwest Vietnam and then 
attacking their flank via north Laos.  Starting in mid-October 1952, this was successful by 
mid-December and in March 1953 the CMAG planned and assisted Viet Minh operations 
inside Laos, including providing advisors inside Laos itself.    
 
In October 1953 General Wei Guoqing was appointed to lead the CMAG with Luo Guibo 
as his political adviser.  Wei and the Viet Minh High Command in late October and late 
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November planned the upcoming offensives that would see which was to launch a two 
pronged attack into Laos from the north, and through central Vietnam.  The French 
decided to parachute forces into the village of Dien Bien Phu to act as a springboard to 
attack the Viet Minh and forestall attacks into northern Laos.  The Viet Minh then started 
to encircle Dien Bien Phu, in the mountainous terrain surrounding it, using thousands of 
peasants as labourers to build roads and as porters to haul ammunition and artillery.646   
This ability to plan and execute a logistics effort, which also needed the ability to feed 
and care for the construction workers and porters in an area that did not allow foraging, 
showed a high level of planning. 
 
The French brought more troops in the airfields they had built, as the Viet Minh encircled 
it and by the end of December 1953 the French had 16 battalions in the area and Viet 
Minh had it under encirclement.  The Viet Minh did not want for materiel as during the 
campaign it supplied 200 trucks, over 10,000 barrels of oil, over 100 artillery pieces 
including mortars, 3,000 small arms and 2.4 million rounds of small arms ammunition.   
 
Operational planning initially was to try and take Dien Bien Phu with ‘human wave’ 
tactics, overwhelming the French defences in a quick assault in January before their 
defences were stronger.  It was an abject failure; French defences were better than 
expected and led to a dispute between the Viet Minh High Command and their Chinese 
advisors.  Although the CMAG’s appreciation of French defences and morale was poor, a 
quick victory would have changed the geopolitical situation in Indo-China much earlier.   
The CMAG suffered from its own lack of appreciation of the morale of the French forces 
as well.  Many of the French soldiers were Foreign Legionnaires, battle-hardened 
veterans of the German SS who had fought on the Eastern Front in the Second World 
War.   
  
The Chinese Military Committee of the Chinese Communist Party sent a directive to the 
CMAG on 24 January 1954 ‘to adopt a strategy of separating and encircling the enemy 
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forces, and annihilate them bit by bit’.647  The Viet Minh and their Chinese advisors were 
to use conventional siege tactics and build up their forces before launching another 
assault.  This was new to the PLA and drew heavily from their experiences in the Korean 
War.   Operational planning for Dien Bien Phu was affected as much by external forces 
as on the battlefield.   The Geneva conference on Korea and Indo-China was due in April 
and a major victory of French forces would give the Viet Minh a stronger hand at the 
negotiation table.  Zhou Enlai instructed the CMAG to attack as quickly as possible and 
in consultation with the Viet Minh High Command attacked on 13 March 1954 at the 
northern end of the French defences.    
  
Drawing on personnel who had fought in Korea, sniper instructors and 12 engineers were 
sent to assist the Viet Minh.  The snipers taught the Viet Minh how to reduce French 
morale by keeping them on edge and the engineers instructed the Viet Minh on how to 
build trenches to approach the French defences unmolested.648  The Viet Minh built 
hundreds of miles of trench works before starting any more assaults.  Four battalions of 
37mm anti-aircraft guns were also supplied with training to stop the French supplying 
their beleaguered forces in Dien Bien Phu.649   The Chinese supplied the Viet Minh with 
modern artillery and multiple rocket launchers.  The artillery were predominately ex-
United States 105 mm howitzers, around 300 in all, captured from the Guomindang 
forces and the multiple rocket launchers were from the supplies the Soviet Union had 
given the Chinese during the Korean War.650   This artillery and its use were a strategic 
surprise to the French.  More importantly, PLA regulars provided the crews and fire 
control coordination.651  The experiences of Korea had given the PLA the capability to 
move, supply and coordinate massed artillery outside China.  This capability was to be 
invaluable in future operations in Tibet and on the border with India.   
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Equipment and Organisation of the PLA 
 
The People’s Liberation Army has been criticized over the large number of different 
weapons and calibres it used.  Many commentators referred to the plethora of weapons 
inherited from the Chinese Civil War.  Given the amount of different types of weapons 
that the PLA had in 1949, this is understandable.652   At the start of the Korean War, to 
simplify logistics and training, entire PLA armies were armed with Japanese weapons, 
United States weapons or ex-Guomindang weapons in 7.92 x 57 mm.653   Appendices 
Two and Three show a Soviet list of small arms used by the Chinese People’s Volunteers 
in Korea which leaves out Chinese built ex-Guomindang arms.  As the war continued, the 
Soviet Union supplied weapons to the PLA and this reflected in the increase in its 
firepower.  Appendix Four shows how this occurred to the PLA and other protagonists in 
the Korean War. 
 
The structure of the infantry company of the Chinese People’s Volunteers that crossed 
the Yalu in November 1950 is shown in Figure One. 
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Figure One 
PLA Infantry Company November 1950 
PLA Infantry Company November 1950
Rifle Platoon
Rifle Squad Rifle Squad Rifle Squad
Rifle Platoon Rifle Platoon
Three Belt fed machine guns
Machine Gun Platoon
Two 60 mm mortars
Mortar Squad
Headquarters
 
Source: Author’s compilation   
 
The CPV units that faced the United States Marine Corps did not have the machine gun 
platoon and although the authorised strength was around 852 men for the battalion its 
actual strength was around 700 men.654  However there were belt fed machine guns 
available for use at the company level.  After one assault the USMC captured 10 heavy 
machine guns, seven light machine guns, 12 Thompson sub-machine guns, 76 rifles, four 
pistols and 500 hand grenades.655   This shows that belt fed machine guns were pushed 
forward in an assault and were left after the repulse of the attack. 
 
In October 1951 the PLA and CPV infantry company was reduced in size to three 
platoons and the 60 mm mortar squad.   Each platoon had three squads of 12 men and the 
company strength was reduced from 190 to 151.  This was based on the Soviet model, the 
result of losses sustained in Korea, plus the need to simplify administration.  The 
previous light machine gun squad in the platoon was disbanded and the light machine 
guns became part of the three remaining rifle squads.   With the influx of Soviet weapons 
the amount of automatic weapons was increased.656   The PLA and CPV infantry 
company was actually stronger in numbers and close-range firepower than its equivalent 
in the British Army.   
                                                 
654 . Montross & Canzona, op. cit., p.87.     
 
655 . Ibid., p. 226. 
 
656 . Cheng, op. cit., p. 19. 
       
 184
 
The CPV quickly found that this structure was clearly insufficient against the firepower 
of the United Nations in Korea and the infantry company was again restructured, more in 
line with that prevailing at the start of the Korean War.  The infantry company 
commander needed to bring his support weapons with him as a lack of communications 
equipment meant he could rarely obtain on call artillery support in the defence and none 
during the attack.  The People’s Liberation Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteer 
infantry company now became a self-contained task force.   It was also a notably ‘square 
organization’ compared to the Soviet triangular model.  It was comprised of three rifle 
platoons, one machine gun platoon and one rocket (bazooka) platoon.  Each platoon was 
still comprised of three squads of 12 men, and the company’s strength rose to 201.657   
The battalion was now comprised of four rifle companies, one 82 mm mortar company, 
one heavy machine gun company, one recoilless rifle platoon and one communications 
platoon.  The battalion at full strength had 1,068 officers and men.658   The 60mm 
mortars were removed as it was a defensive structure with landline communications to 
the rear enabling on-call fire support.     
                                                
 
In the period 1950-1955 the Soviet Union supplied 67 regiments of armoured fighting 
vehicles which gave China the largest and most modern armoured force in Asia at the 
time.  In 1950 the PLA’s armoured force was composed of ex-Japanese and US light 
tanks, mostly M3 Stuarts.  To bolster the PLA against threats from the United States and 
Taiwan, as well as to assist the Chinese People’s Volunteers in Korea, the Soviet Union 
supplied over 3,000 armoured fighting vehicles.659  The advisors for the PLA armoured 
force were housed in Lushan, close to the Korean peninsula but far enough to avoid any 
conflict. 
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In 1950 the Soviet Union supplied 300 T-34-85s; 60 IS-2s and 40 ISU-122s which were 
enough for 10 regiments.  Each regiment was composed of 30 T-35/85 medium tanks, six 
IS-2 heavy tanks and four ISU-122 tank destroyers.660 
 
In 1951 Moscow supplied only 96 T-34-85s and 64 SU-76s which was enough for four 
regiments.  As the PLA armoured training system got into gear, larger numbers of AFVs 
were supplied.  In 1952, 312 T-34-85s and 208 SU-76s were supplied for 13 regiments 
and another 480 T-34-85s and 320 SU-76s were supplied in 1953 for a total of 40 
regiments.  To assist the logistics and battlefield mobility of China’s armoured force, 
which was now becoming proficient in using armour, 72 armoured recovery vehicles and 
60 engineering vehicles of all types were transferred from Soviet stocks to the PLA.  This 
growing proficiency saw the armoured forces of the Chinese People’s Volunteers in 
North Korea in the first six months of 1953 significantly increased.  By the July 1953 
armistice on the Korean peninsula, CPV armour in theatre was 278 T-34-85 medium 
tanks, 38 IS-2 heavy tanks, 27 ISU-122 and 48 SU-76 self-propelled guns for a total of 
391 vehicles, sufficient for nine regiments.661   
 
In the period from 1954 to 1979 the PLA fought a border conflict with India, a 
counterinsurgency campaign against CIA sponsored rebels in Tibet, supplied personnel 
and equipment to North Vietnam to fight the United States, almost started a nuclear war 
with the Soviet Union, went through three major changes of doctrine, the upheaval of the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and saw it suffer a defeat in a ‘punitive’ operation 
against the Vietnamese People’s Army.    
 
The People’s Liberation Army identifies four major changes in their doctrine since the 
Korean War.  In the 1950s it said its doctrine was to ‘Protect the North (from the Soviet 
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Union) and Defend the South (Against the United States/Taiwan)’.  In the 1960s this 
changed to ‘Lure the Enemy Deep into the Country’ in order to crush him with ‘People’s 
War’.   In the 1970s, this became ‘Prepare to Fight Early and Fight Big’, by using nuclear 
weapons, and this evolved from the late 1980s into the doctrine of Active Defence.662     
The People’s Liberation Army’s grand strategy and doctrine is ‘active defence’.   Active 
defence is based on three basic principles: no provocation of other nations; no bases 
anywhere on foreign soil; and no seizure of territory.663   The last principle must be 
tempered with the fact that the People’s Republic of China lays claim to the entire South 
China Sea and controls Tibet by force.664  The Chinese intervention against United 
Nations Forces in the Korean War, and the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, are justified using 
this strategy.  Although the PLA has described its doctrine as active defence, a ‘strong 
lean defence force’ is being made to enable it to perform their policy of active defence;665   
an all arms force that can move anywhere it is required.       
 
Sun Tzu wrote that ‘all warfare is based on deception’ and it may be argued People’s War 
was conceptually constructed on this basis.666  It was a concept by Mao for mobilising 
the masses and reducing the perceived power of the PLA, in line with the dictum that, 
‘Power comes through the barrel of a gun, but the gun must always be under the control 
of the Party’.667  It was unpopular as far as regular People’s Liberation Army units were 
concerned, and was dropped as soon as the Cultural Revolution was over.  The current 
use in the PLA of Ready Reaction Forces (RRFs) or Quantou Budhui (fist units), dates 
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from concepts developed in the early 1960s.  Their development was disrupted due to the 
hiatus of the Cultural Revolution, and the idea of fully trained and equipped ready 
reaction forces was given renewed impetus after the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese debacle.668   
At the operational level there was no People’s War in the PLA and its operational art has 
been the same since the end of the Korean War.   There were two conflicts that started in 
the 1950s and continued into the 1970s, and still have the ability to flare up into conflict: 
the Chinese invasion and occupation of Tibet and the Sino-Indian border dispute.  The 
small number of forces used in the conflict with India did not lend themselves to a show 
of the PLA’s operational art whereas Tibet did.   
 
 
Tibet 1954 – 1974: Fighting a Separatist Movement  
 
There were two Tibetan uprisings against the Chinese, one in 1954 and the major 
uprising in Lhasa in March 1959.  The latter saw the Dalai Lama flee to India with a 
small entourage.   Both uprisings were crushed but guerrilla warfare by the Khampas 
continued until 1974.669       
 
Kham Province in eastern Tibet was populated by Khampas, nomadic tribesmen who 
were fiercely independent, and from the start of the Chinese invasion were successful in 
attacking and defeating the People’s Liberation Army.  They conducted a guerrilla 
campaign in a region known for its harsh environment.  The PLA fought on foot and the 
Khampas used native horses that gave them the mobility for hit and run raids.  Ambushes 
of Chinese road convoys using the primitive winding roads were commonplace and were 
generally successful when mounted.  During the initial invasion by the PLA, a 3,000-man 
                                                 
668 . Hereafter called the Cultural Revolution, its more common name. 
 
669 . Brown, A.   ‘The dragon awakes’, War Monthly, Volume 2, Issue 15, p. 290 and McNair 
-Wilson, A.   ‘Fall of the forbidden city’, War in Peace, Volume 2, Issue 15, 1983, pp. 296 – 299; 
From notes taken during the Cold War And Its Legacy in Tibet: Great-Power Politics and 
Regional Security," seminar held at Harvard University on 20-21 April 2002.   
  
 188
division sent to the mountains to try and cut off retreating Tibetan forces was ambushed 
and annihilated.670   
 
The PLA started to expand the road network from the beginning of its invasion and the 
roads completed in 1956 enabled the PLA to amass 150,000 soldiers in eastern Tibet by 
the end of 1957.  This included some elements of Hiu Muslim cavalry who had been used 
with devastating effect against 1956 rebellions on the steppes of Amdo and in Kham.671   
PLA tactics, employing Korean War veterans and combat aircraft, by mid-1958 saw the 
Tibetan resistance forces in southern Tibet in disarray.  
 
On 16 June 1958 these disparate Tibetan resistance groups formed the National Volunteer 
Defence Army (NVDA).  The Central Intelligence Agency supplied the Tibetan rebels 
with training in the United States in radio equipment and modern weapons, including 57 
and 75 mm recoilless rifles and 60 and 81 mm mortars as well as guerrilla tactics.672    
From July 1958 infantry weapons were air dropped to aid them in their war against the 
Chinese and originally were old British .303-inch bolt-action Short Magazine Lee-
Enfield rifles, which the Tibetan Army had been using since 1914, and modern British 
.303-inch Bren light machine guns.  These weapons were in use by Pakistani and Indian 
forces so their origin could be denied.  Later on when there were no pretences of who 
were supplying the weapons, United States supplied small arms like the semi-automatic 
M-1 Garand rifle along with heavier weapons.673  Chinese logistics convoys and depots 
started to come under increasing attacks and by early 1959 large parts of central Tibet 
were under NVDA control.  The Chinese brought in aircraft to attack the NVDA forces, 
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forcing to move as they had no anti-aircraft weapons.674   At one stage it was reckoned by 
US intelligence that due to the insurgency a full one quarter of the PLA’s trucks were 
operating in Tibet.  
 
The NVDA moved into the Mustang area of Nepal where they conducted operations into 
Tibet until 1974, when they disbanded.  Such operations into Tibet were made in the 
summer when the mountains were passable and the possibility of frostbite less likely.  
The CIA made two more airdrops in 1962 and one in 1965, and afterwards supplying 
intelligence until 1969.  After that the Tibetan resistance was on its own.  The biggest 
intelligence coup for the CIA occurred in October 1961, when NVDA ambushed a 
Chinese convoy that included an assistant regimental commander.  In his pouch were 
discovered over 1,600 classified documents including 29 issues of the Bulletin of 
Activities of the People’s Liberation Army.675  These were secret reports meant for 
political cadres at the regimental level and were a boon to the United States intelligence 
services.  They revealed the state of the PLA including problems with equipment, 
training and the Great Famine of 1958 - 1961.  They were released to China researchers 
through the Library of Congress on 4 August 1963 and published in full by the Hoover 
Institution as The Politics of the Red Army.676   
 
Operations in Tibet gave the PLA real life operational level logistic and combined 
operations planning and experience.  This experience coupled with having to learn to 
conduct operations at high altitudes on China’s periphery would have been invaluable in 
the planning of operations against the Indian military in the 1962 Sino-Indian War.    
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Sino-Indian Border Conflicts 1959 – 1962 and Training for War 
 
In the second half of 1959 a series of clashes between Indian and Chinese troops broke 
out along the McMahon line separating India and Tibet.  This occurred whilst an anti-
Chinese rebellion was in progress in Tibet.  On 25 August there was an armed clash 
between Indian and Chinese troops and the Indians were forced to withdraw from their 
outpost.677   On 21 October in the Kongha Pass area of Ladakh a further clash occurred 
that saw nine Indian soldiers killed and 10 captured.678   On 7 November 1959 Zhou 
Enlai proposed a mutual withdrawal of 20 kilometres from the McMahon Line in the 
east, and to the Line of Control – that is, the line up to which each country exercised 
actual control and which was not in dispute.679 
 
The Chinese Army was suffering from the Great Famine, but when reading various issues 
of the Bulletin of Activities, selected units of the People’s Liberation Army were being 
trained up to a high state of readiness.680  Even after comments like ‘our Army units must 
be active like living dragons and tigers, full of energy and the spirit of revolution’ were 
made, specialist training was still emphasised.681  Lin Biao himself directed that ‘military 
training must come first at all times’, when referring to political and cultural activities as 
well as labour projects.682   He further said this was due to the fact that the ‘weapons of 
war nowadays are more complicated and hard to learn’; and later on in the same passage 
‘fighting has changed altogether, for the present and the past are not only just a little 
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different but entirely different’.683   The meeting of the Military Affairs Commission on 
training held 20-26 January 1961 emphasised that for soldiers the program should be 
chiefly focussed on technical training, and that the problem of ‘one speciality and many 
skills’, was to be addressed by concentrating on their speciality.  The summary included 
that ‘more emphasis should be placed on specialisation than on general skill’.684   These 
comments tend to put into perspective the slogans of ‘man over machine’ and, as Joffe 
described, the ‘better a red head than expert’.685        
 
In 1961, a PLA Ground Force Training Conference was held on subject of the 
‘Implementation of the Policy of Compactness’ as well as quality.  The conference 
decided that there should be an overhaul of shooting training, including an emphasis on 
night shooting, and that dry practice of small arms training should be conducted daily.686   
The sharpshooters of an infantry sub-unit were classified as superior marksmen and good 
marksmen in rifles, sub-machine guns, light machine guns and heavy machine guns.   
Fully equipped and full-strength company units were expected to have one or two 
superior marksmen in every squad, and the company units below full strength were 
expected to have 10 to 15 percent superior marksmen.687  There were no designated 
snipers as such. 
 
Tensions continued along the McMahon Line and both China and India started testing 
each other’s defences in July 1962.  Clashes were initially confined to Ladakh, but by 
September they had also spread along the entire McMahon Line.688  The Chinese 
attacked on 20 October.  On 22 October the Chinese Ministry of Defence said ‘in order to 
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protect the Indian troops from staging a come back and launching fresh attacks, the 
Chinese frontier guards, fighting in self-defence, need no longer restrict themselves to the 
limits of the illegal McMahon Line’.689  The key towns of Walong (eastern NEFA) and 
Bondi La (western NEFA) fell on 17 November and 19 November, respectively; in the 
latter case the Chinese simply by-passed the Indian defence line along the Sela Ridge.690  
At midnight 20-21 November the Chinese announced their troops would stop firing the 
following midnight and they would start withdrawing to positions 20 kilometres north of 
the McMahon Line.  In the middle and Ladakh sectors of the frontier they would 
withdraw 20 km from the Line of Control as defined by them, that is, as at 7 November 
1959.691    
 
The following is a translation on the use of recoilless rifles in the 1962 Sino-Indian War 
and describes the Indian defences as well as how the PLA, through skilful field craft and 
a 57mm recoilless rifle, overcame them: 
 
In October 1962 our infantry from a regiment had the second battalion 
artillery company with 57mm recoilless rifles, with gun-team four  
subordinate to eight company which was deployed on the west side of the 
Qiangdeng region. In the Qiangdeng region the south face of the 
mountains sloped towards the north, and was covered in thick scrub.  The 
Indian Army positions generally overlooked the slope and terrain.  It was 
defended by the 10th company, from the ninth battalion, comprising 
around 130 soldiers.  Well camouflaged they had constructed large scale 
defence works comprising 48 positions, in a dispersed hedgehog type 
defence overlooking the small fighting area. 
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The [Chinese] rear command post fully studied the terrain, and co-located 
with them was gun-team four with eight people carrying a Model 52 
57mm recoilless rifle and 17 rounds of ammunition, which was 
subordinate to eight company and cooperated with them in the battle.   
 
At 0745hours on 20 October, gun-team four, located with the 
headquarters advanced towards the enemy to assist eight company with 
the attack.  Eight infantry company had encountered three enemy 
pillboxes whose firepower blocked their advance and was causing 
casualties. Gun-team four caught up and immediately established itself on 
a small ridge and began close fire support, hitting a bunker with the first 
shot at 60m. 
 
Right afterwards the platoon ordered fire upon the left hand bunker, yet 
the target was obscured by heavy brush; hitting it ‘would defy the laws of 
shooting’.  Gun-team four resolutely pushed forward 30m with the team 
and team leader utilising the terrain for cover, got within 40m to 50m 
downwards of the bunker.  The team fired two rounds; each round 
destroyed a bunker making a breach in the defences which opened the 
road for the Chinese advance.692   
 
The experiences of operating in Tibet and on the Indian border were unlikely to have 
been incorporated in the PLA operations planning as its staff colleges were closed during 
the Cultural Revolution.  The lack of logistics planning and the loss of combined 
operations planning and experience became painfully obvious during the 1979 Sino-
Vietnamese War.  Mao Zedong’s flirtation with his version of People’s War further 
eroded the capacity for operational planning in the PLA, compounded with the upheaval 
of the Cultural Revolution.   
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Infantry tactics - The Myth of People’s War 
 
While Mao Zedong and Lin Biao were advocating the benefits of People’s War doctrine, 
the PLA in 1961 decided to recreate ‘model’ units.693  These were to be expanded into 
battalion level units and larger as time and money permitted - in military parlance, Ready 
Reaction Forces (RRFs).  The use of model companies was first used in the early 1930s 
by the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, the forerunner of the People’s Liberation 
Army, the Red Guards and Young Pioneers.694  These were an elite unit and used as a 
model for other units to aspire to.695  Model units were to be designated as ‘The 
Company on Duty’, the company being the primary combat unit of the PLA at the time, 
to avoid charges of ‘elitism’.696  The units on duty were to be trained and fully equipped 
so they were capable of going into action on six hours’ notice.  Model companies were to 
be established in regiments in full-time or half-time training.  These companies were to 
be fully manned and have the better equipment, and were to be the nucleus around which 
larger RRFs were to be formed as funding allowed.    
 
Thus when People’s War was gathering pace after the fall of Peng Dehuai, special forces 
and RRF units in the PLA were being fostered and encouraged.  The bulk of the 
operational training budget of the PLA went to special forces subordinate to units at the 
divisional level and was meant to account for 70 percent of the local training time.  For 
the ‘special troops of units’ at the regimental level and below, it was meant to account for 
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60 percent of the total training time.697  Thus the bulk of training was going to the duty 
companies and reconnaissance units.  
 
In the early 1960s the PLA based its combat manoeuvre and power around the infantry 
company.698  Its training regime was concentrated at the platoon and squad level, with the 
infantry company being the basic tactical unit.  This meant it was also easier to create 
more RRF units as funding allowed.  Platoons and companies were to have artillery, 
armour and flamethrowing units attached.  Training at the battalion level and above was 
to be combined arms, and at the regimental level and above for command and control 
training.699  Due to funding constraints, training at the operational level was not 
emphasised, the emphasis being at the tactical and close combat levels.700      
 
 
Quoting the relevant PLA document, the functions of the model company were to be: 
 
a. The role of being on duty.   It can meet any sudden emergency and prevent 
any unforseen situation;  
 
b. The role of experiment.  It can test the new operational manuals for the 
infantry and study the usefulness of the organisation, equipment and 
techniques of our Army as well as new tactical requirements; 
 
c. The role of teaching.   It can cultivate and train squad leaders; and 
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d. The role of the model example.  It can set itself as a model example for the 
rest of the regiment.701 
 
 
A note of caution is in order here.  What is regarded as normal in a well-trained infantry 
battalion can be regarded as special in another.702  Many Western European military 
forces designate their light infantry units as elite units, whereas their tasks and roles are 
those that are normally expected of an Australian infantry battalion.   For example there 
is a reconnaissance and surveillance platoon integral to the Australian infantry 
battalion.703 
   
David Shambaugh observed that ‘in 1984, the PLA began to shrink the size of its 
operational commands, experimenting with brigade and battalion level forces instead of 
larger division sized forces and developing mobile and rapidly deployable ‘fist units’ 
(quantou budhui) on an experimental basis’.704  This is incorrect, as the PLA had already 
designated its first divisional sized RRF in 1983 based on its Airborne Force.  The 
Airborne Force was the elite of the PLA, being equipped with the latest weapons and 
equipment, but like the German Falschirmjäger of the Second World War, was part of 
the air force.  In 1983 it was the size of a PLA Army Corps and was the designated 
strategic reserve to reinforce the PLA on the borders, and was stationed at the Yingshan 
and Xiaogan airfields in the Wuhan Military Region.705   From there the PLA started to 
redevelop units inside each military region to act as rapid deployment or ‘fist’ units.   
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Thus the People’s Liberation Army has been continuing the doctrine it was working on 
even during the start of People’s War.  People’s War was never considered seriously and 
the focus on rapidly deployable forces, and combined forces which had started in 1961, 
simply resumed after the Cultural Revolution.  In reality, there has been no change in 
doctrine, People’s War was never close to the PLA’s heart, a core of elite rapidly 
deployable forces was, and still is.  In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s anti-armour weapons 
inside the infantry battalion were obsolete compared to the Western and Eastern Bloc and 
were not capable of defeating main battle tanks in a contemporary environment.706  
 
During the period 1950 - 1979 the PLA’s infantry regiments sorely lacked long-range 
anti-armour weapons, relying on small calibre recoilless rifles for stand-off attacks.    
During the Korean War and afterwards the PLA used a copy of the United States 3.75 
inch M20 bazooka in the infantry company, and 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles as the 
battalion and regiment level anti-armour weapons.  In 1965 a Chinese copy of the Soviet 
82 mm B-10 recoilless rifle, called the Type 65, was introduced to replace the 57 mm and 
75 mm weapons with a more effective weapon.  The major problem was that the effective 
range of the infantry regiment against armour was, at best, 450 metres.707    
 
The Chinese tactic of ‘hugging the enemy’ also meant a reliance on close range anti-
armour attack with anti-tank hand grenades and light anti-armour weapons like the RPG-
2.   In the mid-1950s the Soviet RPG-2 was produced by the Chinese as the Model 56 and 
replaced Chinese copies of the United States 2.36inch and 3.5inch rocket launchers used 
in the Korean War and afterwards.  A Chinese version of the Soviet RKG-3 hollow 
charge anti-tank grenade was introduced to replace the vast assortment of improvised and 
old model anti-tank hand grenades and demolition charges that had also been used in 
Korea.708 
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The RPG-2 was introduced into the People’s Liberation Army as the Type 56 in the mid-
1950s and gave the infantryman an effective, and lightweight, weapon out to 100 
metres.709   The introduction of the Type 69 (RPG-7) rocket propelled grenade launcher 
increased this to 500 metres.   The original PG-7 HEAT round for the RPG-7 was used in 
Vietnam, had a self-destruct fuse of 3.5 seconds initiated upon firing, and had a 
maximum range of approximately 950 metres against area targets and a maximum 
effective range against armour of approximately 500 metres.710  The PG-7 warhead 
contained 0.3kg of cast TNT/RDX that gave it a useful capability against bunkers and 
personnel as well.   During the Vietnam War, Army of the Republic of Vietnam figures 
showed that M-113 armoured personnel carriers had one penetration for every seven RPG 
hits.   The hits themselves averaged one in eight to one in 10 rounds fired.711   The figures 
did not differentiate between the RPG –2 and RPG –7.  The RPG –7 is more accurate so 
the hit rate would have been greater for that weapon.   Statistical analysis showed that 
that only one M-113 was destroyed for every seven penetrations and casualties were 0.8 
per penetration.712    
 
Other than rocket-propelled grenades, the individual infantryman had hollow charge anti-
tank grenade and improvised bundle grenades to attack armour.713   The Chinese soldier 
would remove the handles from their stick grenades and bind the heads around a 
complete stick grenade.  This was originally employed by the Germans in the First World 
War where it was referred to as the as the Geballte Ladung and provided a large amount 
of explosive, but is not effective against main battle tanks.   Still, these weapons were 
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better than dynamite bundles on the end of poles as practised by the People’s Militia 
(Ming Bing) in the 1960s and 1970s.714   The individual PLA infantryman was using the 
same type of weapons, and close battle anti-armour tactics, as the German Army infantry 
had on the Eastern Front in 1941 and 1942.715   When in 1979 China invaded Vietnam, 
the PLA was still using these weapons, their anti-armour weapons now two generations 
behind NATO and Warsaw Pact weapons, whose new generation of main battle tanks 
were coming into service equipped with composite armour. 
    
When China attacked Vietnam in 1979 it lacked a direct fire anti-armour weapon in the 
infantry regiment that was effective past 500 metres, whereas infantry battalions in the 
Warsaw Pact and NATO could hit armour or other targets at 2,000 metres or more.   The 
United States was putting the M47 Dragon and BGM71 TOW anti-tank guided weapons 
(ATGW) into service and European NATO forces had the Milan ATGW.  The 
Vietnamese had Russian 9M14M Malyutka (‘Sagger’) anti-tank missiles with a range of 
3,000 metres for its forces.716  The first long-range anti-tank weapon was only just 
coming into service in the People’s Liberation Army in 1979,  when the Malyutka missile 
was copied as the Hong Jian (Red Arrow) – 73, although pre-production models could 
have been produced in 1978.717      
 
 
The PLA’s Principles of War 
 
                                                 
714 . Bonds, R.   The Chinese War Machine, Salamander Books, London, 1979, p. 101; Joffe, E.’ 
‘”People’s War under Modern Conditions”, A Doctrine for Modern War’, China Quarterly, No. 
112, December 1987, p. 557. 
 
715 . Fleischer, W.   Panzerfaust and other German Infantry Anti-Tank Weapons, Schiffer  
Military/Aviation History, Atglen, 1994, p. 15; Joffe, loc. cit.  
  
716. Ibid., p. 187. 
 
717. Jencks, H.   ‘New Chinese Sagger’, Infantry, Vol. 71, No. 1, January-February 1981,  
p. 12. 
 
 200
The People’s Liberation Army had by now defined its Principles of War and these 
were:718 
1. political mobilisation 
2. selection and maintenance of the aim 
3. offensive action 
4. concentration of force 
5. initiative or flexibility 
6. coordination 
7. security 
8. surprise 
9. morale 
10. freedom of action, and  
11. mobility. 
 
The PLA’s Principles of War were similar to other nations and reflected its experiences; 
for example, political mobilisation was a PLA principle not found in the Soviet Union’s, 
the United States’ or Britain’s contemporary principles. Interestingly, annihilation, which 
was in the Soviet Union’s, was not included, especially giving the Red Army’s emphasis 
on annihilation of the enemy.  The previous Principle Number Nine – the use of captured 
weapons and personnel to supplement the PLA’s own forces – was no longer in evidence.  
Perhaps this came under the PLA’s principle of political mobilisation, which covered the 
need to control the Chinese populace and the PLA as well, as ‘the gun must be under the 
control of the party’.  Similarly, freedom of action was a principle which did not concur 
with the rigid Party command and control of the PLA.  Mobility was given its own 
principle, reflecting the influence of Sun Tzu being an exponent of manoeuvre and the 
PLA putting a priority on manoeuvre due to its lack of heavy arms.   
 
                                                 
718. Starry, D.A.  “The Principles of War’, Military Review, Volume LXI, Number 9, September 1981, 
p. 6 
 201
The PLA in the period 1949-1979 depended on the militia for logistics and control of the 
population.  Political cadres, besides being responsible for political mobilisation and 
education, also had an administrative and training role. 
 
During the disastrous Great Leap Forward the Ming Bing (People’s Army), generally 
referred to as the militia, was greatly expanded during the  ‘everyone a soldier’ campaign 
and large resources devoted to it.  This was done at the expense of the PLA who saw its 
precious few resources diverted away to campaign.  There were considerable problems of 
corruption and some militias became local bandits, for example, in the Honan 
countryside.719   They were referred to by such terms such as ‘bandit kings’, ‘mad dogs’, 
‘little bosses’, ‘living bandits’ and  ‘tiger bandits’.  In one county, 11 of the 13 heads of 
the departments of commune armed forces had committed ‘seriously unlawful acts’.   In 
the same county, 30 of 41 militia regimental commanders and 165 of the 224 militia 
battalions had also committed ‘seriously unlawful acts’.   Weapons control was lax, most 
of the militia units did not know how many they had and some were used in robberies.   
Some of the militia, besides robbing and beating people up, were also responsible for 
rape.  Honan was not the only province that suffered from problems with the militia; 
Shaanxi province also had similar problems.720    The resources were gradually returned 
to the PLA in the early 1960s.     
 
Turning to political cadres, as noted above, Mao Zedong famously wrote, ‘Power comes 
through the barrel of a gun, but the gun must be under the control of the Party’ (6 
November 1938).721   The role of the cadre system was to keep the army under its control 
and to ensure that the political activities of People’s War were undertaken.  The Bulletin 
of Activities of the People’s Liberation Army revealed that the political cadre system was 
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not just used as a Party control system of the PLA.   Political cadres were quite numerous 
and held positions of responsibility, including the deputy platoon leader position and his 
responsibility went down to the squad level.722  Besides their political role, political 
cadres were also responsible for morale, welfare, discipline, the granting of leave, and 
ensuring that military directives were acted upon.  Thus in Western military terms they 
acted as the equivalent of chaplains, naval coxswains, education officers, financial and 
training auditors, as well as their involvement in political education.723   Political officers 
were instructed to ensure that sub-specialisation on technical equipment occurred and to 
train a certain type of soldier to fight a certain type of war.724    
 
A reading of the Bulletin of Activities shows that education and training were deemed 
highly important, with sixteen documents on these subjects in the Bulletin, compared to 
six on political activities. 725   For example, the ‘Four sets of regulations on political 
work’ in company level units of the PLA were promulgated for enforcement.   
Committees were to be formed under the political officers with the company commander 
to reinforce the Party line through ‘democracy sessions’ and to organise and expand 
extra-curricular studies like mass physical, mass cultural and health activities.  These 
were meant to increase morale, fitness, health and therefore fighting capability.726     
 
Thus the responsibility of political officers for the PLA went beyond inculcating the 
correct political line.   In the early days of the PLA they were often the only literate men 
in the lower ranks and part of their duties were to aid the Party by bringing literacy to the 
lower ranks.  In an organisation that lacked formed education, training, and a personnel 
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administration system they were invaluable.   Besides ensuring a standardised system and 
the quality assurance of training, they also kept in check provincialism - the bane of all 
previous Chinese armies.  They may not have been popular but given the administration 
and education problems of the People’s Liberation Army in its early days, political 
officers were necessary. 
 
 
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the ‘Gang of Four’ and Their 
Effects on the PLA, 1966-1976 
 
The PLA became embroiled in the Cultural Revolution reducing is effectiveness and in 
some areas of China contributing to the turmoil.  After Mao died in 1976 the ‘Gang of 
Four’ operating from Shanghai tried to make the militia its power base and reduce the 
power of the PLA.  The following section will explain the GPCR’s effects on the PLA 
and shed further light on the development of doctrine.  
 
The Cultural Revolution severely affected the PLA; in many counties and provinces the 
Cultural Revolution became factionalised and went to war with itself.727  Red Guards 
were often allowed to raid armouries, and created havoc by fighting amongst themselves 
without interference from the PLA.  In the period 1966 – 1968 rival Red Guard factions 
would often attack trains from the Soviet Union loaded with ordnance for North Vietnam.  
The attacks on these trains lead to Soviet accusations that China was blocking weapons 
shipments to North Vietnam.728  The PLA itself was not averse to interfering with Soviet 
arms shipments to Vietnam.  Soviet MiG fighters for the Vietnamese People’s Air Force 
were assembled and stored in Yunnan, where the United States could not hit them.  The 
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PLA would strip them for spare parts and replace them with Chinese made sub-standard 
worn out ones.729 
 
Zhou Enlai, the Prime Minister and second only to Mao, held numerous meetings in 
Beijing with the feuding factions from Guangxi Autonomous Region to stop fighting, 
return the arms they seized and not block shipments to Vietnam.  Eventually, in 1968, 
Zhou ordered the PLA to take control of China’s railway network.730  Similarly the PLA 
could not sit idly by and watch the disintegration of law and order.  Conservative 
elements of the PLA became a stabilising force in many areas, and after what appeared to 
be a descent into civil war in January and February 1968, started to take action with the 
blessing of many in the Politburo.731   This was done with the same zeal that the Red 
Guards showed towards conservative elements and many radical Red Guard elements 
were killed, tortured and then sent to the periphery.732    
 
In late 1967 Mao sent the PLA into the countryside to continue the Cultural Revolution 
but the PLA became the internal security force at the expense of its capability to fight a 
war.733  In April 1969 there were two million soldiers on ‘political duties’ – the 
euphemism for internal security duties.734  The operational capability was not totally 
destroyed and lessons of the Zhen Bao Island Incident caused most of the factions in the 
Politburo to change course and rebuild the war fighting capability of the PLA.735     
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From the start of the Cultural Revolution there was a purging of the ‘old guard’ in the 
PLA.  This was not in itself not an unsound policy given their advanced ages.  However it 
also caused confusion and fear in the hierarchy.  It started with the purging of the PLA 
Chief of Staff, Luo Ruiqing, in late 1965 until the ill-fated flight of Lin Biao to the Soviet 
Union in 1971.  Some of the military hierarchy purged were beaten, imprisoned and even 
killed, for example, Generals Gao Gang and Liu Shaoqi.  
 
Following Peng Dehuai’s fall from grace in 1959 and the rise of the doctrine of People’s 
War, the People’s Militia became more active.  The militia was to defeat the enemy with 
a ‘human wave’ after they had been ‘lured deep’ into the Chinese hinterland.  During the 
Cultural Revolution, Mao’s wife Jiang Qing saw the People’s Militia as a counter to the 
People’s Liberation Army and aided its expansion.  The Municipal Militia General 
Headquarters existed in Shanghai and Guangzhou, but PLA regional commanders outside 
of Shanghai and Guangzhou often gave it no more than ‘lip service’.736    After Mao died, 
Jiang and Zhang Chunqiao called on the masses to ‘learn from Shanghai and Militia 
Building’.  They wanted to continue their ‘Leftist’ influence on the PLA whilst creating 
an alternative armed force to the PLA.737  However, the Gang of Four’s alternative power 
base to the PLA and Politburo was effectively without substance.  After wresting power 
from Deng Xiaoping in early 1976, in the ensuring power struggle the Gang of Four was 
arrested in October that year which also confirmed the PLA’s control of the militia.  Not 
even the Shanghai militia, the Gang of Four’s supposed power base, protested the 
arrest.738  Deng Xiaoping came to power in July 1977, supported by the PLA and 
conservative elements inside the Politburo.739   
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This ushered in the return of a non-politicised professional PLA.  Leftist PLA 
commanders were replaced as quickly as practicable but this did take time and was still 
going on in the mid-1980s.740  More importantly, training again became focused on war 
fighting and not on guerrilla fighting.  The military academies started to examine 
conventional war at the operational level but the loss of 10 years meant starting from 
what was remembered from 1965, putting the PLA at a decided disadvantage in 
comparison with its peers overseas.   The lost decade resulted in the debacle of the 1979 
Sino-Vietnamese War.  
 
 
The Rise and Fall of People’s War      
 
The turmoil of the Cultural Revolution saw the higher-level training in the PLA cease and 
the standing army become a peacekeeping force that was more political in training than in 
combat.  The experiences of operating in Tibet and on the Indian border were unlikely to 
have been incorporated in the PLA operations planning, as staff colleges were closed 
during the Cultural Revolution.  The lack of logistics planning and the loss of combined 
operations planning and experience became painfully obvious during the 1979 Sino-
Vietnamese War.  Two incidents in less than a decade revealed how far the PLA had 
fallen and were catalysts for doctrinal change.  The first were the two 1969 Sino-Soviet 
border incidents and the second was the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War which exposed all 
the flaws of the PLA.     
 
The Russian version is that on 2 March 1969, as had occurred for the previous two years, 
eight Soviet border guards met a demonstration on the disputed island of Damanskyi in 
the middle of the Ussuri River.  Approximately 300 PLA personnel, disguised as civilians 
crossed the frozen river, and demonstrated proclaiming their support for Mao Zedong - 
waiving the Little Red Book - and against the Soviet ‘social-imperialists’.  What 
happened next was totally unexpected.  The ‘demonstrators’ parted and a second group 
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ambushed the Soviet border guards, killing them all.  Other Soviet border guards 
counterattacked, a large fire fight ensued and when more reinforcements arrived, the 
Soviet border guards retook the island.  The Soviets admitted to losing 31 dead and 14 
wounded.741  This is a high proportion of killed to wounded, over two-to-one so the 
fighting, and given that as only small arms were used, must have been at close range.   
The Chinese figures have never been announced.  The area remained tense and on 15 
March a PLA infantry regiment, supported by mortar and artillery fire, attacked the island 
again and forced the border guards to retreat.742    
 
Both the Russians and Chinese agree the major action occurred on 15 March 1969.  The 
Chinese version is that ‘on 15 March 1969 at 0802 hours a major conflict started at Zhen 
Bao Dao to defend China’.  The Chinese claim the Soviet Army concentrated 200 
infantry, 20 tanks and 30 armoured fighting vehicles, and mounted a surprise attack in 
depth of the combat area using artillery fire to cover the attack.  The Chinese version is 
that the PLA soldiers ‘facing Zhen Bao Dao rose and launched a counter-strike damaging 
six infantry vehicles and 10 infantry soldiers and throwing them back’.743  The Russians 
say that their Border Guards were attacked and they fought back with small arms and the 
machine guns from their BTR-60PB wheeled armoured personnel carriers.  Later a 
Russian counterattack led by four T-62s tried to get in behind the rear of the Chinese 
units on the island.  They came under bombardment by Chinese artillery, the lead tank 
lost a track to an anti-tank mine on the ice, and the rest withdrew.  The Chinese had 
placed Type 56 85mm anti-tank guns, which also have a high-explosive round, in direct 
support of their infantry.744  The attack faltered as Chinese artillery fire destroyed or 
disabled some of the APCs and a second assault was launched to rescue the survivors 
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from the first one.  The Soviet border guards did not leave their APCs, in accordance with 
prevailing Soviet doctrine for mechanized infantry.  By this time the Chinese had 
constructed well-built defensive positions on the island.745    
 
The Chinese Version accords with this: 
 
At 0930 higher level ordered gun team seven squad leader Li and teams 
seven and eight to take along two Model 56 75mm recoilless rifles to the 
island and for gun team nine to carry a Model 56 75mm recoilless rifle and 
deploy it at number three gun position to guard against flank attacks 
against the main position at Zhen Bao Dao.  Seven and eight fighter 
squads momentarily prepared the rear area, to become reserve position, 
when they got through as the river was frozen over at the fork.  The force 
headed in the direction of the Zhen Bao Dao main position, as the Soviet 
Army had resolutely sent out four T-62 tanks. Approaching the southwest 
side of the fork in the river our main forces entrenched in the rear 
forcefully came forward.   
 
As a result of the pressing threat teams seven and eight came but could not 
reach the gun or fill their ammunition needs but had the advantage of the 
terrain, so they prepared their hand grenades. The Soviet tanks advanced 
until 10 o’clock, where near the poplar forest, team-eight leader Li bravely 
having no regard for the enemy tanks’ machine gun fire, bravely rose up 
and ran at the tanks continuously throwing five hand grenades.  Positions 
two and three had little anti-tank firepower and the Soviet tank column 
continued fierce fire against them; they lacked the capability to pierce the 
turret armour.   
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The T-62 turret armour could not be penetrated and the hull could only be 
pierced by the hollow charge rounds in the rear which were beyond reach.  
A combination of factors caused a unique situation where the crew 
abandoned a tank and were shot dead.  A T-62 encountered a failed strike 
on its rear and as it attempted to turn around (our people ambushed the 
entire column because it was in a parallel group of the invasion), as it had 
not expected our forceful soldiers.   Our forces long ago had set up an anti-
tank minefield in which it was now located.  It ran over a mine which 
exploded and broke the left side track.  The three remaining tanks realising 
their situation, withdrew.  The crew of the crippled tank tried to escape 
from the tank but were shot as they got out.  One of our soldiers crawled 
up the tank body and threw a hand grenade down an open hatch.  
Afterwards the tank was retrieved and became part of the Chinese 
Revolutionary Vehicle Museum. 
 
Watching the Soviet tanks arrive during their withdrawal, teams seven and 
eight immediately moved men forward in coordination with the defence of 
the main position.  Team seven vigorously moved into an ambush position 
on the river embankment, only to discover on the left side of its position a 
tank and three armoured fighting vehicles coming towards the main 
position to cut it off with fire.  Team seven swiftly got the recoilless rifle 
in to action, and opened fire on one of the armoured fighting vehicles.  
The first shot hit the target and the vehicle caught fire.  Team seven 
immediately moved left, and upon arriving at its second firing position, 
saw enemy armoured fighting vehicles rushing towards it.  Using the 
cover of the poplar forest the team coolly took aim along the track the 
vehicles were to take.  The first shot was at 80m against an armoured 
fighting vehicle which was hit and exploded; the other one turned around 
and ran away.   
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In the poplar forest scouting conducted by the complete fighting squad 
chased [the AFV] up to a high place, striking the rear vehicle; this time the 
Soviet Army was forced to stop its intensive short duration strike.  In the 
poplar forest an order was given to provide third position with many 
artillery rounds because a counterstrike against the Soviet forces was 
being planned.   The Soviet Army had lost one armoured fighting vehicle 
and one T-62 tank but they exceeded themselves by crossing over the river 
to the east side.  Using clumps of scrub for cover our forces moved 
forcefully forward; team seven immediately set up the recoilless rifle and 
fired from the poplar forest causing damage.   
 
On the right hand side of three weapons striking back at the tank, they did 
not turn their heads to see the serious damage being caused by an enemy 
tank which fired round after round; providing mobile firepower from far 
away, the armoured fighting vehicles advancing with the tanks following.  
This time using fire and movement the tanks caused continual damage 
frontally and from the left side.  At this critical moment team seven’s 
recoilless rifle experienced a stoppage which they attempted to clear. The 
enemy force’s tanks struck the emplacement in the poplar forest, thus 
dying a martyr’s death.  The enemy tanks immediately met misfortune 
from fire by our force’s anti-tank weapons, the damned tanks no longer 
dared to continue the attack, became scared and turned around beating a 
hasty retreat.      
 
The Soviet Army forces met with misfortune from our forces on each front 
that struck back immediately and began a fierce retreat; this time our 
reinforcements included heavy long-range artillery that immediately fired 
in depth upon the Soviet Army who no longer dared to attack fiercely the 
rear routes, and our forces broke away from direct contact.  A military 
success, later team eight collected two destroyed armoured fighting 
vehicles. 
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On 15 March the entire area was a fierce battle with our forces brought 
into full play, and our powerful force of rocket propelled grenades and 
recoilless rifles caused the destruction or capture of six enemy armoured 
fighting vehicles and one tank – an excellent military success.746  
 
This is true up to a point.  The Chinese had established themselves on the western side of 
the island and at 1610 hours were poised to take the eastern side in a pincer movement.  
The border guards stopped the attack with artillery fire, but the Chinese were bringing up 
reinforcements via regimental reserves for one final assault to overrun the Soviet border 
guard’s defences.  The Soviets estimated that the Chinese 124th Infantry Regiment had 
been reinforced and contained between 4,500 and 5,000 soldiers.  After resisting, the 
Chinese retreated back to their newly entrenched positions and then opened up with 
artillery on the newly captured Soviet positions.747 
 
Unknown to the Chinese, the Soviets had brought up elements of their divisional artillery 
supplemented by a rocket battalion.  The divisional artillery of the 135th Motorised Rifle 
Division consisted of the 378th Artillery Regiment less three batteries, with 24 M-30 
122mm and; the 13th Independent Rocket Artillery less one battery, with 12 of the new 
BM-21 Grad launchers; both firing from concealed positions and an anti-tank battery 
with six T-12 100mm towed anti-tank guns.   The Soviets had decided to retake the island 
by nightfall and at 1700 hours opened fire with 24 122mm howitzers and the two 
batteries of the then new BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers.  At 1700 the artillery 
opened fire with the 122mm guns destroying the 85mm guns and mortars, the guns being 
plainly visible, and then fired upon the Chinese forces on the island itself.  The Grad 
fired into what they thought was the PLA artillery position, but which was actually the 
infantry reserve, the Chinese only having 1,000 soldiers forward, and in 19.5 seconds, 
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480 rounds impacted into the position.  Each round several thousand fragments and each 
launcher of 40 rocket tubes enabled an area of 3.5 hectares to be completely covered.  
The Soviet observers said it was as ‘if the earth itself was on fire’.  The Chinese never 
announced their casualty figures but Soviet signals intelligence estimated 600-800 were 
killed in the first salvo.  The Soviets retook the island and despite three Chinese sub-unit 
counterattacks kept it; this effectively ended the Chinese incursion.748   
 
During the conflict, under the cover of darkness, PLA soldiers entered the Soviet T-62 
main battle tank that was disabled and obtained needed technology by acquiring the main 
gun stabilizer, the TSh2B-41 gun sight and the then new armour-piercing fin-stabilised 
discarding sabot (APFSDS) ammunition.749  There was a follow-up second engagement 
on 17 March when the Soviets attempted to retrieve, then sink, the T-62 marooned on the 
ice.  Using the entire divisional artillery available, including 152mm howitzers, the 
Soviets fired a heavy barrage onto the remaining Chinese positions, to suppress them 
whilst Soviet soldiers attempted to retrieve the tank.  As this was unsuccessful, the 
Soviets decided to sink the tank by breaking the ice around it.  The tank sank only up to 
its turret.  During the Soviet attempt to tow the tank out, four PLA ISU-122 tank 
destroyers attempted to move into a position to attack the Soviet soldiers but were 
detected by their artillery observers.  The Soviet 152mm howitzers almost immediately 
hit their position with accurate fire; one blew up and a second caught alight, the other two 
withdrawing before they were destroyed too.750   
 
Eventually on the night of 1-2 May, divers attached tow ropes from several large tractors 
which enabled the Chinese to salvage the tank within close proximity to the Soviets.  The 
T-62 was subsequently displayed in the Revolutionary Military Museum in Beijing.751      
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Another incident occurred on 13 August 1969 at Lake Zhalanashkol, on the 
Kazakhstan/Chinese border.  A Chinese infantry battalion with some vehicles and light 
artillery occupied a large deserted hill on the Soviet side of the border and built defensive 
positions to hold it.  The Soviets sent an entire motor rifle regiment of three battalions to 
retake the area.   After a frontal assault using infantry, the APCs could not climb the hills, 
the Chinese units were annihilated, but not without the Soviet infantry suffering severe 
losses.752    
 
These small actions did not reveal a great deal about the operational art of the People’s 
Liberation Army.  It did show that their employment of artillery was incorrect, but the 
gunners shouldwere not at fault.  The PLA was experienced in providing indirect fire 
support; on this occasion it was not used.   The incidents revealed the Chinese soldiers 
still had high morale, being prepared to fight until the last man, and were still skilled in 
weapons and field engineering.  The Chinese in these incidents could not match the 
firepower that Soviet forces could bring to bear.  Further, their infantry anti-armour 
weapons were not capable disabling a Soviet main battle tank except by chance. 
 
The Soviet leadership quickly grew tired of the border incidents and let the Chinese 
leadership know, through third parties, that any more incidents would see Soviet nuclear 
strikes on Chinese nuclear facilities including the Lop Nor missile and nuclear testing 
range.  This was no idle threat as the Soviet Strategic Air Force in the Far East and 
Strategic Missile units were put on combat alert.753       
 
The Chinese leadership had discovered how weak People’s War was in the face of 
nuclear weapons.  The strategy of luring the enemy deep into China was no longer 
applicable against the Soviet Union.  This led to the adoption of the strategy of ‘Prepare 
to Fight Early and Fight Big’.  The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict exposed the flaws in 
this strategy and how far the capability of the People’s Liberation Army had shrunk. 
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The Decline Exposed - The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Conflict 
 
On 5 March 1979 at 1430 hours, forces from the People’s Liberation Army took Hill 413, 
southwest of Lang Son and the way was open to the Red River Delta and Hanoi.  Four 
hours later the PLA announced it was withdrawing from Vietnam.  Could the PLA have 
successfully continued the conflict and launched an armoured thrust against Hanoi if it 
had wished to?  No.  The PLA Air Force could not have gained air superiority and the 
People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) forces would have been under the umbrella of 
Hanoi’s formidable and battle hardened air defences.   The rainy season was approaching, 
which would have crippled logistical support for any PLA forces in Vietnam.  The PLA 
was incapable of extended operations outside its borders.    
 
The People’s Liberation Army had seriously underestimated the capability of the forces it 
went against.  The Vietnamese Government relied on militia and territorial forces to blunt 
the PLA’s attacks and had provided weapons training for people in the border areas in the 
months before the attack.754  These citizen soldiers (dan quan) were backed up by 
regional forces (dia phunog quan) and enabled five regular or main forces, Vietnamese 
Army divisions to be kept in the rear to protect Hanoi and to defeat any breakthrough.755   
There were two principal areas in the conflict, Lao Cai and Lang Son, which is southeast 
of Cao Bang.  The fighting around Lao Cai involved eight PLA infantry divisions while 
the fighting around Lang Song involved 11 PLA infantry divisions.756  Due to the terrain, 
PLA armour and trucks were forced to travel along the few mountainous roads, and if 
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they went off the road were channelled into columns.  The area around Lang Son had 
narrow roads with steep sides, many commanding heights and was not heavily vegetated, 
containing very little jungle.  By employing local knowledge the Vietnamese militia 
using mortars, land mines and ambushes with rocket propelled grenades, took a large toll 
of invading PLA units.757  
   
The Type 62 light tanks suffered severely from RPG hits due 
to the close nature of the terrain.  In one engagement the advance group of a column of 
Chinese Model 62 light tanks ran into a well-camouflaged 100mm KS-19 anti-aircraft 
artillery position.   Surprising the Chinese, the Vietnamese gunners turned their guns 
around and opened fire on their flank.  The attackers had to withdraw with a large 
number of tanks destroyed.758
 
Chinese tactics above the company level had atrophied during the Cultural Revolution.  
The Chinese fought a battle of attrition that wore down the Vietnamese defences but 
suffered horrendous casualties in the process.  If a company failed to secure an objective 
a battalion was sent in, and if it failed, a regiment was used.759  It demonstrated that 
morale amongst the PLA was still strong as they were prepared to suffer heavy casualties 
to achieve victory, even if their tactical ability was poor.  After the capture of Lang Son 
the Chinese media started to comment on the forces against which they fought.  The 
Chinese media announced that the Vietnamese equipment was not as good as the Chinese 
had thought, that some were about 15 years old, and among the soldiers some were old 
men. Xinhua, the Chinese news service, reported: ‘760    In the pillboxes and bunkers 
around Lao Cai were large supplies of weapons, ammunition and rice, and most of the 
weapons and ammunition and all the rice came from China.’761  The PLA also discovered 
that some of this Chinese made equipment was newer than that used by some of their 
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own units.762  These comments and discoveries were in line with the Vietnamese use of 
militia and territorial forces.  The Russian and American equipment, that the Vietnamese 
regarded as better than their Chinese equivalents, was kept in the rear.763   These included 
T-55, T-54, T-34-85 and PT-76 tanks and delivered from the Soviet Union after the ill-
fated 1972 Spring offensive against South Vietnamese forces.764  The United States 
armoured vehicles were from the defeated Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 
and included M-41A3 light tanks and a myriad number of versions of M-113 armoured 
personnel carriers.765  
 
Chinese militia units received prominence in the Chinese News media.   It was reported 
that militia from Jinxi were used to move the wounded and transport munitions to the 
front, and that the militia of Nanpo commune removed mines laid by Vietnamese forces 
in China.766  Further, Xinhua reported militia men from China’s border area, Napo 
County, Guangxi, repulsed three incursions from Vietnamese forces on 17, 24 and 27 
February.767  On 6 March 1979, the day after Lang Son fell, Beijing announced that the 
Vietnamese Third Division at Lang Son, the 346th Division in the Lao Cai area and the 
345th Division in Cao Bang Province, had been destroyed.     
 
This is a translation of a militia mortar unit and its experiences fighting the Vietnamese 
who entered China to keep Chinese units tied down defending China, instead of fighting 
inside Vietnam.768  The translation keeps the flavour of the original. 
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On 17 February, Vietnamese self-defence forces counterattacks first 
began, and Vietnamese forces nearby got ready and planned to carry out 
an attack on our forces this area.  On 22 February, Vietnamese 107mm 
rocket artillery and 122mm howitzer fire faced our Hills 480 and 544; our 
forces’ fighting depended on defence works and the company beat back 
successive times Vietnamese forces which carried out repeated sustained 
bombardments over five hours.  Right afterwards they launched an 
infantry attack on Hills 480 and 544 positions, our company relying on the 
defence works to continually beat back many Vietnamese attacks. 
 
At 1800 hours, 23 February, the Ningming County factory militia mortar 
company of 42 men carrying six Model 67 82mm mortars came to assist 
and support the front.  At 0300 hours, 24 February, the mortar company 
arrived at the joint headquarters and was given an order to occupy firing 
positions at Hill 626, at the rear of Hill 544 to provide support artillery, 
and prepare plans for fighters at the battle front.  At 0730, 24 February 
1979, Vietnamese arranged an artillery fire screen/cover in the downwards 
direction of Hill 480, on the southeast side, initiated a mortar company 
attack and immediately executed obstruction fire - firing 60 rounds to 
check the enemy and repulse them. 
 
At 0830 hours the mortar company made its first move, occupying a fire 
position 150 metres northwest of Hill 480.  It was discovered shortly after 
that 2500 metres from Hill 544’s front, in a sign of things to come, a 
Vietnamese artillery position was located.  The mortar company 
counterattacked, their first shots were near the centre, the second shot hit 
the target and, from then on, the Vietnamese artillery became mute.  At 
0940 our forces subjected the Vietnamese force to a fierce rapid 
bombardment on Hill 544.  The artillery and mortar company positions 
moved, the mortar company moving for a second time, to an unnamed hill 
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east and occupied a position there.  Contact with the forces on Hills 480 
and 544 was continued. 
 
In the afternoon at 1400 hours, the Vietnamese dispatched a platoon sized 
attack on Hill 480.  Our mortar company continuously fired. Second 
Company reported the fire was 100 metres to the left, which the mortar 
company corrected, and the fifth salvo tehn hit the enemy group.  
Afterwards the mortar company had less than 100 remaining rounds to 
check the enemy and beat them back.  The Vietnamese signals line was 
found and intercepted with the significant discovery that Vietnamese 
employ ‘bright’ extremely uplifting words in the report which said: 
‘encountered artillery fire; troops were forceful but did not get to a high 
place’.  After this for nearly an hour Vietnamese forces were peaceful, 
making our forces inactive and our army calm.  At 1800, the Vietnamese 
exploited our forces being at rest eating their meal.  They attacked with 
artillery and machinegun fire, mounting a surprise attack concentrated 
against each company, projecting downwards, along the bank of Hill 480, 
simultaneously attacking from three roads.  Our forces responded on the 
east hillside and our troops battled with bold spirits in thr defence.  
Second Company, seeing imminent danger, ordered long-range artillery 
fire and resolutely summoned mortar fire upon itself.  To guard against 
the enemy from the direction of Hill 544, close to the remaining forces, 
five close bombardment strikes were made on the east side and on our 
forces’ original fighting trenches.  This section of the hill received 90 
rounds at about 10 metres wide, exceeding the enemy’s bombardment and 
the close bombardment on the enemy entrenchments, was followed 
immediately by a Second Company fiercely counterattacking, recapturing 
the position. 
  
At 0000 hours the fighters [PLA] in the centre position were directing the 
mortar company as enemy artillery struck 20 of the PLA fighters.  Eight 
 219
hundred rounds were fired at the Vietnamese attack which followed; the 
Vietnamese were once again beaten back.  From Signals Intelligence we 
learnt the news of a Vietnamese report - ‘encounter with enemy mountain 
top in the dark, artillery and mortar fire kill and wound, [we] fail and are 
defeated’.  They are dejected and angry at the words in the message 
[presumerably the Vietnamese headquarters – translator].  
 
Just before dawn on 25 February, the Chinese artillery company 
concentrated its firepower and overwhelmed the enemy rocket battery and 
60 and 82mm mortar positions. Three rocket tubes [launchers] were 
destroyed and 16 enemy mortar and artillery men were killed.  
Vietnamese are not readily defeated and at 0800 accurate fire by our 
mortar company beat back two attacks.  In the afternoon at 1600, our 
forces now reinforced, decide to counterattack the Vietnamese force 
which collapsed, leaving behind 70 dead in front of our positions.  [The 
figures from Vietnamese dead is restricted to our front position, in reality 
the dead and wounded due to long-range fire would be larger than this, 
approximately 150-200].  This disaster diminished enemy morale and they 
hastily ran away.  Vietnamese forces still inside the border were fired 
upon by the mortar company and the main force artillery platoon, the 
bursting rounds causing the enemy to take fight – bon voyage. 
 
The Vietnamese force against Hills 480 and 544 were small groups who 
chop and changed their attacks due to the pounding on the many 
highways.  Eight soldiers suffered equally, attacked immediately by 
artillery pounding fire meeting with misfortune by our artillery company, 
with our mortar company executing blocking fire.  Artillery firepower cut 
off enemy routes of retreat, after they had stopped the enemy attacks.  In 
the evening they were only utilising odd artillery in fire missions during 
the calm period, pounding the enemy who wandered around, and who 
were depleted of vigour and energy, having been destroyed.  There were 
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two opportunities inside the border area where Vietnamese forces were 
found not capable of advancing nor withdrawing and returning. They were 
like a fly, caught by a sticky lure and no idea what to do.   
 
 
Contrary to the myth that the Chinese lacked modern arms,769 the expansion of the 
Chinese defence industries during the Cultural Revolution had improved the combat 
power of the PLA.  The infantry weapons and artillery had been standardised improving 
logistics and training.  They carried RPGs and 7.62 mm and 12.7 mm machine guns with 
them, which along with the PLA’s towed tube and rocket artillery in support, were on par 
with many nations.   This equipment is still viable and in use by many nations today.   
The lack of anti-armour guided missiles was over-rated.  If they had been available to the 
PLA their use in close quarter mountain fighting would have been marginal. 
770
 
The Vietnamese did use main force units in action.  There were tank battles between 
PAVN T-54 main battle tanks and PLA Type 59 main battle tanks, the latter a Chinese 
modification of T-54.  The Chinese tanks, equipped with a laser rangefinder, had the 
advantage in combat as they enabled more accurate firing.771  
  
In the 1979 Sino-
Vietnamese War the following Chinese AFVs were employed - the Type 59 main battle 
tank, the Type 62 light tank, the Type 63 amphibious tank and the Type 63 armoured 
personnel carrier.  The Model 62 light tanks were at the vanguard of the first PLA units to 
cross into Vietnam and were used for infantry support.772
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The Vietnamese regional forces, which guarded the border, had mainly Second World 
War era T-34-85s.773  The Vietnamese T-35-85s, however were more than a match for 
thinly armoured Type 62 and 63 tanks which lacked any sort of fire suppression system, a 
deficiency noted by the PLA in its post conflict lessons learned.774 
 
The structure of the PLA’s armoured units was so tank heavy that it had trouble against 
Vietnamese infantry ambushes.  Their armoured units had no organic infantry leaving 
them vulnerable to the type of tactics that the Vietnamese used.  A PLA armoured 
battalion had three companies, each with three platoons of 10 tanks and a three tank 
headquarters.  Three battalions made a regiment of around 100 tanks.  Whether there 
were any PLA armoured divisions on the Vietnamese border in 1979 is doubtful.  No 
armoured divisions have been identified although a large number of light tanks were 
certainly used.   These would have been from independent armoured regiments as the 
bulk of China’s heavy divisions were on the Soviet border and protecting Beijing.      
 
By contrast, the PAVN had organic infantry throughout its armoured units.  They had 
started to convert their armoured regiments into a brigade structure from 1973.775  A 
PAVN armoured brigade was a balanced unit that comprised five battalions with 114 
tanks as well as a total of between 60 and 70 armoured personnel carriers.776   The 
brigade would also have contained some self propelled anti-aircraft artillery, including 
the ZSU-57/2 and the ZSU-23/4 Shilka; with the accompanying mechanized infantry 
having Soviet 9M14M Malyutka-M (Sagger) anti-tank guided weapons and Strela-
2/Strela-2M (SA-7) man-portable surface-to-air missiles.  Figure Two shows the 
organisation charts taken from my research. 
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Figure Two 
PAVN and PLA Armour Units, 1979 
 
Source: Grandolini, op.cit. pp. 10 & 11 & Jencks, op. cit., p. 279 
 
 
Command and control was always poor in the PLA if the battlefield was fluid.  Despite 
the introduction of Soviet systems there was little improvement in the 1950s.  In 1961 the 
People’s Liberation Army was having major problems with its communications.  It still 
had a mixture of American, British, Japanese and Chinese made equipment.  The Chinese 
equipment was criticised for being ill made, far too heavy, outdated and having poor 
sensitivity.777   The quality of Chinese manufactured batteries was so bad, that wartime 
batteries were better made.  The ability of radio operators was under question as they 
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could average only 60 to 70 characters per minute whereas in the past the average was 
from 100 to 120 characters per minute.  Only one third of the signals staff could operate 
the equipment and there were very few especially quick technicians.778  Per minute 
message decoding and delivery speed had been much better in the past.779  The Special 
Signals Conference in March 1961 viewed this sorry state of affairs to be ‘inadequate in 
wartime’.780    
 
Command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems had always been a 
weak point with the PLA, and had been almost completely eroded due to the Cultural 
Revolution.  The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war only highlighted this.  The PLA 
troops that attacked Gao Bao Ling on the 10th day of the attack said that no air 
reconnaissance of the battlefield area had been made and the commanders were using 
Qing Dynasty maps from the 19  Century, encountering more than one false mountain 
top.
th
781         The use of po
     
or maps was not confined to the PLA, the United States Ranger 
battalion that parachuted onto Port Salines in Grenada during the 1983 Operation Urgent 
Fury was ‘using a vaguely legible black and white photocopy of a British Ministry of 
Defence Overseas Deployment Map’.782
 
The PLA did show flair in providing secure radio real time communications during the 
conflict.  Personnel from the Wenzhou region of China, who speak the unique regional 
Wenzhou dialect, were used to provide voice communications as the Vietnamese could 
not translate it.  The United States Marine Corps in the South Pacific, during the Second 
World War, used Navajo Indian marines for the same reason.  The Japanese were unable 
to translate their language.   Unlike the United States marines during the Second World 
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War, on-call artillery fire support was not available to the soldiers of the People’s 
Liberation Army due to the inadequate communications equipment and doctrine.  It was 
worse when the PLA soldiers needed aerial fire support, for despite having 124 attack 
aircraft and 24 medium and 82 light bombers in the area of operations, the People’s 
Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was incapable of providing Battlefield Air 
Interdiction (BAI) and Close Air Support (CAIRS) to them.783  
 
The communications systems were obsolete.  The HF Model 63 radio transceiver, the 
first Chinese designed tactical radio was used at the company level and below.  Its low 
output of 1.3 watts limited its range and its narrow bandwidth made it easy to jam.784    
The Model 63 was in common use during the Sino-Vietnamese conflict and had problems 
due to the mountainous terrain.785   Radio communications in mountainous terrain 
plagued the Russians in Afghanistan and still cause problems in armies operating in 
similar terrain.786   
 
The performance of the People’s Liberation Army in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict 
was a shock to the Chinese Communist Party.  Deng Xiaoping spoke to an enlarged 
meeting of the Standing Committee of the CCP Central Committee’s Military 
Commission on 12 March 1980.  He stated that ‘if there were stronger opponents, judging 
by our combat effectiveness, how good is its [our army’s] reliability’.787  Deng outlined 
four areas that needed changing: ‘cutting the fat’, reform of the system, training and 
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strengthening political and ideological work.788   He said that there were too many non-
combatant personnel and headquarters personnel.789  The command and control system 
was bloated and needed streamlining.  Deng also stated that senior personnel in command 
billets were too old, combined arms training was necessary and promotion was to be 
based on attendance at military academies.790  ‘Be both Red and Expert: Red should by 
no means be given up’, was a cornerstone of Deng’s reform in strengthening political and 
ideological work.791    
 
Deng announced that: ‘We will form composite armies, that is, all arms armies with all 
the different type of weapons integrated.’   Also: ‘Company and regimental commanders 
will learn how to have coordinated actions with the air . . .  it is necessary to learn that, 
too.’   Deng further stated: ‘How to deal with tanks, aircraft, and so on . . .  every fighter 
should learn about that.792  Thus the traditional emphasis on political indoctrination, close 
combat skills using hand grenades and the bayonet, stamina, night fighting and 
camouflage, passed down to the People’s Liberation Army from the Eighth Route Army 
was expanded,793 as new equipment was not yet available.  Chinese military journals of 
the period reflected this whilst looking at the newer Western and Soviet systems.794    
Creating a defence force able to deploy at short notice on China’s periphery, units 
capable of high-altitude warfare stationed in, and equipped for, operations at high 
altitudes, especially in Xinjiang Province.     
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Organisational Changes in the PLA 
 
The PLA at the end of the Korean War was on its way to reorganising itself as a modern 
balanced military force.   Large amounts of Soviet aid provided more firepower to front 
line divisions and standardised PLA weaponry.  An article in Bingqi Zhishi looked at the 
corps level organisation for the period under review. It should be noted that in the PLA 
organisation charts, mortars in 60 mm calibre and above are counted as artillery.    
 
An army infantry group in 1959 contained 11 infantry battalions, and 31 other units 
within its structure with 271 pieces of artillery, 114 aircraft but only 22 tanks.  This 
reflected the fact that the PLA still depended on the Soviet Union for the bulk of its 
equipment and that tanks were in short supply to support the infantry.  These tanks could 
have been either the T-34-85 or the SU-76 self propelled guns. 795 
 
 In 1973 a tank group in Hubei was comprised of 371 tanks, 385 pieces of artillery and 55 
aircraft with a total of 21,000 personnel.796  The number of aircraft and tanks, whilst still 
small for a tank group at least had sufficient artillery.   Against a Soviet motor rifle or 
tank division however it was inadequately equipped.  
 
In the 1960s and 1970s the PLA had eight different types of divisions, although some 
were divisions in name only and were no larger than brigades.  They did not stray from 
the 1954 reorganisation but as the Cultural Revolution progressed, and armament 
production increased, were brought up to similar equipment standards which increased 
their interoperability and firepower.  In 1980, the number of divisions in the PLA was: 
between 118-125 infantry, 9-12 armoured, three cavalry, three airborne, 20-25 border 
guard, approximately 50 internal security and garrison, and 40 artillery divisions of all 
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types.  To this must be added the approximately 110 independent regiments of various 
types, such as the Type 62 light tank regiments in Southwest China.797   
 
The infantry division was, and still is, the primary division of the PLA.  In 1980 there 
were between 118-125 infantry divisions, each of three infantry regiments of three 
battalions each, and an artillery regiment with a total of 12 160/120mm mortars, 18 field 
guns of 100mm or 76mm, 12 122mm howitzers, a multiple rocket launcher battalion of 
18 107mm rocket launchers and an anti-aircraft artillery battalion of 12 twin 14.5mm 
machine guns and 18 37/57mm automatic cannon.  There was an armoured regiment 
comprising an armoured battalion of 31 Type 59 main battle tanks, a company of 10 
assault guns and a reconnaissance platoon of three vehicles. The assault guns would 
generally be SU-76s but the elite front line divisions would have had the remnants of the 
SU-100, ISU-122 and ISU-152 assault guns from the 1950s. 
 
There were between nine and 12 armoured divisions composed of three armoured and 
one mechanized infantry regiments, with the armoured regiment as described earlier.  
There were four reconnaissance vehicles attached to the regimental headquarters and a 
reconnaissance company of 10 vehicles attached to the divisional headquarters.  The 
divisional artillery and anti-aircraft units were the same as in the infantry division and the 
mechanized regiment was composed of 100 Type 63 armoured personnel carriers in three 
battalions.  Supporting weapons were few in the mechanized infantry regiment and there 
were no assault guns or self-propelled guns or multiple rocket launchers, although the 
First Armoured Divisions was equipped with Type 70 self-propelled 130mm multiple 
rocket launchers.  As noted above the armoured division lacked sufficient infantry and 
had no self propelled artillery, anti-aircraft guns or surface-to-air missiles to fight on the 
modern battlefield.  
 
                                                 
797 . The figures for this section are taken from Patrick, S.P.  ‘The China War Sino-Soviet Conflict 
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The cavalry divisions were used in Xinjiang and Mongolia and there were three airborne 
divisions which were part of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, which had few 
aircraft capable of dropping them by parachute.  The infantry regiments were equipped to 
Class C scales and the divisional assets included a reconnaissance company, an anti-
aircraft battery of three twin 14.5mm machine guns and five 37mm anti-aircraft guns and 
a mortar company with nine 120mm mortars to provide fire support.   
 
The anti-aircraft and anti-tank divisions were brigades in size and the artillery division 
was comprised of a small regiment of anti-aircraft artillery, a regiment of medium and 
heavy artillery and a multiple rocket launcher regiment.  The border and security 
divisions had three large battalions on Class C scales of equipment with only six 12.7mm 
machine guns, and three 122mm and either 76mm or 85mm field pieces.  There were no 
logistics units inside the divisions; the militia and reserve units were tasked with the role 
of providing logistic support in the event of conflict.  This was to cost the PLA dearly.  
The organisation of the units had not changed since the end of the Korean War whereas 
other countries had reorganised their forces for fluid combined operations.    
 
In May 1954 the PLA reorganised the infantry into three different types of regiments.   
Designated in the West as the class A, B and C they were equipped to different scales for 
different missions.  The class A regiment was designed for conventional operations and 
the division had medium artillery whilst the class B and C divisions were on light scales 
with only light 76.2 mm artillery and 120 mm mortars.  The class B battalion was 
equipped to the same standard as the class A whereas the class C battalion, being for use 
in jungle, mountainous terrain and paddy areas, had lighter weapons.  Each class A 
regiment in addition to the battalion weapons, had a company each of 120 mm mortars, 
75 mm recoilless rifles, 76.2 mm light artillery, and a 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine gun 
platoon, each with six weapons.  The class B regiment was similar, but the class C 
regiment had one 82 mm mortar company with nine mortars and a 75 mm recoilless rifle 
company with six weapons.798   The cautionary note of the Chinese overstating the size 
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of their units needs to be remembered.  Up until the 1980s, that which Western and 
Soviet Bloc militaries would have designated a platoon, the PLA often referred to as a 
company.  
gular system of 
ganisation for the infantry battalion.  This is shown in Figure Three:    
  
 
In May 1954 the People’s Liberation Army went back to the trian
or
Figure Three 
1954 PLA Infantry Battalion 
 
 
 
Headquarters  
Support Company Support Company 
Rifle Company Rifle Company Rifle Company 
Rifle Platoon Rifle Platoon Rifle Platoon 
Source: Compiled from Cheng, op. cit. 
 
 
This new structure neglected the hard won lessons they had learnt from the recently 
ended Korean War.  Again, acting on Soviet advice it was a retrograde step.  In a four 
company structure battalion, if one company is rendered ineffective due to enemy action, 
the battalion is still viable.  In a three company structure the loss of one company renders 
e battalion ineffective as it loses too much front line fighting strength.     th
 
In the class A battalion there was a heavy machine gun company with nine 7.62 x 54 mm 
machine guns and a mortar company with nine 82 mm mortars.  This was one mortar 
tube and heavy machine gun per platoon.  The class B battalion differed in having a 
recoilless rifle platoon at the battalion level composed of three squads with two 57 mm 
recoilless rifles each.  The class A battalion only had one squad with two recoilless rifles, 
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probably for headquarters protection.  The class C battalion was more like a Western 
infantry battalion.  At the battalion level there was a fire support company having one 82 
mm mortar platoon with six mortars, one heavy machine gun platoon with six machine 
guns and one recoilless rifle platoon with six Type 52 57 mm recoilless rifles.  The class 
B and C battalions had extra recoilless rifles to compensate for the lack of divisional 
rtillery.799    
nine men, compared to the class A and B 
ompanies which had 12 men per squad.800    
 be up to 50 per cent of a soldier’s body weight and was deemed 
xcessive.804     
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All three infantry battalions were equipped with three infantry companies, with each 
company being composed of three rifle platoons.  The class A and B companies had a 60 
mm mortar squad of two mortars and a machine gun platoon of three belt fed 7.62 x 54 
mm belt fed weapons attached to the company.  The class C company lost the machine 
gun squad and its squads were composed of 
c
 
The Great Famine of 1958 – 1961 saw the PLA suffer from a manpower shortage.  In 
1961 a PLA infantry was composed of only two squads per platoon as opposed to the 
usual three.801  Each rifle squad had one light machine gun and was split into two five-
man teams.802  The heavy machine gun platoon, in reality only a section, had two five-
man squads each with one company machine gun.803   An infantry soldier’s combat load 
was 20.5 kg but the combat load for a member of the machine gun platoon was up to 27 
kg.  This could
e
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In 1979 the organization of the infantry units that crossed into Vietnam was little changed 
from the ones that were involved against Indian forces in 1961.  In 1979, at the start of 
the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, a typical PLA infantry squad comprised 12 soldiers 
equipped with one Model 56 (RPD) light machine gun, 11 Model 56 (AK47) assault 
rifles both which used the 7.62 x 39mm M43 round and one Model 69 (RPG 7) anti-
armour rocket launcher.805    The Model 69 RPG launcher has an effective range against 
stationary armour of 500 metres against the 150 metres for the Model 56.  The rocket 
propelled grenade launcher and light machine gun, each require two-man teams to be 
effective, and with the commander this left seven riflemen in the squad.  This structure 
was more in line with the structure of the British and German Armies of the time.   
However the squad was different in that there were always three teams of the same size in 
e squad, as opposed the Australian Army infantry section of the time, which had a 
out, machine gun and rifle group of differing sizes.  
                                                
th
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Equipping the Army 
 
As the influx of Soviet weapons were absorbed into the People’s Liberation Army during 
the Korean War and afterwards, many of the older weapons were cascaded down to the 
lower grade units and the militia.806  Some were also shipped to other communist groups 
such as the Viet Minh.807  Comments about the differing types of weapons in the PLA’s 
arsenal continued until the late 1970s yet a simple explanation was available in 1963 
from a translation of the Bulletin of Activities.  Units were instructed to ‘store up the 
necessary technical equipment for actual combat and use some antiquated ones such as 
old aircraft, artillery and guns which cannot be used for combat purposes but can be used 
 
807 . ied 14,000 rifles, 1,700 machine 
guns, around 150 pieces of artillery in various calibres and large amounts of ammunition and 
ent.   Chen Jian, op. cit., p. 93.  
 
805 . Jencks, op. cit., p. 279. 
 
806 . Bonds, op. cit., pp. 73, 80, 81, 88, 89, 101 & 104. 
 
From April to September 1950 the Viet Minh were suppl
communications equipm
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for training purposes’.808    Many infantry weapons were converted to Soviet calibres to 
simplify logistics.  For example, the PLA converted Zb 26 light machine guns from 7.92 
x 57 mm to 7.62 x 39 mm which enabled them to also use Model 56 rifle magazines.   As 
for keeping old weapons, the People’s Liberation Army was not alone.  The Australian 
Army used the Second World War Bren light machine gun until the late 1990s and used 
the Vickers machine gun, a modified Maxim, until well into the late 1980s.809   When the 
Australian Army reintroduced sniping in the mid-1970s it selected the Second World War 
vintage No.1 Mark III*HT (Aust) rifle using the in .303 inch Mk VII round introducing 
another calibre in to the infantry battalion.810   The United States National Guard was still 
using Second World War  M1 Garand rifles, M1918A2 Browning Automatic Rifles and 
load bearing equipment in 1970.811   The 12.7 mm Browning M2 heavy machine gun is 
still in production and the prototype of the weapon dates from 1918.812   The prototype of 
e 12.7 x 99 mm cartridge used in the United States Browning M2 heavy machine gun 
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dates from May 1919 and is itself based on a 1917 German cartridge.813      
 
With the return to ‘People’s War’ and the Cultural Revolution that followed, the 
emphasis was on ‘man over machine’ and minor infantry tactics.  One offshoot of this 
was to finally standardise the equipment in the People’s Liberation Army.  The defence 
budget during the Cultural Revolution from 1965 to 1971 went up 10 percent per 
annum.814  This increase in expenditure enabled the PLA, at the infantry regiment level 
and below, to receive new equipment and standardising their weapons.  Defence 
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expenditures continued to rise prior to the Sino-Vietnamese War; the increase from 1976 
onwards was 10.78 percent in 1977, 12.64 percent in 1978 and 33.87 percent in 1979.   
he latter included the expenditure for the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict with the 
oblem that was never rectified.  As the Model 
4 warmed up during firing, its point of aim changed and the accuracy suffered so much 
This was rounded off with nine armoured recovery vehicles, including two heavy models 
                                                
T
defence expenditure decreasing in the period 1980 to 1982.815 
 
Camouflage uniforms were introduced, one incorporating an integral hood having been 
available to the Chinese infantry from at least the early 1970s.816    During this period the 
Chinese also developed a light machine gun that used a 101 round drum magazine and 
Model 56 magazines.817   The Model 74 compared favourably in weight and length with 
the contemporary M-249 Minimi and the recent shortened variant of the Minimi.818  It 
was not a success as it had an accuracy pr
7
that it was never put into production.819    
 
With regard to PLA armour, in 1954 another 480 T-34-85s and 320 SU-76s were 
supplied again for a total of 40 regiments.  The following year the force was given 
heavier vehicles which were more able to take on modern western armour.  As well as 
169 T-34-85s for attrition, there were a further 22 IS-2s, 99 SU-100 and 67 ISU-152s.  
 
815 . Lee, N.   China’s Defence Modernisation and Military Leadership, Australian National 
University Press, Canberra, 1989, p. 7.   
 
816 . Archer, DHR (ed).    Jane’s Infantry Weapons 1976, Macdonalds and Janes, London, 1976,  
p. 165. 
  
817 . ‘NORINCO 7.62 mm Type 74 light machine gun’, Jane’s Infantry Weapons 2000-2001 CD- 
ROM, Jane’s Publishing Service, Surrey, 2000.  
 
818 . Type 74  6.4 kg empty 1.108 mm overall length   101 round magazine 
 
M-249 Minimi 7.1 kg empty 1.040 mm overall length  100 and 200 round 
link magazines 
 
Minimi SPW 5.7 kg empty 908 mm overall length, butt extended Same  
774 mm length, butt compacted  as M-249 
 
 
819. Li Geng, ‘A Brief Introduction to China’s Machine Guns’, Binqi Zhishi, 3/1997, March, p. 23 
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for the ISU series armoured fighting vehicles.  It is interesting to note that China never 
built an assault gun and no self-propelled artillery until the 122mm Model 70 self-
ropelled gun in the late 1960s/early 1970s. 
 the Type 70, it was still 
bsolete compared to other ARVs in service around the world. 
                                                
p
 
On the question of main battle tanks, these were of Soviet origin.  With the introduction 
of the T-54 and T-55 the Soviet Union was able to divest itself of 3,128 obsolescent 
AFVs and to support a communist partner.  These AFVs formed the bulk of the PLA’s 
armoured forces into the 1960s until Chinese production of the Type 59 and Type 62 was 
able to be started.  The breaking of relations between the Soviet Union and China in 
1959-1960 left the PLA with no ready source of modern armoured vehicles although the 
plans of the T-55 had been supplied.  This led to the creation of an indigenous armoured 
vehicle industry that continues to this day, the T-54A being produced as the Type 59.  
China’s isolation meant that all its main battle tanks were product improved versions of 
the T-55, and this only changed in the mid-1990s.  To be fair, the lineage of the US 
1970’s M60A3, including the Israeli Magach conversions, starts with the 1945 T-26 
Pershing designed to fight German Panther and Tiger tanks.  To aid battlefield recovery 
the PLA introduced the type 64 armoured recovery vehicle (ARV) which was little more 
than the Type 59 with the turret removed and plated over. 820   It was equipped with a 
block and tackle and steel wire for towing; and an upgraded version with a jib to remove 
engine blocks was developed in the late 1960s.  Introduced as
o
 
The Chinese Defence Industry scaled down the Type 59 main battle tank to create a 
vehicle suitable for operations in areas where main battle tanks had trouble operating due 
to poor road networks and the geography, such as extensive paddy fields, jungle and 
mountain roads.  This became the Type 62 (WZ131) which was a well balanced light 
tank as good as its contemporaries.  In 1967 the PLA decided the Type 62 light tank 
needed updating as the 85mm gun was starting to show its age.  The improved tank was 
 
 
820 . ‘Xiandai zhanchang shangde “dadaoshen”____   zhongguo yan zhihuo zhuangbeide  
jikuantanke qiangjie qianyinche’, Tanke zhuangjia cheliang, 2005 Niandi, 1 Qi, Zhongdi 227, pp. 
10 – 14. 
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designated the WZ131-1 and the project had a long history resulting in various upgrades 
that eventually led no where.821  One upgrade was the addition of skirts over the tracks, 
and bar armour around the rear arc and sides of the turret to detonate High Explosive 
Anti-Tank (HEAT) rounds before hitting the turret.  In Chinese, this is translated as 
‘improved screen added outfit cannon tower bars’.822  They do, however, act as a 
repository for tank hunting teams to throw and hang explosive charges where they will sit 
gainst the sides of the turret.   
tated when the machine gun turrets atop their M48 and M60s 
ere shot off in combat.  
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A laser rangefinder was added to the top of the mantle to improve accuracy and at the 
same time, to improve the survivability of the commander in close battle; a 12.7mm 
machine gun turret from the Model 63 APC was added to the commander’s cupola.  
Similar in shape to the 12.7mm machine gun turret used on the M-113 ACAV, this 
copied the US Army in the Vietnam War where crews often added the ACAV turret to 
various AFVs.823  This increased their firepower in the event of close-in attacks by North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces by increasing the survivability of the gunner.  This was 
the reason behind adding of the Type 63 machine gun turret to the Type 62. It was not 
introduced into service as it added 479 mm to the profile of the tank and the experience 
of the Israeli Army in the 1973 Yom Kippur War provided a cautionary lesson: tank 
commanders were decapi
w
 
Some of the Type 62 light tanks in PLA service have been modified with a laser 
rangefinder and a bank of four smoke grenade launchers in armoured mounts added to 
both sides of the turret.  The Type 62 has a combat weight of 19.86 tonnes, four crew and 
had an overall length with the barrel forward of 8.016 metres, a width of 2.994 metres 
with its side skirts, a height of 2.742 metres to the top of the machine gun turret and 
 
821 . ‘Haoyu zhishijie runwu xiwusheng ____  62shi qinxing tankede gaijin guocheng yutedian’,   
Tanke zhangjia cheliang, 2005 Niandi, 12 Qi, Zhongdi 238, pp.  5- 10. 
 
822 . Ibid., p. 9. 
 
823 . Icks, Robert J.  Modern US Armored Support Vehicles, Profile Publications, Windsor, 1971,  
p. 14; Dunstan, Simon.  Vietnam Tracks, Osprey, London, pp. 105 – 107 & 125. 
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2.263 metres without the turret.  Its 316 kilowatt diesel engine gave it a maximum speed 
of 60 kilometres per hour and a maximum range of between 400 and 450 kilometres.  A 
mid-life update also saw improved ammunition storage rise to 62 rounds of 85mm 
ammunition onboard compared to 46 before the refit Type 62.  Three thousand rounds of 
7.62 mm machine gun ammunition are carried and 825 rounds of 12.7mm machine gun 
unds compared to 300 in the earlier confihuration.  
chine gun.  It was the PLA’s first modern ARV and 
e model design for all after it.       
oothbore gun was installed in 1970 with the gun also being tried on the Type 59 MBT.   
 
                                                
ro
 
In the 1970s the most modern ARV in service was the Type 70, based on the Type 62 
light tank for use by forces using that vehicle.  It incorporates a crane on the right hand 
side, dozer blade and purpose built compartments for recovery equipment.  The Type  70 
is 6.64 metres long overall, has a width of 2.39 metres and a height of 2.49 metres and is 
armed with a Model 54 12.7 mm ma
th
 
The PLA tried to find a replacement for the Type 62 light tank during the Cultural 
Revolution with the ill-starred WZ 132 light tank.824  The history of the WZ132 can be 
broken into three parts or phases; phase 1 from 1967 – 1969, phase 2 from 1970 – 1972 
and phase 3 from 1973 – 1975.  It went from a simple project competing with the 
upgraded Model 62 (WZ131-1) to almost an entirely new design.  The first design used 
solid road wheels similar to those on the Model 63 amphibious tank and had a long 
barrelled 76.2 mm gun with a pepper box muzzle brake, making it look similar to 
Taiwan’s Type 64 light tank, itself a copy of the US M41 Walker Bulldog light tank.  The 
next version of the WZ132 used the standard 85 mm gun.  The capture of the then new 
Soviet T-62 main battle tank during the Zhen Bao Dao/Damanskyi Island Incident gave 
Chinese armour designers access to the latest Soviet technology including the 115 mm 
UTS-5 smoothbore gun and its APFSDS ammunition.  To enable the vehicle to engage 
modern Western main battle tanks (MBTs) equipped with the 105 mm gun, a 100 mm 
sm
 
824 . ‘Dao shi wuqing que youqing ____ zhongguo WZ132 qingxing tankede gaiyanshi guo  
chengyu tedian’, Tanke zhangjia cheliang, 2006 Niandi, 1Qi, Zhongdi  239, pp. 5 – 10.  
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The diesel motor incorporated a supercharger, using compressed air to give the tank a 
speed boost in combat.  The WZ132’s 405 kilowatt diesel engine gave it an impressive 
power to weight ratio of 18 kilowatts per tonne and could climb 45 degree slope.  Its 
maximum range was 500 kilometres and unlike the Type 62 it was amphibious, being 
able to travel a maximum of 6.84 km/hr in the water.  The WZ132 design was finalised in 
1973 but languished until its cancellation in 1975.  It was decided to upgrade the Type 62 
using parts of the WZ132 design instead, likely due to the dismal combat performance of 
light armoured combat vehicles like the BMP-1, or lack of it, during the Yom Kippur 
War.  Light tanks could not compete on the modern battlefield and resources were needed 
for other projects rather than another light tank.      
 
The final version of the WZ132 had a combat weight of 22.5 tonnes, a hull length of 
6.049 metres, and an overall length with the gun forward of 8.528 metres.  It was 2.92 
metres wide, 2.121 metres high at the cupola and besides the 100 mm gun, was equipped 
with a 12.7 mm machine gun on the turret roof and two 7.62 mm machine guns in the 
turret.  It could carry 41 rounds of 100 mm, 500 rounds of 12.7 mm and 2,400 rounds of 
7.62 mm machine gun ammunition.     
 
The PLA’s Type 63 was a Chinese development of the PT-76 and it produced a viable 
amphibious tank that was the mainstay of the PLAN Marine Corps for many years.  It is 
also known as the WZ211-1 and the ZTS63.825  Weighing 18.4 tonnes, it had an overall 
length of 8.435 metres with the hull being 7.15metres.  It was 3.2 metres wide and 2.522 
metres high with its 294kilowatt diesel engine giving the tank a top speed of 64 
kilometres per hour on roads and a maximum speed in water of 12 kilometres per hour.  It 
could travel a maximum road range of 370 kilometres and 120 kilometres in water as it 
used water jets for movement.   
 
                                                 
825 . ‘Shuizhong jiaolong yi zhongguo 63 shi shuilu tanke’, Tanke zhuangjia cheliang, 2005  
Niandi, 2 Qi, Zhongdi 228, pp. 11 – 15.    
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The turret mounted an 85mm gun with a fume extractor near the end of the barrel, a 
coaxial 7.62 mm machine gun and the ubiquitous Model 54 12.7 mm machine gun on the 
turret roof.  It carried 47 rounds for the main gun, 500 rounds for the 12.7 mm machine 
gun and 2,000 7.62 mm rounds for the coaxial machine gun.  The Type 63 had a crew of 
four and the turret crew would have been small in stature as the turret is narrow. 
 
As to armoured personnel carriers, the PLA’s first indigenous tracked AFV was the Type 
58-72.826  This was the prototype for the YW531, also known as the WZA531, which 
became the Type 63.  The outward similarity between the prototype and production 
models can be measured in millimetres.  The Type 58-72 had an overall length of 5.26 
metres, a width of 2.8 metres and a height of 2.8metres.  It weighed 12.6 tonnes combat 
ready, had a crew of two and carried 12 soldiers in the rear and was armed with the 
ubiquitous Type 54 12.7mm machine gun.  Its 261 horsepower diesel engine gave the 
vehicle a top on-road speed of 62 kilometres per hour and 47 kilometres per hour cross 
country with a maximum range of 500 kilometres.    
 
The early model of the Type 63 pintle mounted a 7.62mm SG 43 machine gun including 
its Sokolov shield from the Model 1910 Maxim.  The Type 63 was 5.476 metres long, 
2.978 metres wide and 1.887 metres high at the top of the hull and 2.563 metres high with 
its Type 59 12.7mm machine gun.  It was designed for two crew and 13 soldiers and had 
a fighting weight of 12.5 tonnes.  Its 191 kilowatt diesel engine has 55 kilopascals of 
torque and gives the Type 63 a top road speed of 60 kilometres per hour and 6 kilometres 
per hour in water.  It has a maximum road range of 500 kilometres and 61 kilometres in 
water and enabled the PLA to move a section of two groups, one with a Type 69 (RPG-7) 
RPG and the other with a Type 56 (RPD) light machine gun.  If four-man fire teams are 
carried it could carry three with a section commander.    
 
                                                 
826 . ‘Zhonghua  diyi zhuangjiache zhongchan 58-72 ludai shi zhuangjia shusongche’, Tanke  
zhuangjia cheliang, 2005 Niandi, 8 Qi, Zhongdi 234, pp. 5 – 9.   
 
 239
Turning to the Type 70-1 (WZ303) self-propelled multiple rocket (MRL) launcher, 827  it 
used a  semi-retractable 19 round launcher with two rows of tubes, ten on top and nine 
directly underneath.  It fired the H212 rocket from point blank to a maximum range of 
10,115 metres, the launcher having an elevation from 00 to 500 and could move in an arc 
of 1800.  The launcher was mounted to the Type 63 armoured personnel carrier hull with 
19 rounds in the launcher and a further 20 ready use rounds in the hull.  The vehicle took 
120 seconds to prepare to fire and 80 seconds to move after firing.  There was a crew of 
six and the vehicle had a 193 kilowatt diesel engine and a torque of 58.9 kilopascals that 
gave the vehicle a maximum road speed of 57.5 kilometres per hour and 5.2 kilometres 
per hour in water.  The maximum range on road is 500 kilometres and 60 kilometres in 
water.  The vehicle was 5.476 metres long, 2.978 metres wide and a travelling height 
(launcher retracted) of 2.625 metres.  The PLA’s First Armoured Division Type 70 
130mm self-propelled multiple rocket launchers were used during the 1979 Sino-
Vietnamese conflict. 828 
 
Except for the addition of an external armoured laser range finder to a small amount of 
Type 59 main battle tanks, this was the standard main battle tank in the PLA at the start 
of the Sino-Vietnamese War.  Thus as the United States Army was about to introduce the 
M1 Abrams, the British Army the Challenger I, and the Soviet Union the T-80 main 
battle tanks, the PLA was still equipped with a tank at least two generations behind in 
technology.     
 
 
Weapons for Operational Manoeuvre: The Development of Armoured 
Vehicles during the Cultural Revolution  
 
The traditional view of the Cultural Revolution is that research and development on new 
Chinese vehicles became moribund.  Yet this thinking on the PLA needs to change.   
                                                 
827 . ‘Tiejia zhanshen zai nuhuo (xia) ___ guochan zixing liudanpao he zixing huojianpao’,Tanke  
zhangjia cheliang, 2006 Niandi, 8 Qi, Zhongdi 246, pp. 5 - 10. 
 
828 . Ibid. 
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During this period the Chinese defence industry developed a tank that became the test 
bed for new ideas – A Chinese MBT-70.  It was developing weapons for operational level 
manoeuvre by professional forces, not the mobilised masses.  However the PLA had a 
history of producing designs that failed, absorbing resources that could be better 
employed.  In 1966, Luo Ruiqing, the PLA's then chief-of-staff criticised the defence 
industry because it was concentrating on R&D rather than on production.829  He was 
accused in the official Report of Luo's Mistakes that, ‘he still frantically attacked our 
national defence scientific research work as going from data to data, from design to 
design, without completing anything’.830  Luo believed China was in danger of imminent 
war with the United States, and advocated Soviet assistance.  His criticism of the Chinese 
defence industry could well have applied into the 1990s.  
 
Using parts taken from Soviet T-62 main battle tank captured in the Zhen 
Bao/Damanskyi Island incident, the Chinese defence industry developed the WZ 1224 
tank.831  The vehicle hull appeared similar to the US/German MBT-70, mounted a turret 
with a wedged shape face.  The wedge acted as spaced armour, similar to the Leopard 
1A4 but was of lower profile.  It carried a 120 mm smooth bore gun, had an overall 
length of 9.9 metres and a fighting weight of 45 tonnes.   Its original V-8 engine 
produced 650-680 horsepower.  The WZ1224 turret was similar in size and shape to the 
British Challenger One, except for the wedge shaped face.  Another version of the WZ 
1224 was developed and designated the WZ 1226.  This had the same weight and 
dimensions and was equipped with a smaller turret of traditional Soviet ‘mushroom’ 
shape.  It also weighed the same as the WZ 1224 and had the same 120mm gun.  It was 
later fitted with a V-12 1,000 horsepower engine.  Neither vehicle went into production, 
the Type 80 being the first second generation tank to go into Chinese service in 1981. 
 
                                                 
829 . Jencks, op. cit., p. 61.   
 
830 . Ibid. 
 
831 . The translated title of the article is ‘Our Nation’s First Developed Second Generation 
Tank’ in ‘Wuguo Zaoqi Yanzhede Erdai Tanke’, Bingqi Zhishi, 2003 Niandi, 7 Qi, Zhongdi 189 
Qi, pp. 24 - 26.  
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The Chinese defence industry during the Cultural Revolution also developed its first 
indigenously designed 8 x 8 wheeled armoured vehicle.832  Designated the WZ 522-1, 
it was an eight-wheeled infantry fighting vehicle that was first trialled in 1971.  It was 
designed for a crew of two and sixteen passengers.  It was armed with a Type 59 12.7 
mm heavy machine gun with 1,500 rounds in an open cupola.  It measured 6.385 
metres in length, 2.650 metres in width, 2.609 metres in height and had a ground 
clearance of .478 metres.  Its design weight was 10 tonnes and its 150 horsepower 
engine gave and power to weight ratio of 15:1.  It had four firing ports on either side 
towards the rear of the hull and its maximum road speed was 80 kilometres per hour 
and in water 3.3 kilometres per hour.  Its maximum range was quoted at 500 
kilometres.  Although trialled it never went into service.  
 
Again demonstrating that armour development in China did not stagnate during the 
Cultural Revolution, design of the WZ141 was started in 1970 but the project was 
cancelled in 1980 after two different versions were built. 833  Both versions were armed 
with two 105 mm recoilless rifles which were a direct copy of the United States M40 106 
mm recoilless rifle with a launch rail for a Hong Jian 73 anti-tank guided missile 
(ATGM) offset slightly on each barrel ahead of the breech. 
 
With a fully loaded combat weight of 6.2 tonnes , the vehicle was 4.66 metres long by 
2.44 metres wide by 1.86 metres high were crammed three crew, four HJ73 ATGM, 18 
rounds of 105mm ammunition and 3,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition for the 7.62mm  
Type 56 light machine gun.  The 140 kilowatt engine reputedly gave it a maximum road 
speed of 80 kilometres per hour, the engine giving a power to weight ratio of 30.7 
horsepower to the tonnes. 
  
                                                 
 
832 . ‘Zhungguo yanshide diyi cheling 8 x 8 chezhuangjia shusong che’, Tanke Zhuangjia Cheling, 
2002 Niandi, 7 Qi, Zhongdi 197 Qi, pp. 20 – 22. 
 
833 . ‘Feixing landande tansuo ___ woguo shi zhide WZ141 ludai shi chaoqing fantanke shiyan xing  
zhanche’, Tanke zhuangjia cheliang’, 2007 Niandi, 3 Qi, Zhongdi 253, pp. 5 – 11. 
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The first version had a flat turret with one 105mm recoilless rifle either side of the turret 
with the second version having two different turrets.  One had a sloped turret with slab 
sides, with the 105mm recoilless rifles in tandem and the ATGM rails on the gun barrels, 
in a cradle in the right side of the turret.  The other had an enclosed turret that was wedge 
shaped all around, similar to the British Scorpion tracked reconnaissance vehicle, the HJ -
73 ATGM rails on either side of the turret, with a gun cradle towards the centre of the 
turret.  The missile rails appear to be mounted co-axially with the gun cradle.  Luo 
Ruiqing’s criticism of the Chinese defence industry still held true. 
 
The People’s Liberation Army had started in 1949 as an army with no standardisation in 
its organisation or material yet by 1959 it had become well equipped but still lacking in 
the higher command and control mechanisms.  At the height of the Cultural Revolution in 
1969, China nearly brought the threat of nuclear war upon itself by initiating border 
disputes with the Soviet Union.  The results of these border clashes contributed to Mao 
changing from his grand strategy of ‘Luring the Enemy Deep’ into the countryside in 
order to crush him with ‘People’s War’ to ‘Prepare to Fight Early and Fight Big’.  The 
latter meant the use of nuclear weapons that the Chinese were starting to acquire in 
numbers.  The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict revealed how flawed the strategy of using 
nuclear weapons was and how bad the PLA’s command and control, as well as staff 
planning, had become.  It showed that that nuclear weapons and a large militia were not a 
panacea to a professional standing military.  Despite the large investment in new designs, 
the PLA was using obsolescent equipment and the situation was getting worse. 
 
Another factor was its involvement in internal peacekeeping during the Cultural 
Revolution, which had atrophied its combat power above the company level.  This 
became clear in its operations against the Soviet Union in 1969 but little was done due to 
the Cultural Revolution and Mao’s insistence on a peasant-based army.  Arms production 
in the Cultural Revolution meant that it had finally standardised its equipment, but the 
crucible of combat against Vietnamese militia and reserves units revealed the problems of 
the PLA for all to see.  The PLA was bloated with too many divisions, with the heavy 
artillery and main battle tanks available penny packeted amongst them.  A catalyst was 
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needed to make the organisational changes required to turn the PLA into a modern 
fighting force, and that was the PLA’s dismal performance in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese 
conflict.  This was to be the major factor from 1980 onwards for the PLA.  The next 
chapter examines these changes and how they transformed the People’s Liberation Army 
into a modern fighting force.  
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Chapter Five 
   
Laying the Foundations: The Rise of the PLA’s Operational 
Art in the Post Sino-Vietnamese War Period 
 
 
The Revolution in Military Affairs and Information Warfare  
 
 
The People’s Liberation Army was investigating Information Warfare at the operational 
level well before the 1991 Gulf War.  The September 1987 issue of Bingqi Zhishi 
contains an article by Yuan Wenlin titled, Xinxi Zhan, which translates as ‘Information 
War’.834   This article also refutes the claims by many commentators of the PLA that the 
1991 Gulf War took the PLA by surprise.  
 
The article discusses the new warfare of disrupting an enemy command, control, 
communications and intelligence (C3I) system using Qiu pian (bluffing) through the use 
of false signals - 'transmission warfare'.  It states that the responsibility for disrupting an 
enemy's C3I rests with the high command and not through separate 
departments.  According to the article, to win a war one’s own C3I must be strong and the 
first thing one must do in a war is disrupt/disable the enemy's C3I.  The terms used are 
reo loan (disturb) and gam reo which appears to be an amalgam of gam she (interfere) 
and reo loan (disturb), and translates as disturb/disturbance.    
  
Further, the article states that ‘the responsibility does not just lie with intelligence, 
counter-intelligence and communications as separate departments. It is now 
controlled/directed/co-coordinated by the high command’.  Thus the article appears to say 
                                                 
834 . Yuan Wenlin.  ‘Xinxi Zhan’, Bingqi Zhishi, 1987 Niandi, 5 Qi, Zhongdi 116 Qi, p. 10. 
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that C3I is now a more sophisticated form of warfare.  The centralising/coordinating of 
offensive C3I operations and the importance of neutralising an enemy's C3I systems 
predate People’s War under high technology conditions835  and Chinese Information 
Warfare doctrine.  The article also referred to stealth aircraft.  It noted that aircraft have 
to ‘hide like a rat’ from a cat (radar) but a family (of aircraft) can now reduce their 
appearance by 0.2 ‘making the cat nearsighted’.836    
  
 
Training for the Operational Level of War 
 
The operational level of war requires combined arms training on large exercise areas.   
The People’s Liberation Army has built instrumented ranges, similar in concept if not 
technology to the United States Army’s National Training Center at Fort Irwin, 
California.837   The Joint Training Facility is known as Fort Polk.   The idea was based on 
a training initiative conducted at Fort Hood, Texas in the late 1970s.  Called ‘Red 
Thrust’, it showed the possibilities of using soldiers familiar with enemy doctrine to aid 
‘Opposing Forces’ (OPFOR) soldiers.  This saw the NTC be equipped with dedicated 
OPFOR forces and equipment to train the US Army against Soviet forces.838  The United 
States military now incorporates ‘Red Teams’ into its planning and crisis-decision 
planning process to look at possible counters to their actions and incorporate changes 
before they could become a reality.839  
 
                                                 
835 . The State Council Information Office, PRC, China's National Defense in 2002 (White Paper), 9 
December 2002. 
 
836 . Yuan Wenlin.  ‘Xinxi Zhan’, Bingqi Zhishi, op. cit. 
 
837 . For a history of the National Training Center see Herling, M.P. & Boiselle, J.   ‘Coming of  
age in the Desert: The NTC at 20’, Military Review, September/October 2001.  
 
838 . Ibid., p. 1. 
 
839. Malone, T.G. & Schaupp, R.E.   ‘The “Red Team”: Forging a Well-Conceived Contingency 
Plan’, Aerospace Power Journal, Vol. XVI, Number 2, Summer 2002, pp. 22 – 33.  
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Blasko, Klapakis and Corbett, in their 1996 seminal work on training in the PLA, wrote 
that opposing forces training has three benefits: it adds realism not found it set-piece 
scenarios; this realism, which takes the form of changing battlefield conditions, causes 
commanders to use initiative to accomplish their missions; and thirdly, it exposes troops 
to new tactics, theoretically the tactics of a potential enemy.840   Their OPFOR units are 
referred to as ‘confrontational’ (duikang xing) or ‘blue’ (lanse) forces.841    
 
The PLA adopted the idea of creating its first OPFOR unit in the Nanjing Military 
Region (MR) in the 1980s and in 1984 established a large simulation centre in Beijing.842  
The Shenyang Military Region contains a large sized OPFOR unit to enable exercises at 
the ‘higher levels’.843  The high technology OPFOR unit in the Nanjing Region is called 
the ‘Black Panther Unit’ (hei bao bu dui).  The Shenyang MR is the site for a tactical 
logistics simulation training system and where two divisions practised an information 
warfare exercise on 10 October 1997.844   
 
The PLA has created a divisional land forces training area similar to Ford Polk using 
Chinese technology developed by the Nanjing Research Institute on Simulation 
Technique (NRIST).  Called the digital directional (asset tracking) system, it utilises GPS 
tracking, audio-visual frequency compression and digital communication techniques, and 
could be used as a battle management system.845    
 
                                                 
840 . Blasko, D.J., Klapakis, P.T. & Corbett, J.F.  ‘Training Tomorrow’s PLA: A Mixed Bag of  
Tricks’, China Quarterly, Number 146, April-June 1996, p. 497. 
 
841 . Ibid., p. 491, fn.4. 
 
842 . Kondapalli, S.   ‘Towards a Lean and Mean Army: Aspects of China’s Ground Force 
Modernisation’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 26, Number 4, October-December 2002, p. 471;. Foreign 
Bulletin Information Service FTS19980316000192 dated 16 March 1998.  
 
843 . Ibid. 
 
844 . Foreign Broadcast Information Service FTS19971227000149 dated 27 December 1997. 
 
845 . Wu Xiaochun, NRIST Keeps Forging Ahead’, Military Training & Simulation News,  
Volume 5, Issue 5, October 2003, pp. 36 & 37. 
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The PLA through the NRIST has also invested heavily in unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs).  It has developed target drones including ones simulating cruise and anti-
shipping missiles.  The W-50 UAV has a reported ability to loiter over four hours 
depending on the payload and an operational range of over 100 kilometres.846  Their Z-3 
remotely piloted helicopter, which utilises a GPS navigation system, has a takeoff weight 
of 130 kilograms including a 30 kilogram payload.847    
 
 
The Change in Designating Weapons 
 
The use of Western expressions in the PLA, when Chinese terms were used previously, is 
a simple example of the change away from People’s War to a more modern military.   
The Chinese language can be written two ways, character based and phonetic.  Many new 
weapons when introduced by mission due to the low level of literacy and problems of 
communicating with differing dialect groups were written as per their role.  For example, 
the sub-machine gun was referred to as chong feng qiang, which translates as forward 
gun and the mortar as po ji pao, which translates as forward suppress cannon.  Both 
translate their role, the mortar being developed in the First World War to suppress 
machine gun posts and the sub-machine gun being a weapon that has to be used in the 
front due to its short effective range when compared to rifles.  Another term is tanke.  
This translates as tank but the characters mean to ‘go effortlessly across the plains’.   
Similarly, hand grenade translates as ‘hand thrown bomb’, shou liu dan, with the middle 
character incorporating the characters of the pomegranate.  The origin of the term ‘hand 
grenade’ comes from its likeness to a pomegranate.  The shou liu dan is the term for the 
stick or ‘potato masher’ type grenade.  The egg type hand grenade is called the shou lei 
(hand mine).     
 
                                                 
846 . Wu Xiaochun, NRIST Keeps Forging Ahead – Part II’, Military Training & Simulation News,  
Volume 5, Issue 6, November 2003, pp. 54 & 55.  
 
847 . Ibid., p. 66. 
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The Type 67 7.62 x 54mm machine gun when introduced was referred to as lian jiqiang 
(company machine gun), but in line with Western terminology, this was later changed to 
liangyong jiqiang (dual use machine gun).848  This was changed again recently to tong 
ying (general purpose).849  These changes reflected the Chinese translation of the NATO 
term of general-purpose machine gun, which is a weapon that can be used as a light 
machine gun in the platoon or as a sustained fire or heavy machine gun at the company 
and battalion level.  The interesting point is that the Type 67 machine gun is not used as a 
platoon weapon but is kept at the company level or higher.  The new QJY88 5.8mm belt 
fed machine gun is referred to as a general or machine gun.850  
 
 
The Operational Art in Action – Counter Terrorist Operations and 
Exercises in Xinjiang 2001- 2005  
 
China’s need for energy to fuel its burgeoning economy means that Xinjiang is now 
critical to China’s future.  The Tarin Basin alone has proven reserves of over one billion 
tons of crude oil and 59 billion cubic metres of natural gas.  These oilfields are expected 
to provide 50 million tons annually by 2010.851  Xinjiang, on China’s western border 
with Kazakhstan and Afghanistan, is where the last 240 kilometres of the new 3000 
kilometre Kazakhstan-to-China oil pipeline will run, where it will be refined or sent 
eastwards.852   The Chinese economy requires these resources for its industries and more 
                                                 
848 .  ‘Juwang kailai de Zhongguo jichiang’, Bingqi Zhishi, 1997 Niandi, 3 Qi, Zhongdi 
114 Qi, p. 23. 
849 . 2 haomi tongying jiqiang’, Bingqi Zhishi, 2007 Niandi, 8 Qi, Zhongdi  
238, p. 2 
i Zhishi, 2000 Niandi, 2 Qi,  
hongdi 148 Qi, p. 2.  
851 . 
 
852 . inopec to step up efforts in western China’, People’s Daily Daily on-line, 5 January 2005, 
 
‘Li Gang. 
 
Zhongguo CF06 shi 7.6
 
850 . ‘Zhongguo QJY88 shi 5.8 haomi tongyong jiqiang, Bingq
Z
 
‘Xinjiang to be No.1 oil  production area’, Xinhua on-line,  22 May 2005,   
http://www.xinuanet.com/english accessed 23 May 2005 
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energy intensive cities on the east coast; so it will brook no interruptions.  The 
exploitation of natural resources from the impoverished western periphery to assist the 
rich eastern cities, may lead to a backlash in relations between the Uyghurs and the Han 
Chinese, further straining relations between the two groups.  This can only exacerbate the 
Uyghur’s bitterness and distrust towards Beijing, and another cause for Uyghur 
independence and insurgency against the Chinese.   
 
PLA operations and exercises in Xinjiang have been used to develop and impart 
injiang has been the scene of independence movements since before the Second World 
experience in the operational art, whereas previously it had been used primarily for high 
altitude training.  The Xinjiang Military Region, and not the Nanjing Military District, is 
now the premier information warfare test centre for the PLA.  Secondly, it is the training 
area for large-scale operations.  Because of its isolation and varied terrain it has been 
chosen for developing the new ‘informationised’853 warfare for which the Chinese 
military is striving.  China can develop its idea of information warfare in a relatively free 
airspace and ground environment, enabling the use of offensive electronic warfare and 
large scale manoeuvres away from prying eyes and without interfering with commercial 
activities.  One of the aims of the operations and exercises is to train PLA soldiers and 
concurrently stop insurgents from Xinjiang crossing into neighbouring countries and 
vice-versa.  They are also used as confidence and security building measures with 
China’s neighbours and to evaluate new equipment.     
 
X
War.  There had been an East Turkestan Republic in Xinjiang in 1933 and 1944-50.  The 
latter was the result of a Soviet-backed revolt and involved the northern three provinces 
that Communist Chinese forces retook peacefully in early 1950.  The influx of Han 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.chinamil.com.cn accessed 5 January 2005; ‘China starts work on Kazakhstan-China 
oil pipeline’, People’s Daily on-line, 25 March 2005, http://www.chinamil.com.cn accessed 26 
March 2005 
 
853 . The State Council Information Office, PRC, China's National Defense in 2006 (White Paper), 29 
December 2006, and China's National Defense in 2004 (White Paper), 27 December 2004. 
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Chinese; a revival in Islamic religion and culture in the 1980s and the idea of an 
independent republic, like the independent countries of Tadzhikistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan, created a volatile mixture which exploded in 1991.854  With two cultures, 
foreign to each other in the same locality, misunderstandings and incidents are bound to 
occur.  Further migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang will see the Uyghur become 
further marginalised in an area where they have lived for generations.  Uyghurs now 
make up only 48 percent of Xinjiang’s population of 18 million.855  Such an environment 
 conducive to the ferment of Islamic fundamentalism.   
reports, Uyghur insurgents have been trained inside Afghanistan by Al Qaeda and have 
                                                
is
 
Rioting broke out in Xinjiang in April of 1991 and since then there has been a Uyghur-
based insurgency in Xinjiang.856  The Chinese government has conducted an information 
warfare campaign against the Uyghurs in international forums labelling them terrorists 
and producing a white paper and briefings outlining their crimes against China.857   By 
using the ‘war against terrorism’, the PLA suppresses any signs of Uyghur independence 
and has claimed that the Uyghur insurgents are linked directly to the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda.858  In the State Council Information Office report on the Xinjiang Insurgency 
released in January 2002, Xinjiang insurgents are blamed for more than 162 deaths and 
440 injured during the period 1990 to 2001.859  According to Chinese Government 
 
854 . Millward, J.  Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment, East-West Center,  
Washington D.C., 2004, pp. 5 – 10; Davis, A.   ‘Xinjiang learns to live with resurgent Islam’, 
Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 8, No. 9, September 1995, p. 417; Fuller, G.E. & Starr, S.F. 
The Xinjiang Problem, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, John Hopkins University, 2005, 
pp. 4 – 9.  
 
855 . McGregor, A. ‘ Chinese Counter-Terrorist Strike in Xinjiang’, Central Asia – Caucasus  
Analyst, Volume 9, Number 5, 7 March 2007, pp. 13 – 15.  For a recent on the ground look at  
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Winter 2004, at www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view/142 accessed 1 September 2007. 
 
856 . Millward, loc. cit;  Davis, loc. cit. 
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received battle experience in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Kosovo.860    The March 2005 
anti-secessionist law applies equally to Xinjiang and Tibet, as it does to Taiwan.  China 
now uses the criminal code to justify its attacks on the Uyghur independence movements 
wherever it perceives them to be.  The Chinese State Council on 27 December 2004 
released a White Paper on National Defense where non-traditional security threats like 
terrorism were prominent.861    Chapter Two states: 
 
China attaches great importance to security cooperation in the non-
traditional security fields with other countries, maintaining that in jointly 
combating non-traditional security threats, it is imperative to address both 
the symptoms and root causes and to adopt comprehensive measures.862 
 
The 2006 White Paper on National Defense voiced it more aggressively: 
 
Upholding national security and unity, and ensure the interests of national 
development. This includes guarding against and resisting aggression, 
defending against violation of China's territorial sea and air space, and 
borders; opposing and containing the separatist forces for ‘Taiwan 
independence’ and their activities, taking precautions against and cracking 
down on terrorism, separatism and extremism in all forms.863  
 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has been one means of suppressing 
Islamic fundamentalism in its member states and it may be argued that China uses it as a 
means of influencing Central Asian affairs.  On 13 June 2001, to formalise and enhance a 
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series of bilateral and informal agreements, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan signed and formalised the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation.864  Also known as the Shanghai Treaty, the aim of the treaty is to fight 
‘terrorism’, ‘separatism’ and religious ‘extremism’ – the ‘three evils’ as they are known - 
in their respective countries.865   It may be expected that the Chinese government dreads 
a Uyghur ‘People’s War’.  The new infrastructure being built includes oil refineries, the 
pipeline, railways, power stations and the power grid would all be vulnerable to attack by 
insurgents who could cause vast damage to China’s economy for little effort.  Central 
Asia has a large amount of infantry weapons, including rocket-propelled grenades, 
explosives and mortars, as a result of the many wars that occurred in the region in the 
1990s.866    
 
One way of keeping the Uyghur insurgency in check is by displays of force, of which 
Chinese security forces have not been lax in performing.  The Xinjiang Military Area 
Command has an armoured regiment whose mission is to develop mobile operations and 
field survival techniques in high altitude warfare.867  A 2004 Human Rights Watch report 
stated that security forces in Xinjiang had prosecuted 22 cases of groups and individuals 
for alleged ‘separatist and terrorist activities’ in the period January to August 2004.868  A 
Chinese military newspaper noted in February 2005 that Chinese forces used tanks in a 
combat zone;869  as Xinjiang was the only area in China where combat operations had 
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occurred, and then it may be the case that these tanks were employed against Uyghur 
insurgents.   
 
By running counter-terrorist exercises in Xinjiang, both the PAP and PLA are able to 
develop counterinsurgency and terrorist techniques in an area in which they would be 
expected to operate, as well as refine command and control arrangements with similar 
forces in the region.   On 6 August 2004, the first joint counter-terrorist exercise between 
the PLA and Pakistani forces, called ‘Friendship 2004’, was run in Xinjiang.   A high 
altitude cold weather exercise, it comprised over 200 personnel that included personnel 
from the PLA’s dedicated anti-terrorist battalion.  The exercise entailed tracking down 
terrorists over Xinjiang’s mountainous terrain.870   
 
The significance of using Xinjiang for large-scale training is that if a series of insurgent 
incidents were to occur simultaneously in different parts of Xinjiang, the security forces 
already have the infrastructure and means to respond rapidly.  One exercise involved a 
division in the Talikmakan Desert where it incorporate a command, control, 
communications, computers and intelligence local architecture network (C4I LAN) into 
in an area 1,000 kilometres long that integrated intelligence, command and control, 
automated artillery fire support, airspace surveillance and control and logistics 
resupply.871  Units in Xinjiang have been commended by the PLA hierarchy as leading 
the way in the field of C4I.872    
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PLA Special Forces at the Operational Level 
 
A series of external and internal demands in China’s security environment have resulted 
in modifications to the country’s special forces units.  Changes have been driven by the 
possibility of Taiwan’s independence, the military requirements of increasing power 
projection capabilities, and the country’s policy of ‘active defence’ that requires a pre-
emptive strike capacity, as explained in the introduction to this thesis.  Accordingly, PLA 
special forces have expanded their role from traditional reconnaissance operations to 
include counter-terrorism, hostage rescue, combat search and rescue, and direct attack 
missions.873   
  
The People’s Liberation Army, and its predecessor, the Red Army have always had 
special forces elements embedded within it.  As noted in Chapter Two of this thesis, the 
Red Army in 1928 included a special task company in its regimental structure which was 
meant for headquarters protection but also used for other tasks; and the reconnaissance 
teams in the reorganised 1934 division wore civilian clothes and could carry pistols or 
grenades with them.874     
 
These reconnaissance teams evolved into the regimental reconnaissance elements that 
besides receiving the best training also were given the latest equipment first. In the mid-
1990s they were the first to units to be issued unmanned air vehicles, battlefield video 
systems and thermal imaging systems.875  Since the mid-1990s the roles of the PLA 
Special Forces have grown.   They now train to attack the ‘accupoints of the enemy’ - 
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such as ballistic missile sites - by direct action, or inserted by helicopter and parachute to 
provide targeting data for strategic bombers and theatre ballistic missiles of the Second 
Artillery force.876  
 
Each of China’s seven military regions has a Special Forces battalion, dedicated to 
different tasks in accordance with the distinctive geography of the region and mission 
profile. The special operations battalion in Nanjing Military Region is involved in 
opposing forces (OPFOR) psychological warfare and trains with air, land and naval 
assets and ‘stressful’ live fire exercises.877   This unit is responsible for operations in the 
Taiwan Strait and South China Sea; beach reconnaissance and conducting raids would be 
part of its training.  The PLA invests significant resources on studying the lower level 
operations and equipment of foreign forces.  The mission of the Blue Team OPFOR staff 
in Beijing is to study advanced tactical theories of foreign military forces, and by its own 
admission collects a large amount of information on them.878  It is doubtful if any 
Western country has a comparable organisation to study foreign forces at the lower 
levels.  This enables PLA special forces to understand how potential adversaries operate.   
 
The PLA’s First Army Airmobile Regiment was stationed in Xinjiang and develops 
tactics and doctrine for heliborne operations including night time combat, search and 
rescue, as well as conducting counter-terrorist and insurgency missions.879  Its mission 
profile is similar to a US Army Ranger battalion combined with the 160th Special 
Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne).880 Stationed there after 11 September 2001 to 
combat Uyghur separatists, the unit was initially equipped with approximately 
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30 Chinese built Z-9G helicopters.881  It also has People’s Liberation Army Air Force 
(PLAAF) Mi-17 transport helicopters available to provide greater troop lift and fire 
support.  These are equipped with navigation radar and uprated engines with an auxiliary 
power unit to ensure reliable starting at altitudes up to 4,000 metres.882  It is difficult to 
establish whether it is still in Xinjiang, but 16 Z-9G and 16 Mi-17 helicopters  that were 
deployed to Russia for the August 2007 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 
exercise, Peace Mission 2007, came from Xinjiang.883   
 
Since late October 2002 the PLA has conducted an annual joint anti-terrorist exercise 
with its neighbours under the auspices of the SCO.  The first one involved PLA personnel 
from the Army Airborne Regiment and Kyrgyzstan forces on the Sino-Kyrgyzstan border 
in the western region of Xinjiang.  Other members of the SCO were present as observers.    
This was the basis for developing operational level planning and execution of multi-
national counter-terrorist operations under the auspices of the SCO.884  The next exercise 
called ‘Unite 2003’ was conducted from 6-12 August with forces from Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tadzhikistan, with the third, ‘Two Friends – 2004’, conducted on 
6 August 2004 by over 200 PLA and Pakistani Special Forces including personnel from 
the PLA’s new dedicated anti-terrorist battalion.885    
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Unite-2003 was comparatively complex and built on the knowledge gained from the 
previous year’s exercise.886  The exercise started at Kazakhstan’s border city of Ucharal 
on 6 August and then continued into China in the Ili prefecture of Xinjiang, finishing on 
12 August.  The manoeuvre phase was built around the scenario of international terrorists 
having hijacked an aeroplane and violated the airspace of Kazakhstan whilst another 
group of international terrorists set up a base camp from where they were to create 
terrorist incidents.  The exercise included Kazak armoured infantry using BMP-2 infantry 
combat vehicles as well as the army airborne regiment.    
 
The 2007 joint counter-terrorist exercise - ‘Hand-in-Hand 2007’ - was between Indian 
and Chinese Special Forces and ran from 21 to 25 December.887   It was a confidence and 
security building exercise involving 206 personnel and was conducted in hilly terrain 
near Kunming, capital of Yunnan Province.888  It is notable for the fact that Indian and 
Chinese forces still face off against each other in the Himalayas.  
 
As the PLA’s Special Forces grow the need for a single command authority which 
crosses military region responsibilities will arise.  It will enable the government to deal 
with the one organisation in the event of a major terrorist incident, and given the 
impossibility of stopping foreign media transmissions during high level events (such as 
the Beijing Olympics 2008), this will be vital.  This and the expansion of roles for the 
PLA’s Special Forces can be expected to lead to some form of Special Operations 
Command as practised by the United States and Australia.  It will also ensure the 
standardisation of training, which is currently a regional responsibility, the proper use of 
specialised equipment, and prevent the misuse of Special Forces personnel by regional 
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commanders.  A joint police and military command unit was set up for the security of the 
Beijing Olympics.889  
 
To conclude this sub-section on Chinese Special Forces, People’s War was a doctrinal 
strategy that was never taken to heart by the People’s Liberation Army.  The nucleus of 
the PLA’s ready reaction forces of today were the ‘Model Companies’ in the early 1960s 
which the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution stymied, as was shown in the previous 
chapter.  After the Cultural Revolution the now rehabilitated cadres started from where 
they had left off, creating a professional People’s Liberation Army based on ready 
reaction forces.  The shedding of Mao’s thoughts, especially People’s War, started by 
removing leftist PLA commanders and was given impetus by the debacle of the 1979 
Sino-Vietnamese War.  The process that had been started, but hampered by legacies 
resulting from the Cultural Revolution, was renewed with vigour.   Twenty years on from 
Deng Xiaoping’s March 1980 speech calling for the modernisation in the PLA, it had 
achieved his four objectives and can now operate as a combined arms force on the 
periphery of China.  Further, it has gone from a predominately infantry-based force, 
where armour and artillery were subordinate, to an armed force where there are now 
substantial combined arms units. 
 
 
Reorganising and Reequipping the PLA after 1979    
 
To accomplish the new realities of combat, the PLA started from the bottom up by 
reorganising the structure of its infantry company, the building block of the PLA, and 
increasing the effectiveness of its weapons. 
 
Turning to the platoon structure, it is notable that in the 1980s the PLA’s infantry squad 
was reorganised into two teams each, one with a Type 56 (RPD) light machine gun, the 
other with a Type 69 rocket propelled grenade launcher (RPG) which was the main squad 
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anti-armour weapon.890   The present PLA returned to the structure of its roots in the 
1930s.   In 1938 the basic squad of the Eighth Route Army comprised three teams of 
three to five men armed with bolt-action rifles, hand grenades, and on paper, one 
automatic rifle or light machine gun.891    
 
The change in structure was likely due to lessons learned resulting from the 1979 Sino-
Vietnamese conflict.  The combat power of an army resides in its battalions and 
companies, for if they fail so does the operation.  As the PLA becomes more mechanized 
and heliborne, and moves to more long-range mission profiles the size and weight of the 
infantry weapons becomes more important.  So does the soldiers’ load bearing equipment 
so they can carry more equipment comfortably, or else fatigue and injury quickly occur.  
The PLA has always lacked long-range anti-armour weapons in the regiment, let alone 
the battalion, and to some extent still does. 
 
After the Sino-Vietnamese conflict the squad was reorganized into two fire teams, each 
with a squad automatic weapon, assault rifles and one of the squads was also equipped 
with a rocket propelled grenade launcher.892   Around the same time the PLA introduced 
the Model 81 assault rifle to replace the Model 56 assault rifle, and the heavy barrel 
version to replace the Model 56 light machine gun.893    
 
On facing the armour threat, ‘hugging the enemy’ was the anti-armour philosophy of the 
People’s Liberation Army in 1980.  The Model 69 RPG was and still is a viable weapon 
in close combat, so the PLA increased its effectiveness with the fielding of improved 
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anti-armour, as well as airburst and incendiary anti-personnel warheads.894  The short-
range anti-armour capability of the PLA infantry section received a considerable boost in 
1989 with the introduction of the PF 89 80 mm disposable anti-armour rocket launcher.   
The PF 89 weighs 3.6 kg, is 900 mm long overall and is claimed to be able to penetrate 
630 mm of armour plate.895  There is also a bunker buster version called the PF 89A 
which weighs 4.2 kg and uses a similar round the Carl Gustaf 84 mm HEDP 502 
round.896   Compared to the standard PF89 it is 0.5 kg heavier at 4.2 kg, a smaller 
effective range of 180 metres compared to 200 metres, but a larger maximum range of 
1,000 metres compared to 400 metres.  Its penetration against armour plate is 20mm at 00.  
Its dimensions are the same as the anti-armour version.897    
 
To increase the infantry’s capability against modern composite and explosive reactive 
armour panels the PF 98 120 mm rocket launcher was fielded in 1998.  With an effective 
range of 400 metres, that increases to 800 metres with advanced sights, its bulk and 
weight mean that it is kept at least at the company level.  This is to stop the infantry 
squads being burdened with the weight and bulk of extra ammunition.  Although the 
launcher weighs a little less than 10 kg the anti-armour round weighs 6.28 kg and the 
multi-purpose round, 7.6 kg.898  The PLA has reinvented the Carl Gustaf 84 mm 
recoilless rifle which has been in service with Western armies since the early 1960s.899     
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An improved version of the Hong Jian-73 was introduced in the late 1980s, around the 
same time as the Hong Jian Ba (Red Arrow 8) anti-tank guided missile.  The launcher is 
similar in design to the European Milan and the missile itself to the United States TOW, 
the Red Arrow-8 is available in both vehicle and tripod mounted versions and gives the 
infantry an anti-tank capability out to 3,000 metres.900   This has been issued to battalion 
anti-tank platoons and companies.  
 
The rocket propelled grenade launcher is central to the concept of People’s War by 
militia type forces.  In the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war the Vietnamese militia performed 
in an optimal fashion, blunting the Chinese attacks using mostly infantry weapons 
including the RPG.  Another early example of People’s War being successfully tested in 
combat against modern high quality forces was the Egyptian militia during the Israeli 
attack on Suez City in 1973.  The militia in both cases had the missions of blunting an 
aggressor’s attack, and performing rear area and key point defence, to enable the standing 
army to prosecute the main battle.  Both were armed with similar weapons and their 
capability against their contemporary armour was based on the rocket propelled grenade 
and hand thrown anti-tank grenades. The performance of the Egyptian militia equipped 
with rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and hand thrown anti-tank grenades in the Battle 
for Suez, supported by a small amount of Malyutka (Sagger) anti-tank guided missiles 
and artillery, was particularly outstanding.901  On 24 October 1973 an Israeli mechanized 
infantry battalion supporting an armoured brigade attacked the port city of Suez.  One 
hour later the Israelis were repulsed and admitted to losing 28 armoured vehicles.902   
Despite further attacks against the city outskirts the Israelis never ventured back into the 
city.903  Vehicles were hit with RPGs, ATGMs, and from grenades and Molotov cocktails 
thrown from upper storeys of buildings onto the weak top armour.904    
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The 1994 New Year’s Eve assault on Grozny by the Russian 131st Maykop Brigade 
suffered a similar fate due to insufficient and poorly trained conscript infantry in support.  
By 3 January the brigade had lost over 800 men, 20 out of 26 tanks, 102 out of 120 BMP 
Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicles and their six Tunguska M-1 self-propelled 
gun/surface-to-air missile vehicles.  Many of the BMPs had few or no dismounts 
onboard, and many of the infantry were killed in them, as they refused to dismount.905    
In the battle for Grozny and other Chechen cities, a minimum of four hunter-killer teams 
simultaneously attacked a single armoured vehicle from different directions.  They aimed 
for crew hatches, the top and engine transmission compartment decking, the area behind 
the turret and the side area not covered by skirts.906   Chechen forces also dropped bottles 
filled with gasoline or jellied fuel on top of vehicles.   The Chechen and Egyptian hunter-
killer teams trapped vehicle columns in city streets where destruction of the first and last 
vehicles stopped the column and allowed its total destruction.907   The Chechen 
equivalent of a platoon consists of 15 to 20 personnel subdivided into three or four man 
cells.   Each cell comprises a RPG gunner, a machine gunner and a sniper.908   Additional 
personnel served as ammunition bearers and assistant gunners.  This was highly 
illustrative of the ‘man over machine philosophy’, espoused by Mao.  In late 1999 and 
early 2000 the Russians imitated Chechen methods when they again attacked Grozny.   
The Russians employed troika teams comprising a sniper, machine gunner and grenade 
launcher.909    Two soldiers, who acted as ammunition carriers and/or assistant gunners, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
905 . Litovkin, V.  ‘Rasstrel 131i maikopskoi brigadiy’, Izvestia, 11 January 1995, p. 4; Barayantinsky, 
M. Tanks in Chechnya, Rail Road Press, Mocow, 1999, p. 11. 
 
906 . Suvorov, S.   ‘The T-72: Yesterday, Today and Tommorow’, Tekhnika-Moledezhi, Moscow, 
2001, p. 54; Vladykin, O.   ‘Russian Tanks Did Not Let Us Down in Chechnya.  But Fewer of 
Them Could Have Been Lost….’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 February 1995, pp. 1 & 3.   
 
907 . Grau, L.A.   ‘Russian-Manufactured Armored Vehicle Vulnerability in Urban Combat: The  
Chechnya Experience’, Red- Star, January 1997, p. 2; Rogers, op. cit., p. 32. 
 
908 . Ibid. 
 
909 . Thomas,T.L.   ‘Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned’, Foreign Military Studies 
Office, Fort Leavenworth, 2000, p. 4. 
 
 263
supplemented the team.910   There have been calls for the section establishment to go 
from nine to 11 to allow the forming of three troika teams.911  
 
In the area of small arms, in March 1971, the Chinese military decided to move towards a 
smaller rifle and machine gun calibre rifle and various calibres between 5 mm and 6 mm.  
A smaller round enables more ammunition to be carried and the weapon made lighter and 
smaller.  A 2004 article in Qing Bingqi looked at various cartridges developed before the 
5.8 mm DBP87 was accepted into service.912  Identified as the 5.8 x 42 mm round the 
projectile’s diameter is actually 6 mm and the unfired case length is 42 mm.   The DBP 
87 round has a low ballistic co-efficient and is light in weight for its calibre and thus is 
not designed as a long-range round.  The wound ballistics of the projectile is intriguing.   
It is short, and with the steel core taking up so much of the projectile, would have poor 
stability.  Thus it would tend to tumble easily on impact with soft tissue but is unlikely to 
break up.  The steel core would give it effective penetration on body armour, as the 
projectile has no cannelure to create a weak spot at which the projectile could break apart.   
It is not the best designed round for the calibre but for use under 300 metres is adequate.   
 
Harlan Jencks in a 2000 conference paper on the PLA reasoned that the introduction of a 
new round to the PLA ‘may be a self-inflicted wound’.913  This is because the PLA’s new 
Type 95 family of small arms uses a different calibre ammunition to any other country, 
meaning PLA soldiers have to carry more ammunition and magazines as they cannot 
replenish their stocks from other sources, whereas previously they could.  It is possible 
that the PLA followed the trend that was evident in Western military forces.  The 5.8 x 42 
                                                 
910 . Grau, L.   ‘Technology and the Second Chechen Campaign: Not All New and Not That 
Much’ in Eldis, A. C. (ed)  The Second Chechen War, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 
Camberley, 2000, p. 108.      
 
911 . Tereshchenko, V.   ‘And “Grandpa” Is Repaired’ in Roshchin, S; Reznichenko, S; & 
Saoylyuk, S.  ‘War Doesn’t Sleep’, Armeyskiy Sbornik, October 2000, p. 51. 
 
912 . ‘Zhongguo xiaokoujing buqiang dansheng neimu/liu ming’, Qing Bingqi, 2004 Niandi, 2 Qi,  
Zhongdi 193 Qi, pp. 32 – 35. 
  
913 . Jencks, H.   ‘Thoughts and Questions about PLA Ground Forces’, A paper prepared for the 
Conference on Chinese Military Studies: A Conference on the State of the Field, National Defense 
University Washington, DC, October 26–27, 2000, p. 11. 
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mm round is close to the 6 x 45 mm XM 732 6 mm squad automatic weapon round, 
developed by the Frankford Arsenal in the early 1970s.914   The 5.8 x 42 mm round 
would give soldiers equipped with weapons chambered for it, an advantage over soldiers 
equipped with weapons chambered for 5.56 mm NATO, 5.45 mm Russian and 7.62 x 39 
mm M43.  Secondly, other countries have considered the introduction of new small arms 
calibres.  NATO believes a new calibre is warranted for personal defence weapons and 
the United States military wanted a 6 mm round in the 1970s for squad light machine 
guns.915   The 5.56 mm NATO round is not regarded as a suitable light machine gun 
round as it lacks range and penetration against sand bags, masonry and wood.916   
 
With the creation of ready reaction forces and the increased mechanisation of the PLA 
since the late 1980s, a small lightweight family of small arms was required.  The calibre 
of 5.8 mm was selected after various calibres between 5.5 mm and 6 mm were tried and 
became known by Western militaries as the 5.8 x 42 mm. 917    
 
The family of the small arms using the DBP87 .8 x 42mm cartridge are: 
 
a. QBZ87A assault rifle; 
 
b. QBU88 sniping rifle; 
 
c. QJY88 belt-fed general purpose machine gun;     
 
                                                 
914 . From information provided by Mr William Woodin dated 29 December 1999 and Crist, S.C. 
‘Is 6mm the Optimum Caliber?   A Common Cartridge for Rifle and Machinegun’, Infantry, Vol. 
89, No. 3, September-December 1999, pp. 6 – 8; Smith P.   Variations of Military Experimental 
Calibers, Amendment No. 5, Published by author, Iqaluit, March 1999,  
p. 062-045. 
 
915 . Cutshaw, C.Q.   ‘Heckler & Koch aims it latest weapons to fill the gap between pistol and 
rifle’, International Defense Review, September 2000. 
 
916 . Bostock, I.   ‘ADF considers 7.62 mm comeback’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 13 September 
2000; Crist,  op.cit., p. 8. 
  
917 . Correspondence from Mr William Woodin dated 31 August 1998 and Mr David Andrew 
  
 265
d. QBZ95 assault rifle;  
 
d. QBZ95A assault rifle – a product improved version of the QBZ87A;  
 
e. QBB95 squad automatic weapon based on the Model 95 assault rifle; and the 
 
f. QBZ95B carbine version of the QBZ95 assault rifle. 
 
 
The first rifle designed for it was the QBZ87A, and similar in appearance to the Model 81 
7.62 mm x 43 mm assault rifle.  It was not introduced into service as it did not offer any 
weight benefit, with its reduced calibre, when compared with the Model 56.918   This was 
also the case with Heckler and Koch’s 5.56 x 45 mm G-41 in the early 1980s, when 
compared to the 7.62 x 51 mm G-3.  It was redesigned in 1995 and designated the 
QBZ95A, and again redesigned in 2002 and designated the QBZ03.  The major 
differences from the QBZ95A are a new folding stock copied from the Heckler and Koch 
G36, a SIG 540 style foregrip, and a slim mount for the standard 3x optical sight used on 
Chinese rifles. 919   
 
The second rifle was the QBU88 sniping rifle.  This weapon is a bullpup, and the 
Swiss SIG 550 influenced its design.  It has an overall length of 920 mm and weighs 
4.2 kg empty with its telescopic sight adding another 0.6 kg.  The rifle also has a 
burst fire capability.920   It is an urban warfare weapon as the 5.8 mm DBP 87 round’s 
long-range characteristics are poor but are adequate in urban areas where most 
combat occurs at 100 metres or less.921   
                                                 
918 . Wo junbanyong wuqide huimou yu zhanwang’, Qing Bingi, 2002 Niandi, 10 Qi, Zhongdi 164 
Qi, p. 13. 
 
919 . ‘Zhongguo 03 zidong buqiang’, Qing Bingqi, 2005 Niandi, 2 Qi, Zhongdi 193 Qi, pp. 32 – 35. 
 
920 . Li Shulin.   ‘A Brief Introduction to China’s 5.8 mm Sniper Rifle’, Bingqi Zhishi, August 
1997, p. 12. 
 
921 . Small, S.C.   ‘Small Arms and Asymmetric Threats’, Military Review, Vol. LXXX,  
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The QJY88 belt-fed general purpose machine gun is in limited service.  It has an effective 
ground range of 800 metres, vertically up to 500 metres and a combat rate of fire of 200 
to 300 rounds per minute.922  In the light machine gun role without its tripod it weighs 7.6 
kg and is 1,151 mm long.  With the tripod the overall length is 1,321 mm and the tripod 
weighs 4.2 kg giving an empty weight of 11.8 kg.923  The barrel is 600 mm long and the 
weapon has a muzzle velocity is 895 m/sec.924  It has a 200 linked round magazine 
available.  This weapon is suitable for neither role being too large and heavy for a light 
machine gun in its calibre and the cartridge too light for a tripod mounted sustained fire 
machine gun.  It has an effective ground range of 800 metres, vertically up to 500 metres 
and a combat rate of fire of 200 to 300 rounds per minute.925      
 
The first assault rifle issued using the DBP87 round, the QBZ 95A, was publicly first 
seen on 1 July 1997, carried by the PLA’s Hong Kong garrison when arriving after the 
handover.  It weighs 3.25 kg empty, is 746 mm long, the barrel is 520 mm long and as a 
military weapon has numerous design faults.  It has too many parts when field stripped, 
especially rods, and due to the weapon’s short sight picture it requires an optic sight with 
issue one having 3x magnification.926   Worse still, the 30 round magazine protrudes too 
far below the pistol grip to allow firing lying down.927   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
November - December 2000, No. 6, p. 38.  
 
922 . Wang Tingrong.   ‘Zhhongguo QJY 88 5.8 haomi tonhyong jiqiang’, Bingqi Zhishi, 2002  
 Niandi, 2 Qi, Zhongdi 148 Qi, p. 2. 
 
923 . ‘QJY88 shi 5.8mm tongyong jiqiang’, Qingbingqi, 2007 Niandi, 10 (xia) Qi, Zhongdi 257, pp.  
inside front cover and 1.      
 
924 . ‘QJY88 shi 5.8mm tongyong jiqiang’, Qing BingQi, 2006 Niandi, 5 (shang) Qi, Zhongdi 222 Qi,  
photograph inside front cover  
 
925 . Wang, loc.cit.  
 
926. Xan, XF.   ‘Chinese Type 97 5.56mm Automatic Rifle’, Bingqi Zhishi, April 2000,  
pp. 19 – 21. 
 
927 . Ibid. 
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The QBB squad machine gun variant is equipped with a bipod and a 75 round drum 
magazine and weighs 3.95 kg empty and has an overall length of 840 mm and the barrel 
is 614 mm in length.928  With a fully loaded drum magazine the weapon is unbalanced 
due to the weight of the magazine near the butt.   This makes it awkward to carry and use 
in action.    
 
The QBZ95B carbine is a personal defence/close quarter weapon and is fired like a 
stocked pistol.929   It is compact and has a prominent foresight which, when shooting with 
both eyes open, enables quick engagements of targets.    
 
To provide a grenade launching capability the Model 95 rifle can be equipped with the 
Model 91B 35 mm rifle mounted grenade launcher.   The launcher weighs 1.45 kg empty, 
is 310 mm long and the sights are set to 75, 100, 200, 250, 300 and 350 metres.  The 
combat rounds available are high explosive, canister (buckshot), a smoke round that 
covers 10 square metres, and an illumination round of four to five million candela.  For 
riot duty there is a tear gas that is claimed to cover 140m2 in a wind speed of 1-2 m/sec 
and a temperature of 150C, and a target marking round to enable identification of 
individuals after a riot.930     
 
The PLA now wears camouflage uniforms with a new uniform, boots, load bearing 
equipment and Kevlar helmet, all in the same camouflage pattern similar to the United 
States woodland scheme but with more green.931  The QGF02 helmet and XZJ91 
                                                 
928 . Gao Tan.  ‘ China’s Newly Developed 5.8 mm Squad Weapon’, Bingqi Zhishi, July 1997,  
p. 9. 
 
929 . For an explanation of the Personal Defence Weapon concept see, Cutshaw C.Q.   ‘Heckler and 
Koch aims its latest weapons to fill the gap between pistol and rifle’, International Defense 
Review on line, 9/2001, September 2001. 
 
930 . Hu Qingqiang .   ‘QLG 91B 35 mm Rifle Mounted Grenade Launcher, Bingqi Zhishi,  
August 1999, pp. 10 & 11. 
 
931 . Wu Jan-Ping, ‘The People’s Liberation Army in the 21ST Century’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 145, 
No. 3, June 2000, p. 46. 
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personal combat vest designs have been strongly influenced by United States designs.932  
The XZJ91 vest is best described as a modified United States Individual Tactical Load 
Bearing Vest (ITLBV) even incorporating the United States quick release pistol belt 
buckle.933  It incorporates four pouches for Model 95 rifle magazines and two stick 
grenades.  The People’s Armed Police in Xinjiang have also been photographed in 
similar camouflage uniforms, two different types of non-camouflaged chest webbing and 
Model 81 assault rifles.  As noted above, the Model 81 assault rifle is a modern design, 
and with the combat vest holding at least five magazines, the PAP personnel were 
equipped for combat, not for show.934  Differing types of webbing are not uncommon as 
photographs of soldiers of all nations on operations show.  Individuals will carry what 
suits them best, not necessarily what is officially issued.   
 
The PLA has yet to introduce a lightweight anti-armour guided missile like the US 
Army’s FGM-148 Javelin.  The PLA has, however, introduced the improved Red Arrow-
8E missile system into the battalion anti-armour platoons and companies.  Similar in 
appearance to the United States BGM-71 TOW, the system can launch all previous Red 
Arrow-8 missiles and the new missile uses a tandem warhead to defeat explosive reactive 
armour.   Equipped with a digital guidance system incorporating integral test equipment it 
can be equipped with a thermal imaging sight.  Produced by the China North Industrial 
Company (NORINCO) it has a maximum range of 4, 000 metres.935   
 
 
The Effects of PLA Modernisation on the Battalion Structure 
                                                 
932 . Yang Tingxin, Liang Tiande Liu Shanhui.   ‘Zhongchang QGF02 junyong’, Bingqi Zhishi,  
May 1998, pp. 2 & 3. 
 
933 . For the United States Individual Tactical Load Bearing Vest see Rottman, G.L.   U.S. Army 
Combat Equipments, 1910-1988, Men-at-arms series: 205, Osprey Publishing, London, 1989, pp. 
40, 48 and plate H. 
 
934 . Lawrence, S.V.   ‘Where Beijing Fears Kosovo’, Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 163,  
No. 36, 7 September 2000, p. 22.   
 
935 . Bingqi Zhishi, 8/1999, August 1999, explanation of cover photograph on contents page.  
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At the battalion level, the class C battalion structure would seem to be the norm for the 
PLA’s rapid deployment units.  It has a nine-man squad and all the support weapons 
grouped at the battalion level.  It appears similar to the proposals for the restructure of the 
Russian motorised and airborne battalions in light of their experiences in Chechnya.   
Separate mortar, anti-armour and machine gun platoons are already incorporated in the 
People’s Liberation Army class C battalion structure.  Proposals have been put forward 
for the Russian motorised rifle battalion to incorporate all their company level support 
weapons into a fire support company with separate mortar, machine gun, anti-aircraft and 
anti-tank platoons.936  The Australian infantry battalion has already done this with its 
direct fire support weapon platoon at the battalion level.937     
 
The infantry company would keep the fire support section but the present two 60 mm 
mortars would most likely be replaced with different weapons depending on the role of 
the infantry.  Mechanized infantry have fire support available from the organic weapons 
of the armoured personnel carriers so anti-tank guided weapons would replace the 60 mm 
mortars.  Heliborne infantry still need the light mortars, as when the helicopters leave 
they have no organic fire support.      
 
The mechanisation of the PLA has instigated huge changes to the infantry battalion.  At 
the lowest level of organization, the squad, the PLA has gone back to the days of the Red 
Army in Yan’an.   The squad now has three fire teams, each of three men.  It should 
result in increased firepower compared with the previous structure with each team having 
a grenade launcher, machine gun and sniping rifle.  The squad fits well with the PLA’s 
armoured personnel carriers and helicopters, at best, can carry a squad of nine men.   
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The new structure would give the infantry company more flexibility at the platoon level 
and brings it in line with developments in Western armies.  It is unlikely that the platoon 
structure changes a great deal across the various infantry types.  Whether the infantry are 
dropped by parachute, inserted by helicopter, ride in the back of vehicles, or walk, they 
are all foot infantry when on the ground.  
 
To summarise the period since the Sino-Vietnamese War: the People’s Liberation Army 
modernised from an organisation that was bloated, had almost non-existent logistics, 
lacked modern communications and command and control equipment, used ineffective 
anti-armour weapons, had ill-trained staff officers and was in need of major reform. 
Within three decades of the Sino-Vietnamese War, it had become a modern fighting force 
on the cusp of becoming a force able to conduct land operations deep into an opponent’s 
country and developing concepts to be able to fight a modern land battle in the 21st 
Century. 
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Chapter Six 
The Future of the PLA  
With the break up of the Soviet Union and China’s rapid economic boom, the centre of 
gravity has moved to its sources of energy.  This means that China’s offensive 
mechanized forces are now more heavily focused on the northwest due to Xinjiang’s and 
Central Asia’s critical role in China’s energy needs.  In addition, the PRC, like other 
naval powers in the Asia Pacific, has enlarged and updated its amphibious capability as 
part of the modernization of the PLA Navy (PLAN). Most prominently, the PLA has 
engaged in the accelerated deployment of short-range and theatre ballistic missiles 
opposite Taiwan by initially redeploying remnant Cold War forces from the Sino-Russian 
border. 
 
The rhetoric of People’s War has given way to articles on ‘informatized warfare’ and 
writings that refer to digital mapping, active electronic warfare and deception measures, 
computer virus attack, data transfer and computerised battle management systems.938  
Units now regularly deploy in the brutal winters in Xinjiang and Tibet, and Xinjiang 
itself acts as a huge test site for these new methods of warfare (see Chapter Five).  Initial 
battles against an aggressor are to be fought on the periphery, not deep inside the borders 
as envisioned by Mao; though Mao himself in the 1930s acknowledged this would cause 
a large amount of destruction to the infrastructure.939  In any event, it was highly unlikely 
that Soviet armoured forces would have let themselves be drawn deep into the Chinese 
heartland.    
 
Yet informatised warfare has now been overtaken by a doctrine designed for broad 
sweeping operations, as envisaged by the Soviet operational art theorists that taught the 
                                                 
938 . ‘Xinjiang Military District Logistics Subdept  Conducts Precision Support Exercise’, loc. cit;  
‘Lanzhou Military Region Division Tackles Training  Subjects with Higher Information 
Technology Content, loc.cit.; Lanzhou Military Region Division Tackles Training Subjects with 
Higher Information Technological Content’, loc.cit.; ‘Lanzhou Military Region Meeting Reviews 
Progress of Leading organs in Informatisation Drive, loc.cit.  
 
939 . Described in the contemporary literature as the ‘breaking of pots and pans’.  Mao Zedong.   
‘Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War’, in Schram, op. cit., 1999, p. 501  
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original PLA generals in the 1920s and 30s, as shown in Chapter One.  The operational 
art of the PLA has become firmly rooted in the concepts and doctrine of pei shu 
(‘attaching troops to a subordinate unit’), which means the creation of independent battle 
groups within the division or augmenting a division seamlessly with heavier forces.940   
The other important concept is zhi chi (to support), meaning the creation of a battlefield 
logistics organisation able to supply and support forces deep inside an enemy’s rear.941 
 
Like other militaries, the PLA calculates force posture based upon geopolitical 
considerations as well as the force’s mission, put simply threats based versus capabilities 
based.  For the most part, China’s security centres of gravity were in the north and 
northeast, and its deployment of forces on its land borders has almost always been 
defensive.  Forces in the southwest have been composed of light units due to the tropical 
swamps and jungles in the region.  Likewise, Tibet’s high altitude determines PLA units 
structured to operate as mountain units.  Only on the east coast, in view of the Taiwan 
contingency, as well as China’s fear of attack by the United States, has China deployed 
offensively oriented units. 
 
 Kazakhstan is set to become vital to China's energy security.  In the first decade of the 
21st Century, China was buying Kazakh oilfields and companies.  If there were to be a 
problem with the flow of oil to China, its doctrinal philosophy of ‘active defence’ (see the 
Introduction of this thesis) means that the Chinese government will launch a preventative 
or pre-emptive strike to ensure the security of the state and its assets.  The PLA is 
mechanising much of its army and is creating at least two powerful armour heavy 
mechanized corps modelled after the 1980s Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups, 
which are designed for both breakthrough and exploitation roles in an offensive 
operation.  Too heavy for amphibious deployment against Taiwan or for operations in 
China's tropical areas, the corps is designed to ensure China's future energy security.  The 
force, using Xinjiang province as its springboard, would quickly overrun the defences of 
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any Central Asian state and would then be able to secure relevant oilfields.  The PLA has 
already announced its readiness to go to the next stage of its development and ‘forge a 
strong military force powerful enough to take on important missions on the basis of 
China's economic development’.942 
 
The Chinese government views stability as essential to China’s future growth and the 
PLA Army group in Shenyang will have one of the armour heavy corps to ensure the 
stability of China’s heavily industrialised northwest.  An unstable nuclear-armed North 
Korea would be viewed with alarm in Beijing, and the economic and military power of a 
unified Korea on its north-western border could be seen as another reason for 
intervention.  The armour heavy corps could easily cross the Yalu and quickly occupy 
large parts of the country, as most of North Korea’s weapons systems are on the border 
with South Korea.       
 
To adapt to informationized warfare and to enable more rapid decision-making on the 
battlefield, the PLA has decided to increase the number of army corps by removing the 
division and instead adopting a three-level command system of corps, brigade and 
battalion.943  This has already occurred in many ex-Soviet countries, for example, the 
Ukraine.  The People’s Liberation Army is based on the old Soviet triangular model that 
uses a corps, division and regimental command and control structure.  The regiment acts 
as the basic tactical unit, subordinate to the division as it lacks sufficient staff officers and 
command powers within its headquarters to act independently of the division.  In a 
modern brigade, the company is the tactical unit.  Going from a Russian style corps and 
divisional structure requires few changes at the battalion or even regimental level, but it 
does mean a radical change in command and control arrangements as the brigade is 
expected to act independently once committed into operations.  
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In the late 1990s, the PLA decided to abandon its triangular structure at the higher levels 
in favour of a square organisation of two armoured and two mechanized brigades in its 
heavy combined army group (corps).  The Group Army (heavy) is composed of one 
armoured and three mechanized divisions, an air defence brigade, an artillery brigade, a 
helicopter group (dadui), an engineering regiment, headquarters unit and a logistical 
support unit.  The divisions are in the classic triangular structure with three companies to 
a battalion, three battalions to a regiment and three regiments to a division.  Even the 
armoured and mechanized companies have a structure of three platoons and one 
headquarters vehicle.  This force totals around 70,000 and personnel with around 600 
MBTs, over 300 pieces of artillery of 122 mm calibre and above and more than 1,000 
various armoured vehicles in support.944 
 
In contrast, the proposed new structure which, besides two mechanized and two armoured 
brigades, has a brigade each of aviation, artillery, and air defence and engineers; each 
composed of four battalions, and a battalion for chemical defence, communications, corps 
level air defence and electronic warfare.  The new PLA armoured corps is envisioned to 
have a total of 500 ZTZ-96 or ZTZ-99 MBTs; 586 ZDB-97 tracked infantry fighting 
vehicles (IFVs), 126 155mm PLZ-45 self-propelled guns; 96 120mm turreted self-
propelled mortars; 36 Type 89 30 tube 122mm and 27 300mm 12 tube A-100 multiple 
rocket launchers; 12 DF-15D tactical missiles and 48 attack, 18 multipurpose and 60 
transport helicopters and around 2,000 other types of vehicles.945  Its peacetime 
establishment is 22,180, which rises to approximately 23,000 in wartime.946  The Type 
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99s and ZDB 97s will be the core of the corps C4I with battlefield management systems 
down to the individual vehicle.    
 
General Ogarkov tried to create two similar sized corps OMGs in the Soviet Army in 
Germany against NATO in the 1980s, comprising four brigades with a total of 415 
MBTs, advanced IFVs, and 96 152 mm SP artillery guns supported by heavy MRL and 
tactical ballistic missile brigades.  They were never fully established due to their cost and 
the realisation that it was a target-rich environment for NATO PGMs.  A contemporary 
US Armoured or Mechanized Infantry Division has three manoeuvre brigades instead of 
four, and contains 10 mechanized or armoured battalions and an aviation brigade of 134 
aircraft including 48 attack helicopters.947      
 
The biggest change in the corps structure may be found within the company structure.  
Under the prevailing structure there are three AFVs (tanks or armoured personnel 
carriers) per platoon, then three platoons per company and a headquarters vehicle to make 
10 AFVs per company.  In the new structure there are now four AFVs per platoon and 
two AFVs at the company headquarters to give a total of 14 AFVs.948  Not only is the 
company now larger by four vehicles, it can still operate as a viable manoeuvre element 
with casualties, whereas vehicle platoons have difficulty providing fire and movement 
with two vehicles.  It also gives the platoon headquarters its own vehicle, allowing 
elements such as a forward observer or engineer teams to be attached to the platoon for 
the first time.  This enables the platoon to be the lowest tactical unit whereas before it 
was the company.  An IFV infantry squad would be composed of one NCO leading two 
squads of three men equipped with one squad automatic weapon and two rifles, one 
equipped with an under barrel grenade launcher.  Compared to the normal PLA infantry 
company, there are two fewer soldiers per squad and no separate fire support squad at the 
company level.  At the battalion level three are no supporting anti-aircraft, 
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communications or anti-armour platoons.  The supporting weapons would be in the IFVs 
and in the battalion’s six 120 mm self-propelled mortars.  
 
The new tracked infantry fighting vehicle is heavily influenced by the Russian BMP-3 
and uses a turret based on the Russian BMP-3.  The hull is larger than the BMP-3 and is 
matched to the Russian 120 mm ‘Nona’ turret to provide the new 120 mm self-propelled 
mortar.949  Gun-launched anti-tank guided weapons are already in service on selected 
Type 99 MBTs and will be used on command versions of the new ZDB-97 IFV and Type 
99 MBTs.950  In the new armoured and mechanized infantry companies, which use four 
vehicles in the platoon instead of the current three, it means five vehicles out of 14 will 
be able to use the missiles.  In 2008 their maximum range was restricted to 800 metres at 
night due to the limitations of the vehicle’s night vision equipment.951  
 
China’s western periphery contains the world’s largest mountain ranges and high desert 
plateaus.  The forces in Tibet and Xinjiang require lighter forces as this type of terrain is 
unsuited to large heavy armoured forces.  The PLA has equipped its mountain brigades in 
Tibet and the Sixth Independent Division in Xinjiang, which was the first mechanized 
infantry division to be deployed at this height, with wheeled armoured fighting 
vehicles.952  In Tibet and Xinjiang the People’s Liberation Army has fielded the Chinese 
WZ550 four-wheeled, WZ 551 six-wheeled and WZ 525, eight-wheeled family of 
armoured fighting vehicles.  Similar in concept to the Stryker light armoured vehicle, 
various versions are available from a basic armoured personnel carrier with a small open 
turret mounting a 12.7 mm machine gun to an eight-wheeled version with a 122 mm 
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howitzer in an enclosed turret.953  In Xinjiang and Tibet these vehicles are organised 
along the lines of a cavalry battalion, similar to the US Army’s Stryker combat brigades.   
 
In both areas PLA infantry operate the WZ551A APC with its one-man high elevation 
turret mounting 25 mm automatic cannon.  This turret allows the engaging of targets high 
in the mountains or in buildings and the performance of the 25 mm round against light 
armour gives a measure of security if they were to suddenly face light tanks.  The Nona 
120 mm mortar turret has been fitted to the WZ551 and this version could be available 
for the fire support role.954  Given the US experiences with the development of the 
Stryker 105mm MGS, the 100 mm tank destroyer version of the WZ551 would strain the 
transmission, suspension and power plant and the effect on the hull on firing would be 
tremendous.  The vehicle’s performance will be degraded by the rarefied air and steep 
hill and mountain roads of Tibet and Xinjiang.   
 
Light infantry operate in the jungle and the paddy fields of Guangzhou and Yunnan 
where the terrain restricts the use of armour.  When operating in networked paddy fields 
the PLA plans for armour to move at the optimistic speed of 6-10 km/hr and infantry and 
towed artillery at 2.5-3 km/hr. 955  The PLA has not left the light infantry bereft of tanks, 
having the Type 62 light tank equipped with an 85 mm gun.  Introduced in the early 
1960s they equipped armoured regiments supporting light infantry and were prominent in 
the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War.  The major problems of light infantry, a lack of 
sustainability and firepower, readily became apparent in this conflict with the PLA 
suffering heavy casualties.  The Type 62 was particularly vulnerable to rocket propelled 
grenades and automatic cannon fire from anti-aircraft artillery.  The Type 62 is being 
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replaced in PLA service by the ZTZ-63A amphibious tank and WZ551 six-wheeled light 
armoured fighting vehicle with a 100mm gun.  The PLA has traded armour for mobility 
and firepower, as both vehicles can be readily penetrated frontally by heavy machine gun 
fire.     
 
The PLA is forging ahead in creating the aviation brigade and airmobile formations.  
These, along with its attendant light mechanized infantry and armour, can be used for 
long-range outflanking manoeuvres, to seize strategic targets like airfields and oil fields, 
and to stabilize a situation before it becomes uncontrollable, such as peacemaking.  The 
problem in 2008 was that the proposed aviation brigade contained more attack helicopters 
than the PLA currently had.  Initially, the brigade would be equipped with modified 
versions of the Z-9G helicopters were seen equipped with gun pods, anti-tank and 
lightweight air-to-air missiles.956  This, however, cannot be regarded as a substitute for 
dedicated attack helicopters like the Eurocopter Tiger or AH-64 Apache.  
 
The PLA has the ‘light mechanized infantry experimental group’ in Sichuan, which is 
part of the Chengdu Military Region.957  An airmobile trials unit, in Western 
terminology, the group is developing and testing new joint concepts and equipment 
required for the new corps aviation brigade.  The PLA refers to it as a ‘newborn baby’ of 
integrated training and is an ‘integrated entity of operational elements such as intelligence 
and reconnaissance, navigation and positioning, three-dimensional mobility, fire strikes, 
command and control and battlefield management.  In other words, it is organised as an 
independent task force.  Eighty percent of the unit's equipment is new or modernised and 
is not available to other PLA units.  This unit has quadrupled the firepower of the unit 
from which it was formed, with only 30 percent of the original personnel. New 
equipment includes a high mobility amphibious vehicle with an automated fire control 
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system equipped with cannons and missiles. The unit therefore relies on manoeuvrability, 
surprise and advanced fire control systems to bring its firepower to bear.  
 
The unit is entirely airmobile—all vehicles are able to be slung underneath or stored 
inside the unit’s helicopters.  Unless the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) heavy-lift helicopters 
were transferred to the PLA’s army aviation force, this implies that the unit is a joint 
PLA/PLAAF unit.  It uses a variety of vehicles that would not be out of place at a NATO 
airborne meeting in the early 1980s.  The vehicles shown resemble the British argocat 8 x 
8 light vehicle; German Kraka 640 4 x 2 light airborne weapon carrier and the M274 
Mechanical Mule.958  Their fast attack vehicles are similar to the modified Chenowth 
Racing Products FAVs bought by the US Army for the Nineth Infantry Division in the 
early 1980s.   
 
Its 4 x 4 weapons carrier is the PLA’s answer to the Landrover used by military forces 
worldwide.  It is 4 metres long by 2.09 metres wide and a height of 2.21 metres including 
the roll bar/weapons mount.  Its maximum speed is 110 km/hr.  It has a normal combat 
weight of 1.7 tons, a maximum combat weight of 1.95 tons, and can carry between four 
and seven men depending on the variant.  The standard variant has a JQY88 5.8 mm 
machine gun on the front passenger’s side, which can be replaced by a QLZ87 35 mm 
lightweight machine gun and a QJZ89 12.7 x 108 mm machine gun firing from the roll 
bar mount.   
 
Another variant mounts a Chinese copy of the Russian 82 mm 2B9 Vasilek automatic 
mortar on a low recoil mount.  Fire support in the airborne trials unit is provided by large 
4 x 4 wheeled vehicles mounting various weapons.  Besides a towed modular lightweight 
107 mm multiple rocket launcher, one variant mounts a nine-tube 107 mm multiple 
rocket launcher at the left rear of the chassis.  Another has a copy of the Russian 82 mm 
2B9 on a soft recoil mount known as the Tie Ying 82 mm rapid mortar.  Besides man 
portable surface-to-air missiles, air defence is provided by 4 x 4 vehicles equipped with a 
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1978, pp.239 & 240, 252 & 253, 259 & 260.    
 
 280
twin 23 mm AAA gun with an elevation ranging from -100 to +520 and capable of turning 
360 degrees.  
 
Chinese airborne personnel are being equipped with modern Chinese infantry weapons 
like the Model 92 pistol, Model 95 assault rifle and squad automatic weapon, the QLZ87 
35 mm AGL and the Model 89 120 mm anti-tank rocket launcher.959  Like all light 
airborne mechanized units the vehicles lack armour and weather protection, relying on 
speed, small size and their cross-country ability to survive.   
 
In the late 1990s Russia supplied numerous military paratroop systems to the PLA 
including a batch of 2S23 self-propelled 120 mm mortars and 50 BMD-3 airborne 
infantry fighting vehicles.  As these were sold by the Russian Army, China reported only 
one vehicle purchased to the United Nations Register.960  Russia did not acknowledge the 
sale either. 
 
 
The ZDB05 airborne combat vehicle has a maximum road speed of 68 km/hr, a 
maximum speed in water of 6 km/hr, and a maximum road range of 500km.  It uses a 30 
mm chain gun - not 25 mm as previously reported.  The gun can fire up to 300 rounds per 
minute with a maximum effective range of 4 kilometers and a maximum altitude of 2500 
metres.  There are 125 armour piercing (AP) and 225 high explosive (HE) rounds in the 
turret and a further 80 AP and 120 HE rounds in the hull.  There is a coaxial Model 86 
7.62 mm co-axial machine with 1,000 rounds available and two sets of triple 76 mm 
smoke dischargers either side of the turret that have a maximum effective range of 100 
metres and a maximum range of 120 – 150 metres.  Four infantrymen can be squeezed 
into the rear of the hull, making this the PLA’s BMD-2.  PLA airborne units also use WZ 
551 six-wheeled armoured vehicle equipped with the Russian Nona 120 mm mortar 
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turret.  Artillery support is provided by the Model 86 122 mm towed gun which is a copy 
of the Russian D-30.    
 
The ZDB05 airborne combat vehicle was unveiled during the Sino-Russian Peace 
Mission 2005 joint exercise.  The placing of a missile with its explosive rocket motor and 
warhead to fire occurred in exercises and parades with inert rounds.  The Russians never 
had the ATGMs on their BMP-1 and BMP-2 loaded on their launchers on operations in 
case they were set off by enemy fire.  They did not want approximately one kilogram of 
explosive exploding on the barrel or on top of the turret.961  As for fire support, the 
vehicle is too light to support heavy tubed weapons and would have to settle for ATGMs.  
The Soviets tried to arm their equivalent, the BMD, with a 122 mm howitzer and when 
that failed, the 120 mm ‘Nona’ turret.  Both failed due to the strain on the chassis.962   
 
By the latter years of the first decade of the 21st century, the Beijing and Shenyang 
Military Area Commands’ main force mechanized infantry divisions conducted exercises, 
developing the use of units as ‘building blocks’ to create battle groups.  Further, units 
from these two commands were used to develop the PLA’s new high altitude and urban 
warfare doctrines, the former with units in Xinjiang.963 
 
To ensure that the PLA is able to perform under informationized conditions, it has 
invested in realistic training.  Nevertheless, considerable resources to improve command 
and control (C2) have yet to bear fruit due to problems that have been exposed during 
training. The 2005 joint C2 exercise linked command centres and units from Beijing with 
those in the Guangzhou, Shengyang and Chengdu Military Regions (MRs). The exercise 
was commanded from the Guangzhou MR headquarters ‘to work out the deployment and 
cooperation between the Army, Navy and Air Force when ‘separated by hundreds of 
                                                 
961 . Mal’ginov, Viktor.  ‘BMP-2’, M-Khobbi, 3/2004, Issue 49, p. 23. 
 
962 . Sayenko, Maksim.   ‘“Workhorse” for the Airborne”, M-Khobbi, 9/2004, Issue 55, p. 33. 
 
963 . ‘Zhongguo zengqiang jixiehua bubing shi gonglji nengli’, Tanke zhangjia cheliang, 2006 Niandi,  
11Qi, Zhongdi 249, p. 12. 
 
 282
kilometres’ in the Guangzhou region’.964  ‘To ensure the joint training command is up to 
speed’, other articles noted about this exercise and others:  
 
[V]arious arms and services and various units are linked to each other via 
networks with their equipment capable of effective coordinated operation . . .  
integrating military with locality and field locations with fixed locations . . .  
they set up multiple sets of fibre optic transmission systems and used the 
method of integrated platforms, integrated networks and integrated 
applications to connect the major command systems in the cooperation zone, 
thus ensuring that commanders at all levels are able to transmit and receive 
telegrams, data and images real-time at their levels of command.965  
 
The importance of training the C2 systems in the Guangzhou MR is relected in the MR’s 
status as the headquarters responsible for the South China Sea and for Taiwan.  The C2 
exercise demonstrated that the different commands were not using the same standard 
operating procedures, thereby creating a major problem for C2 in potential scenarios.  In 
response, Hu Jintao and the Central Military Commission have reinforced the need for 
standard operating procedures and have called for all headquarters units to read and adopt 
the new regulations for operation.966  This exercise exposed flaws that previous artificial 
command post exercises did not.  In the past, a simulated enemy’s victory would have 
caused problems for the losing command staff’s promotion prospects.  For instance, the 
Peace Mission 2005 exercise held with the Russians had been so stage managed that the 
exercise lost any relevance for operational training except for the TU-95MS cruise missile 
carriers, and the continued training of airdropping procedures. 
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With the PLA developing its own version of the 1980s Soviet Operational Manoeuvre 
Groups and the US Army’s mechanized and armoured divisions in Desert Storm, training 
in command and control and battle management systems will be intensified.967  The 
structure of the PLA’s new self-propelled gun (SPG) battalion, itself a copy of the US 
Army’s Paladin SPG battalion, is an indication of the PLA’s increasing reliance on 
automated fire control systems linked with signals intelligence and unmanned air 
vehicles.968  This will not only require additional specified training but also the extension 
of the length of military service, an ever increasing reliance on volunteers or an increase in 
personnel wages.  This informationized training is now being emphasized with four 
integrations—Goal Orientated Integration, Integrate Peacetime and Wartime Needs, 
Integrate High and Low Technologies and Integrate Military and Local Resources.969   
Joint training was the priority emphasis for the PLA in 2006 to enable force 
modularisation—the building of battle groups.  New structures for the command and 
control of joint operations have been developed and have come into service.  
 
In the Chengdu MR, the PLA for the past two years has been developing joint operational 
training to develop new methods of fighting under informationized conditions.  Many units 
in the PLA do not have the new organizational structures or equipment to exploit these 
new systems as they are in ‘a mechanized or semi-mechanized state with low informatized 
systems’.970 This statement reveals that the new brigade structures have not yet been fully 
implemented throughout the PLA.  
 
To impart these new concepts to the armoured units, the PLA has centralized all initial and 
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advanced training for armoured and mechanized troops in the joint armoured training base 
in the Beijing military area.  The PLA Daily reported in 2006 that ‘in the past few years, 
this training base has turned out more than 60,000 armoured combatants who are now 
playing an active role in the PLA's three services.’971 The unit's curriculum was completely 
revamped in line with the PLA's new informationized warfare strategy, providing new 
training outcomes for the ‘new-style armoured combatant’. 972 
 
To ensure that its field units continue this training, the PLA has developed and tested a 
computer-based ‘fighting capability evaluation system’.  This enables exercise evaluations 
to be conducted ‘quantitatively’, instead of subjectively, speeding up the training cycle.  
Reports that previously took more than 10 personnel working one week to produce are 
now ready in 40 minutes using just a few staff.973  The reports can now be transmitted to 
commanders in Beijing almost immediately after the exercise ends.  
 
In March 2005, the PLA conducted a Battle Management C4I exercise in the Tianshan 
Mountains and the Talikmakan Desert of Xinjiang to develop and test its doctrine for the 
new corps and brigade structures.974  Involving more than 10,000 personnel and 1,000 
vehicles, the exercise saw an army battle group formed with a headquarters having four 
subordinate combat groups that were not necessarily manoeuvre groups.  The exercise 
concentrated on the joint tactical group, which was responsible for operations.  Joint 
operations involving aircraft an artillery strikes in conjunction with offensive electronic 
warfare were practised.  The armoured forces involved in the exercise operated with armed 
helicopters. All these aircraft movements and artillery missions, including both tube 
artillery and multiple rocket launchers, would have also tested the PLA's ground and air 
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force’s joint doctrine in airspace control.  The exercise validated these concepts and 
demonstrated that the PLA was able to conduct modern offensive operations on its borders 
away from its logistics bases. The capability of the PLA to operate away from its logistic 
bases and having the core of an intervention force based in Xinjiang will not be lost on 
China's neighbours.  
 
During the exercise Special Forces elements were inserted by helicopter and parachute and 
provided targeting data for strategic bombers and tactical ballistic missiles of the Second 
Artillery force.  This means that the DF-15 theatre ballistic missiles in the corps will still 
be under the control of the Second Artillery and not the corps commander.  It can send its 
payload 600 kilometres and this poses a problem for the both the corps and theatre 
commanders.  The command and control of China’s ballistic missile force has come under 
some debate inside the PLA.  In the late 1990s control of the PLA’s short-range ballistic 
missiles was delegated to the group armies.975  With the creation of the corps as the major 
combat group, this has created a command and control problem for the use of TBMs.  The 
600-kilometre range DF-15 would now come under a corps commander instead of the 
control of the military region commander.  This is seen as unlikely as theatre ballistic 
missiles would come back under control of the Second Artillery Force as a recent exercise 
in the Talikmakan Desert showed. 
 
There is certainly a mismatch between the PLZ-45 155mm self-propelled gun with a 
maximum range of 40 kilometres and the 300 mm A-100 multiple rocket launcher with its 
50-kilometre minimum and 100-kilometre maximum range, and the 600 kilometre range 
DF-15.976  The A-100 is the PLA’s new long range MRL.  Based on the Russian SMERCH 
9K58, the rocket is 7.236 metres long, 300 mm in diameter, and weighs 840 kilograms 
with a 235 kilogram warhead.  Its maximum range is reported at 120 kilometres and it uses 
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a Chinese copy of the Russian MAZ-543M 8 x 8-wheeled vehicle.977  The DF-15 with its 
500 kilogram warhead is a theatre asset and permission to fire is unlikely to be given to a 
corps commander except in an area like Xinjiang where a division on operations can be 
spread over 1000 kilometres.  It is, after all, an expensive way to deliver the equivalent of a 
Mk83 high explosive bomb if it misses.  The US Army uses the ATACMS system which 
has a range of between 128 kilometres and 300 kilometres depending on the variant.978  
China has recently developed the B611 Zhenmu tactical missile system, which better fits 
the needs of its new corps.979  With a range of 150 kilometres and equipped with cluster or 
high explosive warheads it enables a corps commander to strike deep without having to 
request longer range weapons from the theatre commander.  The launch vehicle uses a 
North-Benz 8 x 8 Type 2629 chassis and is equipped with twin canister launched missiles, 
which can quickly be replaced after firing.  This would enable the corps commander to 
have command and control of his own deep strike assets that would not be available if a 
new short-range ballistic missile system is not procured.      
 
In high altitude operations, the PLA is moving towards the Russian concept of 
Reconnaissance – Combat Operations (RBD) to defeat the PRC’s, and the SCO’s three 
‘evils’- ‘terrorism’, ‘separatism’ and ‘extremism’. 980   This involves the extensive use of 
signals intelligence, Special Forces and helicopters supported by ready reaction forces and 
artillery to provide blocking forces and prosecute attacks.981   Special Forces 
reconnaissance teams provide intelligence information for larger forces and provide fire 
coordination for long range fire support.  The PLA is already developing these forces as 
part of its drive towards ‘informationization’, especially for its high altitude forces on 
China’s western periphery.   
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PLA army aviation units have Z-9G helicopters equipped with thermal imaging sensors 
and fire control equipment, with artillery units having data link equipment to provide near 
real time fire support.  This follows the Russian experience in Chechnya where Russian 
forces have used attack and other helicopters equipped with imaging infra-red seekers 
and real time data links to identify Chechen insurgent positions.  Further the PLA has 
used their first airmobile regiment with its Z-9G helicopters in Xinjiang to develop high 
altitude tactics and operating procedures.  These can mount cannon pods, and air-to-air 
and anti-tank guided missiles.982    
 
PLA light infantry are now being trained and equipped to operate in their traditional roles 
of screening, flank protection and jungle and high altitude operations over larger areas  
than before, with elite units now becoming the PLA’s choice for conversion into 
airmobile units.  New rations enable the PLA to conduct extended operations without 
having to rely on the civilian population for rationing and light infantry are now able to 
conduct covert operations without compromising themselves by needing to replenish 
rations.  Their lack of supporting weapons, when outside their helicopters and light 
armoured vehicles, means that their need for access to supporting forces is still necessary 
as they can quickly become overwhelmed by conventional forces.  A light armoured 4 x 4 
vehicle has been developed to provide a vehicle capable of being used as a troop and 
weapons carrier, as well as for command and control and logistics roles.983  
 
Being the poor cousin of combat arms, logistics has suffered from inadequate funding 
since the inception of the People’s Liberation Army.  The reorganizing of units into 
brigades means that logistics had to be up dated.  The General Logistics Department 
(GLD) has embarked on the modernization of its combat logistics capability which, when 
completed, will enable sustained operations on China’s periphery and beyond its borders.  
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A recent exercise by the GLD and the joint Sino-Russian exercise in August 2005 
revealed the direction of, and recent improvements to, PLA combat logistics and 
highlighted areas needing improvement.984  These include improved combat uniforms 
and personal protective equipment, the need to develop high-mobility transport and 
modular equipment, and better systemisation of the logistics chain.  Supplying personnel 
with adequate food supplies in the field also received special mention.  
 
To enable sustained operations in the field without the need for re-supply, the PLA has 
introduced the 05 series of pre-packaged field rations.985  Ring pull cans are available 
containing such delicacies as seafood, bird, fruit, green vegetables and meat with rice and 
soup bases available in individual soft foil pouches.  MCF-240 240g ‘military 
compressed food’ (‘iron ration’) blocks are also available in a halal version.  These are 
heated in a flameless heater pouch similar to the one in the US military’s MREs and can 
heat meals up to 600C.986  For the squad there are 10-man boxed rations as well as the 
individual rations mentioned earlier.  As noted above, PLA forces on extended operations 
can now eat well without having to forage off the population. 
 
Until recently, providing personnel with food during military operations has been largely 
dependent on the provincial militia.  This has been a huge problem for units operating on 
China’s periphery, and the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict exposed all the problems that 
occur when relying on the militia for logistics support.  Ad-hoc at best, the logistics chain 
broke down and struggled to supply even modest amounts of food to the front line. 
Simply put, the PLA logistics chain had not been improved since the Korean War.    
Units in mountainous and remote areas have suffered from a lack of fresh food; the 
                                                 
984 . Bao Weidong and Liu Mingxue .  ‘All-army quartermaster equipment inspection yields rich  
fruits’, PLA Daily Online, 25 September 2005 accessed 26 September 2005. 
 
985. ‘Zhandouli zhiyuan wojun junyong shipin zonghentan (xia)’, Bingqi Zhishi, 2006 Niandi, 6 Qi,  
Zhongdi 224 Qi, pp. 53 – 55. 
 
986 . ‘Zhandouli zhiyuan wojun junyong shipin zonghentan (xia)’,  Bingqi Zhishi, 2006 Niandi, 6  
Qi, Zhongdi 224 Qi, pp. 53 – 55. 
 
 289
provision of suitable and standardized meals throughout the country still does not 
occur.987  To improve nutritional levels, the GLD has directed messes that ‘a cup of 
soymilk and an egg be provided for each serviceman at breakfast.’ Company messes were 
also directed to ‘prepare fruit for servicemen two to three times a week if conditions 
permit’.988  Compared with a Chinese soldier in the Korean War, the standard and 
quantity of food has, in fact, decreased and is obviously long overdue for 
improvement.989  In established messes, catering for more than 500 personnel now 
includes electronic ovens, freezers, and special machines to make noodles and 
beancurd.990  Typically, rear echelon units have looked after themselves first, as the 
infantry messes are staffed at the company level and will thus have to wait for these 
improvements. 
 
In the field, new mobile kitchen vehicles have been introduced. One vehicle enables four 
cooks to prepare four different hot meals and a soup for 300 people in less than one 
hour.991  The long-held tradition of squads eating from the same rice bowl was only 
discontinued in 2003 due to the problems of spreading diseases such as SARS, raising 
questions about the PLA’s prior commitment to containing disease and contamination. 
More importantly, new field water purification and environmental heath equipment has 
been introduced.  The PLA’s Red Army Division used in OPFOR training was the first 
unit to use new field water purifying equipment, field showers that utilize solar energy 
for heating and other vehicles to assist in field environmental health measures.992  Once 
                                                 
987 . Guan Daxue and Fan Juwei.  ‘PLA cooks up new menus to beef up soldiers’, PLA Daily on- 
 line, 6 November 2005, http://www.chinamil.com.cn accessed 6 November 2005. 
 
988 . Guan Daxue and Fan Juwei.  ‘Making dishes more nutritious for officers and men’, PLA Daily 
on-line, 3 November 2005, http://www.chinamil.com.cn accessed 4 November 2005. 
 
989 . In December 1952 the daily ration was 900gm of cereal, 670gm of meat, vegetables and oils  
with 180gm of condiments (eg soy sauce, salt, spices), Shrader, C.R.   Communist Logistics in the 
Korean War, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1995, pp.  94 & 95. 
 
990 . Guan Daxue and Fan Juwei, op.cit., 6 November 2005. 
 
991 . Ding Shunguo and Zhao Gonghu.  Military unit develops modern cooking equipment for field  
operation,  PLA Daily Online, 4 January 2005, http://www.chinamil.com.cn accessed 5 January 
2005. 
 
 290
these are available throughout the PLA, it will enable sustained operations without 
having to depend on the local population for rationing or water.  
 
In the area of battlefield engineering, the PLA has introduced an array of vehicles to 
enable and enhance battlefield mobility.   For gap and river crossings the PLA employs 
two types of pontoon bridges: Type 84 bridge-laying tanks, and truck-mounted scissors-
type folding bridges that incorporate built-in pylons.993  For initial crossings there are 
motorised small rigid inflatable boats and an amphibious four-wheel drive vehicle, a near 
duplicate of the United States Second World War amphibious jeep.994  By placing a 
detachable bow and stern equipped with an outboard motor on Type 85 and Type 89 
armoured personnel carriers, PLA engineers can quickly provide light armoured vehicles 
for opposed river crossings.  The replacing of the Type 62 light tank with the ZTS-63A 
will enable reconnaissance units to cross river barriers and paddy fields with more easily.  
 
The GJT211A armoured bulldozer provides for rapid breaching minefields and battlefield 
engineering tasks.995  Equivalent to the M9 Armoured Combat Earthmover it is equipped 
with a large bulldozer blade in the front and a tray over the rear of the hull that houses the 
Type 84A rocket launched mine-clearing explosive hose system.  To ensure all weather 
high-altitude support, the PLA regularly operates in late autumn in Xinjiang in extreme 
weather conditions.  In October 2005 an engineer regiment of the Xinjiang Military Area 
Command conducted a high-altitude cold weather exercise at 4,000 meters in the Kunlun 
Mountains.996  Comprising over 1,000 men with over 100 pieces of engineering 
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equipment, the engineers developed new methods for providing engineer support 
including a rolling device that almost halves the time taken to build a bridge, new 
methods of camouflage suited to the terrain, and tested a new model front-end loader.997  
 
Medical services on the battlefield are being modernized in line with the rest of the PLA. 
Currently there are three stages of medical service prior to the evacuation of injured 
personnel to a major army medical facility.  The medics collect the patient and provide 
immediate first aid and transport them to the battalion aid post where they are stabilized 
before moving on to the field or divisional hospital for early stage treatment of their 
wounds.  With the reorganization of the PLA into a brigade and corps structure, the corps 
will now contain the early stage treatment facility.  The PLA is investing in its battlefield 
health services with armoured tracked ambulances using both the Type 85 and 89 chassis. 
The former is armed with a 12.7 mm machine gun and the latter, fully amphibious, is 
used to transport wounded personnel to and from landing craft or over water crossings.998  
 
The extent of PLA needs was demonstrated in August and September 2005 when soldiers 
deployed to the frontier border areas of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region were 
given individual medical kits procured by the Party Committee of the Wenshan Military 
Sub-Command Political Department.999   Medical kits should have been standardized and 
available by the PLA long before 2004, and the kits procured were no improvement on 
similar kits supplied to PLA soldiers in the 1960s.1000   
 
To cut costs while improving the provision of supplies in the field and in-base areas, the 
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PLA now uses computerized outsourcing and procurement to buy equipment directly 
from the civilian sector, including tools, stationery, and engineering equipment. A 
division stationed in the eastern part of Liaoning Province was recently the assembly 
point for a mock emergency procurement drill staged by the GLD to test the PLA’s new 
computerized procurement system with local suppliers in northeast China.1001 The 
success of the exercise demonstrated that the system was viable and points the way for 
future ‘integrated army-civilian emergency procurement systems’.1002 
 
The GLD has embarked on a major modernization campaign to bring logistics in the PLA 
up to the expected level of a modern military force.  The larger items required for 
logistics support on the modern battlefield were under development in 2007, or were 
coming into service.  Within a short-term timeframe, the PLA will be able to conduct 
sustained independent operations outside China’s borders—an activity it has never been 
able to undertake before, finally acknowledging that logistics is the force multiplier.  On 
mobilization issues, the PLA, like the late Soviet army, keeps the majority of its most 
modern equipment in store for use in a potential war; earlier versions and only small 
amounts of the more recent equipment are utilized in training.  Although this ensures new 
equipment during times of mobilization, it also leads to problems of personnel 
unfamiliarity with the modernized equipment and breakdowns due to poor maintenance. 
Furthermore, the mass mobilization of modernized military equipment alerts an opponent 
to one’s intentions.  The PLA is aware of these problems and in the last three months of 
2005, the State National Defense Mobilization Committee issued a series of proposals to 
incorporate the four integrations in wartime manpower mobilization and to improve upon 
rapid manpower mobilization systems.1003  
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Experimenting with Modularity 
 
The influences of pei shu (‘attaching troops to a subordinate unit’) and zhi shi (to 
support), were evident in the PLA’s new mechanized infantry division unveiled in 2006, 
claimed to be two generations ahead of its predecessor.1004  The division is organised and 
equipped to fight in the form of independent battle groups on mountainous and urban 
terrain, with equipment being lighter in weight and firepower than those of the PLA’s 
divisions tasked to defend the nation against aggressors with modern main battle tanks.  
Its theatres of operation are Xinjiang and Tibet where the division’s lighter vehicles and 
support weapons can operate in areas where the communications infrastructure can be 
described as poor at best.    Nine of Asia’s main river systems including the Mekong and 
Brahmaputra originate from the Tibetan Plateau.  The Chinese are damming these and 
hope to be able to divert some of these waters to areas of China currently too dry for 
agriculture.1005  The governments of India, Bangladesh, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and 
Cambodia are concerned and this situation could lead to conflict.1006  The new 
mechanized infantry division is ideally suited to intervene in the event of attacks on the 
Tibetan Plateau if other countries try and destroy the dams to increase their water flow.  
The cavalry brigade/battle group created for the Peace Mission 2007 exercise mentioned 
earlier, besides being the first major test of the pei shu concept, showed how an easily 
created composite brigade of light armour and helicopters could be used on the Tibetan 
Plateau along with the helicopter born light mechanized infantry experimental group.  
 
The division takes some of its structure from the US Army’s Division 86 but generally 
follows the standard PLA triangular organisation.  It comprises three mechanized infantry 
brigades, one tank brigade, one artillery brigade, one air defence brigade, one helicopter 
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wing and a logistics unit directly subordinate to the corps.  The division headquarters 
comprises an engineer battalion, an electronic warfare battalion, a chemical defence 
battalion, the division headquarters itself (company sized), air defence troop and a guard 
company for HQ protection.  In line with the reorganisation of the PLA company 
structure there are now four Type 86 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) in the platoon 
instead of three.  There are three mechanized infantry companies to the battalion and 
three battalions to the brigade with three brigades in the division giving a total of 351 
Type 86 IFVs.  These are supported by an artillery brigade of 72 122 mm self-propelled 
guns and a tank battalion of 99 main battle tanks.  Type 89 armoured command vehicles 
are liberally provided throughout the division down to the company level to provide 
command and control.  Intelligence and electronic warfare assets are held at the 
divisional level in a battalion similar to the US Army’s late Combined Electronic Warfare 
and Intelligence battalion.   
 
The Type 86 infantry fighting vehicle, which is a copy of the Russian BMP-1, has been 
modified by replacing its existing 73 mm low velocity gun turret with the new Chinese 
one-man ‘universal turret’ containing a 30 mm chain gun which has impressive 
performance against light armour and can disable many main battle tanks.1007  This turret 
increases the vehicle’s anti-armour capability by 2.5 times and significantly increases its 
survivability with the removal of over 35 kg of easily ignited high explosive.1008 
Previously when the BMP-1 was penetrated it blew apart at the weld seams.1009  The new 
30 mm turret has greater depression and elevation to enable individual windows and 
mountain sides to be engaged but is still vulnerable to small arms firing from dominating 
heights let alone anti-armour rocket launchers.  Unfortunately the Type 86 is still easily 
penetrated on the sides by full power 7.62 mm ball rounds.1010  Care will also need to be 
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taken with its engine as it is a version of the Russian UTD-20, which suffered from 
power loss and over heating in the thin mountain air of the Chechen hills.1011    
 
Similarly, the Russians found that main battle tanks like the T-72 performed poorly in the 
thin air of the Chechen mountains, its automatic transmission and turbo charged diesel 
engine being unsuited to the mountainous roads and thin air, whereas the T-62 with its 
less stressed engine and five–speed manual gearbox performed much better but still had 
trouble on high mountain ranges.1012  The Chinese Type 96B and Type 99 use a similar 
drive train to the T-72, so would suffer the same problem and this is one reason why the 
PLA still operates the obsolete Type 59 MBT in Xinjiang.1013    Another is that insurgents 
can be handled with the Type 59 leaving the expensive MBTs like the Type 96B and 
Type 99 for the armoured brigades.   
 
The other combat tracked vehicles in the division, other than the tanks, are based on the 
indigenous Type 85/89 armoured fighting vehicles.  The support company of the 
battalion comprises one 100 mm mortar company of 10 vehicles with one mortar per 
vehicle and a fire control vehicle, an automatic grenade launcher (AGL) platoon in two 
vehicles with two AGLs each; one anti-tank platoon in two vehicles sharing three anti-
tank guided missile systems, normally the Red Arrow.  There are a total of 18 Model 85 
series armoured vehicles in each brigade, providing 54 anti-tank guided missile systems 
in the division.  There is an air defence platoon of three vehicles with four missiles per 
vehicle for a total of 12.  A division has 27 air defence vehicles and has 108 ‘Red Tassel’ 
6 MANPADS available for air defence at any time.  They come under operational control 
of the air defence brigade.      
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In line with the lighter vehicles, the divisional air defence brigade comprises one 
battalion of 24 towed 57 mm anti-aircraft guns and one battalion of 18 towed twin 37 mm 
anti-aircraft guns.  An air defence platoon of six Model 95 self-propelled anti-aircraft 
guns and one of light surface-to-air missiles are attached to the artillery brigade.  New to 
a Chinese division is a helicopter wing which has one squadron of six Z-9G attack 
helicopters and one transport squadron of six Mi-17 helicopters.  This is on light scales 
and would be expected to be augmented on operations.  Logistics is provided by corps 
assets attached to the battle groups as required.   
 
The vehicles in the new mechanized division are lighter and operate lighter weapons to 
reduce their logistic footprint.  Tactical mobility is improved as more roads and bridges 
can be used when compared to heavier and larger mechanized divisions.  Lighter weights 
mean refuelling and ammunition resupply is easier.  On the few good roads in Xinjiang 
and Tibet outside of the cities, the ability to operate for extended periods is a greater 
advantage.  In the event of a widespread insurgency or an attack by Indian forces, the 
appearance of tracked IFVs armed with 30 mm automatic cannon and heavier support 
weapons would greatly assist the prevailing force of wheeled armoured fighting vehicles 
operating in Tibet.   
 
If heavier forces are required to augment the new division these have been developed as 
well.  Identified supporting units would be drawn from the Beijing Military Area 
Command including the Sixth Armoured Division.  The Sixth Armoured Division tank 
company structure is the same as in the tank brigade in the mechanized infantry division.  
There are two tanks at the battalion headquarters whereas in the mechanized infantry 
battalion tank brigade there are none.  This gives 35 Model 88B or Type 99 main battle 
tanks per battalion and therefore 105 main battle tanks per brigade.  Supporting artillery 
brigades are equipped with 72 152 mm Model 83 self-propelled guns or the PLZ45 155 
mm self-propelled gun being introduced into PLA service.  The latter allows the use of 
the Chinese built version of the Russian KBP laser guided round.  The air defence 
brigade has a battalion of 24 57 mm towed anti-aircraft guns and one of six ‘Red Tassel 
7’ surface-to-air missiles.  The 16th Anti-Tank Regiment is more a small battalion in size 
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containing six 120 mm self-propelled 120 mm hua tang (PTZ 89) guns and 18 Red 
Arrow 8 anti-tank guided missile tank destroyers.  These would be light enough to go 
with the mechanized division in isolated areas. 
 
The Sino-Russian Peace Mission 2007 exercise held in Russia in August 2007 illustrates 
the PLA’s move towards modular forces.  The PLA created a cavalry brigade in what was 
the first major operational evaluation of the pei shu concept.  This composite brigade of 
light armour and helicopters was created from existing forces and was able to conduct 
light infantry operations, including counter-terrorism, reconnaissance and screening 
operations across a wide area. 
 
The PLA deployed: 
 
a. a wheeled mechanized infantry battalion comprising 40 Type 92 wheeled infantry 
fighting vehicles, each mounting an enclosed turret mounted 25 mm automatic cannon, 
and 15 Type 92 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles, each mounting an open turret 
mounted 12.7 mm machine gun; 
 
b. two companies of 18 PL02 assault guns, each mounting an enclosed turret with a 
100 mm cannon and co-axial 7.62mm machine gun; 
 
c. one battalion of 16 Z-9W attack helicopters;  
 
d. one battalion of 16 Mi-17 transport helicopters; and 
 
e. a company of 12 ZBD05 airborne vehicles mounting a 30 mm automatic cannon.  
 
The 55 Type 92 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles and 18 Type 02 assault guns use the 
WZ551 six-wheeled armoured chassis.1014   
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The force was a composite cavalry brigade combining both ground and heliborne assets.  
This force integrated both mechanized and airmobile infantry, fire support from the 100 
mm assault guns and the attack helicopters, reconnaissance from the helicopters and 
some of the six wheeled IFVs, and logistics from the Mi-17 and 12.7 mm armed Type 92 
vehicles. 
 
The deployed Type 92s could transport a mechanized infantry battalion of three 
companies with the support provided by two companies of the assault guns which is an 
unusually large amount of huoli (firepower) for a mechanized infantry battalion.  The 
Type 92A’s would have provided the vehicles for the battalion headquarters and 
company support weapons.  Infantry support weapons deployed include the QBZ87 
35mm automatic grenade launcher, PF98 anti-tank rocket launcher and Type 74 backpack 
flamethrowers.  The Mi-17s could lift two infantry companies with their support elements 
providing the brigade commander with six company level manoeuvre elements.  The Z-
9W attack helicopters provided aerial reconnaissance, fire support and liaison.  
 
A cavalry brigade like this force could act as the corps reconnaissance and screening 
force, provide flank protection and act as an assault force to seize high value targets as 
part of the PLA’s new heavy corps.   
 
In the tracked units, the medium reconnaissance vehicle will be the Type 03 amphibious 
reconnaissance vehicle, which is replacing the Type 62 light tank and the Type 63 
amphibious tank in PLA service.  It will operate ahead of the main forces; and provide a 
flanking screen up to four km on the flanks.  It is too bulky and large for scouting and 
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close-in reconnaissance which could be performed by the ZBD05 airborne vehicle which 
besides having a 30mm automatic gun can carry a scout section.  This role may have 
been trialled with aviation and other armoured vehicles by the composite 
reconnaissance/cavalry brigade in the Peace Mission 2007 joint exercise.  The Type 02 
100mm assault gun would have provided medium reconnaissance and explains the large 
number of assault guns compared to the number of armoured personnel carriers and 
infantry fighting vehicles.      
 
The opportunity costs to equip the heavy corps will be immense and two reduced-size 
corps could be ready by 2010 by stripping and diverting new equipment away from 
current PLA divisions.  The PLA has certainly moved towards a more modern military 
force and the new mechanized infantry division shows this new direction.  No more tied 
to an infantry force, the operational art of the PLA has moved from primarily a defensive 
infantry force to offensive all arms forces operating on large scale operations deep in an 
enemy’s rear.  The new mechanized division is designed for operations in Xinjiang and 
Tibet as the footprint of the vehicles is much lighter as well as the logistics requirements, 
than heavier armoured units.    The mechanized division would be able quickly to enter 
into Kazakhstan in the event of interruptions to China’s oil supplies in the event of a coup 
or a change of Government sympathetic to the Uyghurs there.  The mechanized division, 
however, lacks helicopters – a situation which will be remedied as the PLA receives 
newer equipment.  The PLA is certainly on its way to the armour heavy corps it has 
envisaged.  
 
The PLA armoured units in Xinjiang have already increased the readiness of armoured 
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vehicles and received the PLA's newest equipment, as have forces in Sichuan.1015  The 
upgrading of the Type 86 IFV with the new universal turret with a 30 mm automatic gun 
enables a leap in firepower and survivability for little cost enabling funds to be expended 
for the heavier items.  It is unlikely that the two would not be fully equipped with armour 
before 2012, as the US Army experience with its Divison-86 heavy unit shows.  
Nevertheless, the PLA is committed to the new structure and the battle group concept as 
envisaged under Pei Shu. 1016 
 
The 112th Mechanised Infantry Division, part of the 38th Army Group, uses the Type 99 
main battle tank and the Type 86 infantry fighting vehicle.     The 3rd and 116th 
Armoured Divisions, part of the 39th Army Group are to be equipped with 198 Type 99 
main battle tanks each, meaning at present they will stay with the three tank platoon 
structure and two regiments.   The 54th Regiment, part of the 127th Mechanised Infantry 
Division uses the Type 96 main battle tank as do the independent 20th Tank Regiment 
and 58th Tank Brigade.  The 113th Mechanised Infantry Division of the 38th Army 
Group is equipped with both Type 92 and 92A wheeled infantry fighting vehicles.   
 
These units will be the key to China securing its energy resources in Central Asia with 
the two armour heavy corps employing their battle groups, being the instrument to do so.  
They will become China's new strategic weapon. 
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Cnclusion 
 
The thesis contributes to the field original research demonstrating that the PLA was, in 
many respects, ahead of contemporary Western forces in the 1930s and 1940s with its 
theories of operational art and small unit organisation.  The United States did not 
officially recognise the operational level of war until the early 1970s.  It is only now that 
the PLA can envision the types of fast moving operational level armoured thrusts that 
Tukhachevsky taught PLA commanders in the 1920s and 1930s.  It was done to some 
extent in the Chinese Civil War but the peculiarities of the fighting, the mass defection of 
entire units being but one example, did not reveal the full extent of the PLA’s grasp of the 
operational level of warfare.   
 
The thesis has argued that the People’s Liberation Army’s operational art  was forged in 
the period 1928-1937 and was based on the Soviet Union’s operational theory which has 
continued to this day.  The two key questions were answered: Where did Mao obtain his 
ideas for his theory on People’s War, and where did the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red 
Army, the predecessor to People’s Liberation Army, learn to wage war?    
 
Whitson’s view1017 that People’s War never existed but was a means of controlling and 
marshalling the population was expanded upon.   Whitson believed, like Jencks, that Liu 
Bocheng the senior Red Army and later PLA marshal was  influenced by his training in 
Moscow - in the ‘integral strategy’ model that was in vogue in Moscow in the late 1920s 
– and which emphasised a professional military, free of commissars’ influence in 
technical plans and operations.  In the integral strategy model, military commanders 
expected the Party to mobilise the masses, not a role for the PLA.1018   This is different to 
what the earlier model, to which the early PLA political officers and leaders were 
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exposed and taught at the Whampoa Academy.  The thesis concurs with Whitson’s 
argument that Mao never advanced his strategic thinking beyond his own concept of 
Frunze’s ‘unified strategy’.1019  The PLA itself opted for professionalism over the mass 
line, resisting the political slogan expressed as ‘better red than expert’ - even in the early 
1960s, when it was at its height, as this thesis shows.   
 
The background starts with the Qing government’s first attempt at a modern army with 
the 1894 ‘Newly Created Army’ and its trials and tribulations.  The failure of the various 
Chinese armies in the Boxer Rebellion is followed by the Qing government’s attempts to 
create a modern army which was curtailed by the 1911 Republican Revolution.  One 
theme noted throughout this period and up to the Communist takeover in 1949 was 
‘regionalism’ or ‘warlordism’, where the local military commander took control over an 
area, and often the armies were loyal to the commander and not to the central 
government.  The Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, later renamed People’s Liberation 
Army, used this to create mass defections, and this became part of their operational art.  
The background then examined the power struggles inside the Republican government 
and finished with Sun Yat-sen’s creation of the Whampoa Academy to create the 
National Revolutionary Army. 
 
Chapter One, titled The Idea of a Red Army: The Arming of the Chinese Communist Party 
1919-1927, focused on the early days of urban agitation in China and the early days of 
the Chinese Communist Party.  The Soviet Union’s influence was shown clearly with the 
creation of the Whampoa Academy and the National Revolutionary Army along with the 
need for the Chinese Communist Party to join as a group inside the Guomindang, 
creating the first United Front.  No operational art was seen at this stage, although it was 
taught at the Whampoa Academy, except for the need to follow railways due to the 
almost non-existent road network in China and the use of bribes to have the local 
warlord’s army join the National Revolutionary Army and keep his power lest he lose the 
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lot.  The operational art was the earlier ‘unified model’ based on the Soviet’s experiences 
in the Civil War.  The Chinese students who were taught later in the Soviet Union at Sun 
Yat-sen University and Frunze Military Academy were taught the latter.  The latter model 
was for a mobile professional army whereas the other was better suited for a large militia-
based force – more applicable to People’s War and the early years at Yan’an - especially 
in 1941 and 1942 in the aftermath of the Japanese sankō offensives in response to the 
One Hundred Regiments Campaign. 
 
The need for a communist army was mooted after previously sympathetic warlords killed 
communist leaders organising railway labour unions.  The Whampoa Academy gave the 
communist leaders valuable training which saw them export their ideology to Singapore 
and the creation of workers’ pickets to enforce the blockade of Hong Kong.  This success 
in organising labour led to the early attempts of the CCP in organising an urban based 
revolution.  The weakness of the Communists inside the Guomindang had been revealed 
in 1926 when Chiang Kai-shek purged many but the success of the workers’ pickets in 
taking over Shanghai prior to the arrival of the NRA in March and April 1927 saw him 
take action.  On 12 April 1927 the Guomindang started the purging and destruction of the 
Chinese Communist Party, leading to the deaths of thousands in what became known as 
the ‘White Terror’.  This led to the Nanchang Uprising and the creation of the Workers’ 
and Peasants’ Red Army on 1 August 1927.   
 
Chapter Two started with the statement that ‘the period 1927 – 1934 is the defining 
period of the People’s Liberation Army’s operational art’.  It then went onto describe 
what was meant by the term ‘operational art’ as was taught at the Whampoa Academy 
and later to Chinese students in the Soviet Union which was a more refined version.  The 
Soviet theories of the operational level of war were, and still are, the cornerstone of the 
People’s Liberation Army’s doctrine, and been proven to be the PLA’s ‘art of war’.   
 
The failure of the nascent Red Army to create a series of urban based revolutions, ending 
with the ill-fated December 1927 Canton Commune showed no thought for an 
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operational art.  This effectively ended the idea of an urban based revolution for the 
moment, as Mao also tried a rural based revolution in Hunan.  He moved to the 
mountains of Jinggangshan and started putting together his thoughts of what became his 
and the People’s Liberation Army’s operational art. 
 
Li Lisan took over the struggling Chinese Communist Party in 1928 and instituted what 
became known as the Li Lisan line.  An aggressive urban insurgency and the taking over 
of cities was an abject failure which saw Mao’s methods become ascendant due to the 
success of the Jinggangshan.  Mao moved his base area away to Southern Jiangxi as the 
Jinggangshan was too small to successfully defend in the face of Guomindang attacks.  
Here Mao created the Jiangxi Soviet which from 1930 to 1934, withstood four major 
attacks and created a viable communist base area.  The Red Army expanded, and had 
instilled into it Mao’s four major points which became the basis for his operational art, 
the ‘Eight Conditions for Victory’ which espoused his operational and strategic doctrines 
of ‘Luring the Enemy in Deep’ and ‘Protracted War’. 
 
Mao lost his power base when the Returned Student Faction took over the Chinese 
Communist Party and the Jiangxi Soviet after their departure from Shanghai, in which it 
had become too difficult to operate.  Regardless, nothing could stop the Guomindang’s 
Fifth Encirclement Campaign which employed overwhelming firepower and siege 
warfare techniques which negated the Red Army’s ability to manoeuvre and exploited its 
lack of heavy weapons.  The Guomindang now employed a way to defeat Mao’s 
operational art and the ever tightening circle saw the bulk of the Red Army and Chinese 
Communist Party cadres leave on the famous Long March. 
 
Chapter Three examined the period from the Long March to the War of Liberation which 
saw the Chinese Communist Party take power in China.  The PLA’s operational art was 
tested against both Japanese and Guomindang forces, and its use of political action in 
conjunction with military force was proven against both.   
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After the Red Army ended the Long March in Yan’an, Mao set about establishing the 
Red University and rewriting his principles to enable the Red Army to learn and employ 
them.  Cadres were sent out into the countryside to create a mass movement. 
 
Chiang Kai-shek was forced to let the Red Army join with the Guomindang to form the 
Second United Front in December 1936 to fight the Japanese.  It rarely worked in 
practice and ended in January 1941 after the Wannan Incident which saw the destruction 
of the headquarters of the New Fourth Army.  The major assault by the Red Army, 
against the Japanese in North China, the August 1940 One Hundred Regiments 
Campaign, went against all of Mao’s operational principles – especially as it had no 
identified operational goal.  The Japanese retaliation from September 1940 was so severe 
that by the end of 1942 the Red Army had shrunk by 100,000 and vast areas came back 
under Japanese control.   
 
Mao’s operational art, encompassing both the political cadres and the Red Army working 
together to mobilise the masses, allowed the Chinese Communist Party to regain much of 
the territory back by mid-1943 and expanded its base by the end of 1945.  This was aided 
by Japanese forces deploying to the Pacific due to the tide of the war turning against 
them.  The Zheng Feng rectification movement aided this by instilling Party discipline 
and ensuring the correct Party line so that all members of the CCP worked in one 
direction under Mao’s direction and in accordance with his operational principles.  The 
Red Army was renamed the People’s Liberation Army to identify its mission for the 
forthcoming war with the Guomindang for the control of China.  If the operational art is 
‘the art of winning wars’ then the Red Army’s mastery of the operational art and 
operational level of warfare spelt doom for the Guomindang. 
 
Unique to the PLA’s operational art was Communist Principle Number Nine – the use of 
ex-enemy soldiers to boost the number of front line soldiers was widely employed as 
 306
were deception measures which were part of the PLA’s operational art.  There were 
rumblings even then between the differing styles of guerrilla and conventional units,  
between the Soviet ‘integral’ and ‘unified’ models of the operational art, which was to 
divide the PLA in the late 1950s.  The first major campaigns were in Manchuria where 
the PLA was able to dictate the battle, putting the Guomindang on the defensive, and was 
able to get inside their decision-making cycle and exploit the distrust between 
Guomindang commanders.  The ability to get whole Guomindang units to cross over and 
then incorporate them within the Red Army exacerbated this, as did the ineptness of 
many Guomindang commanders.  By controlling the countryside, and its ability to move 
rapidly by foot and at night - enabling attacks from unexpected directions in pincer 
movements - the PLA eventually outmanoeuvred the Guomindang forces who had 
retreated into the cities; isolating themselves and leaving the countryside to the PLA.   
Each city in Manchuria and north China was eventually taken so that by January 1949, 
500,000 of Chiang Kai-shek’s soldiers were defeated and north China, including Beijing 
and Tianjin, along with Manchuria was under control of the CCP. 
 
The end for the Guomindang came quickly.  The PLA crossed the Yangtze in April 1949 
creating two large armies that crushed the Guomindang as rapidly as they could move.  
One city after another fell in quick succession so by 1 October 1949, in Shanghai, Mao 
declared the People’s Republic of China.  The nascent Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army 
of August 1927, now renamed the People’s Liberation Army, had conquered China under 
the guidance of Mao Zedong and his contemporaries. 
 
Chapter Four from 1950 to 1979 showed how the PLA went from a force that contained 
the United Nations in Korea, aided the Viet Minh to defeat the French, went through a 
massive professionalism with Soviet assistance, retreated into ‘guerrillaism’ under the 
guise of People’s War, kept the peace in China during the Cultural Revolution, assisted 
the North Vietnamese to defeat South Vietnam and its allies, especially the United States, 
and then was militarily humiliated by the Vietnamese in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war, 
precipitating the overhaul and modernisation of the PLA which is still underway. 
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One of the aims of this thesis was to enrich and deepen Whitson’s work with the 
advantage of documents unavailable to him in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  My 
research shows that the doctrine of Active Defence was the overriding concern of the 
PLA since 1930 and not People’s War.  Active Defence is based on three basic 
principles: no provocation of other nations; no bases anywhere on foreign soil; and no 
seizure of territory.1020   The wars investigated by Chapter Four - the Chinese 
intervention against United Nations Forces in the Korean War, and the Sino-Vietnamese 
conflict - are justified using this strategy.  Whitson was aware of this when he argued that 
the 1962 Sino-Indian War showed the continuity in the Chinese professional preference 
for the offensive defensive, the Chinese government’s way of justifying pre-emptive 
strikes, in which the initial spoiling attack is staged against the weaker adversary (India) 
on the eve of an assumed coordinated attack against China (in this case the USSR).1021  
This was also one of the rationales behind the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict; offensive 
defence representing the lynch pin of Active Defence.       
                                                
  
The introduction noted that the PLA says that its doctrine in the 1950s was to ‘Protect the 
North (from the Soviet Union) and Defend the South (Against the United 
States/Taiwan)’.  In the 1960s this changed to ‘Lure the Enemy Deep into the Country’ in 
order to crush him with ‘People’s War’.  In the 1970s, this became ‘Prepare to Fight 
Early and Fight Big’. By using examples of the PLA in battle I show how the doctrine 
changed in light of failures in battle.  For example, the 1969 Zhen Bao Dao/Damanskyi 
island conflict and the PLA’s incursion into Kazakhstan almost precipitated a nuclear 
conflict between the Soviet Union and China.  The casualties, and defeats, the PLA 
received forced the Chinese military and political planners to see how ‘Lure the Enemy 
Deep’, failed in light of the Soviet Union’s nuclear and conventional weapons systems 
superiority.  The debacle of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war showed how the PLA had 
 
1020 . Sewell, op.cit, p. 2. 
 
1021 . Whitson., op. cit., p. 489. 
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forgotten how to fight a war and its ability to fight a war at the operational level had 
reached its nadir.  Deng Xiaoping’s reorganisation of the PLA which started in 1980 to 
rectify these faults and turn the People’s Liberation Army into a modern military bore 
fruit and the results are seen today with the modern PLA. 
 
Chapter Five, which is a smaller chapter than the others and different in structure,  
inspects how the PLA transformed itself from an essentially bloated infantry force to a 
mechanized one, starting to be both hardened and networked - in Chinese terms 
‘informationized’.  The transformation was not easy but the operational doctrine, as 
espoused by many of the PLA’s marshals and generals prior to the Cultural Revolution, 
could now be accomplished.  By the start of the 21st Century extended mobile operations 
on China’s periphery could be accomplished.  The need for a comprehensive training area 
and the ability to perform counterinsurgency operations enabled the PLA to test many of 
these ideas in Xinjiang against what the Chinese government declare is an Al Qaeda 
sponsored Uyghur separatist movement.  Modernisation to both the equipment and 
structure of the PLA at the lower levels enabled the PLA to face the future which was 
shown in Chapter Six and how the operational art was now accomplished with the force 
restructuring into units able to operate at the operational level.   
 
Chapter Six started with the new structures being incorporated in to PLA to create a 
hardened and networked army using a modular (pei shu) approach to build battle groups 
appropriate to the mission and terrain.  The PLA is creating at least two corps designed to 
break through another country’s defences, and then exploit this breakthrough.   The first 
unit for this new corps is the new mechanized infantry division designed to operate in 
urban and high altitude terrains.  It is designed to be able to create independent battle 
groups and other PLA units have been identified to support it depending on the mission 
profile.  The PLA created a composite cavalry brigade in the August 2007 Sino-Russian 
Peace Mission 2007 exercise, which was the first major test of the pei shu concept.  The 
composite brigade of light armour and helicopters was created from existing forces and 
was able to conduct light infantry operations, including counter-terrorism, reconnaissance 
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and screening operations across a wide area.  The chapter explored the zhi chi concept to 
create a battlefield logistics organisation able to supply and support forces deep inside an 
enemy’s rear.  Simple matters like high altitude and cold weather rations are looked at 
along the new integrated weapons systems designed to propel the PLA into the forefront 
of military forces in Asia.   
 
The PLA has reached a stage of its history where it can fully implement its operational art 
that took root in the theories espoused by Tukhachevsky, Svechin and others, taught to 
Red Army commanders at the Frunze Academy in the 1920s and 1930s, and tried to be 
implemented in the 1950s and 1960s only to be thwarted by the Cultural Revolution.  The 
People’s Liberation Army’s operational art has come of age.  Tuo Mao – removing the 
last vestiges of Mao Zedong’s vision for China’s armed forces – has occurred at the 
operational level without fanfare but with incremental effect.    
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SUMMARY  
 
Tuo Mao translates literally as ‘shedding feathers’ but in the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) it is the euphemism for removing the last vestiges of Mao Zedong’s vision for 
China’s armed forces.  Mao envisaged letting an enemy strike deep into China and then 
be destroyed by a vast militia force using ‘People’s War’.  This vision, to which the PLA 
only paid lip service, has been replaced by a modern combined arms force, utilising 
modular independent battle groups able to fight on and outside China’s land borders, 
hence the term ‘Shedding Mao’. It is therefore the contention and central argument of this 
thesis that by studying the operational history of the People’s Liberation Army, it may be 
argued that its operational art was forged in the period 1928-1937, was based on the 
Soviet Union’s doctrine of operational theory, and that this continues unto the present.  
The significance of the thesis is that it revises and updates conventional thinking among 
external analysts about China’s guiding defence philosophy. 
 
Research in this thesis shows that the doctrine of Active Defence was the overriding 
concern of the PLA since 1930 and not People’s War.  Active Defence is based on three 
basic principles: no provocation of other nations; no bases anywhere on foreign soil; and 
no seizure of territory.   The PLA’s articulated doctrine in the 1950s was to ‘Protect the 
North and Defend the South’.  In the 1960s this changed to ‘Lure the Enemy Deep into 
the Country’ in order to crush him with ‘People’s War’.  In the 1970s, this became 
‘Prepare to Fight Early and Fight Big’.  By using examples of the PLA in battle this 
thesis shows how the doctrine changed in light of failures in battle.  The post-Mao 
reorganisation of the PLA to rectify these faults and turn it into a modern military bore 
fruit and the results are seen today in an armed force that is becoming hardened and 
networked.  The PLA has reached a stage of its history where it can fully implement its 
operational art that took root in the theories espoused in the 1920s and 1930s through the 
Soviet model, and tried to be implemented in the 1950s and 1960s only to be thwarted by 
the Cultural Revolution.  The People’s Liberation Army’s operational art, this thesis 
demonstrates, has come of age.     
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APPENDICES 
Appendix One 
Arsenal Administration Office: Firearms in Services in China, December 1934 
(The names in quotes are not certain, except ‘3 10s’, which was named to celebrate 
10/10/1921 – 10/10/10 in the Republic calendar, developed by T.E. Liu) 
 
I. Pistols  
   
Country 
Origin. Factory Model  Cal Type Name Note 
China Hangyang  M96 7.63  Pistol  Hangyang M96 7.63 Pistol   
China Gongxian M96 7.63  Pistol  Gongxian M96 7.63 Pistol   
Spain    M96 7.63  Pistol Astra M96 7.63 Pistol   
Spain    M96 7.63  Pistol Astra 20-shot M96 7.63 Pistol   
Germany   M96  7.63  Pistol German 20-shot M96 7.63 Pistol   
Germany   M96  7.63  Pistol German 10-shot M96 7.63 Pistol   
Japan   T26  9  Pistol  Japanese T26 9mm Pistol   
Belgium    Browning 9  Pistol Belgium Browning 9mm Pistol   
Belgium    Browning 7.65  Pistol Belgium Browning 7.65 Pistol   
    M96  9  Pistol  M96 ‘Lotus Shell’ 9mm Pistol   
    M96  8.8  Pistol M96 8.8mm Pistol   
Belgium    Royal  8 in  Pistol Belgium Royal 8 in BrowningPistol   
    Diamond 8 in   Pistol Belgium Diamond 8 in BrowningPistol   
      6.35  Pistol 6.35 4 in BrowningPistol   
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      .38  Pistol .38 Revolver Pistol   
      .32  Pistol .32 Revolver Pistol   
  
II. Rifles/Carbines  
   
Country 
Ori. Factory Model  Cal  Type Name Note 
China Hangyang T88 7.9  Rifle Hangyang7.9mm Rifle Clip 
China Gongxian Type Year One 7.9  Rifle Gongxian 7.9mm Rifle 
Charger  
Clip 
China Shanghai     6.8  Rifle Shanghai 6.8mm Rifle   
China Guandong Type Year One 6.8  Rifle Guandong 6.8mm Rifle   
China Guandong Type Year One 7.9  Rifle Guandong 7.9mm Rifle 
Charger  
Clip 
China Fengtien    7.9  Rifle Fengtien 7.9mm Rifle Charger  Clip 
China Sichuan  Type Year One 7.9  Rifle Sichuan 7.9mm Rifle 
Charger  
Clip 
China Shanghai   7.9  Rifle Shanghai 7.9mm Rifle Clip 
China Taiyuan    7.9  Rifle Taiyuan 7.9mm Rifle   
Germany    M88  7.9  Rifle German M88 7.9mm Rifle   
Germany    M98  7.9  Rifle German M98 7.9mm Rifle   
Germany    M24  7.9  Rifle German M24 7.9mm Rifle   
Germany     Mauser   10  Rifle German 9-shot 10mm Mauser Rifle   
Germany    Mauser  11  Rifle German 9-shot ‘Klaus’ Mauser 11mm Rifle   
Germany     Mauser   11  Rifle German 9-shot Mauser   
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11mm Rifle 
Germany     Mauser   11  Rifle German single-shot Mauser 11mm Rifle   
US     Mauser   11  Rifle Lee 5-shot 11mm Rifle   
US     Mauser   11  Rifle Lee Single-shot 11mm Rifle   
Britain     11  Rifle British Martini 11mm Rifle   
Britain     11  Rifle British Belgium Peabody 11mm Rifle   
Britain     .6  Rifle British ‘Taiberi’ .6 Rifle   
Britain     .45  Rifle British Snider .45 Rifle   
France        Rifle French ‘Farderly’ Rifle   
France        Rifle French Hotchikiss .35 Rifle   
France         Carbine French ‘Farderly’ Carbine    
Belgium     7.7  Rifle Belgium 7.7mm Rifle   
US     11  Rifle US Hotchikiss 11mm Rifle   
US     11  Rifle US Winchester 11mm Rifle   
US   Winchester .35  Rifle US Wincheste .35 Rifle   
US     7  Rifle US 7mm Rifle   
US     .45  Rifle US ‘Messli’ Rifle   
Japan   T30  6.5  Rifle Japanese T30 6.5mm Rifle   
Japan   T38  6.5  Rifle Japanese T38 6.5mm Rifle   
Japan   Murata  8  Rifle Japanese Murata 8mm Rifle   
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Japan   Murata 8  Carbine  Japanese Murata 8mm Carbine    
Japan   T38  6.5  Carbine  Japanese T38 6.5mm Carbine    
Japan   T30  6.5  Carbine  Japanese T30 6.5mm Carbine    
Belgium   M24  7.9  Rifle Belgium M24 7.9mm Rifle   
Belgium      7.7  Carbine  Belgium 7.7nn Carbine    
Austria     6.8  Rifle Austrian 6.8mm Rifle   
Austria    Mannlicher 8  Rifle Austrian Mannlicher 8mm Rifle   
Austria    Mannlicher 8  Carbine  Austrian Mannlicher 8mm Carbine    
Austria    ‘Scott’  7.7  Rifle Austrian ‘Scott’ 7.7mm Rifle   
Austria    ‘Heodero’ 8  Rifle Austrian ‘Heodero’ Rim-fire 8mm Rifle  Rim-fire 
Britain   Remington .35  Rifle British Remington Center-fire .35 Rifle 11.5mm 
Britain     .45  Rifle British Remington Center-fire .45 Rifle  14.0mm 
Russia     7.62  Rifle Russian 7.62mm Rifle   
Russia    Mauser  10  Rifle Russian 11mm Mauser 10mm 
Italy     6.6  Rifle Italian 6.6mm Rifle   
Philippine     6.8  Rifle Philippine 6.8mm Rifle   
   
III. Machineguns  
 
Country Factory  Model Cal. Type Name Note 
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Ori. 
China Jinling  Maxim  7.9  Water-cooled  Jinling Maxim 7.9mm Water-cooled    
China Jinling  Automatic Rifle 8    Jinling 8mm Automatic Rifle   
China Hangyang  ‘3 10s’ 7.9  Water-cooled  Hangyang ‘3 10s’ 7.9mm Water-cooled   Browning
China Hangyang    7.63 Submachinegun Hangyang 7.63mm submachinegun  Russian 
China Gongxian Dual- Wheel  7.62 Water-cooled  
Gongxian Dual- Wheel 
7.62mm Water-cooled    
China Huayang  ‘3 10s’ 7.9  Water-cooled  Huayang ‘3 10s’ 7.9mm Water-cooled    
China Taku  Maxim  7.9  Water-cooled  Taku Maxim 7.9mm Water-cooled    
China Taku  Czech 7.9  Submachinegun Taku Czech 7.9mm Submachinegun   
China Sichuan    6.8  Water-cooled  Sichuan 6.8mm Water-cooled   
China Guandong     8  Single Guandong Single 8mm machinegun   
China Taiyuan  Thompson  11  Submachinegun
Taiyuan 11mm 
submachinegun   
China Huayang    7.63 Submachinegun Huayang 7.63 submachinegun   
China Gongxian   7.63 Submachinegun Gongxian 7.63mm submachinegun   
China Shanghai   ‘3 10s’ 7.9  Water-cooled  Shanghai ‘3 10s’ 7.9mm Water-cooled    
China Shanghai     7.63 Submachinegun Shanghai 7.63mm submachinegun   
China Fujiang  Maxim  7.9  Water-cooled  Fujiang Maxim 7.9mm Water-cooled    
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China Hunan  Maxim  7.9  Water-cooled  Hunan Maxim 7.9mm Water-cooled    
China Shendong  Maxim  7.9  Water-cooled  Shendong Maxim 7.9mm Water-cooled    
France    Hotchikiss   13.2 
anti-aircraft 
machinegun 
French 13mm dual anti-
aircraft machinegun 
Anti-
aircraft & 
personel 
France   Hotchikiss  7.9  
Drum 
Machinegun 
French Hotchikiss 7.9mm 
machinegun   
Swiss   Solotharn 7.9  
Drum 
Machinegun 
Swiss Solotharn 7.9mm 
machinegun   
Britain   Vickers 7.9  Drum Machinegun 
British Vickers 7.9mm 
machinegun   
Czech    Czech  7.9  Drum Machinegun Czech 7.9mm machinegun   
Belgium   Browning 7.9  Machinegun 
Belgium Browning 7.9mm 
machinegun   
Germany   Maxim  7.9  Water-cooled  German Maxim 7.9mm Water-cooled    
Germany   Maxim  7.9  Water-cooled  German ‘4 Points’ Maxim 7.9mm Water-cooled    
Germany   Bergman 7.9  machinegun 
German Bergman 7.9mm 
machinegun   
Germany   Maxim 7.9  machinegun  German Maxim 7.9mm machinegun 
Anti-
aircraft 
tripod 
Germany   Hotchikiss  8  machinegun  
German Hotchikiss 8mm 
machinegun   
Germany   Kiraly 7.9  machinegun  German Kiraly 7.9mm machinegun 
Automatic 
Rifle, KE7
Italy     6.6  machinegun  Italian 6.6mm machinegun   
Japan   T38 6.5  machinegun  Japanese T38 6.5mm   
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machinegun 
Japan     6.5  machinegun  Japanese 6.5mm machinegun   
 
 
IV. Submachineguns  
   
Country 
Ori. Factory Model Cal.  Type Name Note 
China Huayang   7.63  submachinegun Huayang 7.63mm submachinegun    
China Gongxian   7.63  submachinegun Gongxian 7.63mm submachinegun    
China Hangyang   7.63  submachinegun Hangyang 7.63mm submachinegun    
China Shanghai     7.63  submachinegun Shanghai 7.63mm submachinegun    
Germany   M96 7.63  submachinegun German M96 7.63mm submachinegun    
Germany   Bergman 7.65  submachinegun German Bergman 7.65mm submachinegun    
US      11  submachinegun US 11mm submachinegun    
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Appendix Two 
Tactical and Technical Characteristics of Primary Models of Small Arms of the 
Chinese People’s Volunteers  
 
 
 
Nomenclature 
Calibre 
in mm 
Weight 
in kg 
Muzzle 
Velocity 
in mps 
Maximum 
range in 
meters 
Practical 
rate of 
fire in 
rpm 
Number 
of rounds 
in 
magazine 
(belt) 
 
 
Remarks 
Type 26 
Revolver 
(1893) 
9 1.019 - - - 6 Japanese 
Type 1895 
Revolver  
7.62 0.794 280 700 7 in 15-
20 
seconds 
7  
TT Model 
1930/33 
Pistol 
7.62 0.854 440 Up to 
1,000 
8 in 10-
15 
seconds 
8  
Nambu Pistol 8 0.977 290 500 - 8 Japanese 
Type 14 
Pistol (1925) 
8 0.907 290 500 - 8 Japanese 
Type 94 
Pistol (1934) 
8 0.765 275 500 - 6 Japanese 
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Submachine 
gun 
8 - - - - - Japanese 
PPSh-41 
Model 1941 
Submachine 
Gun 
 
7.62 
 
3.65 
 
500 
 
1.200 
 
100-140 
 
35/71 
First 
number is 
box 
magazine, 
second is 
drum 
PPS-43 
Model 1943 
Submachine 
Gun 
 
7.62 
 
3.04 
 
500 
 
1,200 
 
100-120 
 
35 
 
Model 
1891/30 Rifle 
7.62 4.3 865  3,000 10-12 5  
Arisaka 
Model 37 
Rifle 
6.5 4.4 
with 
bayonet
730 2,400 10-12 5 Japanese 
Carbine 
Model 1938 
7.62 3.55 820 3,000 10-12 5  
Carbine 
Model 1944 
7.62 3.9 820 3,000 10-12 5  
Arisaka Type 
44 Carbine 
6.5 3.73 670 2.000 10-12 5 Japanese 
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Type 91 
(1931) and 
Type 97 
(1937) 
Sniper’s Rifle  
 
6.5 4.5 less 
bayonet
740 2,400 10-12 5 Japanese 
Type 99 Rifle 
(1939) 
7.7 4 less 
bayonet
700 2,750 10-12 5 Japanese 
Type 99 Long 
Rifle (1939) 
7.7 4.09 
less 
bayonet
778 3,500 10-12 5 Japanese 
Type 2 New 
Rifle 
7.7 - - - - - Japanese 
Degtyarev 
DP  
Light 
Machine Gun 
7.62 10.5 840 3,000 80 47  
Degtyarev 
DPM  
Light 
Machine Gun 
7.62 10.85 840 3,000 80 47  
Type 11 
(1922) 
6.5 10.2 740 4,000 150 30 Japanese 
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 Light 
Machine Gun 
Type 96 
(1936) 
Light 
Machine Gun 
6.5 9.07 735 4,000 150 30 Japanese 
Type 99 
(1939) 
Light 
Machine Gun 
7.7 9.07 760 3,475 250 30 Japanese 
Type 92 
(1932) 
Medium 
Machine Gun 
7.7 55.3 740 4,200 200 30 Japanese 
Maxim 
Model 1910 
Medium 
Machine Gun 
7.62 63.6 800 3,000 250-300 250  
SG-43 
(Model 1943) 
Medium 
Machine Gun 
7.62 44.5 800 3,000 250-300 250  
DShK Model 12.7 169.4 835-865 7,000 80 50  
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1938 
Heavy 
Machine Gun 
DShK Model 
1938/46 
Heavy 
Machine Gun 
12.7 167.0 835-865 7,000 80-100 50  
Type 93 
(1933) 
Heavy 
Machine Gun 
13.2 39.5 670-700 4,000 - 30 Japanese 
 
Note – Beside these weapons, the CPV also had a large number of American weapons as 
well.  
* - Accurate aimed range 
Source: Appendix 20 in Volkovskiy & Petrova, op. cit., p. 858. 
 
 
 
 324
Appendix Three 
Tactical and Technical Characteristics of Primary Models of Artillery Armaments 
of the CPV at the Regimental Level 
 
 
 
Nomenclature 
Firing 
range in 
kilometres 
Muzzle 
velocity 
in mps 
Weight 
of 
projectile 
Weight 
of 
system 
in firing 
position 
Practical 
rate of 
fire – 
rounds 
per 
minute 
Remarks 
50mm Type 98 
Mortar (1938) 
- - 4.5 21.7 - Japanese 
60mm Mortar 1.8 57.4-
158.0 
1.34-1.83 20.5 18 American 
70mm Type 11 
Mortar 
1.55 - 2.14 60 - Japanese 
81mm Mortar 3.0 214 3.12 61.6 18 American 
81mm Type 97 
Mortar (1937) 
2.83 - - 65.7 - Japanese 
81mm Type 99 
Mortar (1939) 
3.0 - 6.5 23.5 - Japanese 
82mm Mortar 3.3 67-202 3.31 44.5 Up to 25  
90mm Type 94 3.8 - 4.2 154 - Japanese 
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Mortar (1934) 
106.7mm 
Mortar 
4.02 61-255 11.1-11.7 151 5 American 
107mm Mortar 6.3 302 9.0 170 16  
120mm Mortar 5.7 272 15.9 280 12-15  
120mm Type 2 
(1942) 
Heavy Mortar 
- - - - - Japanese 
150mm Type 
33 (1933) 
Heavy Mortar 
2.12 - 25.4 99.8 - Japanese 
37mm Type 94 
AT Gun (1934) 
4.57 800 1.225 324 10-20 Japanese 
45mm AT Gun 4.4 870-
1070 
1.4 600 30  
45mm Type 1 
AT Gun (1941) 
- 820 2.8 750 - Japanese 
57mm 
Recoilless 
Rifle 
3.97 366 1.22 20 
without 
tripod 
10 American 
57mm AT Gun 8.4 990-
1270 
1.79-3.14 1150 15-25  
70mm Type 92 2.8 197 2.8 212 10 Japanese 
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Howitzer 
(1932) 
 
75mm Type 41 
Mountain Gun 
(1908) 
7.1 380 5.6 544 10 Japanese 
75mm Type 94 
Gun (1934) 
8.0 396 5.6 544 10-12 Japanese 
76mm Model 
1943 
Regimental 
Gun 
4.3 262 6.23 600 12  
Sources: 
1. A Brief Handbook on Organization, Armaments, and Operational-Tactical 
Norms of the US Army. 2nd Directorate of the General Staff, Moscow, 1953 
2. Handbook on the Armed Forces of Japan, GRU, Moscow, Voyenizdat 1945 
 
Source: Appendix 21 in Volkovskiy & Petrova, op. cit., pp. 859 & 860. 
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Appendix Four 
Comparative Table of Changes in the Number of Personnel and Equipment in 
Divisions of the Opposing Sides During the Course of the Korean War 
 
Korean Peoples’ Army Chinese People’s 
Volunteers 
Republic of Korea 
Army 
US 
Army 
Personnel/Equipment 
Pre-
war 
By the 
end of 
1st 
Stage 
During
3rd 
Stage 
By the 
3rd 
Stage 
During 
4th 
Stage 
Pre-
war 
 
During
2nd 
Stage 
During 
4th 
Stage 
Pre-
war – 
During 
war 
Personnel 12,196 9,698 10.082 11,321 14,963 11,3
50 
11,975 14,578 18,804 
Rifles and Carbines 8,017 6,547  3,993 8,176 9,50
0 
9,746 12,014 14,629 
Automatic rifles - -  - - - 246 - 412 
Submachine guns 1,950 1,932  732 3,145 252 285 1,543 638 
Light machine guns 338 345  201 470 54 81 139 160 
Medium machine guns 204 202  54 162 72 84 - 40 
Heavy machine guns 18 
(AA) 
36 
(AA) 
 - 32 (AA) - 119 167 354 
Grenade launchers - -  - - - - - 2,148 
AT rifles 135 129  - - - - - - 
2.36 inch bazooka - -  -* -* 111 - - 81 
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3.5 inch Super Bazooka - -  -* -* - - 258 465 
60mm mortars - -  84 - 108 84 84 84 
81/82mm mortars 89 87  27 87 54 54 36 40 
4.2 inch/107mm 
mortars 
- -  - 18 - 36 12 36 
120mm mortars - -  12 12 - - - - 
12.7mm AA mount - -  - - - - - 32 
37mm AA gun - 12  - 12 - - - - 
40mm AA mount - -   - - - - - 32 
45mm AT gun 48 52  - - - - - - 
57mm recoilless rifle - -  - - - 18 54 81 
57mm AT gun - -  - 30 18 - - - 
75mm recoilless rifle - -  - 18 - - 18 39 
75mm gun - -  12 - - - - - 
76mm gun 36 36  - 12 - - - - 
70mm howitzer - -  12 - - - - - 
105mm howitzer - -   - - 30 18 54 54 
122mm howitzer 12 12  - 12 - - - - 
155mm howitzer - -  - - - - 18 18 
Tanks - -  - 24 - - - 149 
SP Mounts 16 16  - 16 - - -  
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* Total bazookas used by the Chinese Peoples Volunteers as of 1 July 1951 – 763; as of 1 
June 1953 was 4,525 
Source: Appendix Four in Volkovskiy & Petrova, op. cit., pp. 828 & 829. 
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Appendix Five 
Chinese Built Infantry Weapons 1949-1979 
 
Chinese Nomenclature Original Design    Country of  
      Origin 
 
Sub-Machine Guns 
 
Type 50   7.62 x 25 mm PPSh-41   USSR 
 
Type 53  
Chāochaōngfēngqiāng 7.62 x 25 mm PPS-43    USSR 
(copy sub-machine gun)   
 
Type 64    Silenced 7.62 x 25 mm   China 
 
Rifles     
 
Type 53 carbine  Mosin-Nagant carbine Model 1944  USSR 
 
Type 56 carbine  7.62 x 39 mm SKS    USSR 
 
Type 56 assault rifle  7.62 x 39 mm Modified AKM (receiver) USSR 
 
Type 68 assault rifle  7.62 x 39 mm     China 
 
Machine Guns 
 
Type 53 machine gun  7.62 x 54 mm DPM machine gun  USSR 
 
Type 54    12.7 mm Model 38/46 heavy machine gun USSR 
 
Type 56   7.62 x 43mm RPD light machine gun USSR 
 
Type 57   7.62 x 54 mm SGM machine gun  USSR 
 
Type 58   7.62 x 54 mm RP-46 company machine gun USSR 
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Type 67   7.62 x 54 mm company machine gun  China 
 
Mortars 
 
Type 31   60 mm M-2     USA 
 
Type 53   82 mm M1937    USSR 
 
 
Type 53   120 mm M1943    USSR 
 
Type 55   Update of M19431022    USSR 
 
Type 63   Update of Model 31    USA  
 
    
Anti-Armour Weapons 
 
 
Type 36   57 mm M18A1 recoilless rifle  USA   
 
Type 51   3.5 inch M20 rocket launcher   USA 
 
Type 52   75 mm M20 recoilless rifle   USA 
 
Type 56   RPG-2 anti-tank rocket launcher  USSR  
 
Type 65   82 mm B-10 recoilless gun   USSR 
 
Type 69   RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launcher  USSR  
 
 
Source: Visits to the Infantry Museum at Singleton Army Base and various issues of 
Bingqi Zhishi and Qing Bingqi. 
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